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Harpers  Stereotype  Edition. 


C  ^  S  A  R. 


TRANS LATSD  BT 


WILLIAM  DUNCAN, 

niOrESSOR  of  philosophy  in  the  university  of  ABERDEEN 


3) 

IN  TWO  VOLUMESL 

VOL.  n. 


NEW-YORK: 

Harper  &  Brothers,  82  Clipf-st. 

1844. 


BOSTON  COLLEGE  LIBRARY 
CHESTNUT  HILL,  MASS. 


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CONTENTS 


OP 

THE  SECOND  VOLUME. 


Arguments 

Page 

•  ••••••  3 

Book  I.  . 

11. 

III. 

CIVIL  WAR. 

9  •  •  •  •  •  •  03 

••••••••  93 

Alexandrian  War  ......  167 

African  War  .......  215 

Spanish  War  . . 273 


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ARGUMENTS. 


CIVIL  WAR. 


BOOK  1. 

1.  Different  opinions  in  the  senate  in  relation  to  Caesar’s  letter — 3. 
The  origin  and  causes  of  the  opposition  formed  against  him — 4.  The 
senate’s  severe  decree,  and  flight  of  Caesar’s  friends— 5.  War  against 
Caesar  resolved  on— 6.  Caesar  harangues  his  troops — 7.  Pompey 
sends  proposals  of  peace — 8.  Caesar’s  answer — 9.  Pompey  sends  pro¬ 
posals  a  second  time— 10.  Which  not  pleasing  C-eesar,  he  prepares 
for  war — 11.  Caesar  makes  himself  master  of  Iguviiim  and  Auximum 
—12.  Which  so  alarms  his  enemies  at  Rome,  that  they  hastily  quit 
the  city,  and  retire  to  Capua— 13.  Caesar,  by  his  expedition,  obliges 
many  of  the  towns  in  Italy  to  submit— 23.  Pompey,  after  the  reduc¬ 
tion  of  Corflnium  by  Caesar,  withdraws  with  his  troops  to  Brundu- 
sium— 24.  Caesar  besieges  him  there— 26.  He  escapes  by  sea,  after 
which  the  town  surrenders— 28.  Caesar  cannot  pursue  him  for  want 
of  a  fleet— 29.  Valerius  and  Curio,  partisans  of  Caesar,  drive  Cotta 
from  Sardinia  and  Cato  from  Sicily ;  Varus  compels  Tubero  to  desist 
from  his  design  on  Africa— 30.  Caesar’s  speech  to  the  senate— 31. 
Which  producing  no  effect,  he  sets  out  for  Transalpine  Gaul— 32.  The 
people  of  Marseilles  shut  their  gates  against  Cssar— 34.  Who  com¬ 
mands  Brutus  and  Trebonius  to  besiege  the  place— 35.  Fabius  sent 
before  into  Spain— 39.  Caesar  follows,  and  comes  up  with  Afranius 
and  Petreius  at  Lerida— 41.  A  skirmish,  with  almost  equal  advantage 
on  both  sides— 46.  A  sudden  storm  having  broke  down  his  bridges 
Caesar  is  shut  up  between  two  rivers— 48.  And  reduced  to  great 
straits  for  want  of  provisions— 51.  He  extricates  himself  at  length, 
and  surprises  the  enemy’s  foragers— 52.  Brutus  defeats  the  people 
of  Marseilles  in  a  sea-fight— 53.  Caesar  obtains  the  superiority  near 
Lerida— 54.  Many  states  declare  for  him— 55.  Afranius  and  Petreius 
remove  towards  Celtiberia— 56.  Caesar  pursues  them  with  his  cavalry 
—57.  Then  drawing  out  the  legions,  continues  to  urge  them  in  their 
retreat— 64.  He  cuts  off  their  provisions— 66.  Afranius  and  Petreius’s 
men  talk  with  Caesar’s  about  a  surrender— 67.  Petreius  interrupts 
the  conference— 68.  And  obliges  the  soldiers  to  take  an  oath  of  fidelity 
to  their  generals — 70.  Who,  finding  both  their  provisions  and  forage 
intercepted,  resolve  to  return  to  Lerida— 71.  Caesar  follows,  and 


VI 


ARGUMENTS 


greatly  molests  them  in  their  march — 73.  At  length,  water,  forage, 
,and  every  thing  failing  them,  they  are  forced  to  sue  for  peace,  and 
accept  of  C83sar’s  terms. 


BOOK  II. 

1.  Trebontos  continues  the  siege  of  Marseilles — 3.  Nasidlus  arrives 
with  a  fleet  to  the  relief  of  the  town — 4.  The  inhabitants  repair  their 
fleet,  and  join  it  to  that  of  Nasidius — 5.  A  sea-fight  between  Brutus 
and  the  people  of  Marseilles — 6.  In  which  the  latter  are  defeated — 
8.  Trebonius  raises  a  prodigious  tower  against  the  town — 9.  Like¬ 
wise  a  musculus  of  uncommon  size — 10.  By  which  a  tower  belonging 
to  the  enemy  is  overthrown — 11.  On  this  the  besieged  demand  a  truce 
— 13.  Which  they  afterward  break,  and,  in  a  sudden  sally,  burn 
Trebonius’s  works — 14.  Trebonius,  with  wonderful  expedition,  raises 
a  new  and  amazing  terrace— 15.  On  which  the  besieged  again  treat 
of  a  surrender — 16.  Meanwhile  M.  Varro,  in  Farther  Spain,  prepares 
to  oppose  Caesar — 17.  Caesar  summons  a  general  assem-bly  of  the 
states  at  Corduba — 18.  Varro,  deserted  by  his  troops,  goes  over  to 
C®sar — 19.  Caesar,  having  reduced  Spain,  arrives  before  Marseilles 
— 20.  The  Marseillians  surrender;  L.  Domitius  escapes  by  sea — 21. 
About  the  same  time,  C.  Curio  sets  out  for  Africa— 22.  Where,  at 
first,  he  wars  successfully  against  Varus — 34.  But  afterward.  Varus 
having  received  supplies  from  King  Juba,  he  rashly  vent-ures  a  battle, 
where,  after  some  advantages  in  the  beginning,  by  means  of  his 
cavalry,  he  is  at  last  cut  off  with  his  whole  army 

BOOK  III. 

1,  CffiSAR  reverses  some  judgments  given  on  persons  for  bribery  at  elec¬ 
tions — 2.  He  sets  out  for  Brundusium — 3.  Pompey’s  mighty  prepa¬ 
rations  for  war — 4.  Csesar  embarks,  and  arrives  at  the  promontory 
of  Ceraunium — 6.  His  fleet,  returning  from  Brundusium,  is  inter¬ 
cepted  by  the  enemy — 7.  M.  Octavius,  one  of  Pompey’s  adherents, 
laying  siege  to  Salona,  is  obliged,  by  a  sudden  sally  of  the  inhabitants, 
to  abandon  his  lines— 8.  Caesar’s  embassy  to  Pompey,  with  proposals 
of  peace— 9.  Caesar  makes  himself  master  of  Oricum — 10.  Also  of 
Apollonia,  and  the  whole  country  round  about — 11.  Caesar  and  Pom¬ 
pey  encamp  over-against  each  other,  on  the  banks  of  the  river  Apsus 
— 12.  Caesar’s  transports,  sailing  from  Brundusium,  put  back  imme¬ 
diately  for  fear  of  the  enemy — 13.  Pompey’s  fleet  reduced  to  great 
straits— 14.  Conferences  set  on  foot  about  a  peace,  which  come  to 
nothing — 15.  Bibulus,  admiral  of  Pompey’s  fleet,  dies— 16.  Pompey’s 
answer  to  Caesar’s  proposals  of  peace — 17.  The  conferences  about  a 
peace  renewed,  but  without  effect — 18.  A  commotion  in  Rome— 21. 
Libo,  one  of  Pompey’s  followers,  blocks  up  the  port  of  Brundusium 
with  a  fleet— 22.  But  by  the  valour  and  conduct  of  Antony,  is  forced 
to  quit  his  project— 23.  Antony  and  Kalenus  transport  Caesar’s  troops 
to  Greece,  with  wonderful  good  success— 27.  Pompey,  to  avoid  being 
shut  up  between  two  armies,  retires  to  Asparagium— 28.  Scipio,  a 
partisan  of  Pompey,  behaves  very  tyrannically  in  Asia— 29.  The 
motions  of  Caesar’s  lieutenants  in  Thessaly,  jEtolia,  and  Macedonia 
—34.  Young  Pompey  burns  Caesar’s  fleet  in  the  port  of  Oricum — 


ARGUMENTS 


Vll 


35.  Caesar  cuts  off  Pompey’s  communication  with  Dyrrhachinm^ 

36.  And  besieges  him  in  his  camp— 39.  Many  attempts  and  dispo¬ 
sitions  on  both  sides,  with  various  turns  of  fortune — 40.  Cmsar’s 
troops,  distressed  for  want  of  corn,  make  bread  of  a  certain  root — 
43.  Pompey  repulsed  in  a  sally— 47.  Kalenus,  one  of  Caesar’s  lieu¬ 
tenants,  possesses  himself  of  several  towns  in  Achaia — 48.  Caesar 
offers  Pompey  battle — 49.  Another  embassy,  with  proposals  of  peace, 
which  are  rejected — 50.  Pompey,  distressed  for  want  of  forage,  re¬ 
solves  to  break  through  Caesar’s  lines— 51.  Roscillus  and  .®gus,  dis¬ 
gusted  at  some  checktheyhad  received  from  Cajsar,  revolt  to  Pompey — 
52.  Pompey  breaks  through  Caesar’s  lines,  after  making  great  slaughter 
of  his  troops — 61.  Caesar  desists  from  the  design  of  enclosing  Pom¬ 
pey,  and  makes  a  speech  to  his  men — 62.  Caesar  retires  to  Aspara- 
gium,  and  is  followed  by  Pompey — 65.  Thence  to  Apollonia — 67.  And 
then  to  Gomphi,  a  town  of  Thessaly,  which,  refusing  to  open  its 
gates,  is  taken  by  assault  the  first  day — 68.  Metropolis  submits,  and 
their  example  is  followed  by  other  Thessalian  states — 69.  Pompey 
arrives  in  Thessaly,  elated  with  his  success,  and  confident  of  victory 
— 70.  Caesar  resolves  to  give  battle ;  his  resolution  with  respect  to 
his  cavalry — 72.  Pompey  likewise  resolves  to  give  battle,  and  boasts 
of  an  assured  victory — 73.  The  disposition  of  Pompey’s  army — 74. 
The  disposition  of  Caesar’s — 75.  Caesar’s  speech  to  his  soldiers — 
76.  The  battle  of  Pharsalia,  in  which  Caesar  obtains  a  complete  vic¬ 
tory — 77.  Caesar  makes  himselfmaster  of  Pompey’s  camp — 78.  Where 
he  finds  great  riches — 79.  Pompey’s  flight — 80.  Caesar  pursues  Pom¬ 
pey’s  troops,  and  obliges  them  to  surrender— 81.  The  number  of  men 
killed  on  each  side — 82.  Meanwhile,  Laelius,  a  follower  of  Pompey, 
blocks  up  Brundusium  with  a  fleet — 83.  And  Cassius  burns  some 
ships  in  Sicily  belonging  to  Caesar — 84.  Caesar  pursues  Pompey — 
85.  Pompey,  flying  to  Pelusium,  is  murdered  there  by  some  of  King 
Ptolemy’s  court — 86.  Some  prodigies  that  happened  on  the  day  of 
Caesar’s  victory — 87.  Caesar,  pursuing  Pompey  to  Alexandria,  hears 
there  the  news  of  his  death— 88.  And  is  unexpectedly  entangled  in  a 
new  war. 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 

l.  C®sAR  prepares  for  war — 2.  As  likewise  the  Alexandrians — 3.  Ar- 
sinoe,  Ptolemj'’s  daughter,  possesses  herself  of  the  supreme  authority 
— 4.  Scheme  of  the  Alexandrians  to  deprive  the  Romans  of  water — 
5.  Caesar’s  speech  to  his  soldiers ;  they  fall  to  digging  of  wells,  and 
thereby  find  water— 6.  Caesar,  having  brought  his  transports  to  Alex¬ 
andria,  has  the  advantage  in  several  naval  encounters — 13.  And  after¬ 
ward  makes  himself  master  of  some  forts  that  commanded  the  port 
— 14.  But,  attempting  some  others,  is  repulsed,  and  narrowly  escapes 
by  swimming — 15.  Which  loss  serves  only  the  more  to  animate  his 
soldiers— 16.  Caesar,  at  the  request  of  the  Alexandrians,  sends  them 
their  king,  Ptolemy,  who  immediately  becomes  his  enemy — 17.  Cae¬ 
sar’s  fleet  has  the  disadvantage  in  an  engagement — 18.  Mithridates, 
Caesar’s  friend,  having  made  himself  master  of  Pelusium,  advances 


ARGUMENTS 


•  •• 

vm 

towards  Alexandria  at  the  head  of  a  great  body  of  troops— 19.  The 
king’s  forces,  endeavouring  to  oppose  him,  are  repulsed  with  loss — 
20.  Caesar  marching  to  the  assistance  of  Mithridates,  and  Ptolemy, 
at  the  same  time,  to  reinforce  his  troops,  they  come  to  a  battle,  with 
all  their  forces,  in  which  the  king  is  entirely  defeated — 22.  Caesar 
storms  the  enemy’s  camp ;  and  the  king  himself,  endeavouring  to 
make  his  escape,  is  drowned — 23.  Caesar,  admitting  the  Alexandrians 
to  a  surrender,  restores  tranquillity  to  Egypt— 24.  And  settles  the 
kingdom  on  Cleopatra  and  her  brother — 25.  Meantime  Domitius  Cal- 
vinus,  one  of  Caesar’s  generals,  loses  a  battle  against  Pharnaces,  in 
Armenia  the  Lesser — 32.  At  the  same  time  Gabinius  receives  a  con¬ 
siderable  check  in  Illyricum,  which  had  been  gallantly  defended  by 
Q.  Cornificius— 34.  But  this  loss  is  afterward  repaired  by  the  bravery 
of  Vatinius,  who  recovers  Illyricum  to  the  obedience  of  Caesar — 
38.  About  the  same  time  commotions  arise  in  Spain,  occasioned  by 
the  extortions  of  Cassius  Longinus — 42.  Cassius  is  wounded  by  the 
conspirators — 43.  After  which  he  behaves  still  more  tyrannically — 
44.  Whence  new  disturbances  arise— 50.  Which  are  appeased  at 
last  by  the  arrival  of  Lepidus  and  the  death  of  Cassius — 52.  Caesar 
restores  his  affairs  in  Syria — 53.  As  likewise  in  Cilicia  and  Cappa¬ 
docia — 54.  And  in  Gallograecia — 55.  He  afterward  treats  of  peace 
with  Pharnaces  in  Pontus — 56.  And  finding  him  not  faithful  to  his 
engagements,  resolves  to  make  war  on  him — 59.  Pharnaces,  rashly 
hazarding  a  battle,  is  totally  routed,  and  his  army  cut  to  pieces — 
62.  Pontus  being  thus  speedily  recovered,  and  tranquillity  restored 
to  all  the  Asiatic  provinces,  Caesar  returns  to  Italy. 


AFRICAN  WAR. 

1.  C.SSAR  sets  out  for  Africa — 3.  And  lands  at  Adrumetum— 4.  He 
treats  with  Considius  about  the  surrender  of  that  town  ;  but  in  vain 
— 5.  Thence  he  removes  his  camp  to  Ruspina— 6.  And  again  to 
Leptis,  which  he  immediately  takes  possession  of— 7.  Here  he  draw's 
together  his  auxiliary  troops — 8.  And  afterward  returns  to  Ruspina 
to  provide  himself  with  corn — 9.  Whence  preparing  to  sail  in  quest 
of  his  transports,  they  unexpectedly  appear  before  the  port — 11 
Skirmishes  between  Caesar  and  Labienus,  near  Ruspina — 17.  Petreius 
and  Piso  advance  to  support  Labienus,  but  they  are  nevertheless  all 
repulsed — 18.  The  number  of  Labienus’s  troops,  and  his  presumption 
— 19.  Scipio  joins  Labienus;  Caesar  fortifies  his  camp — 21.  Young 
Pompey,  by  Cato’s  advice,  prepares  for  war,  but  without  success — 
22.  Caesar  suffers  greatly  for  want  of  corn— 23.  King  .Tuba,  march¬ 
ing  to  the  assistance  of  Scipio,  is  forced  to  return  to  defend  his  own 
kingdom  against  Bogud— 24.  Caesar,  resolving  to  fight  the  enemy, 
draws  troops  together  from  all  parts— 25.  The  manner  of  training 
Scipio’s  elephants — 26.  One  of  Caesar’s  ships  taken  by  the  enemy — 
27.  Labienus  attacks  Leptis  in  vain— 28.  Scipio  draws  out  his  troops; 
Caesar  keeps  within  his  camp— 29.  A  great  number  of  Numidians 
and  Getulians  desert  to  Caesar— 30.  The  town  of  Acilia  demands  a 
garrison  from  Caesar,  and  is  immediately  invested  by  the  enemy — 


ARGUMENTS 


IX 


31.  Caesar  receives  a  supply  of  troops  and  corn  by  sea— 32.  A  body 
of  Getulians,  sent  out  as  scouts  by  Scipio,  desert  to  Caesar — 33.  Cato 
sends  supplies  to  Scipio ;  the  city  of  Tisdra  demands  a  garrison  of 
Caesar — 34.  Caesar  makes  choice  of  a  new  camp,  and  strengthens  it 
with  works ;  which  the  enemy  advancing  to  retard,  are  repulsed 
with  great  slaughter — 38.  On  which  Caesar  draws  out  his  army ;  but 
the  enemy  keep  within  their  camp — 40.  The  siege  of  Acilia  raised — 
41.  The  surprising  fortitude  of  one  of  Caesar’s  centurions,  taken  pris¬ 
oner  by  Scipio ;  and  the  cruelty  of  that  general — 42.  The  great  mis¬ 
chief  done  by  a  sudden  storm  of  rain — 43.  King  Juba  arrives  in 
Scipio’s  camp,  at  the  head  of  a  great  body  of  troops — 44.  Caesar, 
having  dislodged  Labienus,  seizes  the  hill  on  which  he  was  posted — 
45.  Caesar’s  works  for  the  security  of  his  camp — 46.  Juba  and  La¬ 
bienus,  attacking  a  party  of  Caesar’s  men,  as  they  returned  from  the 
works,  are  repulsed  with  great  slaughter — 47.  Two  legions  arrive  to 
Caesar’s  aid-^8.  Caesar’s  steadiness  in  maintaining  military  disci¬ 
pline — 49.  The  Getulians,  revolting  from  Juba,  oblige  him  to  divide 
his  forces — 50.  Caesar  feigns  a  design  on  Uzita,  whence  a  great  many 
persons  of  illustrious  rank  join  him — 51.  Juba’s  pride — 52.  Both 
armies  drawn  up — 53.  The  order  of  battle  on  each  side — 54.  After  a 
few  skirmishes  between  the  horse,  both  retire  to  their  camps — 

55.  Some  of  Caesar’s  ships  burned  by  the  enemy,  and  others  taken — 

56.  Caesar,  embarking  in  person,  follows  the  enemy,  defeats  them, 
and  returns  to  his  camp — 57.  Caesar  in  want  of  corn — 58.  Which 
compels  him  to  leave  his  camp;  Scipio  pursues  him — 59.  He  pos¬ 
sesses  himself  of  Zeta,  a  town  beyond  the  enemy’s  camp— 60.  The 
enemy,  attacking  him  as  he  returns  laden  with  plunder,  are  repulsed 
— 61.  Difficulty  of  fighting  with  the  Numidians ;  Caesar’s  contrivance 
for  that  purpose — 62.  The  town  of  Vacca,  demanding  a  garrison  of 
Caesar,  is  plundered  by  King  Juba — 63.  The  enemy  declining  a  battle, 
Caesar  decamps,  and  repulses  the  troops  sent  to  set  on  him  in  his 
march — 64.  But  not  caring  to  besiege  Sarsura,  he  returns  to  his  old 
camp — 65.  The  Thabenenses  demand  Caesar’s  protection — 66.  Caesar 
receives  fresh  succours — 67.  A  battle  of  the  cavalry,  in  which  Caesar 
has  the  advantage — 68.  The  enemy  still  declining  an  engagement, 
Caesar  besieges  Thapsius — 69.  Scipio  attempts  to  relieve  it — 70.  Cae- 
saur,  encouraging  his  men,  and  finding  them  full  of  alacrity,  attacks  the 
enemy — 72.  The  surprising  bravery  of  a  private  soldier — 73.  Scipio’s 
army  defeated,  and  almost  totally  cut  off— 74.  Caesar  marches  for 
Utica — 75.  Whither  Scipio’s  cavalry  had  retired — 76.  Cato  kills  him¬ 
self  ;  Utica  surrenders — 77.  Caesar,  in  his  march  to  Utica,  possesses 
himself  of  Usceta  and  Adrumetum — 78.  He  pardons  the  Uticans — 
79.  Juba,  flying  to  Zama,  is  refused  admittance — 80.  Zama  and  seve¬ 
ral  of  the  king’s  generals  surrender  to  Caesar — 81.  Considius  sur¬ 
renders  Tisdra,  and  Vergilius,  Thapsus — 82.  The  death  of  Juba  and 
Petreius— 83.  Also  of  Faustus  and  Afranius — 84.  And  of  Scipio — 
85.  Caesar  converts  Juba’s  kingdom  into  a  province — 86.  And  returns 
to  Rome. 


SPANISH  WAR. 

L  Thb  commencement  of  the  Spanish  war— 2.  Caesar  marches  to  attack 
Cordova— 3.  At  the  same  time  throws  succours  into  Ulia,  besieged 


X 


ARGUMENTS 


by  Rompey — 4.  The  attempt  on  Cordova  obliges  Pompey  to  raise  the 
siege  of  Ulia — 5.  Pompey  advancing  to  the  relief  of  Cordova,  Caesar 
attacks  Ategua,  vrhither  he  is  followed  by  Pompey— 7.  Both  intrench 
themselves  in  mountainous  places  of  difficult  access — 9.  Pompey, 
attacking  a  fort  belonging  to  Caesar,  is  repulsed — 10.  Caesar  continues 
the  siege  of  Ategua— 11.  Repulses  a  sally  from  the  town — 13.  Va¬ 
rious  skirmishes  between  the  two  armies — 15.  Cruelty  of  the  towns¬ 
men — 16.  Caesar  repulses  them  in  a  second  sally — 17.  Tullius  treats 
with  Caesar  about  a  surrender— 18.  Continuation  of  the  siege— 19. 
The  town  surrenders — 20.  Pompey  removes  his  camp  towards  Ucu- 
bis — 22.  Behaviour  of  the  Bursavolenses — 23.  Caesar  and  Pompey 
both  encamp  near  Ucubis,  where  some  skirmishes  happen — 25.  Single 
combat  of  Turpio  and  Niger— 26.  Great  numbers  of  the  enemy  desert 
to  Caesar ;  some  of  Pompey’s  letters  intercepted — 27.  Both  parties 
encamp  in  the  plain  of  Munda— 28.  A  great  battle  ensues — 31.  In 
which  Pompey  is  totally  defeated — 32.  Caesar  besieges  the  runaways 
in  Munda — 33.  Attacks  and  makes  himself  master  of  Cordova — 
35.  Likewise  of  Hispalis  ;  whence  he  is  expelled,  and  again  recovers 
it:  the  Mundenses,  under  a  pretence  of  a  surrender,  preparing  to 
attack  our  men,  are  themselves  put  to  the  sword— 37.  Carteia  sur¬ 
renders  to  Caesar ;  Pompey  makes  his  escape — 39.  Pompey  is  slain 
— 40.  Some  of  Caesar’s  ships  burned — 41.  Caesar’s  troops  take  pos¬ 
session  of  Munda,  and  afterward  invest  Ursao — 43.  CfflsaPs  speech 
to  the  people  of  Hispalis. 


t 


I 


CIVIL  WAR. 


SUPPLEMENT 


OF 

DIONYSIUS  YOSSIUS 

TO 

CESAR’S  FIRST  BOOK  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR. 


I  THINK  it  needless  to  say  any  thing  here  in  oppo¬ 
sition  to  those  who  pretend  that  the  following  Com¬ 
mentaries,  concerning  the  Civil  War,  were  not 
penned  by  Caesar  himself.  We  have  not  only  the 
express  testimony  of  Suetonius  to  the  contrary,  but 
the  very  style  sufficiently  declares  that  Caesar  alone 
could  be  the  author  of  the  work.  There  is  room 
however  to  suspect,  from  the  abrupt  manner  in  which 
the  subject  is  introduced,  that  the  beginning  of  this 
first  book  is  wanting ;  for  history  takes  notice  of 
several  previous  facts,  of  which  no  mention  is  made 
here.  I  have  therefore  collected  out  of  Plutarch, 
Appian,  and  Dion  as  much  as  was  necessary  to  con¬ 
nect  this  and  the  former  Commentary,  and  fancy  it 
will  not  be  disagreeable  to  the  reader  to  offer  it  here 
by  way  of  preface. 

Gaul  being  wholly  reduced,  Caesar,  on  his  arrival 
in  Lombardy,  thought  proper,  for  many  reasons,  to 
send  deputies  to  Rome  to  demand  the  consulship, 
and  a  prolongation  of  his  command.  Pompey,  who, 
though  averse  to  Caesar’s  interest,  had  not  yet  openly 
declared  against  him,  neither  furthered  nor  opposed 
his  request.  But  the  consuls  Marcellus  and  Len- 
CiES.  VoL.  II  — B 


14  SUPPLEMENT  OF  DIONYSIUS  VOSSIUS. 

tulus,  who  had  already  joined  the  party  of  his  ene¬ 
mies,  resolved  by  every  method  in  their  power  to 
frustrate  the  design.  Marcellus  scrupled  not  to  add 
other  injuries  to  that  of  which  we  speak  ;  for  Caesar 
had  lately  planted  a  colony  at  Novocomum  in  Cisal¬ 
pine  Gaul,  and  Marcellus,  not  satisfied  with  stripping 
the  inhabitants  of  the  privilege  of  Roman  citizens, 
seized  one  of  their  chief  magistrates  at  Rome,  or¬ 
dered  him  to  be  scourged,  and  then  dismissed  him 
to  carry  his  complaints  to  Caesar  ;  an  ignominy  from 
which  all  free  citizens  were  expressly  exempted  by 
the  laws.  While  affairs  were  in  this  train,  C.  Curio, 
tribune  of  the  people,  came  to  Caesar  in  Gaul.  This 
nobleman,  after  many  attempts  in  behalf  of  the  com¬ 
monwealth,  and  to  promote  Caesar’s  interest,  finding 
at  length  all  his  endeavours  without  effect,  fled  from 
Rome  to  avoid  the  malice  of  his  enemies,  and  in¬ 
formed  Caesar  of  all  that  was  transacted  against  him. 
Caesar  received  him  with  great  marks  of  respect,  as 
well  on  account  of  his  rank  in  the  commonwealth 
as  the  many  services  he  had  done  himself  and  the 
state,  and  thanked  him  for  the  signal  zeal  he  had 
shown  in  his  cause.  But  Curio  advised  him,  since 
his  enemies  were  now  openly  preparing  for  war,  to 
draw  his  army  together  without  delay,  and  rescue 
the  commonwealth  from  the  tyranny  of  an  aspiring 
faction.  Caesar,  though  fully  satisfied  of  the  truth 
of  Curio’s  report,  resolved  to  sacrifice  all  other  con¬ 
siderations  to  the  public  tranquillity,  that  no  man 
might  justly  charge  him  with  being  the  author  of  a 
civil  war.  He  therefore  only  petitioned,  by  his 
friends,  that  the  government  of  Cisalpine  Gaul  and 
Illyricum,  with  the  command  of  two  legions,  might 
be  continued  to  him  ;  in  all  which  his  principal  aim 
was,  by  the  equity  of  his  demands,  to  induce  his  ene¬ 
mies  to  grant  peace  to  the  commonwealth.  These 
offers  appeared  so  reasonable  that  even  Pompey  him¬ 
self  knew  not  how  to  oppose  them.  But  the  con¬ 
suls  still  continuing  inflexible,  Caesar  wrote  a  letter 


SUPPLEMENT  OF  DIONYSIUS  VOSSIUS.  15 

to  the  senate,  wherein,  after  briefly  enumerating  his 
exploits  and  services,  he  requested  them  not  to  de¬ 
prive  him  of  the  benefit  of  the  people’s  favour,  who 
had  permitted  him  to  sue  for  the  consulship  in  his 
absence.  He  protested  his  readiness,  if  such  was 
the  resolution  of  the  senate  and  people  of  Rome,  to 
dismiss  his  army,  provided  Pompey  did  the  same  : 
but  could  by  no  means  resolve,  so  long  as  he  con¬ 
tinued  in  command  and  authority,  to  divest  himself 
of  troops,  and  lay  himself  open  to  the  injuries  of  his 
enemies.  Curio  was  commissioned  to  carry  this 
letter;  who,  travelling  with  incredible  despatch, 
reached  Rome  in  three  days  (a  distance  of  a  hun¬ 
dred  and  sixty  miles),  before  the  beginning  of  Janu¬ 
ary,  and  ere  the  consuls  could  get  any  thing  deter¬ 
mined  relating  to  Caesar’s  command.  Curio,  on  his 
arrival,  refused  to  part  with  the  letter,  resolving  not 
to  deliver  it  but  in  full  senate,  and  when  the  tribunes 
of  the  people  were  present ;  for  he  was  apprehen¬ 
sive,  should  he  do  otherwise,  that  the  consuls  would 
suppress  it. 


V 


1 


,  v-.t 

'■'>  (<* 

■’.■■■■ 


\’ 


/ 


CiESAR’S  COMMENTARIES 


CIVIL  WAR. 

BOOK  1. 

1.  Cjesar’s  letter  being-  delivered  to  the  consuls, 
the  tribunes  with  much  difficulty  procured  it  a  read¬ 
ing  in  the  senate ;  but  could  by  no  means  prevail  to 
have  his  demands  brought  under  deliberation.  The 
consuls  proposed  to  debate  on  the  state  of  the  re¬ 
public.  Lentulus  promised  “  to  stand  by  the  senate 
and  people,  if  they  would  deliver  their  sentiments 
with  freedom  and  courage ;  but  if  they  regarded 
Caesar,  and  affected  to  court  his  friendship,  as  had 
been  the  practice  for  some  time  past,  he  knew,  he 
told  them,  what  he  had  to  do,  and  was  determined 
to  disclaim  their  authority;  not  doubting  but  he 
would  find  a  ready  admittance  to  the  favour  and  pro¬ 
tection  of  Caesar.”  Scipio  spoke  much  to  the  same 
purpose ;  “  that  Pompey  was  firmly  bent  not  to 
abandon  the  republic,  if  he  found  the  senators  ready 
to  support  him ;  but  if  they  cooled,  or  were  remiss 
in  their  resolves,  it  would  be  in  vain  for  them  to  ex¬ 
pect  his  aid,  if  they  saw  cause  afterward  to  apply 
for  it.”  This  speech  of  Scipio,  as  the  senate  was 
held  in  the  city,  and  Pompey  resided  in  the  suburbs, 
was  considered  as  coming  from  Pompey’s  own 
mouth.  Some  were  for  following  milder  counsels, 
of  which  number  was  M.  Marcellus,  who  gave  it  as 
his  opinion  “  that  it  was  not  proper  to  enter  on  the 
present  deliberation  till  troops  were  raised  over  aR 

B2 


18 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


Italy,  and  an  army  got  ready,  under  whose  protec¬ 
tion  the  senate  might  proceed  with  freedom  and 
safety  in  their  debates.  Callidius  was  for  sending 
Pompey  to  his  government,  to  take  away  all  occasion 
of  discord ;  because  Caesar  had  reason  to  fear,  as  two 
of  his  legions  had  been  taken  from  him,  that  Pom¬ 
pey  retained  them  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Rome, 
with  a  view  to  employ  them  against  him.”  M.  Ru¬ 
fus  nearly  agreed  in  opinion  with  Callidius.  But 
they  were  all  severely  reprimanded  by  the  consul 
Lentulus,  who  expressly  refused  to  put  Callidius’s 
motion  to  the  vote.  Marcellus,  awed  by  the  con¬ 
sul’s  reprimand,  retracted  what  he  had  said.  Thus 
the  clamours  of  Lentulus,  the  dread  of  an  army  at 
the  gates  of  Rome,  and  the  menaces  of  Pompey’s 
friends,  forced  the  greater  part  of  the  senate,  though 
with  the  utmost  reluctance  and  dislike,  into  a  com¬ 
pliance  with  Scipio’s  motion,  “that  Caesar  should 
be  ordered  to  disband  his  army  before  a  certain  day 
then  fixed ;  and  that  in  case  of  disobedience,  he 
should  be  declared  an  enemy  to  the  republic.”  M. 
Antonius  and  Q.  Cassius,  tribunes  of  the  people, 
opposed  their  negative  to  this  decree.  Immediately 
a  debate  arose  on  the  validity  of  their  interposition. 
Many  severe  speeches  were  made  against  them; 
and  the  more  warm  and  passionate  any  one  appeared, 
the  more  was  he  applauded  by  Caesar’s  enemies. 

2.  In  the  evening  the  senate  rose  ;  and  Pompey,. 
sending  for  all  those  of  his  party,  commended  the 
forward,  confirmed  them  in  their  resolutions,  re¬ 
proved  and  animated  the  more  moderate.  Multi¬ 
tudes  of  veterans  who  had  formerly  served  under 
him  flocked  to  him  from  all  parts,  allured  by  the  ex¬ 
pectation  of  rewards  and  dignities.  A  great  num¬ 
ber  of  officers  belonging  to  the  two  legions  lately 
returned  by  Caesar  had  likewise  orders  to  attend 
him.  Rome  was  filled  with  troops.  Curio  assem¬ 
bled  the  tribunes  to  support  the  decree  of  the  peo¬ 
ple.  On  the  other  hand,  all  the  friends  of  the  con- 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  I. 


19 


sills,  all  the  partisans  of  Pompey,  and  of  such  as 
bore  any  ancient  grudge  to  Caesar,  repaired  to  the 
senate ;  by  whose  concourse  and  votes  the  weaker 
sort  were  terrified,  the  irresolute  confirmed,  and  the 
greater  part  deprived  of  the  liberty  of  speaking  their 
mind  freely.  L.  Piso  the  censor,  and  L.  Roscius  the 
pretor,  offered  to  go  and  acquaint  Caesar  with  the 
state  of  affairs,  demanding  only  six  days  for  that  pur¬ 
pose.  Some  were  for  sending  deputies  to  him  to 
inform  him  of  the  senate’s  disposition. 

3.  But  all  these  proposals  were  rejected,  because 
the  consul,  Scipio,  and  Cato  declared  against  them. 
Cato  was  incited  by  the  remembrance  of  an  old 
quarrel,  and  the  disappointment  he  had  sustained  in 
standing  candidate  for  the  pretorship  with  Caesar. 
Lentulus  was  oppressed  with  debt,  and  flattered  him¬ 
self  with  the  command  of  armies,  the  government 
of  provinces,  and  the  largesses  of  the  kings  for  whom 
he  should  procure  the  title  of  allies  and  friends  of 
the  Roman  people.  He  was  besides  wont  to  boast 
among  those  of  his  own  party  that  he  doubted  not 
of  becoming  a  second  Sylla,  in  whom  the  whole  au¬ 
thority  of  the  commonwealth  should  centre.  Scipio 
entertained  the  same  hope  of  commands  and  govern¬ 
ments,  which  he  expected  to  share  with  his  son-in- 
law  Pompey ;  add  to  this,  his  dread  of  a  prosecu¬ 
tion,  his  vanity  and  self-conceit,  and  the  flatteries 
and  applauses  of  his  friends,  who  at  that  time  bore 
a  considerable  sway  in  the  commonwealth  and  courts 
of  justice.  Pompey  himself,  instigated  by  Caesar’s 
enemies,  and  not  able  to  endure  an  equal  in  dignity, 
was  now  entirely  alienated  from  him,  and  had  joined 
with  their  common  adversaries,  most  of  whom  Caesar 
had  contracted  during  his  affinity  with  Pompey. 
Besides,  the  fraudulent  step  he  had  taken  in  detain¬ 
ing,  for  the  purposes  of  his  own  ambition,  the  two 
legions  destined  to  serve  in  Asia  and  Syria,  deter¬ 
mined  him  to  use  aU  his  endeavours  to  bring  on  a 
civil  war. 


20 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


4.  Thus  nothing  but  tumult  and  violence  was  to 
be  seen  in  the  public  debates.  Caesar’s  friends  had 
no  time  given  them  to  inform  him  of  what  passed. 
Even  the  tribunes  themselves  were  not  exempt  from 
danger,  nor  durst  they  have  recourse  to  that  right 
of  intercession  which  Sylla  had  left  them,  as  the 
last  bulwark  of  liberty  ;  insomuch,  that  the  seventh 
day  after  entering  on  their  office,  they  saw  them¬ 
selves  obliged  to  provide  for  their  safety ;  whereas 
in  former  times  the  most  turbulent  and  seditious 
tribunes  never  began  to  apprehend  themselves  in 
danger  till  towards  the  eighth  month  of  their  ad¬ 
ministration.  Recourse  was  had  to  that  rigid  and 
ultimate  decree  which  was  never  used  but  in  the 
greatest  extremities,  when  the  city  was  threatened 
with  ruin  and  conflagration,  “  that  the  consuls,  the 
pretors,  the  tribunes  of  the  people,  and  the  procon¬ 
suls  that  were  near  Rome  should  take  care  that  the 
commonwealth  received  no  detriment.”  This  de¬ 
cree  passed  the  seventh  of  January ;  so  that  during 
the  first  five  days  in  which  it  was  permitted  the 
senate  to  assemble,  after  Lentulus’s  entrance  on  the 
consulship  (for  two  days  are  always  appropriated  to 
the  holding  of  the  comitia),  the  most  severe  and 
rigorous  resolutions  were  taken,  both  in  relation  to 
Caesar’s  government  and  the  tribunes  of  the  people, 
men  of  eminent  worth  and  dignity.  The  tribunes 
immediately  quitted  the  city  and  fled  to  Caesar,  who 
was  then  at  Ravenna,  waiting  an  answer  to  his  late 
demands,  whose  equity  he  hoped  would  dispose  all 
parties  to  entertain  thoughts  of  peace. 

5.  The  following  days  the  senate  assembled  with¬ 
out  the  city,  where  Pompey  confirmed  every  thing 
he  had  before  intimated  by  the  mouth  of  Scipio. 
He  applauded  the  resolution  and  courage  of  the 
senators,  acquainted  them  with  the  state  of  his 
forces,  that  he  had  ten  legions  already  in  arms,  and 
was  besides  well  informed  that  C?esar’s  troops  were 
by  no  means  satisfied  with  their  general ;  nay,  had 


CiriL  WAR. - BOOK  1. 


21 


even  refused  to  support  and  follow  Mm.  It  was 
then  proposed  in  the  senate  that  troops  should  be 
raised  over  all  Italy  ;  that  Faustus  Sylla  should  be 
sent  propretor  into  Mauritania ;  that  Pompey  should 
be  supplied  with  money  out  of  the  public  treasury ; 
and  that  King-  Juba  should  be  declared  friend  and 
ally  of  the  people  of  Rome  ;  but  Marcellus  opposed 
the  last  of  these ;  and  Philippus,  tribune  of  the 
people,  would  not  agree  to  the  propretorship  of  Sylla. 
The  other  motions  were  approved  by  the  senate. 
The  affair  of  the  provinces  was  next  decided ;  two 
of  which  were  consular,  the  rest  pretorian.  Syria 
fell  to  the  share  of  Scipio,  and  Gaul  fell  to  L.  Do- 
mitius.  Philippus  and  Marcellus  were  set  aside, 
through  the  private  views  of  the  prevailing  party. 
The  rest  of  the  provinces  were  assigned  to  men  of 
pretorian  rank,  who  waited  not  to  have  their  nomina¬ 
tion  confirmed  by  the  people,  as  had  been  the  cus¬ 
tom  in  former  years,  but,  after  taking  the  usual  oath, 
departed  for  their  several  commands  in  a  military 
habit.  The  consuls  left  the  city,  a  thing  unheard  of 
till  that  time,  and  lictors  were  seen  walking  before 
private  men  in  the  forum  and  capitol,  contrary  to 
the  express  practice  of  former  ages.  Troops  were 
levied  over  all  Italy,  arms  enjoined,  money  de¬ 
manded  of  the  colonies  and  free  towns,  and  even 
taken  from  the  very  temples ;  in  fine,  neither  divine 
nor  human  rights  were  regarded. 

6.  Cassar,  having  intelligence  of  these  proceed¬ 
ings,  addressed  himself  to  his  troops :  “  He  took 
notice  of  the  many  injuries  he  had  received  on  all 
occasions  from  his  enemies,  who  had  alienated 
Pompey  from  him,  by  filling  him  with  an  envy  and 
jealousy  of  his  reputation,  though  he  had  done  every 
tMng  in  his  power  to  promote  his  glory,  and  favour 
his  advancement  to  the  highest  dignities.  He  com¬ 
plained  of  the  new  precedent  introduced  into  the 
commonwealth,  in  checking  and  hindering  by  arms 
the  opposition  of  the  tribunes,  which  of  late  years 


22 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


had  been  restored  to  its  wonted  force.  That  Sylla, 
who  had  almost  annihilated  the  tribuneship,  had  yet 
left  it  the  liberty  of  opposition ;  whereas  Pompey, 
who  valued  himself  on  the  re-establishment  of  that 
office,  deprived  it  now  of  a  privilege  it  had  always 
enjoyed.  That  the  decree  enjoining  the  magistrates 
to  provide  for  the  safety  of  the  commonwealth, 
which  implied  an  order  to  the  Roman  people  to  re¬ 
pair  to  arms,  was  never  wont  to  be  used  but  on  oc¬ 
casion  of  dangerous  laws,  seditious  measures  pur¬ 
sued  by  the  tribunes,  or  a  general  secession  of  the 
people,  when  they  possessed  themselves  of  the  tem¬ 
ples  and  places  of  strength  ;  crimes  which  in  former 
ages  had  been  expiated  by  the  fate  of  Saturninus  and 
the  Gracchi.  That  at  present  nothing  of  this  kind 
had  been  attempted,  nor  so  much  as  thought  of ;  no 
law  promulged,  no  endeavour  used  to  seduce  the 
people,  no  appearance  of  revolt  or  disaffection.  He 
therefore  conjured  them  to  defend  against  the  malice 
of  his  enemies  the  honour  and  reputation  of  a  gene¬ 
ral  under  whom  they  had  served  nine  years  with 
so  much  advantage  to  the  commonwealth,  gained  so 
many  battles,  and  subdued  all  Gaul  and  Germany.” 
The  soldiers  of  the  thirteenth  legion,  who  were 
present,  and  whom  he  had  sent  for  in  the  beginning 
of  the  troubles  (the  rest  not  having  yet  arrived), 
cried  out  that  they  were  determined  to  maintain  the 
honour  of  their  general,  and  to  revenge  the  wrongs 
done  to  the  tribunes. 

7.  Being  assured  of  the  good-will  of  the  soldiers, 
he  marched  with  that  legion  to  Rimini,  where  he 
was  met  by  the  tribunes  of  the  people,  who  had  fled 
to  him  for  protection.  He  ordered  the  other  legions 
to  quit  their  winter-quarters,  and  follow  him  with 
all  expedition.  While  he  was  at  Rimini,  young  L. 
Caesar,  whose  father  was  one  of  his  lieutenants, 
came  to  him ;  and  after  acquainting  him  with  the 
occasion  of  his  journey,  added  that  he  had  a  private 
message  to  him  from  Pompey  “  who  was  desirous 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  I. 


23 


ot  clearing  himself  to  Caesar,  that  he  might  not  in¬ 
terpret  those  actions  as  designed  to  affront  him, 
which  had  no  other  aim  but  the  good  of  the  com¬ 
monwealth,:  that  it  had  been  his  constant  maxim  to 
prefer  the  interest  of  the  republic  to  any  private  en¬ 
gagement  ;  that  it  was  worthy  of  Caesar  to  sacrifice 
his  passion  and  resentment  to  the  same  noble  mo¬ 
tive  ;  and  not  prejudice  the  commonwealth,  by  push¬ 
ing  too  far  his  revenge  against  his  private  enemies.” 
He  added  something  more  to  the  same  purpose, 
mingled  with  excuses  for  Pompey.  The  pretor  Ros¬ 
cius  joined  likewise  in  the  negotiation,  declaring  he 
was  commissioned  so  to  do. 

8.  Though  all  this  tended  little  to  redress  the  in¬ 
juries  of  which  Caesar  complained,  yet,  considering 
these  as  proper  persons  by  whom  to  transmit  his 
thoughts,  he  begged  of  them,  that  as  they  had  not 
scrupled  to  bring  Pompey’s  demands  to  him,  they 
would  likewise  carryback  his  proposals  to  Pompey; 
that,  if  possible,  so  small  a  labour  might  put  an  end 
to  mighty  differences,  and  deliver  all  Italy  from  the 
fear  of  a  civil  war.  He  told  them  “  that  the  inter¬ 
est  of  the  commonwealth  had  always  been  dearer  to 
him  than  life ;  but  he  could  not  help  grieving  at  the 
malice  of  his  enemies,  who  had  frustrated  the  good 
intentions  of  the  Roman  people  in  his  favour,  by 
cutting  off  six  months  from  his  command,  and 
obliging  him  to  return  to  Rome  to  sue  for  the  con¬ 
sulship,  t  hough  a  law  had  been  made  dispensing  with 
his  personal  attendance :  that  he  had  yet,  for  the 
sake  of  the  commonwealth,  patiently  submitted  to 
this  assault  on  his  honour;  that  even  his  proposal 
of  disbanding  the  armies  on  both  sides,  which  he 
had  made  by  a  letter  to  the  senate,  had  been  re¬ 
jected  ;  that  new  levies  were  making  over  all  Italy ; 
that  two  legions,  which  had  been  taken  from  him, 
under  pretence  of  the  Parthian  war,  were  still  re¬ 
tained  in  the  service  of  his  enemies  ;  that  the  whole 
state  was  in  arms.  What  could  all  this  aim  at,  but 


24 


CjEsar’s  commentaries. 


his  destruction  1  That,  nevertheless,  he  was  ready 
to  agree  to  any  proposal,  and  expose  himself  to  any 
danger,  for  the  sake  of  his  country.  Let  Pompey 
go  to  his  government ;  let  all  the  armies  be  dis¬ 
banded  ;  let  everybody  throughout  Italy  lay  down 
their  arms  ;  let  every  thing  that  participates  of  terror 
and  force  be  removed ;  let  the  elections  of  magis¬ 
trates  be  made  with  perfect  freedom ;  and  let  the 
republic  be  administered  by  the  authority  of  the 
senate  and  people.  And  the  better  to  settle  all  these 
articles,  and  corroborate  them  with  the  sanction  of 
an  oath,  let  either  Pompey  himself  draw  nearer,  or 
suffer  Caesar  to  approach  him ;  as  all  their  differ¬ 
ences  may  be  most  easily  terminated  by  a  confer¬ 
ence.” 

9.  Roscius  and  L.  Caesar,  having  received  this 
answer,  departed  for  Capua,  where  they  found  Pom¬ 
pey  and  the  consuls,  and  laid  before  them  Caesar’s 
proposals.  After  deliberating  on  the  affair  they  sent 
a  reply  in  writing,  by  the  same  messengers,  the  pur¬ 
port  of  which  was,  “  that  Caesar  should  quit  Rimini, 
return  to  Gaul,  and  disband  his  army ;  which  con¬ 
ditions  performed,  Pompey  would  go  into  Spain. 
In  the  mean  time,  till  Caesar  gave  security  for  the 
performance  of  what  he  had  promised,  neither  Pom¬ 
pey  nor  the  consuls  would  discontinue  the  levies.” 

10.  It  was  by  no  means  a  fair  proposal  that  Caesar 
should  be  obliged  to  quit  Rimini  and  return  to  Gaul, 
while  Pompey  held  provinces  and  legions  that  were 
none  of  his :  that  he  should  dismiss  his  army,  while 
the  other  Avas  levying  troops ;  and  that  only  a  gene¬ 
ral  promise  of  going  into  Spain  should  be  given,  with¬ 
out  fixing  a  day  for  his  departure ;  b}''  which  evasion 
were  he  to  be  found  in  Italy,  even  at  the  expiration 
of  Caesar’s  consulship,  he  could  not  yet  be  charged 
with  breach  of  faith.  His  forbearing  too  to  appoint 
a  time  for  a  conference,  and  declining  to  approach 
nearer,  gave  little  reason  to  hope  for  a  peace.  He 
therefore  sent  Antony  to  Arretium  with  five  cohorts; 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  I. 


25 


remained  himself  at  Rimini,  with  two,  where  he  re¬ 
solved  to  levy  troops ;  and  seizing  Pisaurum,  Fa- 
num,  and  Ancona,  left  a  cohort  in  each  for  a  garrison. 

11.  Meantime,  being  informed  that  Thermus  the 
pretor  had  entered  Iguvium  with  five  cohorts,  and 
was  endeavouring  to  fortify  the  town,  as  he  knew 
the  inhabitants  to  be  well  inclined  to  his  interest,  he 
detached  Curio  thither,  with  three  cohorts,  drawn 
from  Pisaurum  and  Rimini.  On  this,  Thermus,  who 
could  not  confide  in  the  townsmen,  retired  with  his 
cohorts,  and  quitted  the  place  ;  but  his  troops,  aban¬ 
doning  him  in  their  march,  returned  severally  to 
their  own  homes.  Curio  was  received  into  the  place 
with  great  demonstrations  of  joy;  which  being  re¬ 
ported  to  Caesar,  as  he  found  he  had  the  good-will 
of  the  colonies  and  free  towns,  he  drew  the  cohorts 
of  the  thirteenth  legion  out  of  garrison,  and  marched 
to  Auximum,  which  Attius  held  with  a  body  of  troops, 
and  whence  he  had  despatched  senators  to  levy 
forces  over  all  Picenum.  Caesar’s  arrival  being 
known,  the  chief  citizens  of  Auximum  went  in  a  body 
to  Attius  Varus,  and  told  him,  “  that  it  did  not  belong 
to  them  to  determine  on  which  side  justice  lay ;  but 
that  neither  they  nor  the  other  municipal  towns  could 
endure  to  see  their  gates  shut  against  Caesar,  who 
by  his  great  actions  had  deserved  so  well  of  the 
commonwealth :  that  therefore  he  would  do  well  to 
consult  his  own  safety  and  reputation.”  Attius, 
moved  by  this  speech,  drew  off  his  garrison  and 
fled.  But  some  of  Caesar’s  first  ranks,  pursuing  him, 
obliged  him  to  stop  ;  and  a  battle  ensuing,  he  was 
deserted  by  his  men.  Some  of  the  troops  returned 
home ;  the  rest  went  over  to  Caesar,  and  brought 
along  with  them  L.  Pupius,  first  centurion  of  the 
legion,  who  had  formerly  held  the  same  rank  in 
Pompey’s  army.  Caesar  commended  Attius’s  sol¬ 
diers,  dismissed  Pupius,  returned  thanks  to  the  in¬ 
habitants  of  Auximum,  and  promised  to  retain  al¬ 
ways  a  grateful  remembrance  of  their  attachment. 

Ca:s.  Vol.  II. — C 


26 


CiESAR’s  COMMENTARIES. 


12.  These  things  being  reported  at  Rome,  the  con¬ 
sternation  was  so  great  over  the  whole  city  that  when 
the  consul  Lentulus  came  to  the  treasury  to  deliver 
out  the  money  to  Pompey,  in  consequence  of  the  de¬ 
cree  of  the  senate,  he  scarce  waited  the  opening  of 
the  inner  door,  but  precipitately  left  the  place,  on  a 
false  rumour  that  Caesar  was  approaching,  and  some 
of  his  cavalry  already  in  view.  He  was  soon  followed 
by  his  colleague  Marcellus,  and  the  greater  part  of  the 
magistrates.  Pompey  had  left  the  town  the  day  be¬ 
fore,  and  was  on  his  way  to  Apulia,  where  he  had 
quartered  the  legions  he  had  received  from  Caesar. 
The  levies  were  discontinued  within  the  city,  and 
no  place  appeared  secure  on  this  side  Capua.  Here, 
at  last,  they  took  courage  and  rallied,  and  began  to 
renew  their  levies  in  the  colonies  round  about, 
which  had  been  sent  thither  by  the  Julian  law, 
Lentulus  summoned  into  the  forum  the  gladiators 
whom  Caesar  had  ordered  to  be  trained  up  there, 
gave  them  their  liberty,  furnished  them  with  horses, 
and  commanded  them  to  follow  him.  But  being 
afterward  admonished  by  his  friends  that  this  step 
was  universally  condemned,  he  dispersed  them  into 
the  neighbouring  towns  of  Campania,  to  keep  gar¬ 
rison  there. 

13.  Caesar  meanwhile  leaving  Auximum,  traversed 
the  whole  country  of  Picenum,  where  he  was  joy¬ 
fully  received  in  all  parts  by  the  inhabitants,  who 
furnished  his  army  with  every  thing  necessary. 
Even  Cingulum  itself,  a  town  founded  by  Labienus, 
and  built  at  his  own  expense,  sent  deputies  to  him, 
with  an  offer  of  their  submission  and  services.  He 
demanded  a  certain  number  of  soldiers,  which  were 
sent  immediately.  Meantime  the  twelfth  legion 
joined  him  ;  and  with  these  two  he  marched  to  As- 
culum,  a  town  of  Picenum.  Here  Lentulus  Spinther 
commanded  with  ten  cohorts ;  who,  hearing  of  Cae¬ 
sar’s  approach,  quitted  the  place  with  his  troops,  who 
almost  all  deserted  him  on  the  march.  Being  left 


CHESTNUT  HILL,  MASS. 
cmL  WAR. - BOOK  I.  27 

with  only  a  few,  he  fell  in  with  Vibullius  Rufus, 
whom  Pompey  had  sent  into  Picenum,  to  encourage 
his  followers  in  those  parts.  Vibullius,  understanding 
from  him  the  state  of  affairs  in  Picenum,  dismissed 
Lentulus,  and  took  the  soldiers  under  his  command. 
He  likewise  drew  together  from  the  neighbouring 
provinces  as  many  as  he  could  meet  with  of  Pom- 
pey’s  levies ;  among  the  rest  Ulcilles  Hirus,  who  was 
flying,  with  six  cohorts,  from  Camerinum,  where 
they  had  been  quartered.  Out  of  all  these  he  formed 
thirteen  cohorts,  with  which  he  posted,  by  great 
journeys,  to  Corfinium,  where  Domitius  Ahenobar- 
bus  commanded ;  whom  he  informed  that  Caesar  was 
approaching  with  two  legions.  Domitius  had  already 
got  together  with  great  expedition  twenty  cohorts 
from  Alba,  the  country  of  the  Marsi,  Peligni,  and  the 
neighbouring  provinces. 

14.  Caesar,  having  made  himself  master  of  Asculum, 
and  obliged  Lentulus  to  retire,  ordered  the  soldiers 
who  had  deserted  him  to  be  sought  after,  and  new 
levies  to  be  made.  He  remained  only  one  day  there 
to  settle  what  related  to  provisions,  and  then  pursued 
his  march  to  Corfinium.  On  his  arrival  there,  he 
found  five  cohorts,  whom  Domitius  had  detached 
from  the  garrison,  employed  in  breaking  down  a 
bridge  about  three  miles  distant  from  the  town. 
But  Caesar’s  advanced  parties  attacking  them,  they 
quickly  abandoned  the  bridge,  and  retired  to  Corfi¬ 
nium.  Cabsar,  having  passed  with  his  legions,  halted 
before  the  town,  and  encamped  under  the  Walls. 

15.  On  this,  Domitius  engaged,  by  great  rewards, 
persons  well  acquainted  with  the  country,  to  carry 
letters  into  Apulia  to  Pompey,  wherein  he  earnestly 
requested  him  to  come  to  his  aid.  He  told  him, 
“  that  it  would  be  easy,  in  that  close  country,  to  shut 
up  Caesar  between  two  armies,  and  cut  off  his  provi¬ 
sions  :  that  unless  this  course  was  followed,  he  him¬ 
self,  with  about  thirty  cohorts  and  a  great  number 
of  senators  and  Roman  knights,  would  be  exposed  to 


28 


CjEsar’s  commentaries. 


imminent  danger.”  Meanwhile,  having  encouraged 
his  men,  he  disposed  engines  along  the  walls,  ap¬ 
pointed  every  one  his  particular  post ;  and  the  more 
to  animate  them,  promised  each  soldier  four  acres 
of  land  out  of  his  own  estate,  and  in  proportion  to 
every  centurion  and  volunteer. 

16.  Meantime  Caesar  was  informed  that  the  people 
of  Sulmona,  a  town  seven  miles  distant  from  Corfi- 
nium,  desired  to  put  themselves  under  his  protection, 
but  were  restrained  by  Q.  Lucretius,  a  senator,  and 
Attius,  a  Pelignian,  who  held  them  in  subjection 
with  a  garrison  of  seven  cohorts.  He  therefore  des¬ 
patched  M.  Antony  thither,  with  five  cohorts  of  the 
seventh  legion,  whose  ensigns  were  no  sooner  des¬ 
cried  from  the  walls  of  Sulmona  than  the  gates  were 
thrown  open,  and  the  whole  people  in  a  body,  both 
soldiers  and  townsmen,  came  out  to  congratulate 
Antony  on  his  arrival.  Lucretius  and  Attius  en¬ 
deavoured  to  escape  over  the  wall:  but  Attius,  being 
taken,  and  brought  to  Antony,  requested  that  he 
might  be  sent  to  Caesar.  Antony  returned  the  same 
day,  bringing  along  with  him  the  cohorts  and  Attius. 
Caesar  joined  these  cohorts  to  his  army,  and  set  At¬ 
tius  at  liberty. 

17.  Caesar  resolved  to  employ  the  first  three  days 
in  strongly  fortifying  his  camp,  in  procuring  corn 
from  the  neighbouring  towns,  and  waiting  the  arrival 
of  the  rest  of  his  forces.  During  this  space,  the  eighth 
legion  joined  him,  with  two-and- twenty  cohorts  of 
new  levies  from  Gaul,  and  about  three  hundred  horse 
from  the  King  of  Noricum.  This  obliged  him  to 
form  a  second  camp  on  the  other  side  of  the  town, 
under  the  command  of  Curio.  The  remaining  days 
were  spent  in  drawing  a  line  with  redoubts  round 
the  place,  which  work  was  nearly  completed  when 
the  messengers  that  had  been  sent  to  Pompey  re¬ 
turned. 

18.  Domitius,  perusing  the  despatches,  thought 
proper  to  dissemble  the  contents,  and  declared  in 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  I. 


29 


council  that  Pompey  would  speedily  come  to  their 
assistance.  Meantime,  he  exhorted  them  to  behave 
with  courage,  and  provide  every  thing  necessary  for 
a  vigorous  defence.  He  conferred  however  privately 
with  a  few  of  his  most  intimate  friends,  and,  in  con¬ 
cert  with  them,  determined  on  flight.  But  as  his 
looks  and  speech  w^ere  found  to  disagree ;  as  he 
behaved  not  with  his  usual  composure  and  firmness ; 
and  was  observed,  contrary  to  custom,  to  be  much 
in  secret  conference  with  his  friends  ;  avoiding  public 
appearances,  and  councils  of  war ;  it  was  not  possible 
for  the  truth  to  remain  any  longer  concealed :  for 
Pompey  had  written  back,  “  that  he  could  not  put  all 
to  hazard  for  his  sake :  that  he  had  neither  advised 
nor  consented  to  his  shutting  himself  up  in  Corfi- 
nium  :  that  he  must  therefore  endeavour  to  extricate 
himself  as  well  as  he  could,  and  come  and  join  him 
with  all  his  forces.”  But  as  Caesar  had  invested  and 
carried  his  lines  round  the  place,  this  retreat  was 
now  become  impracticable. 

19.  Domitius’s  design  being  discovered,  the  sol¬ 
diers  who  were  at  Corfinium  began  to  assemble  in 
the  evening,  and,  by  means  of  their  tribunes,  centu¬ 
rions,  and  other  officers,  made  known  their  thoughts 
to  one  another :  “  that  they  were  besieged  by  Caesar, 
who  had  already,  in  a  manner,  completed  his  works  : 
that  their  general,  Domitius,  in  whose  promises  of 
assistance  they  had  placed  their  chief  hope,  aban¬ 
doning  all  concern  for  their  safety,  was  contriving 
to  escape  privately  by  flight :  that  it  was  therefore 
incumbent  on  them  to  look  also  to  their  own  preser¬ 
vation.”  The  Marsi  at  first  opposed  this  resolu¬ 
tion,  and  possessed  themselves  of  the  strongest  part 
of  the  town ;  nay,  the  dispute  was  so  warm,  that  it 
almost  came  to  be  decided  by  the  sword.  But, 
shortly  after,  being  made  acquainted  with  Domitius’s 
intended  flight,  of  which  before  they  had  no  know¬ 
ledge,  they  all,  in  a  body,  surrounded  Domitius,  se¬ 
cured  his  person,  and  sent  deputies  to  Caesar :  “  that 

C2 


30 


Caesar’s  commentaries. 


they  were  ready  to  open  their  gates,  receive  his  or¬ 
ders,  and  deliver  up  Domitius  alive.” 

20.  Though  Caesar  was  fully  sensible  of  how  great 
importance  it  was  to  get  possession  of  the  town  im¬ 
mediately,  and  join  the  garrison  to  his  own  army ; 
lest  by  largesses,  promises  of  speedy  relief,  or  false 
reports,  any  change  should  be  produced ;  as  in  war 
great  revolutions  often  arise  from  very  trifling  causes ; 
yet,  fearing  that  if  he  introduced  his  soldiers  in  the 
dark,  they  would  take  that  opportunity  to  plunder 
the  town,  he  sent  back  the  deputies,  with  thanks  for 
their  proffer,  resolving  to  have  the  walls  and  gates 
watched  with  great  care.  To  that  end  he  disposed 
his  men  along  the  works,  not  at  a  certain  distance, 
as  usual,  but  in  one  continued  rank,  so  as  to  touch 
each  other,  and  completely  invest  the  town.  He 
ordered  the  military  tribunes,  and  officers  of  the 
cavalry,  to  patrol  about  the  works,  and  not  only  be 
on  their  guard  against  sallies,  but  even  take  care  to 
prevent  the  escape  of  particular  persons.  And  indeed 
so  alert  and  vigilant  were  our  soldiers,  that  not  a 
man  closed  his  eyes  that  night ;  each  expecting  the 
event  with  impatience,  and  carrying  his  thoughts 
from  one  thing  to  another ;  what  would  be  the  fate 
of  the  Corfinians,  what  of  Domitius,  what  of  Len- 
tulus,  and  the  other  illustrious  persons  in  the  place : 
in  fine,  what  was  like  to  be  the  issue  of  so  compli¬ 
cated  a  scene. 

21.  About  the  fourth  watch  of  the  night,  Lentulus 
Spinther  called  from  the  wall  to  the  guard,  and  de¬ 
sired  to  be  conducted  to  Caesar.  His  request  being 
granted,  he  came  out  of  the  town,  attended  by  some 
of  Domitius’s  soldiers,  who  never  left  him  till  they 
had  conducted  him  to  Caesar’s  presence.  “  He  begged 
him  to  spare  his  life,  and  pardon  the  injuries  he 
had  done  him,  in  consideration  of  their  former  friend¬ 
ship.  He  owned  the  many  obligations  he  had  laid 
him  under,  in  procuring  him  an  admission  into  the 
college  of  priests,  obtaining  for  him  the  government 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  I. 


31 


of  Spain,  after  the  expiration  of  the  pretorship,  and 
supporting  him  in  the  demand  of  the  consulship.” 
Caesar  interrupted  him  by  saying,  “  that  he  was  not 
come  out  of  the  bounds  of  his  province  with  an  in¬ 
tent  to  injure  anybody ;  but  to  repel  the  injuries  done 
him  by  his  enemies ;  to  revenge  the  wrongs  of  the 
tribunes ;  and  to  restore  to  the  Roman  people,  who 
were  oppressed  by  a  small  faction  of  the  nobles, 
their  liberty  and  privileges.”  Lentulus,  encouraged 
by  this  speech,  asked  leave  to  return  into  the  town, 
“  where,”  he  said,  “  the  assurances  he  had  obtained 
of  his  own  safety  would  contribute  not  a  little  to  the 
consolation  of  others,  some  of  whom  were  so  ter¬ 
rified  that  they  were  ready  to  take  desperate  reso¬ 
lutions.”  Leave  being  granted,  he  departed  for  the 
town. 

22.  As  soon  as  it  was  light  Caesar  ordered  before 
him  all  the  senators,  senators’  sons,  military  tri¬ 
bunes,  and  Roman  knights.  There  were  of  sena- 
torian  rank,  L.  Domitius,  P.  Lentulus  Spinther,  L. 
Vibullius  Rufus,  Sextus  Quintilius  Varus,  questor, 
L.  Rubrius ;  also  Domitius’s  son,  and  many  young 
men  of  quality,  with  a  great  number  of  Roman 
knights,  and  some  decurions,  or  senators  of  the 
neighbouring  municipal  towns,  who  had  been  sent 
for  by  Domitius.  As  soon  as  they  appeared,  he  gave 
orders  to  secure  them  from  the  insults  of  the  sol¬ 
diery  ;  and,  addressing  them  in  a  few  words,  remon¬ 
strated,  “  that  they  had  made  a  very  ill  requital  for 
the  many  signal  services  received  at  his  hands.” 
After  which  he  set  them  at  liberty.  He  likewise 
restored  to  Domitius  six  millions  of  sesterces,  which 
that  general  had  brought  with  him  to  Corfinium  and 
deposited  in  the  hands  of  the  two  treasurers  of  the 
town,  who  surrendered  it  to  Caesar.  As  this  was 
public  money,  assigned  by  Pompey  to  pay  the  forces 
with,  Caesar  might  justly  have  seized  it,  but  he  was 
willing  to  show  himself  generous  as  well  as  merciful. 
He  ordered  Domitius’s  soldiers  to  take  the  usual 


32 


C^SAR  S  COMMENTARIES. 


oath  to  him,  decamped  that  very  day,  made  the  or¬ 
dinary  march,  and,  after  staying  in  all  seven  days 
before  Corfinium,  arrived  in  Apulia,  through  the  ter¬ 
ritories  of  the  Marrucini,  Frentani,  and  Larinates. 

23.  Pompey,  having  intelligence  of  what  passed 
at  Corfinium,  retreated  from  Luceria  to  Canusium, 
and  thence  to  Brundusium.  He  ordered  all' the  new 
levies  to  join  him,  armed  the  shepherds  and  slaves, 
furnished  them  with  horses,  and  formed  a  body  of 
about  three  hundred  cavalry.  Meanwhile  the  pretor 
L.  Manlius,  flying  from  Alba,  with  six  cohorts,  and 
the  pretor  Rutilus  Lupus,  from  Tarracina,  ^ith  three, 
saw  Caesar’s  cavalry  at  a  distance,  commanded  by 
Bivius  Curius ;  on  which  the  soldiers  immediately 
abandoned  the  two  pretors,  and  joined  the  troops 
under  the  conduct  of  Curius.  Several  other  parties, 
flying  different  ways,  fell  in,  some  with  the  foot, 
others  with  the  horse.  Cn.  Magius  of  Cremona, 
Pompey’s  chief  engineer,  being  taken  on  his  way  to 
Brundusium,  was  brought  to  Caesar,  who  sent  him 
back  to  Pompey  with  this  message  :  “  that  as  he  had 
not  yet  obtained  an  interview,  his  design  was  to 
come  to  Brundusium,  there  to  confer  with  him  in 
relation  to  the  common  safety ;  because  they  soon 
would  be  able  to  despatch,  in  a  personal  treaty, 
what,  if  managed  by  the  intervention  of  others,  could 
not  be  hindered  from  running  into  a  tedious  nego¬ 
tiation.” 

24.  Having  dismissed  him  with  these  instructions, 
he  arrived  before  Brundusium  with  six  legions,  three 
of  which  were  composed  of  veteran  soldiers,  and  the 
rest  of  new  levies  drawn  together  on  his  march ;  for 
as  to  Domitius’s  troops,  he  had  sent  them  directly 
from  Corfinium  to  Sicily.  He  found  the  consuls 
were  gone  to  Dyrrhachium  with  great  part  of  the 
army,  and  that  Pompey  remained  in  Brundusium 
with  twenty  cohorts.  Nor  was  it  certainly  known 
whether  he  continued  there  with  design  to  keep 
possession  of  Brundusium,  that  he  might  be  master 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  I. 


33 


of  the  whole  Adriatic  Sea,  the  extreme  parts  of  Italy, 
and  the  country  of  Greece,  in  order  to  make  war  on 
both  sides  the  gulf,  or  for  want  of  shipping  to  trans¬ 
port  his  men.  Fearing  therefore  that  it  was  his 
intention  to  keep  footing  in  Italy,  he  resolved  to  de¬ 
prive  him  of  the  advantages  he  might  receive  from 
the  port  of  Brundusium.  The  works  he  contrived 
for  this  purpose  were  as  follows  : — He  carried  on  a 
mole  on  either  side  the  mouth  of  the  haven,  where 
the  entrance  was  narrowest  and  the  water  shallow. 
But  as  this  work  could  not  be  carried  quite  across 
the  port,  by  reason  of  the  great  depth  of  the  sea,  he 
prepared  double  floats  of  timber,  thirty  feet  square, 
which  were  each  secured  by  four  anchors  from  the 
four  corners,  to  enable  them  to  resist  the  fury  of  the 
waves.  These,  extending  all  the  way  between  the 
two  moles,  were  covered  over  with  earth  and  fas¬ 
cines,  that  the  soldiers  might  pass  and  repass  with 
ease,  and  have  firm  footing  to  defend  them.  The 
front  and  sides  were  armed  with  a  parapet  of  hurdles, 
and  every  fourth  float  had  a  tower  of  two  stories, 
the  better  to  guard  the  work  from  fire  and  the  shocks 
of  the  vessels. 

25.  Against  these  preparations  Pompey  made  use 
of  several  large  ships,  which  he  found  in  the  port  of 
Brundusium ;  and  having  fitted  them  with  towers  of 
three  stories,  which  he  filled  with  a  great  number  of 
engines  and  darts,  let  them  loose  on  Caesar’s  floats, 
to  break  through  the  staccado,  and  interrupt  the 
works.  Thus  daily  skirmishes  happened  with  darts, 
arrows,  and  slings,  at  a  distance.  Amid  these  hos¬ 
tilities,  Caesar’s  thoughts  were  still  bent  on  peace ; 
and  though  he  could  not  but  wonder  that  Magius, 
whom  he  had  sent  with  proposals  to  Pompey,  was 
not  yet  returned  with  an  answer,  and  even  saw  his 
designs  and  undertakings  retarded  by  his  frequent 
offers  of  this  kind,  he  nevertheless  still  persevered 
in  these  peaceable  resolutions.  Accordingly  he  des¬ 
patched  Caninius  Robilus,  one  of  his  lieutenants,  a 


34 


CiESAR’S  COMMENTARIES. 


relation  and  intimate  friend  of  Scribonius  Libo,  to 
confer  with  him  on  this  subject.  He  charged  him 
to  exhort  that  nobleman  to  think  seriously  of  peace, 
and  if  possible  procure  an  interview  between  him 
and  Pompey.  Could  this  be  effected,  he  showed 
there  was  the  greatest  ground  to  believe  that  peace 
would  soon  be  concluded  on  reasonable  terms ;  the 
honour  and  reputation  of  which  would,  in  a  manner, 
wholly  redound  to  Libo,  if  by  his  mediation  both 
parties  should  be  prevailed  with  to  lay  down  their 
arms.  Libo,  after  conferring  with  Caninius,  waited  on 
Pompey;  soon  after  he  returned  with  this  answer, 
that  the  consuls  were  absent,  without  whom  Pompey 
had  no  power  to  treat  of  an  accommodation.  Thus 
Ccesar,  having  often  tried  in  vain  to  bring  about  a 
peace,  t)  )ught  it  now  time  to  drop  that  design,  and 
bend  all  his  thoughts  to  war. 

26.  Caesar,  having  spent  nine  days  about  his  works, 
had  now  half-finished  the  staccado,  when  the  ships 
employed  in  the  first  embarkation,  being  sent  back 
by  the  consuls  from  Dyrrhachium,  returned  to  Brun- 
dusium.  Pompey,  either  alarmed  at  Caesar’s  works, 
or  because  from  the  first  he  had  determined  to  re¬ 
linquish  Italy,  no  sooner  saw  the  transports  arrive, 
than  he  prepared  to  carry  over  the  rest  of  his  forces. 
And  the  better  to  secure  himself  against  Caesar,  and 
prevent  his  troops  from  breaking  into  the  town 
during  the  embarkation,  he  walled  up  the  gates, 
barricaded  the  streets,  or  cut  ditches  across  them, 
filled  with  pointed  stakes,  and  covered  with  hurdles 
and  earth.  The  two  streets  which  led  to  the  port, 
and  which  he  left  open  for  the  passage  of  his  men, 
were  fortified  with  a  double  palisado  of  very  strong 
well-sharpened  stakes.  These  preparations  being 
made,  he  ordered  the  soldiers  to  embark  with  great 
silence,  having  placed  on  the  walls  and  towers  some 
select  archers  and  slingers,  who  were  to  wait  till  all 
the  troops  had  got  aboard,  and  then  retire,  on  a 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  I.  35 

Signal  given,  to  some  small  ships  that  awaited  them 
at  a  convenient  distance. 

27.  The  people  of  Brundusium,  provoked  by  the 
affronts  they  had  received  from  Pompey,  and  the 
insults  of  his  soldiers,  wished  well  to  Caesar’s  cause  ; 
and  having  notice  of  Pompey’s  intended  departure, 
while  the  soldiers  were  busied  with  the  care  of  em¬ 
barking,  found  means  to  signify  it  from  the  tops  of 
their  houses.  Caesar,  on  this  intelligence,  ordered 
scaling  ladders  to  be  prepared,  and  the  soldiers  to 
repair  to  their  arms,  that  he  might  not  lose  any 
opportunity  of  acting.  Pompey  weighed  anchor  a 
little  before  night,  and  gave  the  signal  for  recalling 
the  soldiers  that  were  '  on  the  walls,  who  repaired 
with  all  expedition  to  the  s.hips  prepared  for  them. 
Meantime  the  scaling  ladders  were  applied  to  the 
walls,  and  C2esar’s  troops  entered  the  town.  But 
being  informed  by  the  Brundusians  of  the  snares  and 
ditches  provided  for  them  by  the  enemy,  they  were 
obliged  to  take  a  great  circuit,  which  gave  Pompey 
time  enough  to  put  to  sea.  Two  transports  only, 
impeded  by  Caesar’s  mole,  were  taken  with  the  troops 
on  board. 

28.  Though  Caesar  was  fully  sensible  that  to 
finish  the  war  at  a  blow  he  must  pass  the  sea  im¬ 
mediately,  and  endeavour  to  come  up  with  Pompey 
before  he  could  draw  his  transmarine  forces  together, 
yet  he  dreaded  the  delay  and  length  of  time  that 
such  a  project  might  require ;  because  Pompey, 
having  carried  with  him  all  the  ships  on  that  coast, 
rendered  the  present  execution  of  the  design  imprac¬ 
ticable.  He  must  therefore  wait  the  arrival  of  ships 
from  Picenum,  Sicily,  and  the  remoter  coasts  of 
Gaul,  which  was  a  tedious  business,  and,  at  that  sea¬ 
son  of  the  year,  subject  to  great  uncertainty.  It 
appeared  likewise  of  dangerous  consequence  to 
suffer  a  veteran  army,  and  the  two  Spains,  one  of 
which  was  wholly  devoted  to  Pompey,  to  strengthen 
themselves  in  his  rival’s  interest ;  to  let  them  grow 


36 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


powerful  by  levies  of  horse  and  foot,  and  leave  Gaul 
and  Italy  open  to  their  attacks  in  his  absence.  He 
determined  therefore  to  lay  aside,  for  the  present, 
the  design  of  pursuing  Pompey,  and  turn  all  his 
thoughts  towards  Spain.  He  ordered  the  magis¬ 
trates  of  the  municipal  towns  to  assemble  all  the 
vessels  they  could,  and  send  them  to  Brundusium. 
He  sent  Valerius,  one  of  his  lieutenants,  into  Sar¬ 
dinia,  with  one  legion,  and  the  propretor  Curio  into 
Sicily  with  three ;  ordering  him,  as  soon  as  he  had 
mastered  Sicily,  to  pass  over  with  his  army  into 
Africa. 

29.  M.  Cotta  commanded  in  Sardinia ;  M.  Cato  in 
Sicily ;  and  Africa  had  fallen  by  lot  to  Tubero.  The 
inhabitants  of  Cagliari,  hearing  of  Valerius’s  commis¬ 
sion,  of  their  own  accord,  before  he  had  left  Italy, 
drove  Cotta  out  of  their  city ;  who,  terrified  by  the 
unanimous  opposition  he  met  with  from  the  province, 
fled  into  Africa.  In  Sicily,  Cato  applied  himself  with 
great  diligence  to  the  refitting  of  old  ships,  and 
building  of  new.  He  sent  his  lieutenant  to  raise 
forces  in  Lucania,  and  the  country  of  the  Brutians, 
and  ordered  the  states  of  Sicily  to  furnish  him  with 
a  certain  number  of  horse  and  foot.  When  these 
preparations  were  almost  completed,  being  informed 
of  Curio’s  arrival,  he  called  his  chief  officers  to¬ 
gether,  and  complained  “  that  he  was  betrayed  and 
abandoned  by  Pompey,  who,  without  any  previous 
preparation,  had  involved  the  commonwealth  in  an 
unnecessary  war ;  and  on  being  questioned  by  him¬ 
self  and  others  in  the  senate,  had  assured  them  that 
he  was  abundantly  able  to  sustain  it.”  Having  thus 
declared  his  mind,  he  quitted  the  province,  which  by 
this  means  submitted  without  trouble  to  Curio,  as 
Sardinia  had  before  done  to  Valerius.  Tubero, 
arriving  in  Africa,  found  Attius  Varus  in  possession 
of  that  province  ;  who,  after  the  loss  of  his  cohorts 
at  Auximum,  as  we  have  shown  above,  had  fled  into 
those  parts,  and,  with  the  consent  of  the  natives, 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  I. 


37 


taken  on  him  the  command.  Here  he  had  found 
means  to  levy  two  legions,  by  his  knowledge  of  the 
people  and  country,  where  he  had  been  governor 
some  years  before,  after  the  expiration  of  his  pre- 
torship.  Tubero,  coming  before  Utica  with  his  fleet, 
was  forbid  the  harbour  and  town ;  nor  could  he  even 
obtain  leave  for  his  son  to  land,  though  he  had  a  fit 
of  sickness  on  him,  but  was  obliged  to  weigh  anchor 
and  be  gone. 

30.  These  affairs  despatched,  Caesar,  that  his  troops 
might  enjoy  some  repose,  cantoned  them  in  the 
nearest  towns,  and  set  out  himself  for  Rome.  There 
he  assembled  the  senate,  and  after  complaining  of 
the  injuries  of  his  enemies,  told  them  “  that  he  had 
never  affected  extraordinary  honours,  but  waited 
patiently  the  time  prescribed  by  the  laws  to  solicit 
for  a  second  consulship,  to  which  every  Roman  citi¬ 
zen  had  a  right  to  aspire  :  that  the  people,  with  the 
concurrence  of  their  tribunes  (in  spite  of  the  at¬ 
tempts  of  his  enemies,  and  the  vigorous  opposition 
of  Cato,  who  endeavoured,  according  to  custom,  to 
spin  out  the  time  in  speaking),  had  permitted  him  to 
stand  candidate  though  absent,  and  that  even  in  the 
consulship  of  Pompey ;  who,  if  he  disapproved  of 
the  decree,  why  did  he  let  it  passl  But  if  he 
allowed  it,  why  now  oppose  the  execution!  He 
set  before  them  his  moderation,  in  voluntarily  pro¬ 
posing  that  both  parties  should  lay  down  their  arms, 
by  which  he  must  have  been  himself  divested  of  his 
government  and  command.  He  displayed  the  malice 
of  his  enemies,  who  sought  to  impose  terras  on  him, 
to  which  they  would  not  submit  themselves ;  and 
chose  rather  to  involve  the  state  in  a  civil  war  than 
part  with  their  armies  and  provinces.  He  enlarged 
on  the  injury  they  had  done  him  in  taking  away  two 
of  his  legions,  and  their  cruelty  and  insolence  in 
violating  the  authority  of  the  tribunes.  He  spoke 
of  his  many  offers  of  peace,  his  frequent  desire  of  an 
interview,  and  the  continual  refusals  he  had  received. 

Cjss.  Vol.  II. — D 


38 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


For  all  these  reasons,  he  requested  and  conjured 
them  to  undertake  the  administration  of  the  repub¬ 
lic  jointly  with  him.  But  if  they  declined  it  through 
fear,  he  had  no  intention  to  force  so  great  a  burden 
on  them,  and  would  take  the  whole  charge  alone. 
That,  in  the  mean  time,  it  would  be  proper  to  send 
a  deputation  to  Pompey,  to  treat  of  an  accommoda¬ 
tion:  nor  was  he  frightened  at  the  difficulty  Pompey 
had  started  some  time  before  in  the  senate, — that  to 
send  deputies  was  to  acknowledge  the  superiority  of 
him  to  whom  they  were  sent,  and  a  sign  of  timidity 
in  the  sender.  That  this  was  a  little  low  way  of 
thinking ;  and  that,  in  the  same  manner  as  he  had 
^endeavoured  at  a  superiority  in  action,  he  would 
also  strive  to  be  superior  in  justice  and  equity.” 

31.  The  senate  liked  the  proposal  of  a  deputation 
to  Pompey,  but  the  great  difficulty  was,  to  find 
deputies  ;  every  one,  out  of  fear,  refusing  to  charge 
himself  with  that  commission :  for  Pompey,  at  his 
departure  from  Rome,  had  declared  in  the  senate, 
“that  he  would  esteem  those  who  staid  behind 
as  no  less  guilty  than  those  in  Caesar’s  camp.”  Thus 
three  days  were  spent  in  debates  and  excuses.  The 
tribune  L.  Metellus  had  likewise  been  suborned  by 
Caesar’s  enemies  to  traverse  this  design,  and  hinder 
whatever  he  should  propose  :  which  Caesar  coming 
to  understand,  and  that  he  only  wasted  his  time  to 
no  purpose,  he  set  out  from  Rome,  without  effecting 
what  he  had  intended,  and  arrived  in  Farther  Gaul. 

32.  Here  he  was  informed  that  Pompey  had  sent 
into  Spain  Vibullius  Rufus,  the  same  who  a  few  days 
before  had  been  made  prisoner  at  Corfinium,  and  set 
at  liberty  by  Caesar :  that  Domitius  was  gone  to  take 
possession  of  Marseilles,  with  seven  galleys,  which 
he  had  fitted  out  at  Igilium  and  Cosanmn,  and 
manned  with  his  Slaves,  freedmen,  and  labourers: 
that  the  deputies  of  the  above-mentioned  states, 
young  men  of  the  first  quality  (whom  Pompey  at 
his  departure  from  Rome  had  exhorted  not  to  suffer 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  I. 


39 


the  memory  of  his  past  services  to  their  country  to 
be  blotted  out  by  those  lately  received  from  Caesar), 
had  been  sent  before,  to  prepare  the  way  for  his  re¬ 
ception.  In  consequence  of  their  remonstrances, 
the  inhabitants  of  Marseilles  shut  their  gates  against 
Caesar,  and  summoned  to  their  assistance  the  Albici, 
a  barbarous  people,  who  had  long  been  under  their 
protection,  and  inhabited  the  adjoining  mountains. 
They  brought  provisions  from  the  neighbouring 
country  and  castles,  appointed  work-shops  for  the 
making  of  arms,  refitted  their  navy,  and  repaired 
their  walls  and  gates. 

33.  Caesar,  sending  for  fifteen  of  the  principal  men 
of  the  city,  exhorted  them  not  to  be  the  first  to 
begin  the  war,  but  to  be  swayed  rather  by  the 
authority  of  all  Italy  than  the  will  of  one  particular 
person.  He  forgot  not  such  other  considerations  as 
seemed  most  likely  to  bring  them  to  reason.  The 
deputies,  returning  into  the  town,  brought  back  this 
answer  from  the  senate  :  “  that  they  saw  the  Romans 
divided  into  two  parties,  and  it  did  not  belong  to 
them  to  decide  such  a  quarrel :  that  at  the  head  of 
these  parties  were  Pompey  and  Csesar,  both  patrons 
of  their  city  ;  the  one  having  added  to  it  the  country 
of  the  Volcae  Arecomici  and  Helvians ;  the  other, 
after  the  reduction  of  Gaul,  considerably  augmented 
its  territories  and  revenues :  that  as  they  were 
therefore  equally  indebted  to  both,  it  became  them 
not  to  aid  the  one  against  the  other,  but  to  remain 
neuter,  and  grant  neither  an  admittance  into  their 
city  or  port.” 

34.  While  these  things  were  in  agitation,  Domitius 
arrived  at  Marseilles  with  his  fleet,  and  being  re¬ 
ceived  into  the  town,  was  appointed  governor,  and 
charged  with  the  whole  administration  of  the  war. 
By  his  order  they  sent  out  their  fleet  to  cruise  round 
the  coasts  ;  seized  and  brought  in  all  the  merchant 
vessels  they  could  find,  and  made  use  of  the  nails, 
rigging,  and  timber  of  such  as  were  unfit  for  service 


40 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


to  repair  the  rest.  They  deposited  in  public  grana¬ 
ries  all  the  corn  that  was  to  be  found  in  the  city,  and 
secured  whatever  else  they  thought  might  be  ser¬ 
viceable  to  them  in  case  of  a  siege.  Caesar,  pro¬ 
voked  at  these  preparations,  brought  three  legions 
before  the  town,  began  to  erect  towers  and  galleries, 
and  gave  orders  for  building  twelve  galleys  at  Arles, 
which  being  finished,  launched,  and  brought  to  Mar¬ 
seilles  within  thirty  days  from  the  cutting  of  the 
wood  they  were  composed  of,  he  put  them  under  the 
command  of  D.  Brutus,  and  having  directed  the 
manner  of  the  siege,  left  the  care  of  it  to  C.  Trebo- 
nius,  his  lieutenant. 

35.  During  these  orders  and  preparations,  he  sent 
C.  Fabius  before  him  into  Spain,  with  three  legions 
that  had  wintered  about  Narbonne,  charging  him  to 
secure  with  all  diligence  the  passage  of  the  Pyre¬ 
nean  mountains,  which  was  at  that  time  guarded  by 
a  party  of  Afranius’s  army.  His  other  legions,  whose 
quarters  were  more  remote,  had  orders  to  follow  as 
fast  as  they  could.  Fabius,  according  to  his  instruc¬ 
tions,  having  made  great  despatch,  forced  the  passes 
of  the  Pyrenees,  and  by  long  marches  came  up  with 
Afranius’s  army. 

36.  Pompey  had  then  three  lieutenants  in  Spain, 
— Afranius,  Petreius,  and  Varro.  The  first  of  these 
was  at  the  head  of  three  legions,  and  governed  the 
Nearer  Spain.  The  other  two  had  each  two  legions, 
and  commanded,  the  one  from  the  Castilian  forest 
to  the  Anas,  the  other  from  the  Anas  quite  through 
Lusitania,  and  the  territories  of  the  Yettones.  These 
three  lieutenants,  on  the  arrival  of  Vibullius  Rufus, 
whom  Pompey  had  sent  into  Spain,  as  we  have  seen 
above,  consulted  together,  and  agreed  that  Petreius 
should  join  Afranius  with  his  two  legions,  and  that 
Varro  should  stay  and  secure  Farther  Spain.  These 
resolutions  being  taken,  Petreius  levied  horse  and 
foot  in  Lusitania,  and  Afranius  in  Celtiberia,  and  the 
barbarous  nations  bordering  on  the  ocean.  When 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  I. 


41 


the  levies  were  completed,  Petreius  speedily  joined 
Afranius,  through  the  territories  of  the  Vettones; 
and  both  resolved  to  make  Lerida  the  seat  of  the 
war,  because  the  country  lay  convenient  for  their 
purpose. 

37.  We  have  already  observed  that  Afranius  had 
three  legions,  and  Petreius  two.  Besides  these, 
there  were  about  eighty  cohorts,  some  light,  some 
heavy  armed,  and  five  thousand  horse,  raised  in  both 
provinces.  Caesar  had  sent  his  legions  before  him 
into  Spain,  with  six  thousand  auxiliary  foot,  and 
three  thousand  horse,  who  had  served  under  him  in 
all  his  former  wars,  and  he  was  furnished  with  the 
like  number  from  Gaul,  all  chosen  troops  :  for  hear¬ 
ing  that  Pompey  was  coming  with  his  whole  force 
through  Mauritania  into  Spain,  he  sent  circular  let¬ 
ters  to  all  the  Gallic  states,  inviting  by  name  those 
of  the  most  known  and  approved  valour,  and  in  par¬ 
ticular  a  select  body  of  mountaineers  from  Aquitain, 
where  it  borders  on  the  Roman  province.  At  the 
same  time  he  borrowed  money  from  the  military 
tribunes  and  centurions,  which  he  distributed  among 
the  soldiers.  This  policy  was  attended  with  two 
great  advantages :  it  bound  the  officers  to  him  by  the 
obligation  of  interest,  and  the  soldiers  by  the  tie  of 
gratitude. 

38.  Fabius,  by  letters  and  messengers,  endeavoured 
to  sound  the  disposition  of  the  neighbouring  states. 
He  had  laid  two  bridges  over  the  Sicoris,  four  miles 
distant  from  each  other,  for  the  convenience  of 
foraging,  having  consumed  all  the  pasture  on  this 
side  the  river.  Pompey’s  generals  did  the  same, 
with  much  the  like  view,  which  occasioned  frequent 
skirmishes  between  the  horse.  Two  of  Fabius’s  le¬ 
gions,  which  was  the  ordinary  guard  of  the  foragers 
passing  one  day  according  to  custom,  and  the  cav¬ 
alry  and  carriages  following,  the  bridge  broke  down 
on  a  sudden,  by  the  violence  of  the  winds  and  floods 
and  separated  them  from  the  rest  of  the  army.  Afra* 

D2 


42 


CiESAR’s  COMMENTARIES. 


nius  and  Petreius,  perceiving  it,  by  the  fascines  and 
hurdles  that  came  down  with  the  stream,  detached  im¬ 
mediately  four  legions,  with  all  their  cavalry,  over  the 
bridge  that  lay  between  the  town  and  their  camp,  and 
marched  to  attack  Fabius’s  legions.  On  this  L.  Plan- 
cus,  who  commanded  the  escort,  finding  himself  hard 
pressed,  seizing  a  rising  ground,  and  forming  his 
men  in  two  divisions,  posted  them  back  to  back, 
that  he  might  not  be  surrounded  by  the  enemy’s 
horse.  By  this  disposition,  though  inferior  in  num¬ 
ber,  he  was  enabled  to  sustain  the  furious  charge 
of  their  legions  and  cavalry.  During  the  course  of 
the  battle,  the  ensigns  of  two  legions  were  per¬ 
ceived  at  a  distance,  which  Fabius  had  sent  by  the 
farther  bridge  to  sustain  his  party,  suspecting  what 
might  happen,  and  that  Pompey’s  generals  would 
seize  the  opportunity  offered  them  by  fortune  to 
fall  on  our  men.  Their  arrival  put  an  end  to  the 
engagement,  and  both  parties  returned  to  their  re¬ 
spective  camps. 

39.  Two  days  after,  Caesar  arrived  in  the  camp 
with  nine  hundred  horse,  which  he  had  kept  for  a 
body-guard.  He  began  by  re-establishing  in  the 
night  the  bridge  which  had  been  broken  down,  and 
was  not  yet  quite  repaired.  Next  day  he  took  a 
view  of  the  country,  and  leaving  six  cohorts  to 
guard  the  bridge,  the  camp,  and  the  baggage,  marched 
with  all  his  forces  in  three  lines  to  Lerida,  and 
stopped  near  Afranius’s  camp,  where  he  remained 
some  time  under  arms,  and  offered  him  battle  on  an 
even  ground.  Afranius  drew  out  his  troops,  and 
formed  them  before  his  camp,  half-way, down  the 
hill.  Caesar,  finding  that  he  declined  an  engagement, 
resolved  to  encamp  within  four  hundred  paces  of 
the  foot  of  the  mountain,  and,  to  hinder  his  troops 
from  being  alarmed  or  interrupted  in  their  works  by 
sudden  incursions  from  the  enemy,  ordered  them 
not  to  throw  up  a  rampart,  which  must  have  ap¬ 
peared  and  betrayed  them  at  a  distance,  but  to  cut 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  I. 


43 


a  ditch  in  front,  fifteen  feet  broad.  The  first  and 
second  lines  continued  in  order  of  battle,  as  had 
been  resolved  from  the  beginning,  and  the  third  car¬ 
ried  on  the  work  behind  them  unperceived.  Thus 
the  whole  was  completed  before  Afranius  had  the 
least  suspicion  of  his  design  to  encamp  there. 

40.  In  the  evening,  Caesar  retreated  with  his  le¬ 
gions  behind  the  ditch,  and  passed  the  whole  night 
under  arms.  Next  day  he  carried  the  intrenchment 
quite  round  his  camp,  and  because  materials  for  a 
rampart  must  have  been  fetched  from  a  great  dis¬ 
tance,  he  contented  himself  for  the  present  with  a 
naked  ditch,  as  the  day  before,  allotting  a  legion  to 
each  side  of  the  camp,  and  keeping  the  rest  of  the 
troops  under  arms,  to  cover  those  that,  worked. 
Afranius  and  Petreius,  to  alarm  our  men  and  disturb 
the  works,  advanced  with  their  troops  to  the  foot 
of  the  mountain,  and  threatened  to  give  battle.  But 
Caesar,  trusting  to  the  three  legions  under  arms, 
and  the  defence  of  his  ditch,  still  persisted  in  his  de¬ 
sign.  At  last,  after  a  short  stay,  and  without  daring 
o  come  forwards  into  the  plain,  they  retreated 
again  to  their  camp.  The  third  day  Caesar  added  a 
rampart  to  his  camp,  and  brought  into  it  the  six 
cohorts,  with  the  baggage  which  he  had  left  in  his 
former  camp. 

41.  Between  the  city  of  Lerida  and  the  hill  where 
Petreius  and  Afranius  were  encamped  was  a  plain 
of  about  three  hundred  paces,  in  the  midst  of  which 
was  a  rising  ground,  which  Caesar  wanted  to  take 
possession  of ;  because,  by  that  means  he  could 
cut  off  the  enemy’s  communication  with  the  town 
and  bridge,  and  render  the  magazines  they  had  in 
the  town  useless.  In  this  hope,  he  drew  out  three 
legions,  and  having  formed  them  in  order  of  battle, 
commanded  the  first  ranks  of  one  of  them  to  run  be¬ 
fore,  and  gain  the  place.  Afranius,  perceiving  his 
design,  despatched  the  cohorts  that  were  on  guard 
before  the  camp  a  nearer  way  to  the  same  eminence. 


44 


CjEsar  s  commentaries. 


The  contest  was  sharply  maintained  on  both  sides  • 
but  Afranius’s  party,  who  first  got  possession  of  the 
post,  obliged  our  men  to  give  ground,  and  being  re¬ 
inforced  by  fresh  supplies,  put  them  at  last  to  rout, 
and  forced  them  to  fly  for  shelter  to  the  legions. 

42.  The  manner  of  fighting  of  Afranius’s  soldiers 
was,  to  come  forward  briskly  against  an  enemy,  and 
boldly  take  possession  of  some  post,  neither  taking 
care  to  keep  their  ranks,  nor  holding  it  necessary  to 
fight  in  a  close  compact  body.  If  they  found  them¬ 
selves  hard  pushed,  they  thought  it  no  dishonour  to 
retire  and  quit  their  post,  following  in  this  the  custom 
of  the  Lusitanians,  and  other  barbarous  nations,  as  it 
almost  always  happens  that  soldiers  give  in  to  the 
manners  of  the  country  where  they  have  long  been 
used  to  make  war.  This  manner  of  fighting,  how¬ 
ever,  as  it  was  new  and  unexpected,  disordered  our 
men,  who,  seeing  the  enemy  come  forward,  without 
regard  to  their  ranks,  were  apprehensive  of  being 
surrounded,  and  yet  did  not  think  themselves  at 
liberty  to  break  their  ranks,  or  abandon  their  ensigns, 
or  quit  their  post,  without  some  very  urgent  cause. 
The  first  ranks  therefore  being  put  into  disorder, 
the  legion  in  that  wing  gave  ground,  and  retired  to 
a  neighbouring  hill. 

43.  Caesar,  contrary  to  his  expectation,  finding  the 
consternation  like  to  spread  through  the  whole  army, 
encouraged  his  men,  and  led  the  ninth  legion  to  their 
assistance.  He  soon  put  a  stop  to  the  vigorous  and 
insulting  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  obliged  them  to  turn 
their  backs,  and  pushed  them  to  the  very  walls  of 
Lerida.  But  the  soldiers  of  the  ninth  legion,  elated 
with  success,  and  eager  to  repair  the  loss  we  had 
sustained,  followed  the  runaways  with  so  much  heat, 
that  they  were  drawn  into  a  place  of  disadvantage, 
and  found  themselves  directly  under  the  hill  where 
the  town  stood,  whence  when  they  endeavoured  to 
retire,  the  enemy,  again  facing  about,  charged  vigor¬ 
ously  from  the  higher  ground.  The  hill  was  rough, 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  I. 


45 


and  steep  on  each  side,  extending  only  so  far  in 
breadth  as  was  sufficient  for  drawing  up  three  cohorts ; 
but  they  could  neither  be  reinforced  in  flank,  nor 
sustained  by  the  cavalry.  The  descent  from  the 
town  was  indeed  something  easier  for  about  four 
hundred  paces,  which  furnished  our  men  with  the 
means  of  extricating  themselves  from  the  danger 
into  which  their  rashness  had  brought  them.  Here 
they  bravely  maintained  the  fight,  though  with  great 
disadvantage  to  themselves,  as  well  on  account  of 
the  narrowness  of  the  place,  as  because  being  posted 
at  the  foot  of  the  hill,  none  of  the  enemy’s  darts  fell 
in  vain.  Still,  however,  they  supported  themselves 
by  their  courage  and  patience,  and  were  not  dis¬ 
heartened  by  the  many  wounds  they  received.  The 
enemy’s  forces  increased  every  moment,  fresh  co¬ 
horts  being  sent  from  the  camp  through  the  town,  who 
succeeded  in  the  place  of  those  that  were  fatigued. 
Caesar  was  likewise  obliged  to  detach  small  parties 
to  maintain  the  battle,  and  bring  off  such  as  were 
wounded. 

44.  The  fight  had  now  lasted  five  hours  without 
intermission,  when  our  men,  oppressed  by  the  multi¬ 
tude  of  the  enemy,  and  having  spent  all  their  darts, 
attacked  the  mountain  sword  in  hand,  and  over¬ 
throwing  such  as  opposed  them,  obliged  the  rest  to 
betake  themselves  to  flight.  The  pursuit  was  con¬ 
tinued  to  the  very  walls  of  Lerida,  and  some  out  of 
fear  took  shelter  in  the  town,  which  gave  our  men 
an  opportunity  of  making  good  their  retreat.  At 
the  same  time  the  cavalry,  though  posted  disadvan- 
tageously  in  a  bottom,  found  means  by  their  valour 
to  gain  the  summit  of  the  mountain,  and  riding  be¬ 
tween  both  armies,  hindered  the  enemy  from  har¬ 
assing  our  rear.  Thus  the  engagement  was  attended 
with  various  turns  of  fortune.  Caesar  lost  about 
seventy  men  in  the  first  encounter,  among  whom 
was  Q.  Fulginius,  first  centurion  of  the  Hastati  of 
the  fourteenth  legion,  who  had  raised  himself  by 


46 


CESAR’S  COMMENTARIES. 


his  valour  to  that  rank,  through  all  the  inferior  orders. 
Upwards  of  six  hundred  were  wounded.  On  Afra- 
nius’s  side  was  slain  T.  Caecilius,  first  centurion  of  a 
legion  ;  also  four  centurions  of  inferior  degree,  and 
above  two  hundred  private  men. 

45.  Yet  such  were  the  circumstances  of  this  day’s 
action,  that  both  sides  laid  claim  to  the  victory ;  the 
Afranians,  because,  though  allowed  to  be  inferior  in 
number,  they  had  long  sustained  our  attack,  kept 
possession  of  the  eminence  which  occasioned  the 
dispute,  and  obliged  our  men  at  first  to  give  ground ; 
Caesar’s  troops,  because  they  had  maintained  a  fight 
of  five  hours,  with  a  handful  of  men,  and  in  a  very 
disadvantageous  post ;  because  they  had  attacked 
the  mountain  sword  in  hand ;  because  they  had 
driven  their  adversaries  from  the  higher  ground, 
and  compelled  them  to  take  shelter  in  the  town. 
Meantime  A  franius  fortified  the  hillock  which  had 
been  the  subject  of  dispute,  with  a  great  number  of 
works,  and  posted  there  a  large  body  of  troops. 

46.  Two  days  after,  a  very  unfortunate  accident 
happened :  for  so  great  a  storm  arose,  that  the  water 
was  never  known  to  be  higher  in  those  parts  ;  and 
the  snow  came  down  in  such  quantities  from  all  the 
mountains  round  about,  that  the  river  overflowed 
its  banks,  and  in  one  day  broke  down  both  the  bridges 
Fabius  had  built  over  it.  Caesar’s  army  was  reduced 
to  great  extremities  on  this  occasion :  for  his  camp, 
as  we  have  before  observed,  was  between  the  Sicoris 
and  Cinga,  two  rivers  that  were  neither  of  them  ford¬ 
able,  and  necessarily  shut  him  up  within  the  space 
of  no  more  than  thirty  miles.  By  this  means,  nei¬ 
ther  could  the  states  that  had  declared  for  him  sup¬ 
ply  him  with  provisions,  nor  the  troops  that  had 
been  sent  beyond  the  rivers  to  forage  return,  nor 
the  large  convoys  he  expected  from  Gaul  and  Italy 
get  t9  his  camp.  Add  to  all  this,  that  it  being  near 
the  time  of  harvest,  corn  was  extremely  scarce : 
and  the  more  as,  before  Caesar’s  arrival,  Afranius 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  I. 


47 


had  carried  great  quantities  of  it  to  Lerida ;  and  the 
rest  had  been  consumed  by  Caesar’s  troops.  The 
cattle,  which  was  the  next  resource  in  the  present 
scarcity,  had  been  removed  to  places  of  security, 
on  the  breaking  out  of  the  war.  The  parties  sent 
out  to  forage  and  bring  in  corn  were  perpetually 
harassed  by  the  Spanish  infantry,  who,  being  well 
acquainted  with  the  country,  pursued  them  every¬ 
where.  The  rivers  themselves  did  not  impede  them, 
because  they  Were  accustomed  to  pass  them  on 
blown-up  skins,  which  they  always  brought  with 
them  into  the  field.  Afranius,  on  the  contrary, 
abounded  in  all  things.  He  had  large  magazines  of 
corn  already  laid  up,  was  continually  receiving 
fresh  supplies  from  the  province,  and  had  plenty  of 
forage.  The  bridge  of  Lerida  furnished  all  these 
conveniences  without  danger,  and  opened  a  free 
communication  with  the  country  beyond  the  river, 
from  which  Caesar  was  wholly  excluded. 

47.  The  waters  continued  several  days.  Caesar 
endeavoured  to  re-establish  his  bridges,  but  could 
not  get  the  better  of  the  obstacles  occasioned  by  the 
swelling  of  the  river,  and  the  enemy’s  forces  sta¬ 
tioned  on  the  opposite  bank.  They  found  it  easier 
to  prevent  his  design,  as  the  river  was  deep  and 
rapid,  and  they  could  discharge  their  darts  all  along 
the  bank,  on  that  particular  spot  where  our  men 
were  at  work :  whereas  it  was  extremely  difficult  on 
our  side  to  struggle  with  the  force  of  the  stream, 
and  at  the  same  time  guard  ourselves  against  the 
assaults  of  the  enemy. 

48.  Meanwhile  Afranius  was  informed  that  a  large 
convoy,  which  was  on  its  way  to  join  Caesar,  had 
been  obliged  to  halt  at  the  river-side.  It  consisted 
of  archers  from  Rovergue,  Gaulish  horse,  with  many 
carts  and  much  baggage,  according  to  the  custom 
of  the  Gauls,  and  about  six  thousand  men  of  all  sorts, 
with  their  domestics  and  slaves  ;  but  without  disci¬ 
pline  or  commander,  every  one  following  his  own 


48 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


choice,  and  all  marching  in  perfect  security,  as  if  they 
had  nothing  more  to  apprehend  than  in  former  times. 
There  were  likewise  many  young  gentlemen  of 
quality,  senators’  sons,  and  Roman  knights,  with 
the  deputies  of  the  states  of  Gaul,  and  some  of  Cae¬ 
sar’s  lieutenants  ;  who  were  all  stopped  short  by 
the  river.  Afranius  set  out  in  the  night,  with  three 
legions,  and  all  his  cavalry ;  and  sending  the  horse 
before,  attacked  them  when  they  least  expected  it. 
The  Gaulish  squadrons,  forming  with  great  expedi¬ 
tion,  began  the  fight.  While  the  contest  was  on 
equal  terms,  the  Gauls,  though  few  in  number,  bore 
up  against  the  vast  multitude  of  the  enemy ;  but 
seeing  the  legions  advance,  and  having  lost  some 
of  their  men,  they  retreated  to  the  neighbouring 
mountains.  This  delay  saved  the  convoy ;  for 
during  the  skirmish  the  rest  of  the  troops  gained 
the  higher  ground.  We  lost  that  day  about  two 
hundred  archers,  a  few  troopers,  and  some  servants 
and  baggage. 

49.  All  this  served  to  enhance  the  price  of  pro¬ 
visions,  a  calamity  inseparable  from  present  scarcity, 
and  the  prospect  of  future  want.  Corn  was  already 
at  fifty  denarii  a  bushel ;  the  soldiers  began  to  lose 
their  strength,  and  the  evil  increased  every  moment. 
Nay,  so  great  was  the  change  produced  in  a  few 
days,  and  such  the  alteration  of  fortune,  that  while 
our  men  were  in  the  utmost  want  of  all  kinds  of 
necessaries,  the  enemy  had  plenty  of  every  thing, 
and  were  accounted  victorious.  Caesar  left  nothing 
untried  to  remove  the  present  scarcity:  he  dis¬ 
missed  all  the  useless  mouths,  and  applied  to  the 
states  that  had  declared  for  him,  desiring  them  to 
send  him  cattle  where  they  wanted  corn. 

'  50.  These  things  were  greatly  exaggerated  by 

Afranius,  Petreius,  and  their  friends,  in  the  letters 
they  sent  on  this  occasion  to  Rome.  Nor  was  fame 
backward  in  adding  to  the  account :  insomuch,  that 
the  war  appeared  almost  at  an  end.  These  couriers 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  I. 


49 


and  letters  having-  reached  Rome,  there  was  a  great 
concourse  of  people  at  Afranius’s  house,  many  con¬ 
gratulations  passed,  and  multitudes  of  the  nobility 
flocked  out  of  Italy  to  Pompey ;  some  to  carry  the 
first  accounts  of  this  grateful  news ;  others,  that 
they  might  not  be  so  late  as  to  subject  them  to  the 
reproach  of  having  waited  for  the  event  of  things. 

51.  Affairs  being  in  this  extremity,  and  all  the 
passes  guarded  by  Afranius’s  parties,  without  a  pos¬ 
sibility  of  repairing  the  bridges,  Caesar  ordered  the 
soldiers  to  build  some  light  boats,  in  imitation  of 
those  he  had  formerly  seen  in  Britain,  whose  keel 
and  ribs  were  of  wood,  and  the  rest  of  wicker,  cov¬ 
ered  with  leather.  When  he  had  got  a  sufficient 
number,  he  sent  them  by  night  in  wagons,  twenty- 
two  miles  off  his  camp.  In  these  he  embarked  a 
good  number  of  soldiers,  and  sent  them  over  the 
river;  took  possession  unexpectedly  of  a  hill  ad¬ 
joining  to  the  bank  on  the  other  side ;  threw  up  a 
fortification  before  the  enemy  thought  of  hindering 
him  ;  posted  a  legion  in  this  fortification ;  and  then 
threw  a  bridge  over  the  Sicoris  in  two  days.  By 
this  means  he  recovered  his  foragers,  secured  the 
convoy,  and  opened  a  passage  for  future  supplies. 
The  same  day  be  detached  a  great  part  of  his  cav¬ 
alry  over  the  river ;  who,  falling  unexpectedly  on 
the  enemy’s  foragers,  dispersed  up  and  down  with¬ 
out  a  suspicion  of  danger,  made  a  considerable  cap¬ 
ture  of  men  and  horses  ;  and  observing  some  Span¬ 
ish  cohorts  on  the  march  to  their  assistance,  skil¬ 
fully  divided  themselves  into  two  bodies, — one  to 
secure  the  booty,  the  other  to  receive  and  return 
the  enemy’s  charge.  One  of  their  cohorts,  which 
had  rashly  separated  from  the  rest,  and  advanced 
too  far  before  the  main  body,  was  surrounded  and 
cut  to  pieces  by  our  men,  who  returned  over  the 
same  bridge  to  the  camp,  without  loss,  and  enriched 
with  a  considerable  booty, 

52,  While  these  things  passed  at  Lerida,  the 

Cms.  Vol.  II.— E 


50 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


people  of  Marseilles,  by  the  advice  of  L.  Domitius, 
equipped  seventeen  galleys,  eleven  of  which  were 
covered.  To  these  they  added  a  multitude  of  smaller 
vessels,  that  they  might  strike  a  terror  into  our  fleet 
by  their  very  number ;  and  manned  them  with  arch¬ 
ers  and  the  mountaineers  we  have  already  men¬ 
tioned,  whom  they  encouraged  to  perform  their  part 
by  great  rewards  and  promises.  Domitius  desired 
some  of  these  ships,  and  filled  them  with  the  shep¬ 
herds  and  labourers  he  had  brought  thither  with  him. 
Thus  furnished  and  equipped,  they  sailed  with  great 
confidence  in  quest  of  our  fleet,  which  was  com¬ 
manded  by  Decimus  Brutus,  and  rode  at  anchor  at 
an  island  over-against  Marseilles.  Brutus  was  much 
inferior  to  the  enemy  in  number  of  ships  ;  but  Caesar 
had  manned  them  with  his  best  soldiers,  chosen  out 
of  all  the  legions,  and  headed  by  centurions  of  dis¬ 
tinguished  bravery,  who  had  petitioned  him  for  this 
service.  These  had  provided  themselves  with  hooks 
and  grappling-irons,  and  a  great  number  of  darts, 
javelins,  and  offensive  weapons  of  all  sorts.  Thus 
prepared,  on  notice  of  the  enemy’s  arrival  they 
stood  out  to  sea,  and  attacked  their  fleet.  The  con¬ 
flict  was  sharp  and  vigorous  ;  for  the  mountaineers, 
a  hardy  race,  habituated  to  arms,  and  trained  up  in 
war,  scarce  yielded  to  the  Romans  in  bravery ;  and, 
having  but  just  parted  from  Marseilles,  still  retained 
a  lively  sense  of  the  promises  so  lately  made  them. 
The  shepherds  too,  animated  by  the  hopes  of  liberty, 
and  fighting  under  the  eye  of  their  master,  did  won¬ 
ders  to  merit  his  approbation.  The  townsmen  them¬ 
selves,  confiding  in  the  nimbleness  of  their  ships,  and 
the  skill  of  their  pilots,  eluded  the  shock  of  our 
vessels,  and  baffled  all  their  attempts.  As  they  had 
abundance  of  sea-room,  they  extended  their  line  of 
battle,  in  order  to  surround  our  fleet,  or  attack  our 
ships  singly  with  a  number  of  theirs,  or  in  running 
alongside  sweep  away  a  range  of  oars.  If  they 
were  compelled  to  come  to  a  closer  engagement, 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  1. 


61 


setting  aside  the  skill  and  address  of  their  pilots, 
they  relied  wholly  on  the  bravery  of  their  mountain¬ 
eers.  Our  men  were  but  indifferently  provided  with 
rowers  and  pilots,  who  had  been  hastily  taken  out 
of  some  merchants’  ships,  and  knew  not  so  much 
as  the  names  of  the  tackle.  They  were  incom¬ 
moded  too  by  the  weight  and  lumpishness  of  their 
vessels,  which,  being  built  in  haste,  of  unseasoned 
timber,  were  not  so  ready  at  tacking  about.  But 
when  an  opportunity  offered  of  coming  to  close 
fight,  they  would  boldly  get  between  two  of  the 
enemy’s  ships,  and  grappling  them  with  their  hooks, 
charge  them  on  each  side,  board  them,  and  cut  to 
pieces  the  mountaineers  and  shepherds  that  defended 
them.  In  this  manner  they  sank  part  of  their  ves¬ 
sels,  took  some  with  all  the  men  on  board,  and  drove 
the  rest  into  the  haven.  In  this  engagement  the 
enemy  had  nine  galleys  sunk  or  taken. 

53.  The  report  of  this  battle  reaching  Lerida,  and 
Caesar  having  finished  his  bridge  over  the  Sicoris, 
affairs  soon  began  to  put  on  a  new  face.  The 
enemy,  dreading  the  courage  of  our  horse,  durst  not 
disperse  about  the  country  as  formerly ;  but  either 
foraged  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  camp,  that  they 
might  the  sooner  make  good  their  retreat,  or,  by  a 
long  circuit,  endeavoured  to  avoid  our  parties :  and 
on  receiving  any  check,  or  even  descrying  our  cav¬ 
alry  at  a  distance,  they  would  throw  down  their 
trusses  and  fly.  At  last  they  were  reduced  to  omit 
foraging  several  days  together,  and  resolved  to  pur¬ 
sue  it  only  by  night,  contrary  to  the  general  custom 
of  war. 

54.  In  the  mean  time  the  Oscenses  and  Calagur- 
ritani  jointly  sent  deputies  to  Caesar,  with  an  offer 
of  their  submission  and  services.  The  Tarraco- 
nenses,  Jacitani,  and  Ausetani,  and,  not  many  days 
after,  the  Illurgavonenses,  who  inhabit  along  the 
banks  of  the  Iberus,  followed  their  example.  He 
only  required  them  to  supply  him  with  corn,  to  which 


52 


Caesar’s  commentaries. 


they  readily  agreed ;  and  having  got  together  a  great 
number  of  carriage-horses,  brought  it  to  his  camp. 
A  cohort  of  the  Illurgavonenses,  hearing  of  the  reso 
lution  taken  by  their  state,  deserted  from  the  ene¬ 
my,  and  came  over  to  Caesar’s  camp.  The  change 
was  sudden  and  great;  for,  the  bridge  being  finished 
provisions  secured,  the  rumour  of  Pompey’s  march 
through  Mauritania  extinguished,  and  five  consider¬ 
able  states  having  declared  in  his  favour,  a  great 
number  of  distant  provinces  renounced  their  engage¬ 
ments  with  Afranius,  and  entered  into  new  ones 
with  Caesar. 

55.  These  things  having  struck  a  terror  into  the 
enemy,  that  he  might  not  be  always  obliged  to  send 
his  cavalry  so  far  about  to  forage,  the  bridge  lying 
about  seven  miles  from  his  camp,  he  bethought  him¬ 
self  of  draining  the  river,  by  turning  some  of  its 
water  into  canals  thirty  feet  deep,  so  as  to  make  it 
fordable.  The  work  being  almost  completed,  Pe- 
treius  and  Afranius  grew  extremely  apprehensive  of 
being  entirely  cut  off  from  their  provisions  and  for¬ 
age,  because  Caesar  was  very  strong  in  cavalry. 
They  therefore  thought  proper  to  quit  a  post  that 
was  no  longer  tenable,  and  to  carry  the  war  into 
Celtiberia.  What  contributed  still  further  to  con¬ 
firm  them  in  this  resolution  was,  that  of  the  two 
contrary  parties,  concerned  in  the  late  war,  those 
who  had  declared  for  Sertorius  still  trembled  at  the 
name  of  the  conqueror,  and  dreaded  his  power, 
though  absent ;  and  those  who  had  attached  them¬ 
selves  to  Pompey  continued  to  love  him  for  the 
many  services  he  had  done  them ;  but  Caesar’s  name 
was  hardly  known  among  these  barbarians.  Here 
they  expected  considerable  reinforcements  of  horse 
and  foot ;  and  doubted  not,  by  taking  the  advantage 
of  places,  to  be  able  to  protract  the  war  till  winter. 
In  order  to  execute  this  plan,  they  collected  all  the 
boats  to  be  found  on  the  Iberus,  and  ordered  them 
to  be  brought  to  Octogesa,  a  city  on  that  river,  about 


CIVIL  WAR - BOOK  I. 


53 


twenty  miles  from  their  camp.  Here  they  com¬ 
manded  a  bridge  of  boats  to  be  built ;  and  having 
sent  two  legions  over  the  Sicoris,  fortified  their 
camp  with  a  rampart  of  twelve  feet. 

56.  Caesar,  having  notice  of  this  by  his  scouts, 
laboured  day  and  night  at  his  drains  with  the  utmost 
diligence ;  and  had  already  so  far  diminished  the 
water  of  the  Sicoris  that  the  cavalry  could  with 
some  difficulty  pass  over :  but  it  took  the  infantry 
as  high  as  the  shoulders,  who  had  therefore  both  the 
depth  of  the  river  and  the  rapidity  of  the  stream  to 
struggle  with.  Meanwhile  it  was  known  that  the 
bridge  over  the  Iberus  was  almost  finished,  and 
Caesar’s  ford  in  great  forwardness.  This  was  a 
fresh  motive  to  the  enemy  to  quicken  their  march  : 
wherefore,  leaving  two  auxiliary  cohorts  for  a  gar¬ 
rison  at  Lerida,  they  crossed  the  Sicoris  with  all 
their  forces,  and  joined  the  two  legions  they  had 
sent  over  before.  Caesar  had  now  no  other  remedy 
left  but  to  harass  and  fatigue  them  with  his  cavalry: 
for  if  he  went  with  his  whole  army  over  his  bridge, 
he  lengthened  his  march  prodigiously,  and  gave 
Afranius  time  enough  to  get  to  the  Iberus.  Accord¬ 
ingly,  the  horse,  having  forded  the  river,  came  up 
with  Petreius  and  Afranius’s  rear,  who  had  decamped 
about  midnight,  and  making  a  motion  to  surround 
them,  began  to  stop  and  retard  their  march. 

57.  At  daybreak  we  discovered  from  the  hills 
near  the  camp  that  the  enemy’s  rear  was  greatly 
harassed  by  our  cavalry.  Sometimes  they  obliged 
them  to  halt,  and  disordered  their  ranks ;  at  other 
times,  the  enemy,  facing  about,  charged  with  all  their 
cohorts  at  once,  and  forced  our  men  to  give  ground ; 
who,  wheeling  again  as  soon  as  the)"  began  to  march, 
failed  not  to  renew  the  attack.  At  this  sight,  the 
legionary  soldiers,  running  up  and  down  the  camp, 
complained  that  the  enemy  would  escape  out  of 
their  hands,  and  the  war  necessarily  be  prolonged. 
They  addressed  themselves  to  the  centurions  and 

E2 


54 


cjesar’s  commentaries. 


military  tribunes,  and  desired  them  to  beg  of  Caesar 
not  to  spare  them ;  that  they  feared  neither  danger 
nor  fatigue,  and  were  ready  to  pass  the  river  as  the 
horse  had  done,  Caesar,  moved  by  their  alacrity 
and  entreaties,  though  he  saw  some  danger  in  ex¬ 
posing  his  army  to  the  rapidity  of  a  deep  river, 
judged  it  yet  proper  to  attempt  and  make  trial  of 
the  passage.  Having  therefore  withdrawn  from 
every  company  such  as  were  weak  of  body,  or  of 
less  courage  than  the  rest,  he  left  them  in  the  camp, 
with  a  legion,  and  all  the  baggage.  The  rest  of  the 
army  happily  passed  the  river,  by  the  assistance  of 
a  double  line  of  cavalry,  placed  above  and  below 
them.  Some  of  the  infantry  were  carried  away  by 
the  violence  of  the  current ;  but  they  were  picked 
up  and  saved  by  the  horse  below  them ;  so  that  no 
one  man  was  lost.  Having  passed  the  river  without 
loss,  he  drew  up  his  army  in  order  of  battle,  and 
began  to  pursue  the  enemy  in  three  lines ;  and  such 
was  the  ardour  of  the  soldiers,  that  notwithstanding 
the  army  was  obliged  to  make  a  circuit  of  six  miles, 
notwithstanding  the  time  necessarily  lost  in  crossing 
the  river,  they  got  up  at  the  ninth  hour  of  the  day 
to  the  enemy,  who  had  set  out  at  midnight, 

58.  When  Afranius  and  Petreius  perceived  them 
at  some  distance,  being  with  reason  intimidated, 
they  suspended  their  march,  halted  on  an  eminence, 
and  formed  in  order  of  battle.  Caesar  would  not 
hazard  an  action  with  his  troops  thus  fatigued,  and 
halted  likewise  in  the  plain.  On  this  the  enemy 
resumed  their  march,  and  he  the  pursuit;  which 
obliged  them  to  encamp  earlier  than  they  designed. 
Hard  by  was  a  range  of  mountains,  and  about  five 
miles  farther  the  ways  were  difficult  and  narrow. 
The  enemy  retired  among  these  mountains,  to  avoid 
the  pursuit  of  the  cavalry ;  and  having  placed  par¬ 
ties  in  all  the  passes,  to  stop  Ciesar’s  army,  hoped, 
by  this  means,  to  continue  their  march  to  the  Iberus, 
without  fear  or  danger.  This  was  their  great  affair. 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  I. 


55 


and  what  before  all  things  they  should  have  endea¬ 
voured  to  effect ;  but,  being  fatigued  by  a  long  march, 
and  their  continual  skirmishes  with  Caesar’s  cavalry, 
they  deferred  it  till  next  day.  Caesar  likewise  en¬ 
camped  on  a  hill  that  lay  near  him. 

59.  About  midnight,  the  cavalry  having  surprised 
some  of  the  enemy,  who  had  adventured  a  little  too 
far  from  their  camp  in  quest  of  water,  Caesar  was 
informed  by  them  that  Pompey’s  lieutenants  were 
decamping  without  noise.  Immediately  he  ordered 
the  alarm  to  be  sounded,  and  gave  his  army  the  sig¬ 
nal  to  march.  The  enemy,  finding  they  should  be 
pursued,  kept  still ;  being  afraid  of  a  nocturnal  flight, 
wherein  they  would  have  had  greatly  the  disadvan¬ 
tage,  on  account  of  their  heavy  baggage  which  they 
had  with  them,  and  the  superiority  of  Caesar’s  cav¬ 
alry.  Next  day,  Petreius  went  privately  out  with  a 
party  of  horse  to  take  a  view  of  the  country. 
Caesar  likewise  detached  a  squadron  for  the  same 
purpose,  under  the  command  of  Decidius  Saxa. 
Both  made  the  like  report  in  their  several  camps  ; 
that  for  five  miles  together  the  country  was  level 
and  open,  but  after  that  rough  and  mountainous ; 
and  that  whoever  should  first  get  possession  of  the 
defiles  might  easily  prevent  the  other  army  from  ap¬ 
proaching  them. 

60.  On  this,  a  council  of  war  was  held  by  Petreius 
and  Afranius,  to  deliberate  about  the  time  of  begin¬ 
ning  their  march.  The  greater  number  were  for 
setting  out  by  night,  in  hopes  of  reaching  the  defiles 
before  Caesar  could  have  notice  of  their  departure. 
Others  argued  against  the  possibility  of  decamping 
privately,  by  the  alarm  given  in  Caesar’s  camp  the 
night  before,  “  that  the  enemy’s  cavalry  were  con¬ 
tinually  patrolling  in  the  night,  and  had  beset  all  the 
ways  and  passes ;  that  a  nocturnal  engagement  was 
to  be  avoided,  because,  in  a  civil  war,  the  soldiers 
were  more  apt  to  listen  to  their  fears  than  the  obli¬ 
gations  of  the  military  oath;  that  shame,  and  the 


56 


cjesar’s  commentaries. 


presence  of  the  centurions  and  tribunes,  the  great 
instruments  of  obedience  and  military  duty,,  could 
have  their  proper  effect  only  in  the  light,  which  ren¬ 
dered  it  of  infinite  importance  to  wait  the  approach 
of  day ;  that  in  case  of  a  disaster,  yet  the  bulk  of 
the  army  would  escape,  and  be  able  to  possess  them¬ 
selves  of  the  post  in  question.”  This  opinion  pre¬ 
vailed  in  the  council,  and  they  resolved  to  set  out 
the  next  morning  by  break  of  day. 

61.  Caesar,  having  taken  a  view  of  the  country, 
decamped  as  soon  as  it  was  light,  taking  a  consider¬ 
able  circuit,  and  observing  no  particular  route ;  for 
the  direct  way  to  the  Iberus  and  Octogesa  lay  in  the 
rear  of  the  enemy’s  camp.  He  was  therefore  obliged 
to  march  through  valleys,  and  over  precipices  and 
steep  rocks,  which  the  soldiers  could  not  climb,  but 
by  disencumbering  themselves  of  their  arms,  and 
returning  them  afterward  to  one  another.  But  not 
a  man  murmured  at  these  difficulties,  in  hopes  of 
seeing  a  speedy  end  of  all  their  labours,  if  they 
could  but  gain  the  Iberus  before  the  enemy,  and  in¬ 
tercept  their  provisions.  As  in  this  march  we  pur¬ 
sued  at  first  an  opposite  course,  and  seemed  to  turn 
our  backs  on  the  enemy,  Afranius’s  soldiers,  who  ob¬ 
served  us  from  their  camp,  came  forth  with  joyful 
looks,  and  in'sulted  us  on  our  supposed  flight,  imagin¬ 
ing  the  want  of  provisions  obliged  us  to  return  to  Le- 
rida.  Their  generals  applauded  themselves  on  their 
resolution  of  not  decamping,  and  were  confirmed 
in  the  notion  of  our  retreat,  as  they  saw  we  had 
neither  horses  nor  carriages ;  whence  they  concluded 
the  scarcity  must  be  exceeding  great.  But  when  they 
saw  us,  after  some  time,  turn  to  the  right,  and  that 
our  advanced  guard  had  already  gained  the  ground 
beyond  their  camp,  there  was  not  a  man  so  tardy  or 
indolent  as  not  to  perceive  the  necessity  of  decamp¬ 
ing  and  opposing  our  march.  Immediately  they  ran 
to  arms,  and  leaving  a  few  cohorts  to  guard  the 
camp,  sallied  in  a  body,  pursuing  their  way  directly 
to  the  Iberus. 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  I. 


57 


62.  All  depended  on  despatch,  and  getting'  the  first 
possession  of  the  defiles  and  mountains.  Our  troops 
were  retarded  by  the  difficulties  of  the  way,  and 
Afranius’s  by  the  continual  attacks  of  Caesar’s  cav¬ 
alry  :  but  such  was  the  situation  of  the  Afranians, 
that  even  supposing  them  to  gain  the  hills  first,  they 
could  only  secure  their  own  retreat,  without  a  pos¬ 
sibility  of  preserving  their  baggage  and  the  cohorts 
left  to  guard  the  camp ;  because  Caesar’s  army, 
getting  between,  cut  them  off  from  all  communica¬ 
tion  with  their  own  men.  Caesar  arrived  first  at  the 
place  in  question ;  and  having  found  a  plain  beyond 
the  rocks,  formed  his  men  in  order  of  battle  against 
the  enemy.  Afranius,  who  now  saw  our  army  in 
his  front,  at  the  same  time  that  his  rear  was  con¬ 
tinually  harassed  by  the  cavalry,  halted  on  an  emi¬ 
nence,  from  whence  he  detached  four  Spanish  co¬ 
horts  to  take  possession  of  the  highest  mountain 
thereabouts  ;  ordering  them  to  make  all  the  despatch 
they  could  to  seize  it,  that  he  might  get  thither  him¬ 
self  with  the  rest  of  his  forces,  and,  changing  his 
route,  march  them  over  the  hills  to  Octogesa.  The 
Spaniards,  wheeling  obliquely  to  take  possession  of 
the  place,  were  perceived  by  Caesar’s  cavalry ;  who 
charged  them  furiously,  broke  them  at  the  first  on¬ 
set,  surrounded,  and  cut  them  in  pieces  in  sight  of 
both  armies. 

63.  Caesar  had  now  an  opportunity  of  giving  the 
enemy  an  effectual  blow ;  whose  army,  in  the  pres¬ 
ent  consternation  it  was  under,  would,  he  was  sen¬ 
sible,  make  but  a  faint  resistance  ;  more  especially 
as  it  was  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  the  cavalry, 
and  would  be  obliged  to  fight  on  equal  ground.  He 
was  pressed,  on  all  hands,  to  give  the  signal.  The 
lieutenants,  centurions,  and  military  tribunes  got 
round  him,  urging  him  not  to  delay  the  engage¬ 
ment,  “  That  the  soldiers  were  all  eager  for  a  battle  ; 
whereas,  on  the  contrary,  the  Afranians  had  given 
many  marks  of  fear ;  that  they  had  neither  dared  to 


58 


Caesar’s  commentaries. 


support  their  own  detachment,  nor  offered  to  de¬ 
scend  from  the  hill,  nor  been  able  to  withstand  the 
very  first  charge  of  our  cavalry;  that  they  had 
brought  their  ensigns  all  into  one  place,  where  they 
crowded  confusedly  round  them,  without  observing 
ranks  or  order ;  that  if  he  was  afraid  to  attack  them 
on  the  eminence,  he  would  soon  have  an  opportunity 
of  more  equal  ground,  as  Afranius  would  be  obliged 
to  remove  for  want  of  water.” 

64,  Caesar  was  in  hopes  of  terminating  the  affair 
without  bloodshed  or  a  battle ;  because  he  had  inter¬ 
cepted  the  enemy’s  provisions.  Why,  therefore, 
even  supposing  the  event  to  be  prosperous,  should 
he  unnecessarily  lose  any  of  his  men  1  Why  should 
he  expose  to  wounds  soldiers  who  had  so  well  de¬ 
served  of  him  1  Why,  in  fine,  should  he  tempt  for¬ 
tune  especially  as  it  redounded  no  less  to  the 
honour  of  a  good  general  to  gain  the  victory  by  his 
conduct  than  by  the  force  of  his  arms.  He  was 
also  touched  with  compassion  for  Afranius’s  soldiers, 
who,  after  all,  were  fellow-citizens,  and  whom  he 
must  have  slaughtered,  when  he  could  equally  suc¬ 
ceed  without  touching  their  lives.  This  resolution 
was  not  at  all  relished  by  the  army ;  who,  in  their 
discontent,  openly  declared,  that  since  Caesar  did 
not  lay  hold  of  so  favourable  an  opportunity,  nor  let 
them  fight  when  they  had  a  mind,  they  would  not 
fight  when  he  had  a  mind.  But  nothing  could  shake 
him.  Nay,  he  even  retreated  a  little,  to  give  Afra¬ 
nius  and  Petreius  liberty  to  regain  their  camp,  which 
they  did.  He  then  posted  troops  on  the  mountains 
to  guard  the  defiles,  and  came  and  encamped  as  near 
the  enemy  as  possible. 

65.  The  day  after,  Pompey’s  lieutenants,  disturbed 
at  finding  their  provisions  cut  off,  and  all  the  ways 
to  the  Iberus  intercepted,  consulted  what  was  proper 
to  be  done.  They  had  it  still  in  their  power  to  re¬ 
turn  to  Lerida,  or  march  to  Tarraco.  But  while 
they  were  debating  this  matter,  notice  was  brought 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  I. 


59 


them  that  our  cavalry  had  fallen  on  their  parties 
sent  out  in  quest  of  water.  On  this  intelligence 
they  formed  several  posts  of  hoise  and  foot,  inter¬ 
mixed  with  legionary  cohorts,  and  began  to  throw 
up  a  rampart  from  the  camp  to  the  place  where  they 
watered,  that  the  soldiers  might  pass  and  repass 
under  cover,  without  fear,  and  without  a  guard. 
Afranius  and  Petreius  divided  this  work  between 
them,  and  went  to  give  directions  about  it  in  person. 

66.  In  their  absence  their  soldiers  found  frequent 
opportunities  of  conversing  with  our  men,  and  sought 
out  every  one  his  fellow-citizen  and  acquaintance. 
They  began  by  thanking  them  for  having  spared  them 
the  day  before,  owning  they  were  indebted  to  them 
tor  their  lives.  Afterward  they  asked  them  if  they 
might  trust  to  Caesar’s  honour:  testifying  much 
grief  at  being  obliged  to  fight  with  their  countrymen 
and  relations,  with  whom  they  were  united  by  the 
strictest  ties.  At  last  they  stipulated  even  for  their 
generals,  whom  they  would  not  seem  to  betray ; 
and  promised,  if  the  lives  of  Petreius  and  Afranius 
were  granted  them,  to  change  sides.  At  the  same 
time  they  sent  some  of  their  principal  officers  to 
negotiate  with  Caesar ;  and  these  preliminaries  to 
an  accommodation  being  settled,  the  soldiers  of  both 
armies  went  into  one  another’s  tents,  so  that  the 
two  camps  were  now  in  a  manner  one.  A  great 
number  of  centurions  and  military  tribunes  came  to 
pay  their  court  to  Caesar,  and  beg  his  protection. 
The  Spanish  chiefs,  who  had  been  summoned  to 
attend  Afranius,  and  were  detained  in  the  camp  as 
hostages,  followed  their  example.  Every  man  sought 
out  his  acquaintance  and  friends,  who  might  recom¬ 
mend  and  procure  him  a  favourable  reception  from 
Caesar.  Things  were  carried  to  such  a  length  that 
Afranius’s  son,  a  young  gentleman,  treated  with 
Caesar,  by  the  mediation  of  Sulpicius,  to  desire  he 
would  give  his  word  for  his  life  and  that  of  his 
father.  The  joy  was  general;  they  mutually  con- 


60 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


gratulated  each  other ;  the  one  in  that  they  had  es¬ 
caped  so  imminent  a  danger,  and  the  other  in  that 
they  had  brought  to  a  happy  conclusion  so  important 
an  enterprise  without  striking  a  blow.  Caesar,  in 
the  judgment  of  all,  was  on  the  point  of  amply  reap¬ 
ing  the  fruits  of  his  wonted  clemency,  and  every¬ 
body  applauded  his  late  conduct. 

67.  Afranius,  having  notice  of  what  passed,  quitted 
the  work  he  was  engaged  in,  and  returned  to  the 
camp  ;  prepared,  as  it  would  seem,  to  bear  with  an 
equal  mind  whatever  should  happen.  But  Petreius 
was  not  wanting  to  himself.  He  armed  his  slaves  ; 
and  joining  them  to  a  pretorian  cohort  of  target- 
bearers  and  some  Spanish  horse,  his  dependants, 
whom  he  always  kept  about  him  to  guard  his  per¬ 
son,  he  instantly  flew  to  the  rampart,  broke  off*  the 
conferences  of  the  soldiers,  drove  our  men  from  the 
camp,  and  put  all  of  them  he  could  find  to  the  sword. 
The  rest  flocked  together ;  where,  alarmed  at  the 
danger  to  which  they  saw  themselves  exposed,  they 
wrapped  their  cloaks  round  their  left  arms,  drew 
their  swords,  and  trusting  to  the  nearness  of  their 
camp,  defended  themselves  against  the  Spanish  tar- 
get-bearers  and  cavalry,  till  they  had  retreated  to  our 
advanced  guard,  who  screened  them  from  any  fur¬ 
ther  assault. 

68.  After  this  he  went  through  the  whole  camp, 
begging  his  troops,  with  tears,  to  have  pity  on  him, 
and  Pompey  their  general ;  and  that  they  would  not 
deliver  them  both  up  to  the  cruel  vengeance  of  their 
enemies.  Every  one  on  this  flocks  to  the  head 
quarters.  There  Petreius  proposes  to  the  army  to 
bind  themselves  by  a  new  oath,  not  to  abandon  nor 
betray  their  commanders,  nor  to  act  separately,  but 
all  in  concert,  for  the  common  good.  He  himself 
took  this  oath  first,  and  then  exacted  it  of  Afranius, 
afterward  of  the  military  tribunes  and  centurions, 
and  lastly  of  all  the  companies,  man  by  man.  At 
the  same  time  an  order  was  issued,  that  all  who  had 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  I. 


61 


any  of  Caesar’s  soldiers  in  their  tents  should  signify 
it,  that  they  might  be  put  to  death  in  the  sight  of  the 
whole  army.  But  the  majority,  detesting  this  bloody 
order,  carefully  hid  those  who  were  under  their  pro¬ 
tection,  and  procured  them  means  to  escape  in  the 
night.  However,  the  terror  they  had  been  thrown 
into  by  their  generals,  the  severity  shown  in  punish¬ 
ing,  and  the  new  oath  they  had  been  obliged  to  take 
defeated  for  the  present  all  hopes  of  a  surrender, 
changed  the  soldiers’  minds,  and  reduced  the  war  to 
its  former  state. 

69.  Caesar  ordered  diligent  search  to  be  made  after 
such  of  the  enemy’s  soldiers  as  had  come  to  his 
camp  during  the  time  of  conference,  and  carefully 
sent  them  back.  Some  military  tribunes  and  cen¬ 
turions  voluntarily  chose  to  stay  with  him,  whom 
he  afterward  treated  with  great  distinction ;  pro¬ 
moting  the  centurions  to  higher  ranks,  and  honour¬ 
ing  the  Roman  knights  with  the  office  of  military 
tribunes. 

70.  The  Afranian  troops  were  destitute  of  forage, 
and  could  not  water  without  much  difficulty.  The 
legionary  soldiers  had  indeed  some  provisions,  be¬ 
cause  they  had  been  ordered  to  bring  two-and-twenty 
days’  corn  with  them  from  Lerida ;  but  the  Spanish 
infantry  and  auxiliaries  had  none  ;  for  they  neither 
had  opportunities  of  supplying  themselves,  nor  were 
their  bodies  inured  to  carry  heavy  burdens.  Ac¬ 
cordingly  they  every  day  deserted  in  shoals  to 
Caesar.  In  this  extremity,  of  the  two  expedients 
proposed,  that  of  returning  to  Lerida  appeared  the 
safest,  as  they  had  still  some  provisions  in  that  city, 
and  might  there  concert  what  further  measures  to 
pursue.  Tarraco  was  at  a  greater  distance,  and 
they  would  of  course  be  exposed  to  more  accidents 
by  the  way.  This  resolution  being  taken,  they  de¬ 
camped.  Caesar  sent  the  cavalry  before  to  harass 
and  retard  them  in  their  march ;  and  followed  him¬ 
self  with  the  rest  of  the  army.  The  cavalry  gave 

Cais.  Vol.  II. — F 


62 


CjaSAR  S  COMMENTARIES. 


the  enemy  no  respite,  being  continually  engaged 
with  their  rear. 

71.  The  manner  of  fighting  was  thus: — Some 
light-armed  cohorts  formed  the  rear-guard,  which, 
in  a  plain,  halted  from  time  to  time,  and  made  head 
against  our  cavalry.  When  they  fell  in  with  an 
eminence,  the  very  nature  of  the  ground  furnished 
them  with  the  means  of  defending  themselves,  be¬ 
cause  those  who  were  first  could  cover  those  behind. 
But  when  a  valley  or  descent  came  in  the  way,  the 
van  could  give  no  assistance  to  the  rear,  and  our 
cavalry  annoyed  them  with  their  darts  from  the 
higher  ground,  which  put  them  in  imminent  danger. 
In  this  case  the  legions  were  obliged  to  halt,  and  en¬ 
deavour  to  drive  back  the  cavalry  a  good  way,  after 
which  they  ran  down  the  valley  precipitately,  until 
they  came  to  the  opposite  eminence  ;  for  their  cav¬ 
alry,  of  which  they  had  a  considerable  number,  was 
so  terrified  by  their  ill  success  in  former  skirmishes, 
that,  far  from  being  of  any  service,  they  were  forced 
to  place  it  in  the  centre  to  secure  it ;  and  if  any  of 
them  chanced  to  straggle  from  the  main  body,  they 
were  immediately  taken  by  Caesar’s  horse. 

72.  During  these  continual  skirmishes,  in  which 
the  enemy  were  often  obliged  to  halt,  in  order  to 
disengage  their  rear,  it  is  easy  to  perceive  that  their 
march  could  not  be  very  expeditious.  This  was  in 
fact  the  case ;  so  that  after  advancing  four  miles, 
finding  themselves  greatly  incommoded  by  the  cav¬ 
alry,  they  halted  on  an  eminence,  and  drew  a  line 
before  them,  as  it  were  to  encamp,  but  did  not  un¬ 
load  their  beasts  of  burden.  When  they  saw  that 
Caesar  had  marked  out  his  camp,  pitched  his  tents, 
and  sent  his  cavalry  to  forage, — suddenly,  towards 
noon,  they  resumed  their  march  briskly,  hoping  to 
be  rid  of  the  cavalry  which  had  so  much  incommoded 
them.  But  Caesar  set  out  immediately  with  his 
legions,  leaving  a  few  cohorts  to  guaid  the  baggage, 
and  sent  orders  to  his  cavalry  to  return  with  all 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  I. 


63 


diligence.  The  cavalry  returned  accordingly,  and, 
having  overtaken  the  enemy  before  the  close  of  day, 
attacked  their  rear  so  vigorously  that  they  were 
almost  routed  ;  a  great  number  of  soldiers,  and  even 
some  centurions,  being  slain.  Caesar’s  whole  army 
came  up,  and  threatened  them  with  an  immediate 
attack. 

73.  As  they  could  then  neither  choose  a  proper 
place  for  a  camp,  nor  continue  their  march,  they  were 
forced  to  halt  where  they  were,  far  from  any  water, 
and  on  very  disadvantageous  ground.  Caesar  did  not 
otfer  to  attack  them,  for  the  reasons  mentioned  be¬ 
fore  :  he  would  not  even  permit  any  tents  to  be 
pitched  that  day,  that  he  might  be  the  readier  to 
pursue  with  all  his  forces,  should  they  attempt  to 
escape  either  by  night  or  by  day.  The  Afranians, 
perceiving  the  disadvantage  of  their  situation,  em¬ 
ployed  the  whole  night  in  throwing  up  intrench- 
ments,  and  disposed  their  camp  directly  fronting 
ours.  The  same  they  did  the  following  day,  from 
sunrise  till  the  evening.  But  the  farther  they  ex¬ 
tended  their  camp  and  produced  their  lines,  in  order 
to  better  their  position,  the  farther  they  went  from 
water,  and,  to  avoid  one  inconvenience,  fell  into  an¬ 
other.  The  first  night  nobody  went  out  of  the  camp 
for  water,  and  the  next  day  the  whole  army  was 
obliged  to  do  it  in  order  of  battle,  so  that  they  could 
not  forage  that  day.  Caesar  wanted  to  humble  them 
by  these  misfortunes,  and  reduce  them  by  want  and 
necessity,  rather  than  force.  He  began  however  to 
draw  lines  round  their  camp,  the  better  to  check 
their  sudden  sallies  and  eruptions,  to  which  he  fore¬ 
saw  they  would  be  obliged  to  have  recourse  at  last. 
Want  and  the  desire  of  marching  with  less  difficulty 
soon  constrained  them  to  kill  all  the  beasts  of 
burden. 

74.  Two  days  were  spent  in  forming  and  execut¬ 
ing  these  resolutions  ;  on  the  third  Caesar  had  con¬ 
siderably  advanced  his  works.  Afranius  and  Pe- 


64 


Caesar’s  commentaries. 


treius,  sensible  of  the  consequences,  drew  all  their 
forces  out  of  the  camp,  and  formed  them  in  order  of 
battle.  Caesar  presently  called  in  his  workmen,  as¬ 
sembled  his  cavalry,  and  put  his  army  in  a  condition 
to  receive  them ;  for  he  was  aware  of  the  hurt  his 
reputation  might  sustain,  if,  contrary  to  the  opinion 
of  the  troops,  and  the  earnest  expectations  of  all,  he 
should  still  seem  to  decline  an  engagement.  How¬ 
ever,  for  the  reasons  already  mentioned,  he  resolved 
to  keep  only  on  the  defensive ;  and  the  rather  be¬ 
cause  the  distance  between  the  two  camps  was  so 
small,  that  should  he  even  put  his  adversaries  to 
rout,  he  could  not  flatter  himself  with  the  hopes  of 
a  complete  victory.  In  fact,  from  camp  to  camp 
was  not  above  two  thousand  feet ;  the  armies  were 
posted  on  each  side  of  this  space,  which  was  left 
void  for  the  mutual  charge  and  assault  of  the  soldiers. 
On  supposition,  therefore,  of  a  battle,  the  nearness 
of  their  camp  furnished  an  easy  retreat  to  the  van¬ 
quished.  For  this  reason  he  resolved  to  wait  the 
enemy’s  charge,  and  not  enter  the  first  into  action. 

75.  Afranius’s  troops  were  ranged  in  two  lines, 
consisting  of  five  legions,  and  the  cohorts  wont  to 
be  stationed  in  the  wings  formed  a  body  of  reserve. 
Caesar’s  army  was  on  three  lines;  in  the  first  of 
which  were  posted  four  cohorts,  detached  out  of 
each  of  the  five  legions,  in  the  second  three,  and 
in  the  third  the  like  number,  all  from  their  respect¬ 
ive  legions  :  the  archers  and  slingers  were  disposed 
in  the  midst,  and  the  cavalry  on  the  two  wings.  The 
armies  being  drawn  up  in  this  manner,  each  general 
kept  firm  to  his  resolution ;  Caesar,  not  to  engage 
unless  forced  to  it ;  and  Afranius,  to  prevent  the 
progress  of  our  works.  In  this  posture  they  con¬ 
tinued  till  sunset,  when  both  armies  returned  to  their 
several  camps.  The  next  day  Caesar  prepared  to 
finish  his  lines ;  and  Pompey’s  lieutenants,  as  their 
last  resource,  endeavoured  to  find  a  fordable  place  in 
the  Sicoris ;  but  Caesar,  penetrating  their  design,  sent 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  I. 


65 


his  light-armed  Germans,  with  part  of  his  cavalry, 
over  the  river,  and  posted  many  good  bodies  of 
troops  along  the  banks,  at  a  small  distance  from  one 
another. 

76.  At  last,  having  no  hope  left,  and  being  in  want 
of  every  thing,  wood,  water,  forage,  corn,  they  de¬ 
manded  an  interview  ;  and  that  it  might  be,  if  possi¬ 
ble,  in  some  place  out  of  the  sight  of  the  soldiers. 
Caesar  denied  the  last  part  of  their  request,  but 
offered  to  grant  them  a  public  interview;  whereon 
Afranius,  having  given  his  son  for  a  hostage,  went 
to  the  place  appointed  by  Caesar,  where,  in  the 
presence  of  both  armies,  he  addressed  him  to  this 
effect : — “  That  it  was  no  just  matter  of  blame,  either 
in  him  or  his  soldiers,  to  have  preserved  their  fidel¬ 
ity  to  their  general,  Potnpey  ;  but  that  they  had  now 
sufficiently  acquitted  themselves  of  their  duty,  and 
suffered  enough  in  his  cause,  by  the  want  of  all  kind 
of  necessaries :  that,  like  wild  beasts  caught  in  a 
toil,  they  were  deprived  of  the  most  common  en¬ 
joyments,  having  their  bodies  oppressed  by  want,  and 
their  minds  overwhelmed  with  ignominy :  that  they 
therefore  acknowledged  themselves  vanquished, 
and  besought  and  conjured  him  not  to  make  a  rigor¬ 
ous  use  of  his  victory,  but  to  spare  the  lives  of  his 
unhappy  countrymen.”  This  speech  was  delivered 
with  all  possible  marks  of  humility  and  submission. 

77.  Caesar  replied,  “that  he,  of  all  mankind,  had 
least  reason  to  complain,  or  implore  compassion : 
that  all  the  rest  had  fully  done  their  duty ;  himself, 
in  forbearing  to  attack  him,  with  all  the  advantages 
of  time  and  place,  that  the  way  to  an  accommoda¬ 
tion  might  be  the  more  open ;  his  army,  in  returning 
untouched  the  men  that  were  in  their  power,  after 
injuries  received,  and  the  massacre  of  their  com¬ 
rades  :  in  fine,  even  his  own  troops,  in  endeavouring 
to  conclude  a  peace,  whereon  they  thought  their 
safety  depended.  Thus  all  orders  had  shown  an  in¬ 
clination  to  treat,  while  Afranius  and  Petreius  alone 

F  2 


66 


Caesar’s  commentaries. 


opposed  an  accommodation,  refusing  both  interview 
and  truce,  and  barbarously  murdering  those  whom 
the  faith  of  a  conference  had  enticed  to  their  camp : 
that  it  had  therefore  happened  to  them  as  frequently 
happens  to  men  of  obstinacy  and  arrogance,  and 
they  were  forced  to  have  recourse  to  those  con¬ 
ditions,  and  earnestly  solicit  the  very  same  terms 
which  not  long  before  they  had  despised.  However, 
he  would  not  take  advantage  of  their  present  sub¬ 
mission,  or  the  favourable  circumstances  in  which 
he  found  himself,  to  demand  any  thing  tending  to  the 
increase  of  his  own  power,  but  only  that  they  would 
disband  those  troops  which  they  had  now  for  so 
many  years  kept  on  foot  against  him.  For  with 
what  other  view  had  six  legions  been  sent  into  Spain ; 
a  seventh  levied  there ;  so  many  powerful  navies 
equipped ;  so  many  able  and  experienced  officers 
sent  over  1  These  mighty  preparations  could  not 
be  meant  against  Spain,  or  to  supply  the  w’ants  of 
the  province  ;  which,  having  enjoyed  a  long  run  of 
peace,  had  no  occasion  for  such  extraordinary  forces. 
Their  real  aim  was  to  pave  the  way  to  his  destruc¬ 
tion  ;  to  effect  which,  a  new  species  of  pov  er  had 
been  introduced  into  the  commonwealth,  and  the 
same  man  appointed  to  command  in  Italy,  at  the 
gates  of  Rome,  and  hold  for  so  many  years,  though 
absent,  the  government  of  the  two  most  potent  prov¬ 
inces  of  the  republic.  For  this  reason  the  magis¬ 
trates  were  stripped  of  their  prerogatives,  and  not 
suffered  to  take  possession  of  their  provinces,  at  the 
expiration  of  the  pretorship  or  consulship,  as  had 
always  been  the  custom ;  but  particular  governors 
were  sent,  by  the  choice  and  management  of  a  fac¬ 
tion.  For  this  reason  even  the  excuse  of  old  age 
was  disallowed ;  and  those  who  had  merited  a  dis¬ 
charge  by  their  past  services  were  compelled  to 
take  arms  again,  to  complete  the  number  of  their 
troops.  In  fine,  for  this  reason  he  alone  had  been 
denied  that  justice  which  was  never  refused  to  any 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  I. 


67 


general  before  him ;  that  after  having  successfully 
served  the  commonwealth,  he  should  be  allowed  to 
return  home  and  disband  his  own  army,  with  some 
marks  of  honour,  or  at  least  without  ignominy.  All 
which,  nevertheless,  he  had  hitherto  borne,  and  still 
resolved  to  bear  with  patience ;  nor  was  it  now  his 
design  to  take  from  them  their  soldiers,  and  enlist 
them,  as  it  would  be  easy  for  him  to  do,  but  to  pre¬ 
vent  their  employing  them  against  him.  Therefore, 
as  he  had  already  intimated,  they  must  resolve  to 
quit  Spain,  and  disband  their  forces,  in  which  case 
he  would  injure  no  man.  This  was  his  final  resolu¬ 
tion,  and  the  only  condition  of  peace  they  were  to 
expect.” 

78.  These  conditions  were  agreeable  to  Afranius’s 
soldiers,  who,  instead  of  being  punished,  as  they 
feared,  were  in  some  sort  rewarded  by  the  discharge 
procured  them.  They  plainly  showed  their  satisfac¬ 
tion  ;  for,  while  the  place  and  time  of  their  dismis¬ 
sion  were  debating,  they  signified  by  their  gestures 
and  cries  from  the  rampart,  where  they  stood,  that 
they  desired  to  be  disbanded  immediately ;  because 
no  sufficient  security  could  be  given  for  the  per¬ 
formance  of  what  was  put  off*  till  another  time. 
After  some  discussion  of  that  article  by  Cassar  and 
Afranius,  it  was  regulated,  that  those  who  had  houses 
or  possessions  in  Spain  should  be  discharged  on  the 
spot;  and  the  rest  near  the  Var,  a  river  between 
Gaul  and  Italy.  Caesar,  on  his  side,  declared  that 
he  would  hurt  nobody,  nor  force  any  one  to  take  on 
in  his  service. 

79.  Caesar  undertook  to  find  them  in  corn  until 
they  got  to  the  Var.  He  even  promised  to  restore 
to  them  all  they  had  lost  in  the  war  that  could  be 
known  again;  himself  indemnifying  his  own  sol¬ 
diers,  who  hereby  lost  part  of  their  booty.  By  this 
conduct  he  acquired  their  confidence  to  such  a  de¬ 
gree  that  he  was  arbiter  of  all  the  disputes  they 
had,  either  among  themselves  or  with  their  com- 


68 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


manders.  The  soldiers  being  ready  to  mutiny  about 
their  pay,  because  Petreius  and  Afranius  affirmed  it 
was  not  yet  due,  the  matter  was  referred  to  Caesar, 
who  determined  it  to  the  satisfaction  of  both  parties. 
About  a  third  of  the  army  was  disbanded  during  the 
two  days  they  continued  here,  after  which  the  rest 
set  out  for  the  Var  in  this  order ; — Two  of  Caesar’s 
legions  marched  at  the  head,  the  others  in  the  rear, 
and  the  vanquished  troops  in  the  middle.  Q.  Fufius 
Calenus,  one  of  Caesar’s  lieutenants,  presided  over 
the  march.  In  this  manner  they  continued  their 
route  to  the  Var,  where  the  remainder  of  the  troops 
were  disbanded. 


BOOK  II. 

1.  While  these  things  passed  in  Spain,  Trebonius, 
Caesar’s  lieutenant,  who  had  been  left  to  carry  on 
the  siege  of  Marseilles,  raised  terraces  for  two  dif¬ 
ferent  attacks,  and  approached  with  his  towers  and 
galleries.  One  of  the  attacks  was  on  the  side  of  the 
port ;  the  other  towards  the  mouth  of  the  Rhone, 
which  empties  itself  into  the  sea  bordering  on  Spain 
and  Gaul :  for  Marseilles  is  washed  by  the  sea  on 
three  sides,  and  can  be  approached  by  land  only  on 
the  fourth;  of  which  that  part  where  the  citadel 
stands,  being  very  strong  by  nature,  because  of  a 
deep  valley  that  runs  before  it,  requires  a  long  and 
difficult  siege.  For  the  completing  of  these  works, 
Trebonius  drew  together  from  all  parts  of  the  prov¬ 
ince  a  great  number  of  workmen  and  beasts  of  car¬ 
riage  ;  ordered  wood  and  osiers  to  be  brought ;  and 
having  prepared  all  things  necessary,  raised  a  terrace 
eighty  feet  high. 

2.  But  so  well  was  the  town  provided  with  all 
requisites  of  war,  and  so  great  was  the  multitude  of 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  II. 


69 


KJ^ichines  to  annoy  the  besiegers,  that  no  mantles 
were  sufficient  to  withstand  their  violence  :  for  they 
had  wooden  bars,  twelve  feet  in  length,  armed  at 
the  point  with  iron,  which  were  shot  with  such  force 
from  their  balistae  that  they  pierced  four  rows  of 
hurdles,  and  entered  a  considerable  way  into  the 
ground.  To  resist  the  violence  of  these  batteries, 
the  besiegers  made  use  of  galleries,  whose  roofs 
consisted  of  pieces  of  wood  of  about  a  foot  in  thick¬ 
ness,  strongly  compacted  together.  Under  this 
cover  the  materials  necessary  for  raising  the  terrace 
were  conveyed  ;  and  a  tortoise,  sixty  feet  long,  com¬ 
posed  of  strong  beams,  and  armed  with  every  thing 
necessary  to  defend  it  against  fire  and  stones,  went 
before  to  level  the  ground.  But  in  spite  of  all  en¬ 
deavours,  the  greatness  of  the  works,  the  height  of 
the  walls  and  towers,  and  the  multitude  of  machines 
made  use  of  by  the  besieged  greatly  retarded  the 
approaches.  Besides,  the  mountaineers  made  fre¬ 
quent  sallies,  and  set  fire  to  the  towers  and  mount ; 
which,  though  our  men  easily  sustained,  driving 
them  back  with  great  loss  into  the  town,  yet  failed 
not  very  much  to  incommode  the  works. 

3.  In  the  mean  time  L.  Nasidius,  sentby  Pompey 
to  the  assistance  of  Domitius  and  the  Marseillians, 
with  a  fleet  of  sixteen  ships,  some  of  which  were 
strengthened  with  beaks  of  brass,  passed  the  straits 
of  Sicily  unknown  to  Curio,  landed  at  Messana,  and 
raised  so  great  a  terror  in  the  place  that,  being  aban¬ 
doned  by  the  senate  and  principal  inhabitants,  he 
found  means  to  carry  oflf  one  of  their  galleys ;  and 
joining  it  to  his  own  fleet,  steered  directly  for  Mar¬ 
seilles  ;  having  despatched  a  frigate  before,  to  ap¬ 
prize  Domitius  and  the  inhabitants  of  his  coming, 
and  press  them  to  hazard  a  second  engagement 
with  Brutus,  when  they  should  be  reinforced  by  his 
fleet. 

4.  The  Marseillians,  after  their  defeat,  had  drawn 
as  many  old  ships  out  of  the  docks  as  they  had  lost 


70 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


in  the  engagement,  and  repaired  and  rigged  them 
with  wondrous  expedition.  They  were  likewise 
well  provided  with  rowers  and  pilots  ;  and  had  pre¬ 
pared  a  number  of  fishing-barks,  which  they  filled 
with  archers  and  engines,  and  strengthened  with 
roofs  to  shelter  the  rowers  from  the  enemy’s  darts. 
The  fleet  being  equipped  in  this  manner,  the  Mar- 
seillians,  animated  by  the  prayers  and  tears  of  their 
old  men,  matrons,  and  virgins  to  exert  themselves 
in  defence  of  their  country  in  so  pressing  a  conjunc¬ 
ture,  embarked  with  no  less  confidence  and  assu¬ 
rance  than  they  had  done  before  their  late  defeat : 
for  such  is  the  weakness  of  the  human  mind,  that 
things  dark,  hidden,  and  unknown  always  produce 
in  us  a  greater  degree  of  confidence  or  terror,  as 
happened  in  the  present  case ;  for  the  arrival  of 
Nasidius  had  filled  all  men  with  an  uncommon  share 
of  hope  and  eagerness.  The  wind  springing  up 
fair,  they  set  sail,  and  rendezvoused  at  Tauroenta,  a 
castle  belonging  to  the  town  where  Nasidius  lay 
with  his  fleet.  Here  they  put  their  ships  in  order, 
armed  themselves  with  courage  for  a  second  encoun¬ 
ter,  and  entering  readily  into  all  the  measures  pro¬ 
posed  by  Nasidius,  left  to  him  the  command  of  the 
left  wing,  and  stationed  themselves  on  the  right. 

5.  Brutus  sailed  to  meet  them,  with  his  fleet  con¬ 
siderably  increased;  for  besides  the  ships  which 
Caesar  had  caused  to  be  built  at  Aries,  he  had  also 
joined  to  it  six  more,  taken  from  the  Marseillians, 
which  he  had  refitted  and  rigged  since  the  late  ac¬ 
tion.  Wherefore,  exhorting  his  men  to  despise  an 
enemy  who  had  not  been  able  to  resist  them  when 
entire  and  unvanquished,  he  advanced  against  them 
full  of  resolution  and  confidence.  It  was  easy  to 
discern  from  Trebonius’s  camp,  and  the  eminences 
around  it,  what  passed  in  the  town.  All  the  youth 
that  were  left,  the  old  men,  the  women,  children,  and 
even  the  guards  on  the  waUs,  extending  their  hands 
to  heaven,  or  repairing  to  the  temples,  and  pros- 


«7lVIL  WAR. - BOOK  II. 


71 


trating  themselves  at  the  altars,  besought  the  gods 
to  grant  them  victory.  Nor  was  there  a  man  among 
them  who  did  not  believe  that  their  safety  depended 
wholly  on  the  issue  of  that  day’s  action ;  for  the 
choice  of  their  youth,  and  the  most  considerable 
men  of  their  city,  were  all  on  board  the  fleet :  inso¬ 
much,  that  in  case  of  any  disaster,  they  had  no  re¬ 
source  left :  but  should  they  obtain  the  victory,  they 
were  in  hopes  of  preserving  their  city,  either  by 
their  own  forces  or  the  reinforcements  they  ex¬ 
pected  from  without. 

6.  Accordingly,  in  the  engagement,  they  behaved 
with  the  most  determined  courage.  The  remem¬ 
brance  of  what  their  wives  and  children  had  repre¬ 
sented  to  them  at  their  departure  served  to  exalt 
their  bravery ;  in  a  full  persuasion  that  this  was  the 
last  opportunity  they  should  have  of  exerting  them¬ 
selves  in  defence  of  their  country  ;  and  that  if  they 
fell  in  the  engagement,  their  fellow-citizens  could 
not  long  survive  them,  as  their  fate  must  be  the  same 
on  the  taking  of  the  town.  Our  ships  being  at  some 
distance  from  each  other,  both  gave  the  enemy’s 
pilots  an  opportunity  of  showing  their  address  in 
working  their  vessels,  and  flying  to  the  assistance 
of  their  friends,  when  they  were  laid  hold  on  by  our 
grappling-hooks.  And  indeed,  when  it  came  to  a 
close  fight,  they  seconded  the  mountaineers  with 
wonderful  resolution,  and,  in  bravery,  seemed  to 
yield  but  little  to  our  men.  At  the  same  time,  a 
great  quantity  of  darts  poured  incessantly  from  their 
smaller  frigates,  wounded  a  great  many  of  our  row¬ 
ers,  and  such  of  the  soldiers  as  were  without  shel¬ 
ter.  Two  of  their  galleys  fell  on  that  of  Brutus, 
which  was  easily  distinguished  by  its  flag:  but 
though  they  attacked  him  on  both  sides,  he  extri¬ 
cated  himself  with  such  agility  and  address,  as  in  a 
short  time  to  get  a  little  before,  which  made  them 
run  foul  of  each  other  so  violently  that  they  were 
both  considerably  shattered ;  one  in  particular  had 


72  Cesar’s  commentaries. 

its  beak  broken,  and  was  in  a  manner  totally  crushed; 
which  being  observed  by  those  of  our  fleet  that  lay 
nearest,  they  suddenly  fell  on  and  sank  them,  before 
they  could  recover  out  of  their  disorder. 

7.  In  this  encounter,  the  ships  under  Nasidius 
were  of  no  manner  of  service  to  the  Marseillians, 
but  quickly  retired  out  of  the  fight :  for  as  they 
were  neither  animated  by  the  sight  of  their  country, 
nor  the  entreaties  of  their  relations,  they  were  not 
very  forward  to  expose  their  lives  to  hazard,  but  es¬ 
caped  without  hurt  from  the  combat.  The  Marseil¬ 
lians  had  five  ships  sunk  and  four  taken.  One  es¬ 
caped  to  the  coast  of  Hither  Spain,  with  those  of 
Nasidius.  Of  the  rest  that  remained,  one  was  im¬ 
mediately  despatched  to  Marseilles,  to  carry  thither 
the  news  of  the  defeat.  As  soon  as  it  drew  near 
the  town,  all  the  inhabitants  flocked  out  to  know 
what  had  passed;  and  being  informed  of  it,  ap¬ 
peared  no  less  dejected  than  if  the  city  had  been 
taken  by  storm.  However,  they  still  continued  their 
preparations  for  the  defence  of  the  place  with  as 
much  diligence  as  ever. 

8.  The  legionaries  who  had  the  charge  of  the 
works  on  the  right  perceived  that  a  tower  of  brick, 
built  at  a  little  distance  from  the  walls,  would  be  of 
great  service  to  shelter  them  from  the  frequent  sal¬ 
lies  of  the  enemy.  At  first  they  made  it  very  low 
and  small,  to  guard  against  sudden  incursions. 
Hither  they  retired  in  case  of  danger:  here  they 
defended  themselves  against  the  most  obstinate  at¬ 
tacks  of  the  enemy ;  nay,  even  assaulted  them  in 
their  turn,  repulsed,  and  pursued  them.  This  tower 
was  of  a  square  form,  thirty  feet  every  way,  allow¬ 
ing  for  the  thickness  of  the  walls,  which  might  be 
about  five  feet.  Afterward  (being  instructed  by  ex¬ 
perience,  which  is  the  best  of  teachers)  they  plainly 
perceived  that  the  higher  it  was  carried  the  more 
serviceable  it  would  prove.  The  manner  of  effect¬ 
ing  it  was  thus ;  when  the  work  was  raised  to  the 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  II. 


73 


height  of  one  story,  they  laid  a  floor  over  it,  the  ex¬ 
tremities  of  whose  beams  were  concealed  in  the 
thickness  of  the  wall,  that  they  might  not,  by  ap¬ 
pearing  on  the  outside,  be  liable  to  be  set  on  fire. 
Thence  they  continued  the  wall  directly  upwards, 
as  far  as  their  galleries  and  mantles  would  allow. 
Here  they  laid  two  beams  crosswise,  whose  ex¬ 
tremities  almost  reached  the  angles  of  the  wall,  for 
supporting  the  floor,  which  was  to  serve  as  a  roof 
to  the  whole.  Over  these  beams  they  laid  the  joists 
of  the  roof,  and  boarded  them  with  planks.  The 
roof  was  so  contrived  as  to  project  a  little  beyond 
the  wall,  in  order  to  suspend  from  it  what  might  be 
necessary  to  shelter  the  workmen,  while  employed 
in  completing  the  story.  This  floor  was  paved  with 
tiles  and  clay,  to  render  it  proof  against  fire,  and 
had  besides  a  covering  of  strong  mattresses,  to  break 
the  force  of  stones  and  darts.  At  the  same  time 
they  suspended  from  the  beams  of  the  roof  that 
projected  beyond  the  wall  curtains  made  of  strong 
cables,  wove  to  the  depth  of  four  feet,  and  which 
went  round  the  three  sides  of  the  tower  that  were 
exposed  to  the  engines  of  the  enemy ;  having  expe¬ 
rienced  on  former  occasions  that  this  kind  of  cover 
was  impenetrable  to  any  dart  or  engine  whatever. 
When  this  part  of  the  tower  was  finished,  roofed, 
and  sheltered  from  the  enemy’s  blows,  they  removed 
their  mantles  to  another,  and  by  means  of  engines 
elevated  the  roof  entire  from  the  first  story,  as  far 
as  the  curtains  would  allow.  There  secure  from  all 
insult,  they  laboured  at  the  wall,  elevating  the  roof 
a  second  time,  and  thereby  enabling  themselves 
both  to  continue  the  work  and  lay  the  interjacent 
floors.  In  this  manner  they  proceeded  from  story 
to  story,  mounting  them  one  on  another,  till,  with¬ 
out  danger  or  wounds,  they  had  completed  the  num¬ 
ber  of  six,  leaving  loop-holes  in  convenient  places 
for  the  engines  to  play  through. 

9.  When,  by  means  of  this  tower,  they  thought 

CiES.  VoL.  II.— G 


74 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


they  had  sufficiently  provided  for  the  security  of  the 
works  around  it,  they  resolved  to  build  a  gallery 
sixty  feet  long  of  wood  two  feet  in  thickness,  to 
extend  from  the  brick  tower  to  the  tower  of  the 
enemy,  and  the  very  walls  of  the  town.  The  form 
of  the  gallery  was  this :  first,  two  beams  of  equal 
length  were  laid  on  the  ground,  at  the  distance  of 
four  feet  from  one  another ;  and  in  these  were  fixed 
little  pillars  five  feet  high,  joined  at  the  top  by  beams 
designed  to  support  the  roof  of  the  gallery.  Over 
these  were  laid  rafters,  two  feet  square,  fastened 
strongly  with  nails  and  plates  of  iron.  The  uppei 
part  of  the  roof  was  composed  of  square  laths,  four 
inches  thick,  which  were  placed  at  a  small  distance 
one  from  another,  to  bear  the  tiles  that  were  to  be 
laid  on  them.  Thus  was  the  whole  finished  with  a 
sloping  roof,  which,  being  partly  composed  of  tiles 
and  mortar,  was  proof  against  fire,  and  had  besides 
a  covering  of  hides,  to  hinder  the  mortar  from  being 
washed  away  by  spouts  of  water.  Over  all  we 
threw  strong  mattresses,  to  screen  the  hides  from 
fire  and  stones.  This  work  was  finished  close  by 
the  brick  tower,  under  cover  of  four  mantles,  and 
immediately  carried  forward  on  rollers,  in  the  man¬ 
ner  ships  are  launched,  till  it  unexpectedly  reached 
the  very  tower  of  the  enemy. 

10.  The  Marseillians,  astonished  at  so  threatening 
and  unlooked-for  a  machine,  pushed  forward  with 
levers  the  largest  stones  they  could  find,  and  tum¬ 
bled  them  from  the  top  of  the  wall  on  the  gallerj^ 
But  the  strength  of  the  wood  resisted  the  violence 
of  the  blows,  so  that  they  fell  to  the  ground  without 
doing  any  hurt.  Observing  this,  they  changed  their 
design,  and  poured  down  on  us  burning  barrels  of 
pitch  and  tallow.  But  these  likewise  rolled  along 
the  roof  without  damage,  and,  falling  on  the  ground, 
were  afterward  thrust  away  with  forks  and  long 
poles.  Meanwhile  our  soldiers,  under  protection  of 
the  gallery,  were  endeavouring  with  their  levers  to 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  II. 


75 


undermine  the  enemy’s  tower.  The  gallery  itself 
was  defended  by  the  tower  of  brick,  whence  our 
engines  played  without  intermission ;  insomuch,  that 
the  enemy,  driven  from  their  tower  and  walls,  were 
at  last  obliged  to  abandon  their  defence.  By  de¬ 
grees  the  tower  being  undermined,  part  of  it  fell 
down,  and  the  rest  was  so  shaken  that  it  could  not 
stand  long. 

11.  On  this  the  enemy,  alarmed  at  so  unexpected 
a  misfortune,  discouraged  by  the  downfall  of  the 
tower,  awed  by  such  a  testimony  of  the  wrath  of 
the  gods,  and  dreading  the  plunder  and  devastation 
of  their  city,  came  forth  in  the  habit  of  suppliants, 
and  with  outstretched  hands  besought  the  compas¬ 
sion  of  the  army  and  generals.  At  this  new  and 
unexpected  sight,  all  acts  of  hostility  ceased,  and  the 
soldiers,  la^dng  aside  their  ardour  for  the  fight,  were 
eager  to  hear  and  get  acquainted  with  the  proposals 
of  the  enemy,  who,  arriving  in  presence  of  the  army 
and  generals,  threw  themselves  at  their  feet,  re¬ 
questing  them  to  suspend  all  further  operations 
till  Caesar’s  arrival.  They  told  them,  “  that  as  the 
works  were  now  completed,  and  the  tower  destroyed, 
they  were  sensible  the  city  could  no  longer  hold 
out,  and  therefore  meant  not  to  defend  it ;  that  in 
the  mean  time  no  prejudice  could  arise  to  the  be¬ 
siegers  from  this  respite;  because  if  they  refused 
to  submit  on  Caesar’s  coming,  he  would  have  it  in 
his  power  to  treat  them  as  he  pleased.”  They  added, 
“  that  if  the  whole  tower  should  be  brought  down,  it 
would  be  impossible  to  hinder  the  soldiers  from 
yielding  to  the  desire  of  plunder,  by  breaking  into 
and  pillaging  the  town.”  This,  and  much  more  of 
the  same  nature  (for  the  Marseillians  are  a  learned 
people),  they  urged  in  a  very  moving  and  pathetic 
strain. 

12.  The  generals,  moved  by  these  remonstrances, 
drew  olf  the  soldiers  from  the  works,  discontinued 
the  attack,  and  contented  themselves  with  posting 


76 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


guards  in  convenient  places.  Compassion  occa¬ 
sioned  a  kind  of  truce  till  Caesar’s  arrival ;  so  that 
on  neither  side  were  any  acts  of  hostility  committed, 
but  every  thing  was  quiet  and  secure,  as  if  the  siege 
had  been  at  an  end :  for  Caesar  had  earnestly  re¬ 
commended  it  to  Trebonius  by  letter  to  prevent,  if 
possible,  the  city’s  being  taken  by  storm,  lest  the 
soldiers,  irritated  by  their  revolt,  and  the  resistance 
they  had  found,  should  put  all  the  youth  to  the  sword, 
as  they  threatened  to  do.  Nay,  they  were  even  then 
hardly  restrained  from  breaking  into  the  town,  and 
loudly  murmured  against  Trebonius  for  delaying  a 
conquest  which  they  looked  on  as  certain. 

13.  But  the  Marseillians,  a  nation  without  faith, 
aimed  at  nothing  further  in  all  this  than  to  find  a 
time  and  opportunity  to  deceive  us,  and  put  in  prac¬ 
tice  the  treacherous  purpose  they  had  formed, 
For  after  some  days,  our  men  suspecting  no  danger, 
but  relying  on  the  good  faith  of  the  enemy,  while 
some  were  retired  to  their  tents,  others  laid  down 
to  rest  in  the  trenches,  overpowered  by  the  long 
fatigue  they  had  undergone,  and  all  the  arms  laid 
up  and  removed  out  of  sight ;  suddenly  they  sallied 
from  the  town,  and  the  wind  being  high  and  favour¬ 
able  to  their  design,  set  fire  to  the  works.  The  flame 
in  a  moment  spread  itself  on  all  sides ;  insomuch 
that  the  battery,  the  mantles,  the  tortoise,  the  tower, 
the  machines,  and  the  gallery  were  entirely  destroyed, 
before  it  was  possible  to  discover  whence  the  dis¬ 
aster  arose.  The  suddenness  of  the  accident  made 
our  men  immediately  run  to  their  arms,  where  every 
one  took  what  first  came  to  hand.  Some  sallied  out 
on  the  enemy,  but  were  checked  by  the  arrows  and 
darts  poured  on  them  from  the  town;  insomuch 
that  the  Marseillians,  sheltered  by  their  walls,  burnt 
without  any  difficulty  the  tower  of  brick  and  the 
gallery.  Thus  the  labour  of  many  months  was  de¬ 
stroyed  in  an  instant,  by  the  treachery  of  an  enemy 
and  the  violence  of  the  wind.  Next  day  they  made 


1 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  II. 


77 


f.he  same  attempt,  favoured  by  the  same  wind,  and 
with  yet  greater  assurance,  against  the  tower  and 
terrace  of  the  other  attack.  They  approached  them 
boldly,  and  threw  plenty  of  tire  on  them ;  but  our 
men,  grown  wise  by  their  late  misfortune,  had  made 
all  necessary  preparations  for  their  defence  ;  so  that, 
after  losing  many  men,  they  were  obliged  to  re¬ 
treat  into  the  city  without  effecting  their  purpose. 

14.  Trebonius  immediately  resolved  to  repair  his 
loss,  in  which  he  found  himself  warmly  seconded 
by  the  zeal  of  the  soldiers.  They  saw  the  works 
which  had  cost  so  much  labour  and  toil  destroyed 
by  the  perfidy  of  a  people  who  made  no  scruple  of 
violating  the  most  sacred  engagements ;  they  saw 
that  their  credulity  had  been  abused,  and  that  they 
were  become  the  jest  of  their  enemies,  which 
grieved  and  provoked  them  at  the  same  time.  But  it 
was  still  difficult  to  determine  whence  they  might 
be  supplied  with  wood,  to  repair  all  these  works. 
There  was  none  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Marseilles, 
the  trees  having  been  all  cut  down  for  a  great  way 
round.  They  resolved  therefore  to  raise  a  terrace 
of  a  new  kind,  and  such  as  history  nowhere  men¬ 
tions  before  that  time.  They  raised  tw’O  walls  of 
brick,  each  six  feet  thick,  and  distant  from  one  an¬ 
other  nearly  the  breadth  of  the  former  mount.  Over 
these  they  laid  a  floor,  and  to  render  it  firm,  besides  its 
being  supported  on  either  side,  placed  pillars  under¬ 
neath  between  the  walls,  to  bear  it  up  where  it  was 
weakest,  or  had  a  greater  stress  of  weight  to  sup¬ 
port.  There  were  moreover  cross-beams,  which 
rested  on  niches  in  the  wall ;  and  to  render  the  sev¬ 
eral  floors  proof  against  fire,  hurdles  were  laid  over 
them,  which  were  afterward  covered  with  clay. 
The  soldiers,  thus  sheltered  overhead  by  the  roof, 
on  the  right  and  left  by  walls,  and  before  by  a  breast¬ 
work,  brought  the  necessary  materials  without  dan¬ 
ger,  and,  by  the  eagerness  with  which  they  laboured, 

G  2 


78 


cjesar’s  commentaries. 


soon  completed  the  whole,  leaving  ouvertures  in 
convenient  places,  to  sally  out  on  occasion. 

15.  The  enemy  seeing  we  had  repaired,  in  so 
short  a  time,  what  they  imagined  must  have  costjis 
the  labour  of  many  days;  that  there  was  now  no 
hope  left,  either  of  deceiving  us  or  sallying  out  on  us 
with  success ;  that  all  the  approaches  to  the  city, 
by  land,  might  in  like  manner  be  shut  up  by  a  w^ 
and  towers,  so  as  to  render  it  impossible  for  them 
to  appear  on  their  works,  our  walls  overtopping  and 
commanding  theirs,  that  they  could  neither  dis¬ 
charge  their  javelins,  nor  make  any  use  of  their  en¬ 
gines,  in  which  their  principal  hope  lay ;  and  that 
they  were  now  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  fighting 
us  on  equal  terms,  though  conscious  of  their  great 
inferiority  in  point  of  valour ;  they  were  forced  to 
have  recourse  again  to  the  same  conditions  of  truce 
they  had  so  ill  observed  before. 

16.  M.  Varro,  in  Farther  Spain,  having  early  no¬ 
tice  of  what  passed  in  Italy,  and  beginning  to  dis¬ 
trust  the  success  of  Pompey’s  affairs,  spoke  in  a 
very  friendly  manner  of  Caesar.  He  said,  “  that  he 
was  indeed  under  particular  obligations  to  Pompey, 
who  had  made  him  his  lieutenant-general,  but  at  the 
same  time  was  no  less  indebted  to  Caesar :  that  he 
was  not  ignorant  of  the  duty  of  a  lieutenant,  em¬ 
ployed  by  his  general  in  an  office  of  trust ;  but  that 
he  likewise  knew  his  own  strength,  and  the  attach¬ 
ment  of  the  whole  province  to  Caesar.”  After  this 
manner  he  talked  in  aU  companies,  nor  declared  ex¬ 
pressly  for  either  side.  But  when  he  afterward 
understood  that  Caesar  was  detained  by  the  siege 
of  Marseilles  ;  that  the  armies  of  Petreius  and  Afra- 
nius  had  joined,  and  daily  grew  stronger  by  the  ar¬ 
rival  of  new  succours  ;  that  there  was  room  to  hope 
for  every  thing ;  that  the  hither  province  had  unani¬ 
mously  declared  in  their  favour;  that  Caesar  him¬ 
self  was  reduced  to  great  straits  at  Lerida,  of  all 
which  Afranius  wrote  largely,  magnifying  his  own 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  II. 


79 


advantages ;  he  began  to  alter  with  fortune.  He 
raised  troops  over  the  whole  province :  added  thirty 
auxiliary  cohorts  to  the  two  legions  he  had  already 
under  his  command;  formed  great  magazines  of 
corn  to  supply  Marseilles,  and  the  armies  under 
Afranius  and  Petreius ;  ordered  the  Gaditani  to  fur¬ 
nish  him  with  ten  ships  of  war ;  caused  a  consider¬ 
able  number  to  be  built  at  Hispalis ;  sent  all  the 
money  and  ornaments  he  found  in  the  temple  of 
Hercules  to  Gales ;  left  there  a  garrison  of  six  co¬ 
horts,  under  the  command  of  Gains  Gallonius,  a  Ro¬ 
man  knight,  the  friend  of  Domitius,  who  had  sent 
him  thither  to  look  after  an  inheritance  of  his ;  con¬ 
veyed  all  the  arms,  public  and  private,  to  Gallonius’s 
house  :  spoke  everywhere  disadvantageously  of 
Gaesar  ;  declared  several  times  from  his  tribunal  that 
Gaesar  had  been  worsted,  and  that  many  of  his  sol¬ 
diers  had  gone  over  to  Afranius,  as  he  was  well  as¬ 
sured  by  undoubted  testimonies ;  by  all  which,  hav¬ 
ing  struck  a  terror  into  the  Roman  citizens  of  that 
province,  he  obliged  them  to  promise  him  one  hun¬ 
dred  and  ninety  thousand  sesterces,  twenty  thou¬ 
sand  weight  of  silver,  and  one  hundred  and  twenty 
thousand  bushels  of  wheat.  The  states  well  affected 
to  Gaesar  he  loaded  with  heavy  contributions  ;  con¬ 
fiscated  the  effects  of  such  as  had  spoken  against 
the  commonwealth ;  quartered  soldiers  on  them ; 
harassed  them  with  arbitrary  judgments ;  and,  in 
fine,  obliged  the  whole  province  to  take  an  oath  of 
fidelity  to  himself  and  Pompey.  Hearing  of  what 
had  passed  in  Hither  Spain,  he  prepared  for  war. 
His  design  was,  to  shut  himself  up  with  his  two 
legions  in  Gales,  where  all  the  provisions  and  ship¬ 
ping  lay,  because  he  very  well  understood  that  the 
whole  province  was  in  Gaesar’s  interest ;  for  he 
judged  it  would  be  easy  in  that  island,  with  the 
ships  and  provisions  he  had,  to  draw  out  the  war  into 
length. 

17.  Caesar,  though  called  on  by  many  and  neces* 


80  CiESAR  S  COMMENTARIES. 

V 

sary  affairs  to  return  to  Italy,  resolved,  however,  not 
to  leave  Spain  till  he  had  entirely  quelled  the  war  in 
that  province ;  for  he  knew  that  Hither  Spain  had 
many  obligations  to  Pompey,  and  that  most  of  the 
inhabitants  were  strongly  in  his  interest.  Having 
therefore  detached  two  legions  into  Farther  Spain, 
under  the  command  of  Q,  Cassius,  tribune  of  the 
people,  he  himself  advanced  by  great  journeys,  at 
the  head  of  six  hundred  horse.  He  sent  orders 
before  to  the  magistrates  and  the  principal  men  of 
every  state  to  meet  him  by  a  certain  day  at  Cor¬ 
dova.  All  obeyed ;  every  state  sent  its  deputies ; 
nor  was  there  a  single  Roman  citizen  of  any  con¬ 
sideration  who  did  not  repair  thither  on  this  occa¬ 
sion.  The  very  senate  of  Cordova,  of  their  own 
proper  motion,  shut  their  gates  against  Yarro,  sta¬ 
tioned  guards  and  sentinels  along  the  walls,  and  de¬ 
tained  two  cohorts,  called  Calonicae,  which  chanced 
to  march  that  way,  that  they  might  serve  to  protect 
the  town.  At  the  same  time,  those  of  Carmona,  the 
most  considerable  state  in  the  province,  drove  out  of 
their  city  three  cohorts,  which  Yarro  had  left  to 
garrison  the  citadel,  and  shut  their  gates  against 
them. 

18.  This  determined  Yarro  to  make  all  possible 
despatch,  that  he  might  reach  Cales  as  soon  as 
possible,  lest  his  march  should  be  intercepted ;  so 
great  and  apparent  was  the  affection  of  the  province 
to  C^sar.  When  he  was  advanced  a  little  way,  he 
received  letters  from  Cales,  which  informed  him, 
“  that  as  soon  as  Caesar’s  edict  was  known,  the  prin¬ 
cipal  men  of  Cales,  with  the  tribunes  of  the  cohorts 
he  had  left  in  garrison,  had  conspired  to  drive  Gallo- 
nius  from  the  city,  and  preserve  the  town  and  island 
for  Caesar  ;  that  this  project  being  formed,  they  had 
warned  Gallonius  to  retire  of  his  own  accord,  while 
he  yet  might  with  safety ;  threatening,  if  he  did  not, 
to  come  to  some  immediate  resolution  against  him : 
that  Gallonius,  terrified  by  so  general  a  revolt,  had 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  iL 


81 


accordingly  left  Gales.”  On  this  intelligence,  one 
of  the  two  legions,  known  by  the  name  of  Vernacula, 
took  up  their  ensigns  in  Varro’s  presence,  quitted 
the  camp,  and  marched  directly  to  Hispalis,  where 
they  sat  down  in  the  market-place  and  cloisters, 
without  committing  the  least  act  of  violence,  which 
so  wrought  on  the  Roman  citizens  residing  in  the 
town  that  every  one  was  desirous  of  accommodating 
them  in  their  houses.  Varro,  astonished  at  these 
proceedings,  turned  back  with  design  to  reach  Ital- 
ica,  but  was  informed  that  the  gates  were  shut.  At 
last,  finding  himself  surrounded  on  all  sides,  and  the 
ways  everywhere  beset,  he  wrote  to  Caesar  that 
he  was  ready  to  resign  the  legion  under  his  com¬ 
mand  to  whomsoever  he  should  order  to  receive  it. 
Caesar  sent  Sextus  Caesar  to  take  the  command  ; 
and  Varro,  having  resigned  the  legion  accordingly, 
came  to  him  at  Cordova.  After  giving  him  an  ac¬ 
count  of  the  state  of  the  province,  he  faithfully  re¬ 
signed  all  the  public  money  he  had  in  his  hands,  and 
informed  him  of  the  quantity  of  corn  and  shipping 
he  had  prepared. 

19.  Caesar,  assembling  the  states  at  Cordova,  re¬ 
turned  thanks  severally  to  all  who  had  declared  in 
his  favour ;  to  the  Roman  citizens,  for  having  made 
themselves  masters  of  the  town  in  his  name  ;  to  the 
Spaniards,  for  driving  out  Pompey’s  garrison  ;  to  the 
people  of  Cales,  for  having  frustrated  the  designs  of 
his  enemies,  and  asserted  their  own  liberty  ;  to  the 
military  tribunes  and  centurions  sent  thither  to  guard 
the  place,  for  having  confirmed  them  in  their  resolu¬ 
tions  by  their  example.  He  remitted  the  tribute 
imposed  by  Varro  on  the  Roman  citizens  ;  restored 
their  estates  to  those  who  had  been  deprived  of  them 
for  speaking  their  thoughts  freely ;  distributed  re¬ 
wards  to  a  great  many,  both  in  public  and  private, 
and  gave  all  room  to  hope  for  like  favours  in  the 
issue.  After  a  stay  of  two  days  at  Cordova,  he 
went  to  Cales,  where  he  restored  to  the  temple  of 


82 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


Hercules  all  the  treasures  and  ornaments  which  had 
been  carried  off  and  lodged  in  private  houses.  He 
committed  the  government  of  the  province  to  Q. 
Cassius,  assigned  him  four  legions  for  that  purpose  ; 
and,  embarking  for  Tarraco  on  board  the  fleet  which 
Varro  had  obliged  the  Gaditani  to  furnish,  arrived 
there  in  a  few  days.  There  he  found  deputies  from 
almost  all  the  states  of  the  province,  and  having,  in 
like  manner  as  at  Cordova,  both  publicly  and  pri¬ 
vately  rewarded  some  states,  he  left  Tarraco,  came 
by  land  to  Narbonne,  and  thence  to  Marseilles. 
There  he  was  informed  of  the  law  touching  the  dic¬ 
tatorship,  and  that  M.  Lepidus  the  prelor  had  named 
him  to  that  office. 

20.  The  Marseillians,  overwhelmed  with  a  pro¬ 
fusion  of  calamities,  reduced  to  the  utmost  distress 
by  famine,  worsted  in  two  different  engagements  by 
sea,  weakened  by  continual  sallies,  assaulted  by  a 
heavy  pestilence,  occasioned  by  the  length  of  the 
siege  and  their  constant  change  of  diet  (for  they 
were  obliged  to  feed  on  old  meal  and  musty  barley, 
which  had  been  long  treasured  up  in  their  magazines 
against  an  accident  of  this  kind),  their  tower  being 
overthrown,  a  great  part  of  their  walls  undermined, 
and  no  prospect  of  relief  from  armies  or  the  prov¬ 
inces,  which  were  now  all  reduced  under  Caesar’s 
power,  they  resolved  to  surrender  in  good  earnest. 
But  some  days  before,  Domitius,  who  was  apprized 
of  their  intentions,  having  prepared  three  ships 
(two  of  which  he  assigned  to  his  followers,  and  em¬ 
barked  in  person  on  board  the  third),  took  occasion, 
during  a  storm,  to  make  his  escape.  Some  of  Brutus’s 
galleys,  which  he  had  ordered  to  keep  constantly 
cruising  before  the  port,  chancing  to  get  sight  of 
him,  prepared  to  give  chase.  That  in  which  Do¬ 
mitius  was  escaped  under  favour  of  the  tempest ;  but 
the  two  others,  alarmed  at  seeing  our  galleys  so 
near  them,  re-entered  the  port.  Caesar  spared  the 
town,  more  in  regard  to  its  antiquity  and  reputation 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  II. 


83 


than  any  real  merit  it  could  plead.  He  obliged  the 
citizens,  however,  to  deliver  up  their  arms,  machines, 
and  ships  of  war,  whetlier  in  the  port  or  arsenal ; 
to  surrender  all  the  money  in  their  treasury  ;  and  to 
receive  a  garrison  of  two  legions.  Then,  sending 
the  rest  of  the  army  into  Italy,  he  himself  set  out 
for  Rome. 

21.  About  the  same  time,  C.  Curio  sailed  from 
Sicily  into  Africa,  with  two  of  the  four  legions 
which  had  been  put  under  his  command  by  Caesar, 
and  five  hundred  horse,  having  conceived  the  highest 
contempt  of  the  troops  headed  by  P.Attius  Varus. 
After  two  days’  and  three  nights’  sailing,  he  landed 
at  a  place  called  Aquilaria.  This  place  is  about 
twenty-two  miles  distant  from  Clupea,  and  has  a 
very  convenient  harbour  for  ships  in  the  summer 
time,  sheltered  on  each  side  by  a  promontory.  L. 
Caesar,  the  son,  waited  for  him  at  Clupea,  with  ten 
galleys,  which  P.  Attius  had  taken  in  the  war  against 
the  pirates,  and  repaired  at  Utica  for  the  service  of 
the  present  war.  But,  terrified  at  the  number  of 
ships  Curio  brought  with  him,  he  stood  in  for  the 
coast ;  where,  running  his  galley  on  shore,  he  left 
her,  and  went  by  land  to  Adrumetum.  C.  Confidius 
Longus  commanded  in  that  town,  with  one  legion  ; 
and  here  also  the  rest  of  the  fleet  repaired  after 
Caesar’s  flight.  M.  Rufus  the  questor  pursuing  them 
with  twelve  galleys,  which  Curio  had  brought  with 
him  from  Africa,  to  guard  the  transports ;  when  he 
saw  Caesar’s  own  galley  on  the  strand,  he  towed  her 
off,  and  returned  with  the  fleet  to  Curio. 

22.  Curio  ordered  him  to  sail  directly  for  Utica, 
and  followed  himself  with  the  land  army.  After  a 
march  of  two  days  he  arrived  at  the  river  Bagradas, 
where  he  left  C.  Caninius  Rebilus  with  the  legions, 
and  advanced  before  with  the  cavalry,  to  take  a  view 
of  the  Cornelian  camp,  which  was  judged  to  be  a 
situation  extremely  advantageous.  It  is  a  high  rock, 
jutting  out  into  the  sea,  steep  and  rough  on  both 


CJESAR  S  COMMENTARIES. 


84 

sides,  but  with  an  easier  descent  where  it  fronts 
Utica.  It  lies  little  more  than  a  mile  from  Utica  in 
a  direct  line  ;  but  as  there  is  a  fountain  about  half¬ 
way,  which  runs  towards  the  sea,  and  overflowing 
the  plain  forms  a  morass,  to  avoid  this,  in  marching 
to  Utica,  it  is  necessary  to  take  a  compass  of  six 
miles.  When  he  had  taken  a  view  of  this  post,  he 
went  next  and  examined  Varus’s  camp,  which  was 
under  the  walls  of  the  town,  towards  the  gate  named 
the  Gate  of  War.  The  situation  of  it  was  extremely 
advantageous ;  for  on  the  one  side  it  was  covered 
by  the  city  of  Utica  itself,  and  on  the  other  by  a 
kind  of  theatre,  which  stood  without  the  walls,  the 
works  round  which  took  up  so  much  room  that  they 
rendered  the  approach  to  the  camp  extremely  difli- 
cult.  At  the  same  time  he  saw  all  the  ways  crowded 
with  people,  who,  out  of  fear  of  being  pillaged,  were 
carrying  their  most  valuable  effects  into  the  city. 
He  detached  the  cavalry  against  them  to  disperse 
them,  and  likewise  have  an  opportunity  of  making 
some  booty:  on  which  Varus  ordered  six  hundred 
Numidian  horse  to  advance  to  their  assistance,  which 
he  further  strengthened  with  four  hundred  foot,  sent 
by  Juba,  a  few  days  before,  to  reinforce  the  garrison 
of  Utica.  This  king  inherited  from  his  father  an 
affection  for  Pompey,  and,  besides,  personally  hated 
Curio,  who,  during  his  tribuneship,  had  published  a 
law  to  deprive  him  of  his  kingdom.  The  Numidian 
cavalry  soon  came  to  blows  with  ours;  but  were 
not  able  to  stand  their  first  charge,  retreating  to  their 
camp  with  the  loss  of  a  hundred  and  twenty  men. 
Meantime,  on  the  arrival  of  Curio’s  fleet,  he  ordered 
proclamation  to  be  made  among  the  merchant  ships 
which  were  at  Utica,  to  the  number  of  two  hundred, 
that  he  would  treat  them  as  enemies  if  they  did  not 
immediately  repair  to  the  Cornelian  camp.  On  this 
proclamation  they  instantly  weighed  anchor,  and 
leaving  Utica,  sailed  whither  they  were  ordered ;  by 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  II.  85 

which  means  the  army  was  plentifully  supplied  with 
every  thing  they  stood  in  need  of. 

23.  These  things  despatched,  Curio  repaired  to 
his  camp  at  Bagrada,  where,  with  the  joint  acclama¬ 
tions  of  the  whole  army,  he  was  saluted  by  the 
name  of  Imperator.  Next  day  he  led  his  army  to¬ 
wards  Utica,  and  encamped  not  far  from  the  town. 
But  before  he  had  finished  his  intrenchments,  he 
was  informed  by  some  parties  of  horse,  who  were 
on  the  scout,  that  a  powerful  body  of  horse  and  foot 
had  been  sent  by  the  king  to  Utica :  at  the  same 
time  a  great  cloud  of  dust  began  to  appear,  and  soon 
after  the  enemy’s  van  was  in  view.  Curio,  aston¬ 
ished  at  a  motion  so  unexpected,  sent  the  cavalry 
before  to  sustain  their  first  charge,  and  keep  them  in 
play ;  he,  meanwhile,  drawing  off  the  legions  from 
the  works,  with  all  possible  expedition  formed  them 
in  order  of  battle.  The  horse  engaged,  according 
to  orders ;  and  with  such  success,  that  before  the 
legions  could  be  duly  drawn  up,  the  whole  reinforce¬ 
ment  sent  by  the  king,  who  marched  without  order 
or  apprehension  of  danger,  falling  into  confusion, 
at  last  betook  themselves  to  flight.  The  cavalry, 
wheeling  nimbly  along  the  shore,  escaped  with  little 
loss  into  the  town  ;  but  great  numbers  of  the  infantry 
were  cut  to  pieces. 

24.  Next  night  two  centurions  of  the  nation  of 
the  Marsi,  with  twenty-two  private  soldiers,  deserted 
from  Curio,  and  went  over  to  Attius  Varus.  These, 
either  believing  the  thing  themselves,  or  desirous  to 
carry  grateful  tidings  to  Varus  (for  we  easily  be¬ 
lieve  what  we  wish,  and  readily  hope  that  others 
will  fall  into  our  way  of  thinking),  assured  him  that 
the  whole  army  was  extremely  averse  to  Curio,  and 
would  infallibly  revolt,  if  he  would  but  advance,  and 
come  to  a  conference  with  them.  Accordingly,  Va¬ 
rus  drew  out  his  legions  next  day.  Curio  did  the 
same ;  and  the  two  armies  stood  facing  one  another 

Cm8.  Vol.  II.— H 


86  Cesar’s  commentaries. 

in  order  of  battle,  with  a  small  valley  between 
them. 

25.  Sextus  Qiiintilius  Varus,  who,  as  we  have  re¬ 
lated  above,  had  been  made  prisoner  at  Corfinium, 
was  now  in  the  enemy’s  army ;  for  Caesar,  having 
granted  him  his  liberty,  he  had  retired  into  Africa. 
Curio  had  brought  over  with  him  from  Sicily  the 
very  same  legions  who  had  revolted  some  time  be¬ 
fore  to  Caesar  at  the  siege  of  Corfinium ;  so  that, 
excepting  a  few  centurions  who  had  been  changed, 
the  officers  and  companies  were  the  same  as  had 
formerly  served  with  this  very  Quintilius.  He  made 
use  of  this  handle  to  debauch  the  army  of  Curio ; 
“  and  began  with  putting  the  soldiers  in  mind  of 
their  former  oath  to  Domitius,  and  to  himself,  that 
general’s  questor :  he  exhorted  them  not  to  carry 
arms  against  the  old  companions  of  their  fortune, 
who  had  shared  with  them  in  all  the  hazards  of  that 
siege  ;  nor  fight  in  defence  of  that  party  who  treated 
them  ignominiously,  and  as  deserters.”  To  these 
considerations  he  added  offers  of  a  liberal  recom¬ 
pense,  if  they  would  follow  his  fortune  and  that  of 
Attius.  But  his  speech  made  no  impression  on 
Curio’s  troops,  so  that  both  armies  retired  to  their 
respective  camps. 

26.  But  an  uncommon  panic  soon  spread  itself 
over  Curio’s  camp,  which  the  various  discourses  of 
the  soldiers  served  only  to  increase  ;  for  every  one 
had  his  opinion,  and  added  the  suggestions  of  his 
own  fear  to  that  which  he  heard  from  others.  These 
reports  spreading  from  one  to  many,  and  receiving 
additions  in  every  new  relation,  there  appeared  to 
be  several  authors  of  the  same  notions  : — “  That  in 
a  civil  war  it  was  lawful  for  every  soldier  to  choose 
what  side  he  pleased :  that  the  same  legion  who  a 
little  before  had  fought  on  the  side  of  the  enemy 
might,  without  scruple,  return  again  to  the  same 
cause,  since  Caesar’s  conferring  favours  on  his  ene¬ 
mies  ought  not  to  render  them  unmindful  of  prior 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  II. 


87 


and  greater  obligations ;  that  even  the  municipal 
towns  were  divided  in  their  affection,  and  sided, 
some  with  one  party,  some  with  another.’*  These 
di  scourses  proceeded  not  from  the  Marsi  and  Peligni 
alone,  but  ran  like  a  torrent  through  the  whole  camp. 
However,  some  of  the  soldiers  blamed  their  com¬ 
panions  for  this  so  great  freedom  of  talk ;  and  otbiers, 
who  affected  to  appear  more  diligent  than  the  rest, 
enlarged  in  their  accounts  of  it  to  the  officers. 

27.  For  these  reasons.  Curio,  summoning  a  coun¬ 
cil  of  war,  began  to  deliberate  about  the  proper 
remedies  for  this  evil.  Some  were  for  attacking, 
at  all  hazards,  the  camp  of  Varus,  in  order  to  find 
employment  for  the  soldiers,  whose  idleness  they 
considered  as  the  cause  of  all  the  present  alarms. 
Besides,  it  was  better,  they  said,  to  trust  to  valour, 
and  try  the  fortune  of  a  battle,  than  see  themselves 
abandoned  by  their  men,  and  delivered  up  to  the 
barbarity  of  the  enemy.  Others  were  for  retiring, 
during  the  night,  to  the  Cornelian  camp,  where  they 
would  have  more  time  to  cure  the  infatuation  of  the 
soldiers ;  and  whence,  in  case  of  a  disaster,  they 
could  with  more  safety  and  ease  make  good  their 
retreat  into  Sicily,  by  means  of  the  great  number 
of  ships  they  were  there  provided  with.  Curio 
relished  neither  of  these  motions :  the  one,  he 
thought,  argued  cowardice  ;  the  other,  a  rash  bold¬ 
ness  :  to  retreat  would  have  all  the  appearance  of 
a  shameful  flight ;  to  attack,  they  must  resolve  to 
fight  in  a  place  of  disadvantage.  “  With  what  hope,” 
said  he,  “  can  we  attack  a  camp  fortified  by  nature 
and  art  1  And  what  advantage  can  we  draw  from 
an  attempt  whence  we  shall  be  obliged  to  retire 
with  loss  1  Does  not  success  always  secure  to  a 
general  the  affection  of  his  troops,  whereas  ill  for¬ 
tune  is  evermore  followed  with  contempt  1  And 
what  would  a  decampment  imply  but  an  ignominious 
flight,  an  absolute  despair  of  all  things,  and  an  un¬ 
avoidable  alienation  of  the  whole  army  1  That  we 


88 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


ought  not  to  let  the  modest  think  we  distrust  them, 
nor  the  insolent  that  we  fear  them ;  because  the 
knowledge  of  our  fear  only  augments  the  presump¬ 
tion  of  the  one,  and  an  apprehension  of  being  sus¬ 
pected  abates  the  zeal  of  the  other.  But  if  what 
is  reported  of  the  discontent  of  the  army  be  true, 
which  I  am  yet  unwilling  to  believe,  at  least  to  the 
degree  some  pretend,  we  ought,  for  that  reason, 
rather  to  hide  and  dissemble  our  fears  than  by  an 
unreasonable  discovery  of  them  to  add  strength  to 
the  evil :  that  as  in  some  cases  it  was  necessary 
to  conceal  the  wounds  of  the  body,  that  the  enemy 
might  not  conceive  hope  from  our  misfortunes,  so 
also  ought  we  to  hide  the  indisposition  of  an  army ; 
that  by  retreating  in  the  night,  as  some  proposed, 
they  would  only  furnish  a  fairer  occasion  to  the  ill- 
affected  to  execute  their  purpose ;  for  fear  and  shame 
are  powerful  restraints  by  day,  but  night  entirely 
divests  them  of  their  force  :  that  he  was  neither  so 
rash  as  to  attack  a  camp  without  hopes  of  success, 
nor  so  blinded  by  fear  as  to  be  at  a  loss  what  meas¬ 
ures  to  pursue  :  that  he  thought  it  his  duty  to  exam¬ 
ine  things  to  the  bottom  ;  and  as  he  had  called  them 
together  to  deliberate  on  the  present  state  of  affairs, 
doubted  not,  with  their  assistance,  to  take  such 
measures  as  would  be  attended  with  success.” 

28.  He  then  dismissed  the  council;  and  assem¬ 
bling  the  soldiers,  put  them  in  mind  of  what  advan¬ 
tage  their  steadiness  and  zeal  had  been  to  Caesar  at 
Corfinium,  and  how  serviceable  towards  the  con¬ 
quest  of  the  greatest  part  of  Italy.  “  It  was  you,” 
said  he,  “  that  gave  the  example,  and  all  the  munici¬ 
pal  towns  soon  followed :  their  submission  to  Caesar 
was  your  work;  and  therefore  it  is  not  without 
reason  that  he  is  so  particularly  attached  to  you, 
and  that  Pompey  hates  you  sincerely.  It  was  you 
that  obliged  him  to  quit  Italy,  without  being  forced 
to  it  by  the  loss  of  a  battle.  Caesar,  who  ranks  me 
in  the  number  of  his  dearest  friends,  has  committed 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  II.  89 

my  safety  to  your  care,  with  Sicily  and  Africa,  with¬ 
out  which  it  would  be  impossible  to  defend  either 
Rome  or  Italy,  You  are  now  in  the  presence  of 
those  who  exhort  you  to  abandon  us ;  and,  indeed, 
what  could  be  more  desirable  to  them  than  at  the 
same  time  to  ensnare  us  and  fix  on  you  the  stain 
of  an  infinite  crime  1  What  worse  opinion  could 
an  enraged  enemy  testify  of  you,  thap  to  suppose 
you  capable  of  betraying  those  who  own  themselves 
indebted  to  you  for  all ;  and  of  throwing  yourselves 
into  the  power  of  a  party  who  consider  you  as  the 
authors  of  all  their  misfortunes  1  Are  you  strangers 
to  Caesar’s  exploits  in  Spain  1  Two  armies  defeated ! 
Two  generals  overcome  !  Two  provinces  brought 
under  subjection  !  And  all  this  in  the  space  of  forty 
days  after  Caesar  came  within  sight  of  the  enemy. 
Is  it  likely  that  those  who,  with  forces  unbroken, 
could  not  stand  their  ground,  will  be  able  to  resist, 
now  they  are  vanquished  1  And  will  you,  who  fol¬ 
lowed  Caesar  before  fortune  declared  in  his  favour, 
now  return  to  the  vanquished,  when  fortune  has 
already  decided  the  quarrel,  and  you  are  on  the 
point  of  obtaining  the  reward  of  your  services  1 
They  charge  you  with  having  abandoned  and  be¬ 
trayed  them,  contrary  to  the  faith  of  oaths.  But  is 
it  indeed  true  that  you  abandoned  Domitius  1  Or 
did  he  not  rather  meanly  abandon  you,  at  a  time 
when  you  were  ready  to  suffer  every  thing  for  his 
sake  1  Did  he  not,  unknown  to  you,  resolve  to  seek 
his  safety  in  flight  1  And  were  you  not,  after  being 
thus  basely  betrayed  by  him,  indebted  to  Ca3sar’s 
goodness  for  your  preservation  1  How  could  your 
oath  bind  you  to  one  who,  after  throwing  away  the 
ensigns  of  his  authority,  and  divesting  himself  of 
his  office,  surrendered  himself  a  private  man  and  a 
captive  into  the  power  of  another  1  The  new  en¬ 
gagement  you  were  then  brought  under  alone  sub¬ 
sists  at  present,  and  ought  quite  to  obliterate  that 
which  the  surrender  of  your  general,  and  his  loss 

H  9 


90 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


of  liberty,  have  made  void.  But  though  I  doubt  not 
of  your  being  satisfied  with  Caesar,  you  may  perhaps 
have  taken  offence  at  me.  And,  indeed,  I  have  no 
thought  of  mentioning  any  services  I  may  have 
done  you ;  which,  as  yet,  come  far  short  of  my 
intentions  and  your  expectations :  but  you  are  not 
ignorant  that  the  rewards  of  military  service  come 
not  till  after  the  conclusion  of  the  war ;  and  I  believe 
you  little  doubt  what  the  issue  of  this  will  be.  Nor 
need  I,  on  this  occasion,  decline  taking  notice  of 
the  diligence  1  have  used,  the  progress  already  made, 
and  the  good  fortune  that  has  hitherto  attended  me. 
Are  you  dissatisfied  that  I  have  landed  my  army  safe 
in  Africa,  without  the  loss  of  a  single  ship  1  That 
I  dispersed  the  enemy’s  fleet  at  the  first  onset  1 
That  within  the  space  of  two  days  I  have  twice 
defeated  their  cavalry  1  That  I  forced  two  hundred 
of  their  merchantmen  to  quit  the  port  of  Utica  and 
join  me  1  And  that  I  have  reduced  them  to  a  situa¬ 
tion  where  it  is  impossible  for  them  to  receive  any 
supplies  either  by  land  or  sea  1  Can  you  think  of 
abandoning  a  cause  conducted  by  such  leaders,  and 
attended  with  such  success,  to  follow  the  fortune 
of  those  who  so  ignominiously  delivered  up  Cor- 
finium,  relinquished  Italy,  surrendered  Spain,  and 
have  already  sustained  considerable  losses  in  the 
African  war  1  I  never  pretended  to  more  than  being 
a  follower  of  Caesar ;  it  was  you  that  honoured  me 
with  the  title  of  Imperator ;  which  I  am  this  mo¬ 
ment  ready  to  resign,  if  you  think  me  unworthy  of 
the  favour.  Restore  me  my  former  name,  that  it 
may  not  be  said  I  was  honoured  to  be  covered 
afterward  with  the  greater  ignominy.” 

29.  These  remonstrances  made  such  an  impres¬ 
sion  on  the  soldiers,  that  they  frequently  interrupted 
him  while  he  was  speaking,  and  appeared  deeply 
touched  at  his  suspecting  their  fidelity.  As  he  re¬ 
tired,  they  all  gathered  round  him,  exhorting  him  not 
to  be  discouraged,  or  scruple  to  hazard  a  battle,  and 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  11. 


91 


make  trial  of  their  fidelity  and  bravery.  This  be¬ 
haviour  of  the  troops  wrought  so  great  a  change  in 
the  minds  of  the  officers,  that  Curio,  with  the  joint 
concurrence  of  them  all,  resolved  to  give  battle  the 
first  opportunity  that  offered.  Accordingly,  drawing 
out  his  men  next  day,  in  the  same  place  he  had  done 
for  some  time  past,  he  ranged  them  in  order  of 
battle.  Attius  Varus  did  the  same;  that  if  an  op¬ 
portunity  offered,  either  of  corrupting  the  soldiers 
or  fighting  to  advantage,  he  might  be  in  readiness 
to  lay  hold  of  it. 

30.  Between  the  two  armies  lay  a  valley,  as  we 
have  observed  above,  not  indeed  considerable  for  its 
breadth,  but  steep  and  difficult  of  ascent.  Both 
sides  waited  till  the  other  should  pass  it,  that  they 
might  engage  to  more  advantage.  Curio,  observing 
that  all  the  horse  onVariis’s  right  wing,  together 
with  the  light-armed  foot,  had  ventured  down  into 
this  valley,  detached  his  cavalry  against  them,  with 
two  cohorts  of  Marnicinians ;  whose  first  shock  the 
enemy  were  not  able  to  sustain,  but  returned  full 
speed  to  their  own  men,  leaving  the  light-armed 
foot  behind,  who  were  surrounded  and  cut  to  pieces 
in  sight  of  Varus’s  army ;  which,  fronting  that  way, 
was  witness  to  the  flight  of  the  one,  and  slaughter 
of  the  other.  On  this,  Rebilus,  one  of  Caesar’s 
lieutenants,  whom  Curio  had  brought  with  him  from 
Sicily,  on  account  of  his  consummate  knowledge  in 
the  art  of  war, — “Why,”  said  he,  “do  you  delay 
seizing  the  favourable  moment  1  You  see  the  enemy 
struck  with  terror.”  Curio  made  no  answer,  only 
desired  his  soldiers  to  remember  what  they  had 
promised  the  day  before  ;  and  marching  the  first, 
commanded  them  to  follow  him.  The  valley  was 
so  steep  and  difficult  that  the  first  ranks  could  not 
ascend  but  with  the  assistance  of  those  that  came 
after.  But  the  Attinian  army  was  so  dispirited  with 
fear,  and  the  flight  and  slaughter  of  their  troops,  that 
they  never  thought  of  making  resistance,  fancying 


92 


CiESAR’s  COMMENTARIES. 


themselves  already  surrounded  by  our  cavalry ;  so 
that  before  we  could  arrive  within  reach  of  dart,  the 
whole  army  of  Varus  fled,  and  retreated  to  their 
camp. 

31.  In  this  flight,  one  Fabius  Pelignus,  a  centu¬ 
rion  of  the  lowest  rank  in  Curio’s  army,  as  he  was 
pursuing  the  fugitives,  called  with  a  loud  voice  to 
Varus,  as  if  he  had  been  one  of  his  own  men,  who 
wanted  to  admonish  him  of  something.  Varus,  hear¬ 
ing  himself  named  several  times,  turned  and  stood 
still,  demanding  who  he  was,  and  what  he  wanted. 
Fabius  aimed  a  blow  at  his  breast  with  his  sword, 
and  would  certainly  have  killed  him,  had  not  Varus 
warded  it  off  with  his  shield.  Fabius  himself  was 
soon  after  surrounded  and  slain.  Meanwhile,  the 
multitude  of  fugitives  so  closed  up  the  gates  of  the 
camp,  and  pressed  on  one  another  in  such  a  manner, 
that  more  were  crowded  to  death  than  fell  either  in 
the  battle  or  pursuit.  Nay,  the  camp  itself  was  very 
near  being  taken ;  because  great  numbers,  instead 
of  stopping  there  to  defend  it,  made  directly  for  the 
town.  But  both  the  nature  of  the  ground  and  the 
fortifications  themselves  prevented  the  assault ;  and 
the  rather,  as  Curio’s  soldiers,  being  armed  only  for 
battle,  had  brought  with  them  none  of  the  necessary 
tools  to  force  a  camp.  Curio  brought  back  his  army 
without  the  loss  of  a  man,  Fabius  excepted.  Of  the 
enemy  about  six  hundred  were  killed,  and  a  thou¬ 
sand  wounded.  After  Curio  had  drawn  off  his  men, 
all  the  wounded  quitted  the  camp  and  retired  into 
the  city,  as  did  a  great  many  others,  who,  overcome 
by  fear,  sheltered  themselves  there  also  under  the 
same  pretence.  Varus,  observing  this,  and  that  a 
universal  dread  had  seized  the  army,  left  only  a 
trumpet  in  the  camp,  with  a  few  tents  for  show,  and 
about  midnight  silently  entered  the  town  with  all 
his  forces. 

32.  Next  day  Curio  resolved  to  besiege  Utica,  and 
draw  a  line  of  circumvallation  round  it.  There  was 


CmL  WAR. - BOOK  II. 


93 


in  the  town  a  multitude  of  men  unfit  for  the  fatigues 
of  war,  through  a  long  enjoyment  of  peace.  The 
inhabitants  themselves  were  strongly  attached  to 
Ceesar,  for  ancient  favours  received  from  him.  The 
senate  was  composed  of  people  greatly  differing  in 
their  tempers,  and  the  losses  already  sustained  spread 
terror  through  all  ranks.  A  surrender  was  publicly 
talked  of,  and  all  concurred  in  soliciting  Varus  not 
to  ruin  them  by  his  obstinacy  and  perverseness. 
While  these  things  were  in  agitation,  messengers 
sent  by  King  Juba  arrived,  who  informed  them  of 
the  approach  of  his  army,  and  exhorted  them  to  de¬ 
fend  the  city ;  which  contributed  not  a  little  to  con¬ 
firm  their  wavering  minds. 

33.  Curio  received  the  same  news,  but  for  some 
time  would  not  believe  it,  so  greatly  did  he  confide 
in  his  good  fortune.  Besides,  Caesar’s  success  in 
Spain  was  already  known  in  Africa ;  whence  he  con¬ 
cluded  it  improbable  that  Juba  would  attempt  any 
thing  against  him.  But  when  he  was  for  certain 
informed  of  his  being  within  twenty-five  miles  of 
Utica  with  his  w'hole  array,  he  retired  from  before 
the  town  to  the  Cornelian  camp,  laid  in  great  quan¬ 
tities  of  corn  and  wood,  began  to  fortify  himself,  and 
sent  directly  to  Sicily  for  the  cavalry  and  the  two 
legions  he  had  left  there.  The  camp  itself  was  very 
advantageous  for  protracting  the  war,  being  strong 
both  by  nature  and  art,  near  the  sea,  and  abounding 
in  water  and  salt,  great  quantities  of  which  had.  been 
carried  thither  from  the  neighbouring  salt-pits.  Nei¬ 
ther  ran  he  any  hazard  of  being  straitened  for  wood 
and  corn,  as  the  country  abounded  in  trees  and 
grain.  He  resolved,  therefore,  with  the  consent  of 
the  whole  army,  to  wait  here  the  arrival  of  the  rest 
of  the  troops,  and  make  preparations  for  continuing 
the  war. 

34.  This  resolution  being  taken,  and  meeting  with 
general  approbation,  some  of  the  townsmen  who  had 
deserted  to  Curio  informed  him  that  the  war  in 


94 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


which  Juba  was  engaged  with  the  Leptitani  having 
obliged  him  to  return  into  his  own  kingdom,  he  had 
only  sent  his  lieutenant  Sabura,  with  a  small  body 
of  forces,  to  the  assistance  of  the  Uticans.  On  this 
intelligence,  to  which  he  too  hastily  gave  credit,  he 
changed  his  design,  and  resolved  to  give  battle. 
The  fire  of  youth,  his  courage,  good  success,  and 
self-confidence  contributed  greatly  to  confirm  him 
in  this  resolution.  Urged  by  these  considerations, 
about  the  beginning  of  the  night  he  sent  all  his  cav¬ 
alry  towards  the  enemy’s  camp,  which  was  on  the 
river  Bagradas,  and  where  Sabura,  of  whom  we  have 
spoken  before,  commanded  in  chief;  but  the  king  fol¬ 
lowed  with  all  his  forces,  and  was  not  above  six 
miles  behind  him.  The  cavalry  which  Curio  had 
detached  marched  all  night,  and  coming  unexpect¬ 
edly  on  the  enemy,  attacked  them  before  they  were 
ready  to  receive  the  charge  ;  for  the  Numidians,  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  custom  of  that  barbarous  country, 
were  encamped  without  order  or  rule.  Falling  on 
them,  therefore,  in  this  confusion,  and  oppressed 
with  sleep,  they  slew  great  numbers,  and  obliged 
the  rest  to  fly  in, the  utmost  consternation;  after 
which  they  returned  to  Curio  with  the  prisoners 
they  had  taken. 

35.  Curio  had  set  out  with  all  his  forces  about  the 
fourth  watch  of  the  night,  leaving  only  five  cohorts 
to  guard  his  camp.  After  a  march  of  six  miles  he 
was  met  by  his  cavalry,  who  informed  him  of  all  that 
had  passed.  He  asked  the  prisoners  who  com¬ 
manded  at  Bagradas  :  they  answered,  Sabura.  On 
this,  without  making  any  further  inquiries,  for  fear 
of  being  detained  too  long,  he  turned  to  the  troops 
next  to  him,  and  said,  “  Do  you  not  see,  fellow-soldiers, 
that  the  report  of  the  prisoners  corresponds  exactly 
with  the  intelligence  given  by  the  deserters  1  Juba 
is  not  with  the  army.  It  must  consist  of  but  a  few 
troops,  since  they  were  not  able  to  withstand  the 
charge  of  a  small  body  of  horse.  Haste,  therefore, 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  II. 


95 


in  the  pursuit  of  glory,  booty,  and  victory.”  What 
the  cavalry  had  done  was  indeed  considerable,  be¬ 
cause  they  were  but  few’  in  number  in  comparison 
with  the  Numidians ;  but  as  vanity  always  makes 
us  believe  our  merit  to  be  greater  than  it  is,  they 
themselves  boasted  immoderately  of  the  action,  and 
endeavoured  to  enhance  the  value  of  it.  They  made 
a  mighty  parade  of  the  booty.  The  prisoners  too, 
as  well  infantry  as  cavalry,  marched  in  procession 
before  them  :  and,  indeed,  the  whole  army  imagined, 
that  to  delay  the  battle  was  no  other  than  to  delay 
the  victory  ;  so  that  the  ardour  of  the  troops  per¬ 
fectly  seconded  Curio’s  hopes.  He  therefore  has¬ 
tened  his  march,  ordering  the  horse  to  follow,  that 
he  might  as  soon  as  possible  come  up  with  the 
frighted  enemy.  But  as  they  were  fatigued  with 
their  late  march,  they  found  themselves  unable  to 
keep  pace  with  the  army  ;  but  stopped,  some  in  one 
place,  some  in  another ;  which,  however,  retarded 
not  Curio’s  hopes. 

36.  .luba,  having  notice  from  Sabura  of  the  action 
in  the  night,  detached  to  his  assistance  two  thousand 
Spanish  and  Gallic  horse,  of  his  ordinary  guard,  with 
that  part  of  the  infantry  in  which  he  put  the  great¬ 
est  confidence.  Himself  followed  leisurely  with  the 
rest  of  the  troops  and  about  forty  elephants,  suspect¬ 
ing  that  Curio,  who  had  sent  the  cavalry  before, 
could  not  be  far  off  with  his  army.  Sabura  drew  up 
his  horse  and  foot,  ordering  them  to  give  ground  on 
the  enemy’s  attack,  and,  as  through  fear,  counterfeit 
a  flight.  Meanwhile,  he  told  them  that  he  would 
give  the  signal  of  battle  when  he  saw  proper, 
and  direct  their  motions  as  the  case  might  require. 

37.  Curio,  flattered  with  new  hopes,  and  imagin¬ 
ing,  by  the  enemy’s  motions,  that  they  were  pre¬ 
paring  for  flight,  made  his  troops  come  down  from 
the  mountain  into  the  plain  ;  and  advancing  still 
farther,  though  his  army  was  already  very  much 
fatigued,  having  marched  upwards  of  sixteen  miles, 


96 


CjESARS  COMMENTARIES. 


halted  at  last  to  give  the  men  breath.  That  moment 
Sabura  sounded  the  charge,  led  on  his  men  in  order 
of  battle,  and  went  from  rank  to  rank  to  animate  the 
troops ;  but  he  suffered  only  the  cavalry  to  come  to 
blows,  keeping  the  infantry  at  a  distance  within 
sight.  Curio  was  not  wanting  on  his  side,  but  ex¬ 
horted  his  men  to  place  all  their  hopes  in  their  val¬ 
our  :  and  indeed  neither  the  infantry,  though  fatigued 
with  their  march,  nor  the  cavalry,  though  few  in 
number  and  spent  with  toil,  showed  any  want  of 
valour,  or  backwardness  to  fight ;  though  the  last,  in 
particular,  did  not  exceed  two  hundred,  the  rest  hav¬ 
ing  stopped  by  the  way.  These,  wherever  they  at¬ 
tacked  the  enemy,  obliged  them  to  give  ground ;  but 
they  could  neither  pursue  far  nor  drive  their  horses 
on  with  impetuosity.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Nu- 
midian  cavalry  began  to  surround  our  men,  and 
charge  them  in  the  rear.  When  the  cohorts  ad¬ 
vanced  against  them  they  fell  back,  and  by  the  quick¬ 
ness  of  their  retreat  eluded  the  charge ;  but  imme¬ 
diately  returning,  they  got  behind  our  men,  and  cut 
them  off  from  the  rest  of  the  army.  Thus  it  was 
equally  dangerous  for  them  to  maintain  their  ranks, 
or  advance  to  battle.  The  enemy’s  forces  increased 
continually  by  the  reinforcements  sent  from  the  king; 
ours,  on  the  contrary,  were  disabled  by  fatigue.  Nei¬ 
ther  could  our  wounded  men  retire,  or  be  sent  to 
any  place  of  safety,  the  whole  army  being  invested 
by  the  enemy’s  horse.  These,  despairing  of  safety, 
as  IS  usual  for  men  in  the  last  moments  of  life,  either 
lamented  their  own  fate,  or  recommended  their  re¬ 
lations  to  their  fellow-soldiers,  if  any  should  be  so 
fortunate  as  to  escape  that  danger.  The  whole  army 
was  filled  with  consternation  and  grief. 

38.  Curio,  perceiving  the  general  alarm,  and  that 
neither  his  exhortations  nor  prayers  were  regarded, 
ordered  the  troops  to  retire  with  the  standards  to 
the  nearest  mountains,  as  the  only  resource  in  the 
present  exigence :  but  the  cavalry  detached  by  Sa- 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  II. 


97 


bura  had  already  seized  them.  All  hope  being"  now 
lost,  some  were  slain  endeavouring  to  fly ;  others 
threw  themselves  on  the  ground,  partly  in  despair, 
partly  unable  to  make  any  efforts  for  their  own 
safety.  At  this  moment  Cn.  Domitius,  who  com¬ 
manded  the  horse,  addressing  Curio,  entreated  him 
to  regain  his  camp  with  the  few  cavalry  that  re¬ 
mained,  promising  not  to  abandon  him.  “  Can  I,” 
says  Curio,  “  look  Caesar  in  the  face,  after  having 
lost  an  army  he  had  committed  to  my  charge  I”  So 
saying,  he  continued  fighting  till  he  was  slain.  Very 
few  of  the  cavalry  escaped,  those  only  excepted  who 
had  stopped  to  refresh  their  horses ;  for  perceiving 
at  a  distance  the  rout  of  the  whole  army,  they  re¬ 
turned  to  their  camp.  All  the  infantry  were  slain 
to  a  man. 

39.  When  this  disaster  was  known,  M.  Rufus,  the 
questor,  whom  Curio  had  left  to  guard  the  camp,  en¬ 
treated  his  men  not  to  lose  courage.  They  begged 
and  requested  him  to  reconduct  them  into  Sicily ; 
which  he  promised,  and  ordered  the  masters  of  the 
transports  to  have  their  ships  in  readiness  at  night 
along  the  shore.  But  fear  had  so  universally  seized 
the  minds  of  the  soldiers,  that  some  cried  out  Juba 
was  arrived  with  his  troops  ;  some  that  Varus  ap¬ 
proached  with  the  legions,  the  dust  of  whose  march 
they  pretended  to  discern  ;  and  others,  that  the  ene¬ 
my’s  fleet  vvould  be  on  them  in  an  instant ;  though 
there  was  not  the  least  ground  for  these  reports. 
The  consternation  thus  becoming  general,  each  man 
thought  only  of  his  own  safety.  Those  who  were 
already  embarked  sailed  immediately,  and  their  flight 
drew  after  it  that  of  the  transports  ;  so  that  only  a 
very  few  small  frigates  obeyed  the  summons,  and 
came  to  the  general  rendezvous.  The  disorder  was 
so  great  on  the  shore,  every  one  striving  who  should 
first  embark,  that  many  boats  sank  under  the  crowd, 
and  others  were  afraid  to  come  near  the  land. 

40.  Thus  only  a  few  soldiers  and  aged  men,  who 

C/ES.  VoL.  11. — I 


98 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


either  through  interest  or  compassion  were  received 
on  board,  or  had  strength  enough  to  swim  to  the 
transports,  got  safe  to  Sicily:  the  rest,  deputing 
their  centurions  to  Varus  by  night,  surrendered  to 
him.  Juba,  coming  up  next  day,  claimed  them  as 
his  property,  put  the  greater  number  to  the  sword, 
and  sent  a  few  of  the  most  considerable,  whom  he 
had  selected  for  that  purpose,  into  Numidia.  Varus 
complained  of  this  violation  of  his  faith ;  but  durst 
not  make  any  resistance.  The  king  made  his  en¬ 
trance  into  the  city  on  horseback,  followed  by  a 
great  number  of  senators,  among  whom  were  Ser- 
vius  Sulpicius  and  Liciniiis  Damasippus.  Here  he 
staid  a  few  days,  to  give  what  orders  he  thought 
necessary,  and  then  returned  with  all  his  forces  into 
his  own  kingdom. 


BOOK  III. 

1.  Ca:sa.r,  as  dictator,  holding  the  comitia,  Julius 
Caesar  and  P.  Servilius  were  chosen  consuls ;  for 
this  was  the  year  in  which  he  could  be  elected  to 
that  magistracy,  consistent  with  the  laws.  This 
affair  being  despatched,  as  Caesar  saw  public  credit 
at  a  stand  over  all  Italy,  because  nobody  paid  their 
debts,  he  ordered  that  arbiters  should  be  chosen, 
who  should  make  an  estimate  of  the  possessions 
of  all  debtors,  and  should  convey  them  in  payment 
to  their  creditors  at  the  price  they  bore  before  the 
war.  This  regulation  he  thought  best  calculated  to 
restore  public  credit,  and  prevent  the  apprehension 
of  a  general  abolition  of  debts,  which  is  but  too 
common  in  consequence  of  wars  and  civil  dissen¬ 
sions.  At  the  same  time,  in  consequence  of  an  ad¬ 
dress  to  the  people,  he  re-established  the  pretors 
and  tribunes,  who  had  been  deprived  on  a  charge 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


99 


of  bribery,  at  a  time  when  Pompeyawed  the  city  by 
his  legions.  These  decisions  were  so  little  con¬ 
formable  to  law,  that  sentence  was  often  pronounced 
by  a  party  of  judges  different  from  those  who  at¬ 
tended  the  pleadings.  As  these  had  made  him  an 
offer  of  their  service  in  the  beginning  of  the  war,  he 
accounted  the  obligation  the  same  as  if  he  had  ac¬ 
tually  accepted  of  their  friendship ;  but  thought  it 
better  their  restoration  should  seem  to  flow  from 
the  people,  than  appear  a  mere  act  of  bounty  in  him  ; 
that  he  might  neither  be  charged  with  ingratitude  to 
his  followers  nor  accused  of  invading  the  preroga¬ 
tives  of  the  people. 

2.  All  this  business,  with  the  celebration  of  the 
Latin  festivals,  and  the  holding  of  the  comitia  for 
elections,  took  him  up  only  eleven  days,  at  the  end 
of  which  he  abdicated  the  dictatorship,  and  imme¬ 
diately  set  out  from  Rome,  in  order  to  reach  Brun- 
dusium,  where  he  had  ordered  twelve  legions,  with 
all  the  cavalry,  to  rendezvous.  But  he  had  scarce 
ships  to  carry  over  twenty  thousand  legionary  sol¬ 
diers  and  six  hundred  horse,  which  alone  hindered 
him  from  putting  a  speedy  end  to  the  war.  Besides, 
the  legions  were  considerably  weakened  by  their 
many  losses  in  the  Gallic  war,  and  the  long  and  pain¬ 
ful  march  from  Spain ;  and  an  unhealthful  autumn 
in  Apulia  and  about  Brundusium,  with  the  change  of 
so  fine  a  climate  as  that  of  Gaul  and  Spain,  had 
brought  a  general  sickness  among  the  troops. 

3.  Pompey,  having  had  a  whole  year  to  complete 
his  preparations,  undisturbed  by  wars,  and  free  from 
the  interruption  of  an  enemy,  had  collected  a  mighty 
fleet  from  Asia,  the  Cyclades,  Corcyra,  Athens,  Pon- 
tus,  Bithynia,  Syria,  Cilicia,  Phenicia,  and  Egypt, 
and  had  given  orders  for  the  building  of  ships  in  all 
parts.  He  had  exacted  great  sums  from  the  people 
of  Asia  and  Syria ;  from  the  kings,  tetrarchs,  and 
dynasties  of  those  parts ;  from  the  free  states  of 
Achaia,  and  from  the  corporations  of  the  prov- 


100 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


inces  subject  to  his  command.  He  had  raised  nine 
legions  of  Roman  citizens ;  five  he  had  brought  with 
him  from  Italy  ;  one  had  been  sent  him  from  Sicily, 
consisting  wholly  of  veterans,  and  called  Gemella, 
because  composed  of  two  ;  another  from  Crete  and 
Macedonia,  of  veteran  soldiers  likewise,  who,  hav¬ 
ing  been  disbanded  by  former  generals,  had  settled 
in  those  parts ;  and  two  more  from  Asia,  levied  by 
the  care  of  Lentulus.  Besides  all  these,  he  had  great 
numbers  from  Thessaly,  Boeotia,  Achaia,  and  Epi¬ 
rus  ;  whom,  together  with  Antony’s  soldiers,  he  dis¬ 
tributed  among  the  legions  by  way  of  recruits.  He 
expected  also  two  legions  that  Metellus  Scipio  was 
to  bring  out  of  Syria.  He  had  three  thousand 
archers,  drawn  together  from  Crete,  Lacedaemon, 
Pontus,  Syria,  and  other  provinces ;  six  cohorts  of 
slingers,  and  two  of  mercenaries.  His  cavalry 
amounted  to  seven  thousand ;  six  hundred  of  which 
came  from  Galatia,  under  Dejotarus ;  five  hundred 
from  Cappadocia,  under  Ariobarzanes  ;  and  the  like 
number  had  been  sent  him  out  of  Thrace,  by  Cotus, 
with  his  son  Sadalis  at  their  head.  Two  hundred 
were  from  Macedonia,  commanded  by  Rascipolis,  an 
officer  of  great  distinction  ;  five  hundred  from  Alex¬ 
andria,  consisting  of  Gauls  and  Germans,  left  there 
by  A.  Gabinius,  to  serve  as  a  guard  to  King  Ptolemy, 
and  now  brought  over  by  young  Pompey  in  his  fleet, 
together  with  eight  hundred  of  his  own  domestics. 
Tarcundarius  Castor  and  Donilaus  furnished  three 
hundred  Gallogrecians ;  the  first  of  these  came  him¬ 
self  in  person,  the  latter  sent  his  son.  Two  hun¬ 
dred,  most  of  them  archers,  were  sent  from  Syria, 
by  Comagenus  of  Antioch,  who  lay  under  the  great¬ 
est  obligations  to  Pompey.  There  were  likewise  a 
great  number  of  Dardanians  and  Bessians,  partly 
volunteers,  partly  mercenaries,  with  others  from 
Macedonia,  Thessaly,  and  the  adjoining  states  and 
provinces ;  who  all  together  made  up  the  number 
mentioned  above.  To  subsist  this  mighty  army,  he 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


101 


had  taken  care  to  amass  vast  quantities  of  corn  from 
Thessaly,  Asia,  Egypt,  Crete,  Cyrene,  and  othei 
countries  ;  resolving  to  quarter  his  troops  during  the 
winter  at  Dyrrhachium,  Apollonia,  and  the  other 
maritime  towns,  to  prevent  Caesar’s  passing  the  sea ; 
for  which  purpose  he  ordered  his  fleet  to  cruise  per¬ 
petually  about  the  coasts.  Young  Pompey  com¬ 
manded  the  Egyptian  squadron,  D.  Lelius  and  C. 
Triarius  the  Asiatic,  C.  Cassius  the  Syrian,  C.  Mar- 
cellus  and  C.  Coponius  the  Rhodian,  Scribonius  Libo 
and  M.  Octavius  the  Liburnian  and  Achaian  ;  but  the 
chief  authority  was  vested  in  M.  Bibulus,  who  was 
admiral  of  the  whole,  and  gave  his  orders  accord¬ 
ingly. 

4.  CcBsar,  on  his  arrival  at  Brundusium,  harangued 
his  troops,  and  told  them,  “  that  as  they  were  now 
on  the  point  of  seeing  an  end  of  all  their  toils  and 
dangers,  they  ought  not  to  scruple  at  leaving  their 
servants  and  baggage  behind  them  in  Italy,  that  they 
might  embark  with  less  confusion,  and  in  greater 
numbers  ;  putting  all  their  hopes  in  victory,  and  the 
generosity  of  their  general.”  The  whole  army  tes¬ 
tified  their  approbation  of  what  was  proposed,  and 
called  out  that  they  were  ready  to  submit  to  his 
orders.  Accordingly,  having  put  seven  legions  on 
board,  as  we  have  before  observed,  he  set  sail  the 
fourth  of  January,  and  arrived  next  day  at  the 
Ceraunian  mountains ;  where,  having  found,  among 
the  rocks  and  shelves  with  which  that  coast  abounds, 
a  tolerable  road ;  and  not  daring  to  go  to  any  port, 
as  he  apprehended  they  were  all  in  the  enemy’s 
possession,  he  landed  his  troops  at  a  place  called 
Pharsalus,  whither  he  brought  his  fleet,  without  the 
loss  of  a  single  ship. 

5.  Lucretius  Vespillo  and  Minucius  Rufus  were  at 
Oricum,  with  eighteen  Asiatic  ships ;  and  Bibulus 
had  a  hundred  and  ten  at  Corcyra.  But  the  first 
durst  not  hazard  an  engagement,  though  Caesar  was 
escorted  by  no  more  than  twelve  galleys,  only  four 

12 


102 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


of  which  had  decks ;  and  Bibulus  had  not  time  to 
reassemble  his  sailors  and  soldiers,  who  were  dis¬ 
persed  in  full  security ;  for  no  news  of  Caesar’s  ap¬ 
proach  had  reached  those  parts  till  his  fleet  was  seen 
from  the  continent. 

6.  Caesar,  having  landed  his  troops,  sent  the  fleet 
back  the  same  night  to  Brundusium,  to  bring  over 
his  other  legions  and  cavalry.  Fufius  Kalenus,  lieu¬ 
tenant-general,  had  the  charge  of  this  expedition, 
with  orders  to  use  the  utmost  despatch.  But  setting 
sail  too  late,  he  lost  the  benefit  of  the  wind,  which 
offered  fair  all  night,  and  fell  in  with  the  enemy. 
For  Bibulus,  hearing  at  Corcyra  of  Caesar’s  arrival, 
forthwith  put  to  sea,  in  hopes  of  intercepting  some 
of  the  transports  ;  and  meeting  the  fleet  as  it  re¬ 
turned  empty,  took  about  thirty  ships,  which  he 
immediately  burned,  with  all  that  were  on  board ; 
partly  to  satisfy  his  own  vengeance  for  the  disap¬ 
pointment  he  had  received,  partly  to  deter  the  rest 
of  the  troops  from  attempting  the  passage.  He  then 
stationed  his  fleet  along  the  coast,  from  Salona  to 
Oricum,  guarded  all  places  with  extraordinary  care, 
and  even  lay  himself  aboard,  notwithstanding  the 
rigour  of  the  winter ;  declining  no  danger  nor  fatigue, 
and  solely  intent  on  intercepting  Caesar’s  supplies. 

7.  After  the  departure  of  the  Liburnian  galleys,  M, 
Octavius,  with  the  squadron  under  his  command, 
sailed  from  Illyricum,  and  came  before  Salona. 
Having  spirited  up  the  Dalmatians  and  other  bar¬ 
barous  nations  in  those  parts,  he  drew  Issa  to  revolt 
from  Caesar ;  but  finding  that  the  council  of  Salona 
was  neither  to  be  moved  by  promises  nor  threats,  he 
resolved  to  invest  the  town.  Salona  is  built  on  a 
hill,  and  advantageously  situated  for  defence ;  but 
as  the  fortifications  were  very  inconsiderable,  the 
Roman  citizens  residing  there  immediately  sur¬ 
rounded  the  place  with  wooden  towers ;  and  finding 
themselves  too  few  to  resist  the  attacks  of  the  en¬ 
emy,  who  soon  overwhelmed  them  with  wounds. 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


103 


betook  themselves  to  their  last  refuge,  by  granting 
liberty  to  all  slaves  capable  of  bearing  arms,  and 
cutting  olF  the  women’s  hair  to  make  cords  for 
their  engines.  Octavius,  perceiving  their  obstinacy, 
formed  five  different  camps  round  the  town,  that 
they  might  at  once  suffer  all  the  inconveniences  of  a 
siege,  and  be  exposed  to  frequent  attacks.  The  Sa- 
lonians,  determined  to  endure  any  thing,  found  them¬ 
selves  most  pressed  for  want  of  corn ;  and  therefore 
sent  deputies  to  Caesar  to  solicit  a  supply,  patiently 
submitting  to  all  the  other  hardships  they  laboured 
under.  When  the  siege  had  now  continued  a  con¬ 
siderable  time,  and  the  Octavians  began  to  be  off 
their  guard,  the  Salonians,  finding  the  opportunity 
favourable,  about  noon,  when  the  enemy  were  dis¬ 
persed,  disposed  their  wives  and  children  on  the 
walls,  that  every  thing  might  have  its  wonted  ap¬ 
pearance  ;  and  sallying  in  a  body  with  their  enfran¬ 
chised  slaves,  attacked  the  nearest  quarters  of  Oc¬ 
tavius.  Having  soon  forced  these,  they  advanced 
to  the  next ;  thence  to  a  third,  a  fourth,  and  so  on 
through  the  rest ;  till  having  driven  the  enemy  from 
every  post,  and  made  great  slaughter  of  their  men, 
they  at  length  compelled  them,  and  Octavius  their 
leader,  to  betake  themselves  to  their  ships.  Such 
was  the  issue  of  the  siege.  As  winter  now  ap¬ 
proached,  and  the  loss  had  been  very  considerable, 
Octavius,  despairing  to  reduce  the  place,  retired  to 
Dyrrhachium,  and  joined  Pompey. 

8.  We  have  seen  that  L.  Vibullius  Rufus,  Pompey’s 
chief  engineer,  had  fallen  twice  into  Caesar’s  hands, 
and  been  as  often  set  at  liberty ;  the  first  time  at 
Corfinium,  the  next  in  Spain.  Having  been  there¬ 
fore  twice  indebted  to  him  for  his  life,  and  being  also 
much  in  Pompey’s  esteem,  Caesar  thought  him  a 
proper  person  to  negotiate  between  them.  His  in¬ 
structions  were,  “  That  it  was  now  time  for  both  to 
desist  from  their  obstinacy,  and  lay  down  their  arms, 
without  exposing  themselves  any  more  to  the  pre- 


104  Cesar’s  commentaries. 

callous  events  of  fortune.  That  the  losses  they  had 
already  sustained  ought  to  serve  as  lessons  and  cau¬ 
tions,  and  fill  them  with  just  apprehensions  with 
regard  to  the  future.  That  Pompey  had  been  forced 
to  abandon  Italy,  had  lost  Sicily  and  Sardinia,  the 
two  Spains,  with  about  a  hundred  and  thirty  cohorts 
of  Roman  citizens,  who  had  perished  in  these  coun¬ 
tries.  That  himself  too  had  been  a  considerable 
sufferer  by  the  death  of  Curio,  the  destruction  of  the 
African  army,  and  the  surrender  of  his  forces  at 
Corcyra.  That  it  was  therefore  incumbent  on  them 
to  show  some  regard  to  the  sinking  state  of  the  com¬ 
monwealth,  having  sufficiently  experienced  by  their 
own  misfortunes  how  prevalent  fortune  was  in  war. 
That  the  present  moment  was  the  most  favourable 
in  this  respect ;  because,  not  having  yet  tried  one 
another’s  strength,  and  considering  them  as  equals, 
there  would  be  more  likelihood  of  agreeing  on  terms ; 
whereas,  if  one  of  them  once  got  the  superiority,  he 
would  exact  every  thing  from  the  other,  and  give 
up  nothing.  That  as  hitherto  they  had  been  unable 
to  settle  the  conditions  of  peace,  they  ought  to  refer 
them  to  the  decision  of  the  senate  and  people  of 
Rome ;  and,  in  the  mean  time,  to  obtain  a  free  and 
unbiased  judgment,  both  swear  to  disband  their 
armies  in  three  days’  time.  That  when  they  were 
once  divested  of  their  national  and  auxiliary  forces, 
in  which  their  whole  confidence  lay,  they  would  find 
themselves  under  a  necessity  of  submitting  to  the 
decree  of  the  senate  and  people.  In  fine,  that  to  give 
Pompey  a  proof  of  his  readiness  to  perform  these 
proposals,  he  would  give  immediate  orders  for  the 
discharge  of  all  his  forces,  both  in  garrison  and  in 
the  field.” 

9.  Vibullius,  having  received  these  instructions, 
thought  it  necessary  to  give  Pompey  speedy  notice 
of  Caesar’s  arrival,  that  he  might  be  provided  against 
that  event  before  he  laid  open  the  commission  he 
was  charged  with.  Accordingly,  journeying  day  and 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


]05 


night,  and  frequently  changing  horses  for  the  greater 
expedition,  he  at  length  got  to  Pompey,  and  informed 
him  that  Caesar  was  approaching  with  all  his  forces. 
Pompey  was,  at  that  time,  in  Candavia,  from  whence 
he  was  marching  through  Macedonia,  to  his  winter- 
quarters  at  Apollonia  and  Dyrrhachium.  Concerned 
at  this  unexpected  news,  he  hastened  his  march  to 
Apollonia,  to  prevent  Caesar’s  making  himself  master 
of  the  seacoasts.  Meanwhile  Caesar,  having  landed 
his  forces,  marched  the  same  day  to  Oricum.  On 
his  arrival  there,  L.  Torquatus,  who  commanded  in 
the  town  for  Pompey,  with  a  garrison  of  Parthinians, 
ordered  the  gates  to  be  shut,  and  the  Greeks  to 
repair  to  their  arms,  and  man  the  walls ;  but  they 
refusing  to  fight  against  the  authority  of  the  people 
of  Rome,  and  the  inhabitants,  of  their  own  accord, 
endeavouring  to  admit  Caesar,  Torquatus,  despairing 
of  relief,  opened  the  gates,  and  surrendered  both 
himself  and  the  town  to  Caesar,  who  readily  granted 
him  his  life. 

10.  Caesar,  having  made  himself  master  of  Oricum, 
marched  directly  to  Apollonia.  On  the  report  of  his 
arrival,  L.  Staberius,  who  commanded  in  the  place, 
ordered  water  to  be  carried  into  the  castle,  fortified 
it  with  great  care,  and  demanded  hostages  of  the 
townsmen.  They  refused  to  comply,  declaring  they 
would  not  shut  their  gates  against  the  consul  of  the 
Roman  people,  nor  presume  to  act  in  contradiction 
to  the  judgment  of  the  senate,  and  of  all  Italy.  Sta¬ 
berius,  finding  it  in  vain  to  resist,  privately  left  the 
place ;  on  which  the  Apollonians  sent  deputies  to 
Ceesar,  and  received  him  into  the  town.  The  Bul- 
lidenses,  Amantiani,  with  the  rest  of  the  neighbour¬ 
ing  countries,  and  all  Epirus,  followed  their  example  ; 
acquainting  Caesar,  by  their  ambassadors,  that  they 
were  ready  to  execute  his  commands. 

11.  Meanwhile  Pompey,  having  notice  of  what 
passed  at  Oricum  and  Apollonia,  and  being  appre¬ 
hensive  for  Dyrrhachium,  marched  day  and  night  to 


106 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


reach  the  place.  At  the  same  time  it  was  reported 
that  Caesar  was  not  far  off ;  which  meeting  with  the 
more  credit  because  of  their  hasty  march,  put  the 
whole  army  into  such  consternation,  that  many 
abandoning  their  colours  in  Epirus  and  the  neigh¬ 
bouring  states,  and  others  throwing  down  their 
arms,  every  thing  had  the  appearance  of  a  precipitate 
flight.  But  on  Pompey’s  halting  near  Dyrrhachium, 
and  ordering  a  camp  to  be  formed  as  the  army  had 
not  even  then  recovered  its  fright,  Labienus  ad¬ 
vanced  before  the  rest,  and  swore  never  to  abandon 
his  general,  but  to  share  in  whatever  lot  fortune 
should  assign  him.  The  other  lieutenants  did  the 
same,  as  likewise  the  military  tribunes  and  centu¬ 
rions,  whose  example  was  followed  by  the  whole 
army,  Caesar,  finding  that  he  was  prevented  in  his 
design  on  Dyrrhachium,  pursued  his  march  more 
leisurely;  and  encamped  on  the  river  Apsus,  in  the 
territories  of  the  Apollonians,  that  he  might  protect 
the  possessions  of  a  state  which  had  so  warmly 
declared  in  his  favour.  Here  he  resolved  to  pass 
the  winter  in  tents,  and  wait  the  arrival  of  the  rest 
of  his  legions  out  of  Italy.  Pompey  did  the  like ; 
and  having  encamped  on  the  other  side  of  the  Apsus, 
assembled  there  all  his  legions  and  auxiliaries. 

12.  Kalenus,  having  embarked  the  legions  and 
cavalry  at  Brundusium,  according  to  the  instructions 
he  had  received,  put  to  sea  with  his  whole  fleet ;  but 
had  not  sailed  very  far,  till  he  was  met  by  letters 
from  Caesar,  informing  him  that  all  the  Grecian 
coasts  were  guarded  by  the  enemy’s  fleet.  On  this 
he  recalled  his  ships,  and  returned  again  into  the 
harbour.  Only  one  continued  its  route,  which  car¬ 
ried  no  soldiers,  nor  was  subject  to  the  orders  of 
Kalenus,  but  belonged  to  a  private  commander.  This 
vessel,  arriving  before  Oricum,  fell  into  the  hands  of 
Bibulus ;  who,  not  sparing  the  very  children,  put  all 
on  board  to  death,  both  freemen  and  slaves.  So 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III.  107 

much  did  the  safety  of  the  whole  army  depend  on  a 
single  moment. 

13.  Bibulus,  as  we  have  related  above,  lay  at 
Oricum  with  his  fleet ;  and  as  he  deprived  Caesar  of 
all  supplies  by  sea,  so  was  he,  in  like  manner,  greatly 
incommoded  by  Caesar  on  land ;  who,  having  disposed 
parties  along  the  coast,  hindered  him  from  getting 
water  or  wood,  or  coming  near  the  shore.  This  was 
attended  with  many  inconveniences,  and  threw  him 
into  great  straits  ;  insomuch  that  he  was  obliged  to 
fetch  all  his  other  necessaries,  as  well  as  wood  and 
water,  from  the  island  of  Corcyra ;  and  once,  when 
foul  weather  prevented  his  receiving  refreshments 
from  thence,  the  soldiers  were  necessitated,  for  want 
of  water,  to  collect  the  dew  which  in  the  night  fell 
on  the  hides  that  covered  their  ships.  Yet  he  bore 
all  these  difficulties  with  surprising  firmness,  and 
continued  resolute  in  his  design  of  not  unguarding 
the  coast.  But  at  last,  being  reduced  to  the  above- 
mentioned  extremity,  and  Libo  having  joined  him, 
they  called  from  on  board  to  M.  Acilius  and  Statius 
Murcus,  two  of  Caesar’s  lieutenants,  one  of  whom 
guarded  the  walls  of  Oricum,  and  the  other  the  sea- 
coasts,  that  they  wanted  to  confer  with  Caesar  about 
affairs  of  the  greatest  consequence,  if  they  could  but 
have  an  opportunity.  To  gain  the  more  credit,  they 
let  fall  some  expressions  that  seemed  to  promise 
accommodation ;  and  in  the  mean  while  demanded 
and  obtained  a  truce :  for  Murcus  and  Acilius,  be¬ 
lieving  their  proposals  to  be  serious,  knew  how  ex¬ 
tremely  grateful  they  would  be  to  Caesar,  and  doubted 
not  but  Vibullius  had  succeeded  in  his  negotiation. 

14.  Caesar  was  then  at  Buthrotum,  a  town  over- 
against  Corcyra ;  whither  he  was  gone,  with  one 
legion,  to  reduce  some  of  the  more  distant  states, 
and  supply  himself  with  corn,  which  then  began  to 
be  scarce.  Here,  receiving  letters  from  Acilius  and 
Murcus,  with  an  account  of  Libo  and  Bibulus’s  de  • 
mands,  he  left  the  legion  and  returned,  to  Oricu.m. 


108 


Caesar’s  commentaries. 


On  his  arrival,  he  invited  them  to  a  conference.  Libo 
appeared,  and  made  an  apology  for  Bibulus :  “  that 
being  naturally  hasty,  and  bearing  a  personal  grudge 
to  Caesar,  contracted  during  the  time  of  his  edileship 
and  questorship,  he  had,  for  that  reason,  declined 
the  interview,  to  prevent  any  obstructions  from  his 
presence  to  the  success  of  so  desirable  and  advan¬ 
tageous  a  design :  that  Pompey  was,  and  ever  had 
been,  inclined  to  lay  down  his  arms,  and  terminate 
their  differences  by  an  accommodation,  but  as  yet 
had  not  sent  him  sufficient  powers  to  treat ;  which, 
however,  he  doubted  not  soon  to  receive,  as  the 
council  had  intrusted  him  with  the  whole  adminis¬ 
tration  of  the  war  :  that  if  he  would  therefore  make 
known  his  demands,  they  would  send  them  to  Pom¬ 
pey,  who  would  soon  come  to  a  resolution  on  their 
representations.  In  the  meantime,  the  truce  might 
continue,  and  both  parties  abstain  from  acts  of  hos¬ 
tility,  till  an  answer  could  be  obtained.”  He  added 
something  about  the  justice  of  their  cause,  and  their 
forces  both  natural  and  auxiliary ;  to  which  Caesar 
neither  at  that  time  returned  any  answer,  nor  do  we 
now  think  it  of  importance  enough  to  be  transmitted 
to  posterity.  Caesar’s  demands  were,  “  that  he  might 
have  leave  to  send  ambassadors  to  Pompey;  and 
that  they  would  either  stipulate  for  their  return,  or 
undertake  themselves  to  convey  them  in  safety :  that 
with  regard  to  the  truce,  such  were  the  present  cir¬ 
cumstances  of  the  war,  that  their  fleet  kept  back  his 
supplies  and  transports,  and  his  forces  deprived  them 
of  water  and  access  to  the  shore.  If  they  expected 
any  abatement  on  his  side,  they  must  likewise  abate 
in  guarding  the  coast ;  but  if  they  still  persisted  in 
their  former  vigilance,  neither  would  he  yield  in 
what  depended  on  him :  that,  notwithstanding,  the 
accommodation  might  go  forward,  without  any  ob¬ 
struction  from  this  mutual  denial.”  Libo  declined 
receiving  Caesar’s  ambassadors,  or  undertaking  for 
their  safe  return,  and  chose  to  refer  the  whole  matter 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


109 


to  Pompey ;  yet  insisted  on  the  truce.  Caesar,  per¬ 
ceiving  that  the  only  aim  of  the  enemy  was  to  ex¬ 
tricate  themselves  out  of  their  present  straits  and 
danger,  and  that  it  was  in  vain  to  entertain  any  hopes 
of  peace,  turned  all  his  thoughts  to  the  vigorous 
prosecution  of  the  war. 

15.  Bibulus,  having  kept  at  sea  for  many  days,  and 
contracted  a  dangerous  illness  by  the  cold  and  per¬ 
petual  fatigue,  as  he  could  neither  have  proper  assist¬ 
ance  on  board  nor  would  be  prevailed  on  to  quit 
his  post,  he  at  last  sank  under  the  weight  of  his  dis¬ 
temper.  After  his  death,  nobody  succeeded  in  the 
command  of  the  whole  fleet ;  but  each  squadron  was 
governed,  independently  of  the  rest,  by  its  particular 
commander. 

16.  When  the  surprise  occasioned  by  Caesar’s 
sudden  arrival  was  over,  Vibullius,  in  presence  of 
Libo,  L.  Lucceius,  and  Theophanes,  who  were  among 
Pompey ’s  most  intimate  counsellors,  resolved  to 
deliver  the  commission  he  had  received  from  Caesar. 
But  scarce  had  he  begun  to  speak,  when  Pompey 
interrupted  him,  and  ordered  him  to  proceed  no  fur¬ 
ther.  “  What,”  said  he,  “  is  my  life  or  country  to 
me,  if  I  shall  seem  to  be  beholden  to  Caesar  for  them  ? 
And  will  it  be  believed  that  I  am  not  indebted  to  him 
for  them,  if  he,  by  an  accommodation,  restores  me 
to  Italy  1”  Caesar  was  informed  of  this  speech,  after 
the  conclusion  of  the  war,  by  those  who  were  present 
when  it  was  delivered :  he  still  continued,  however, 
by  other  methods,  to  try  to  bring  about  an  accom¬ 
modation. 

17.  As  the  two  camps  were  only  separated  by  the 
river  Apsus,  the  soldiers  had  frequent  discourse 
among  themselves ;  and  it  was  settled,  by  mutual 
consent,  that  no  act  of  hostility  should  pass  during 
the  conferences.  Caesar,  taking  advantage  of  this 
opportunity,  sent  P.  Vatinius,  one  of  his  lieutenants, 
to  forward  to  the  utmost  an  accommodation ;  and  to 
demand,  frequently,  with  a  loud  voice,  “  whether  it 

Cms.  Vol.  it.— K 


110 


C^SAR  S  COMMENTARIES. 


might  not  be  permitted  to  citizen®  to  send  deputies 
to  their  fellow-citizens  about  peace :  that  this  had 
never  been  denied  even  to  fugitives  and  robbers,  and 
could  much  less  be  opposed  when  the  only  design 
was  to  prevent  the  effusion  of  civil  blood.”  This 
and  much  more  he  said,  with  a  submissive  air,  as 
became  one  employed  to  treat  for  his  own  and  the 
common  safety.  He  was  heard  with  great  silence 
by  both  parties,  and  received  this  answer  from  the 
enemy:  “That  A  Varro  had  declared  he  would 
.next  day  appear  at  an  interview,  whither  the  deputies 
of  both  parties  might  come  in  perfect  security,  and 
mutually  make  known  their  demands.”  The  hour 
of  meeting  was  likewise  settled  ;  which  being  come, 
multitudes  on  both  sides  flocked  to  the  place  ;  the 
greatest  expectations  were  formed ;  and  the  minds 
of  all  seemed  intent  on  peace.  T.  Labienus,  ad¬ 
vancing  from  the  crowd,  began  in  a  low  voice  to 
confer  with  Vatinius,  as  if  to  settle  the  articles  of 
the  treaty.  But  their  discourse  was  soon  interrupted 
by  a  multitude  of  darts  that  came  pouring  in  on  all 
sides.  Vatinius  escaped  the  danger,  by  means  of 
the  soldiers,  who  protected  him  with  their  shields ; 
but  Cornelius  Balbus,  M.  Plotius,  L.  Tiburtus,  cen¬ 
turions,  and  some  private  men,  were  wounded.  La¬ 
bienus  then  lifted  up  his  voice  and  cried,  “  Leave  off 
prating  of  an  accommodation ;  for  you  must  not  ex¬ 
pect  peace  till  you  bring  us  Caesar’s  head.” 

18.  About  the  same  time,  M.  Coelius  Rufus,  pretor 
at  Rome  for  foreign  affairs,  having  undertaken  the 
cause  of  the  debtors,  on  his  entrance  into  his  office 
ordered  his  tribunal  to  be  fixed  near  that  of  the  cit}" 
pretor,  C.  Trebonius,  and  promised  to  receive  the 
complaints  of  such  as  should  appeal  to  him,  in  regard 
to  the  estimation  and  payments  made  in  consequence 
of  Caesar’s  late  regulation.  But  such  was  the  equity 
of  the  decree,  and  the  humanity  of  Trebonius,  who 
in  so  nice  and  critical  an  affair  thought  it  necessary 
to  conduct  himself  with  the  utmost  clemency  and 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


moderation,  that  no  pretence  of  appeal  could  be 
found :  for  to  plead  poverty,  personal  losses,  the 
hardness  of  the  times,  and  the  difficulty  of  bringing 
their  effects  to  sale,  is  usual  enough  even  with  rea¬ 
sonable  minds ;  but  to  own  themselves  indebted,  and 
yet  aim  at  keeping  their  possessions  entire,  would 
have  argued  a  total  want  both  of  honesty  and  shame. 
Accordingly,  not  a  man  was  found  who  had  made 
any  such  demand.  Coelius’s  whole  severity,  there¬ 
fore,  was  pointed  against  those  to  whom  the  inher¬ 
itance  of  the  debtor  was  adjudged  ;  and  having  once 
embarked  in  the  affair,  that  he  might  not  seem  to 
have  engaged  himself  to  no  purpose  in  an  unjustifi¬ 
able  cause,  he  published  a  law,  by  which  he  allowed 
the  debtors  six  years  for  the  discharge  of  their  debts, 
which  they  were  to  clear  at  equal  payments,  without 
interest. 

19.  But  the  consul  Servilius,  and  the  rest  of  the 
magistrates,  opposing  the  law,  when  he  found  it  had 
not  the  effect  he  expected,  he  thought  proper  to 
drop  that  design ;  and,  with  the  view  of  inflaming 
the  people,  proposed  two  new  laws ;  the  one,  to  ex¬ 
empt  all  the  tenants  in  Rome  from  paying  rents ;  the 
other,  for  a  general  abolition  of  debts.  This  bait 
took  with  the  multitude  ;  and  Coelius,  at  their  head, 
came  and  attacked  Trebonius  on  his  tribunal,  drove 
him  thence,  and  wounded  some  about  him.  The 
consul  Servilius  reported  these  things  to  the  senate, 
who  interdicted  to  Coelius  the  functions  of  his  office 
In  consequence  of  this  decree,  the  consul  refused 
him  admittance  into  the  senate,  and  drove  him  out 
of  his  tribunal  when  he  was  going  to  harangue  the 
people.  Overwhelmed  with  shame  and  resentment, 
he  openly  threatened  to  carry  his  complaints  to  Cae¬ 
sar  ;  but  privately  gave  notice  to  Milo,  who  had  been 
banished  for  the  murder  of  Crolius,  to  come  into 
Italy,  and  join  him  with  the  remains  of  the  gladiators, 
which  he  brought  formerly  to  entertain  the  people 
with,  in  the  shows  he  gave  them.  With  this  view 


112 


CiESAR’s  COMMENTARIES. 


he  sent  him  before  to  Tiirinum,  to  solicit  the  shep¬ 
herds  to  take  arms,  and  went  himself  to  Casilinum ; 
where,  hearing  that  his  arms  and  ensigns  had  been 
seized  at  Capua,  his  partisans  at  Naples,  and  their 
design  of  betraying  the  city  discovered, — finding  all 
his  projects  defeated,  the  gates  of  Capua  shut  against 
him,  and  the  danger  increasing  every  moment,  be¬ 
cause  the  citizens  had  taken  arms,  and  began  to  con¬ 
sider  him  as  a  public  enemy  ;  he  desisted  from  the 
project  he  had  formed,  and  thought  proper  to  change 
his  route. 

20.  In  the  mean  time,  Milo,  having  despatched  let¬ 
ters  to  all  the  colonies  and  free  towns,  intimating 
that  what  he  did  was  in  virtue  of  Pompey’s  authority, 
who  had  sent  him  orders  by  Bibulus,  endeavoured 
to  draw  over  the  debtors  to  his  party ;  but  not  suc¬ 
ceeding  in  his  design,  he  contented  himself  with  set¬ 
ting  some  slaves  at  liberty,  and  with  them  marched 
to  besiege  Cosa,  in  the  territory  of  Turinum.  Q. 
Pasdius,  the  pretor,  with  a  garrison  of  one  legion, 
commanded  in  the  town ;  and  here  Milo  was  slain 
by  a  stone  from  a  machine  on  the  walls.  Coelius, 
giving  out  that  he  was  gone  to  Csesar,  came  to  Thu- 
rium ;  where,  endeavouring  to  debauch  the  inhabit¬ 
ants,  and  corrupt,  by  promises  of  money,  the  Spanish 
and  Gaulish  horse,  whom  Caesar  had  sent  thither  to 
garrison  the  place,  they  slew  him.  Thus  these  dan¬ 
gerous  beginnings,  that  by  reason  of  the  multiplicity 
of  affairs  wherewith  the  magistrates  were  distracted, 
and  the  ticklish  situation  of  the  times,  threatened 
great  revolutions,  and  alarmed  all  Italy,  were  brought 
to  a  safe  and  speedy  issue. 

21.  Libo,  leaving  Oricum  with  the  fleet  under  his 
command,  consisting  of  fifty  sail,  came  to  Brundu- 
sium,  and  possessed  himself  of  an  island  directly 
facing  the  harbour;  judging  it  of  more  consequence 
to  secure  a  post,  by  which  our  transports  must  neces¬ 
sarily  pass,  than  guard  all  the  coasts  and  havens 
on  the  other  side  As  his  arrival  was  unexpected, 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


113 


he  surprised  and  burned  some  transports,  and  carried 
off  a  vessel  loaded  with  corn.  The  consternation 
was  great  among  our  men,  insomuch,  that  having 
landed  some  foot,  with  a  party  of  archers,  in  the 
night,  he  defeated  our  guard  of  cavalry,  and  had  so 
far  the  advantage,  by  the  commodiousness  of  his 
post,  that  he  wrote  Pompey  word  he  might  draw 
the  rest  of  the  navy  on  shore,  and  order  them  to  be 
careened;  for  he  alone,  with  his  squadron,  would 
undertake  to  cut  off  Caesar’s  supplies. 

22.  Antony  was  then  at  Erundusium,  who,  con¬ 
fiding  in  the  valour  of  the  troops,  ordered  some  boats 
belonging  to  the  fleet  to  be  armed  with  hurdles  and 
galleries  ;  and  having  filled  them  with  chosen  troops, 
disposed  them  in  several  places  along  the  shore. 
At  the  same  time,  he  sent  two  three-benched  gal¬ 
leys,  which  he  had  caused  to  be  built  at  Erundusium, 
to  the  mouth  of  the  harbour,  as  if  with  design  to 
exercise  the  rowers.  Libo,  perceiving  them  advance 
boldly,  and  hoping  he  might  be  able  to  intercept 
them,  detached  five  quadriremes  for  that  purpose. 
At  their  approach,  our  men  rowed  towards  the  har¬ 
bour,  whither  the  enemy,  eager  of  the  pursuit,  in¬ 
considerately  followed  them;  for  now  Antony’s 
armed  boats,  on  a  signal  given,  came  pouring  on 
them  from  all  parts,  and  on  the  very  first  onset  took 
a  quadrireme,  with  all  the  soldiers  and  sailors  on 
board,  and  forced  the  rest  to  an  ignominious  flight.. 
To  add  to  this  disgrace,  the  cavalry,  which  Antony 
had  posted  all  along  the  coast,  hindered  the  enemy 
from  watering  ;  which  reduced  them  to  such  straits, 
that  Libo  was  forced  to  quit  the  blockade  of  Erun¬ 
dusium,  and  retire  with  his  fleet. 

23.  Several  months  had  now  passed ;  the  winter 
was  almost  over ;  meantime,  neither  the  ships  nor 
the  legions  were  yet  arrived  which  Caesar  expected 
from  Erundusium.  He  could  not  help  thinking  that 
some  opportunities  had  been  lost,  as  it  was  certain 
the  wind  had  many  times  offered  fair,  and  there  was 

K  2 


114  Cesar’s  commentaries, 

a  necessity  of  trusting  to  it  at  last.  The  longer  the 
delay  in  sending  over  the  troops,  the  more  vigi¬ 
lant  and  alert  were  the  enemy  in  guarding  the  coast, 
and  the  greater  their  confidence  to  hinder  the  pas¬ 
sage  ;  nay,  Pompey,  in  his  letters,  frequently  re¬ 
proached  them,  that  as  they  had  not  prevented  the  first 
embarkation,  they  ought  at  least  to  take  care  that 
no  more  of  the  troops  got  over  ;  and  the  season 
itself  was  becoming  less  favourable,  by  the  approach 
of  milder  weather,  when  the  enemy’s  fleet  would  be 
able  to  act  and  extend  itself.  For  these  reasons, 
Caesar  wrote  sharply  to  his  lieutenants  at  Brundu- 
sium,  charging  them  not  to  omit  the  first  opportunity 
of  sailing,  as  soon  as  the  wind  offered  fair,  and  to 
steer  for  the  coast  of  Apollonia,  which  they  could 
approach  with  less  danger,  as  it  was  not  so  strictly 
guarded  by  the  enemy,  who  were  afraid  of  venturing 
on  a  coast  so  ill  provided  with  havens. 

24.  The  lieutenants,  roused  and  imboldened  by 
these  letters,  and  encouraged  by  the  exhortations 
of  the  troops  themselves,  who  professed  they  were 
ready  to  face  any  danger  for  Caesar’s  sake,  embarked 
under  the  direction  of  M.  Antony  and  Fufius  Kale- 
nus  ;  and  setting  sail  with  the  wind  at  south,  passed 
Apollonia  and  Dyrrhachium  next  day.  Being  des¬ 
cried  from  the  continent,  C.  Coponius,  who  com¬ 
manded  the  Rhodian  squadron  at  Dyrrhachium,  put 
out  to  sea ;  and  the  wind  slackening  on  our  fleet,  it 
was  near  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy ;  but 
a  fresh  gale  springing  up  at  south,  saved  us  from 
that  danger.  Coponius,  however,  desisted  not  from 
the  pursuit,  hoping,  by  the  labour  and  perseverance 
of  the  mariners,  to  surmount  the  violence  of  the 
tempest ;  and  though  we  had  passed  Dyrrhachium 
with  a  very  hard  gale,  still  continued  to  follow  us. 
Our  men,  apprehensive  of  an  attack,  should  the 
wind  again  chance  to  slacken,  seized  an  advantage 
fortune  threw  in  their  way,  and  put  into  the  port  of 
Nymphaeum,  about  three  miles  beyond  Lissus.  This 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


115 


port  is  sheltered  from  the  south-west  wind,  but  lies 
open  to  the  south ;  but  they  preferred  the  hazard 
they  might  be  exposed  to  by  the  tempest,  to  that  of 
fighting.  At  that  instant,  by  an  unusual  piece  of  good 
fortune,  the  wind,  which  for  two  days  had  blown 
from  the  south,  changed  to  the  south-west.  This 
was  a  sudden  and  favourable  turn  :  for  the  fleet,  so 
lately  in  danger  from  the  enemy,  was  sheltered  in  a 
safe,  commodious  port ;  and  that  which  threatened 
ours  with  destruction  was  in  its  turn  exposed  to  the 
utmost  peril.  By  this  unexpected  change,  the  storm, 
which  protected  our  fleet,  beat  so  furiously  on  the 
Rhodian  galleys,  that  they  were  all  to  the  number 
of  sixteen  broke  to  pieces  against  the  shore.  Most 
of  the  soldiers  and  mariners  perished  among  the 
rocks  :  the  rest  were  taken  up  by  our  men,  and  sent, 
by  Caesar’s  orders,  to  their  several  homes. 

25.  Two  of  our  transports,  unable  to  keep  up  with 
the  rest,  were  overtaken  by  the  night ;  and  not  know¬ 
ing  where  the  fleet  had  put  in,  cast  anchor  over 
against  Lissus.  Otacilius  Crassus,  who  commanded 
in  the  place,  sent  out  some  boats  and  small  vessels 
to  attack  them  :  at  the  same  time  he  urged  them  to 
a  surrender,  promising  quarter  to  such  as  would 
submit.  One  of  these  vessels  carried  two  hundred 
and  twenty  new-raised  soldiers  ;  the  other  less  than 
two  hundred  veterans.  On  this  occasion  appeared 
how  great  a  defence  against  danger  results  from 
firmness  of  mind.  The  new  levies,  frighted  at  the 
number  of  their  adversaries,  and  fatigued  with  sea¬ 
sickness,  surrendered  on  promise  of  their  lives  ;  but 
when  they  were  brought  to  Otacilius,  regardless  of 
the  oath  he  had  taken,  he  ordered  them  all  to  be 
cruelly  slain  in  his  presence.  The  veterans,  on  the 
contrary,  though  they  had  both  the  storm  and  a  leaky 
vessel  to  struggle  with,  abated  nothing  of  their 
wonted  bravery ;  but  having  spun  out  the  time  till 
night  under  pretence  of  treating,  obliged  the  pilot  to 
run  the  vessel  ashore,  where  finding  an  advantageous 


116 


Caesar’s  commentaries. 


post,  they  continued  the  remainder  of  the  night 
At  daybreak,  Otacilius  detached  against  them  about 
four  hundred  horse,  who  guarded  that  part  of  the 
coast,  and  pursued  them  sword  in  hand ;  but  they 
defended  themselves  with  great  bravery  ;  and  having 
slain  some  of  the  enemy,  rejoined,  without  loss,  the 
rest  of  the  troops. 

26.  On  this,  the  Roman  citizens  inhabiting  lassus, 
to  whom  Caesar  had  before  made  a  grant  of  the 
town,  after  fortifying  it  with  great  care,  opened  their 
gates  to  Antony,  and  furnished  him  with  every  thing 
he  stood  in  need  of.  Otacilius,  dreading  the  con¬ 
sequences  of  this  revolution,  quitted  the  place,  and 
fled  to  Pompey.  Antony,  having  landed  his  troops, 
which  consisted  of  three  veteran  legions,  one  new- 
raised,  and  eight  hundred  horse,  sent  most  of  the 
transports  back  again  to  Brundusium,  to  bring  over 
the  rest  of  the  foot  and  cavalry ;  retaining  neverthe¬ 
less  some  ships  of  Gaulish  structure,  that  if  Pompey, 
imagining  Italy  destitute  of  troops,  should  attempt 
to  run  thither,  as  was  commonly  rumoured,  Caesar 
might  be  able  to  follow  him.  At  the  same  time  he 
gave  Caesar  speedy  notice  of  the  number  of  forces  he 
had  brought  over  with  him,  and  the  place  where  he 
had  landed. 

27.  This  intelligence  reached  Caesar  and  Pompey 
much  about  the  same  time ;  for  both  had  seen  the 
fleet  pass  Apollonia  and  Dyrrhachium,  and  had  in 
consequence  directed  their  march  that  way;  but 
neither  knew,  for  some  days,  into  what  harbour  it 
had  put.  On  the  first  news  of  Antony’s  landing,  the 
two  generals  took  different  resolutions ;  Caesar  to 
Join  him  as  soon  as  possible  ;  Pompey  to  oppose  his 
inarch,  and,  if  possible,  draw  him  into  an  ambus¬ 
cade.  Both  quitted  their  camps  on  the  Apsus  about 
the  same  time  ;  Pompey,  privately,  during  the  night ; 
Caesar,  publicly,  by  day.  But  Caesar,  who  had  the 
river  to  cross,  was  obliged  to  fetch  a  compass,  that 
he  might  come  at  a  ford.  Pompey,  on  the  other 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


117 


hand,  having  nothing  to  obstruct  his  march,  advanced 
by  great  journeys  against  Antony;  and  understand¬ 
ing  that  he  was  not  far  off,  posted  his  troops  on  an 
advantageous  ground,  ordering  them  to  keep  within 
their  camp,  and  light  no  fires,  that  his  approach 
might  not  be  perceived.  But  Antony,  being  informed 
of  it  by  the  Greeks,  would  not  stir  out  of  his  lines, 
and  sending  immediate  notice  to  Caesar,  was  joined 
by  him  next  day.  On  advice  of  Caesar’s  arrival, 
Pompey,  that  he  might  not  be  shut  up  between  two 
armies,  quitted  the  place,  and  coming  with  all  his 
forces  to  Asparagium,  a  town  belonging  to  the 
Dyrrhachians,  encamped  there  on  an  advantageous 
ground. 

28.  About  the  same  time  Scipio,  notwithstanding 
some  checks  he  had  received  near  Mount  Amanus, 
assumed  the  title  of  emperor ;  after  which  he  ex¬ 
acted  great  sums  of  money  from  the  neighbouring 
states  and  princes  ;  obliged  the  farme-?^  of  the  reve¬ 
nue  to  pay  the  two  years’  taxes  which  lay  in  their 
hands,  and  advance  a  third  by  way  of  loan ;  and  sent 
orders  to  the  whole  province  for  levying  cavalry. 
Having  got  a  sufficient  number  together,  he  quitted 
the  Parthians,  his  nearest  enemies,  who  not  long 
before  had  slain  M.  Crassus,  and  held  Bibulus  in¬ 
vested,  and  marched  out  of  Syria  with  his  legions 
and  cavalry.  When  he  arrived  in  Asia  Minor,  he 
found  the  whole  country  filled  with  terror  on  account 
of  the  Parthian  war ;  and  the  soldiers  themselves 
declared  that  they  were  ready  to  march  against  an 
enemy,  but  would  never  bear  arms  against  a  consul 
and  their  fellow-citizens.  To  stifle  these  discon¬ 
tents,  he  made  considerable  presents  to  the  troops, 
quartered  them  in  Pergarnus  and  other  rich  towns, 
and  gave  up  the  whole  country  to  their  discretion. 
Meanwhile  the  money  demanded  of  the  province 
was  levied  with  great  rigour,  and  various  pretences 
were  devised  to  serve  as  a  ground  to  new  exactions. 
Slaves  and  freemen  were  subject  to  a  capitation  tax. 


118 


cjesar’s  commentaries. 


Imposts  were  laid  on  pillars  and  doors  of  houses. 
Corn,  soldiers,  mariners,  arms,  engines,  carriages — 
in  a  word,  every  thing  that  had  a  name,  furnished  a 
sufficient  handle  for  extorting  money.  Governors 
were  appointed,  not  only  over  towns,  but  over  vil¬ 
lages  and  castles ;  and  he  that  acted  with  the  great¬ 
est  rigour  and  cruelty  was  accounted  the  worthiest 
man  and  best  citizen.  The  province  swarmed  with 
lictors,  overseers,  and  collectors,  who,  besides  the 
sums  imposed  by  public  authority,  exacted  money 
likewise  on  their  own  account,  colouring  their  iniqui¬ 
tous  demands  with  a  pretence  that  they  had  been 
expelled  their  country  and  native  homes,  and  were 
in  extreme  want  of  every  thing.  Add  to  all  these 
calamities,  immoderate  usury,  an  evil  almost  insepa¬ 
rable  from  war  ;  for  as  great  sums  are  then  exacted, 
beyond  what  a  country  is  able  to  furnish,  they  are 
obliged  to  apply  for  a  delay,  which  at  any  price  is 
still  accounted  a  favour.  Thus  the  debts  of  the 
province  increased  considerably  during  these  two 
years.  Nor  were  the  Roman  citizens  the  only  suf¬ 
ferers  on  this  occasion ;  for  certain  sums  were  de¬ 
manded  of  every  state  and  corporation,  as  a  loan  on 
the  senate’s  decree  ;  and  the  farmers  of  the  revenue 
were  ordered  to  advance  the  next  year’s  tribute,  in 
like  manner  as  when  they  first  entered  on  office. 
Besides  all  this,  Scipio  gave  orders  for  seizing  the 
treasures  of  the  temple  of  Diana  at  Ephesus,  Muth 
all  the  statues  of  that  goddess.  But  when  he  came 
to  the  temple,  attended  by  many  persons  of  sena- 
torian  rank,  he  received  letters  from  Pompey,  de¬ 
siring  him  to  lay  aside  all  other  concerns,  and  make 
what  haste  he  could  to  join  him,  because  Caesar  had 
passed  into  Greece  with  his  whole  army.  In  conse¬ 
quence  of  this  order,  he  sent  back  the  senators  who 
had  been  summoned  to  attend  him  at  Ephesus,  made 
preparations  for  passing  into  Macedonia,  and  began 
his  march  a  few  days  after.  Thus  the  Ephesian 
treasures  escaped  being  plundered. 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


119 


29.  Caesar,  having  joined  Antony’s  army,  and  re¬ 
called  the  legion  he  had  left  at  Oriciim  to  guard  the 

,seacoast,  judged  it  necessary  to  advance  farther 
into  the  country,  and  possess  himself  of  the  more 
distant  provinces.  At  the  same  time  deputies  ar¬ 
rived  from  Thessaly  and  Altolia,  with  assurances 
of  submission  from  all  the  states  in  those  parts,  pro¬ 
vided  he  would  send  troops  to  defend  them.  Ac¬ 
cordingly  he  despatched  L.  Cassius  Longinus,  with 
a  legion  of  new  levies,  called  the  twenty-seventh, 
and  two  hundred  horse,  into  Thessaly;  and  C.  Cal- 
visius  Sabinus,  with  five  cohorts  and  some  cavalry, 
into  Altblia  ;  charging  them  in  a  particular  manner, 
as  those  provinces  lay  the  nearest  to  his  camp,  that 
they  would  take  care  to  furnish  him  with  corn.  He 
likewise  ordered  Cn.  Domitius  Calvinus,  with  the 
eleventh  and  twelfth  legions,  and  five  hundred  horse, 
to  march  into  Macedonia :  for  Menedemus,  the  prin¬ 
cipal  man  of  that  country,  having  come  ambassador 
to  Caesar,  had  assured  him  of  the  affection  of  the 
province. 

30.  Calvisius  was  well  received  by  the  JStolians, 
and  having  driven  the  enemy’s  garrisons  from  Caly- 
don  and  Naupactum,  possessed  himself  of  the  whole 
country.  Cassius,  arriving  in  Thessaly  with  his 
legion,  found  the  state  divided  into  two  factions. 
Egesaretus,  amaninyears,  and  of  established  credit, 
favoured  Pompey ;  Petreius,  a  young  nobleman  of 
the  first  rank,  exerted  his  whole  interest  in  behalf 
of  Caesar. 

31.  About  the  same  time  Domitius  arrived  in 
Macedonia  ;  and  while  deputies  were  attending  him 
from  all  parts,  news  came  that  Scipio  approached 
with  his  legions,  which  spread  a  great  alarm  through 
the  country  ;  as  fame,  for  the  most  part,  magnifies 
the  first  appearances  of  things.  Scipio,  without 
stopping  anywhere  in  Macedonia,  advanced  by  great 
marches  towards  Domitius  ;  but  being  come  within 
twenty  miles  of  him,  suddenly  changed  his  route, 


120 


CiESAR’s  COMMENTARIES. 


and  turned  off  to  Thessaly,  in  quest  of  Cassius 
Longinus.  This  was  done  so  expeditiously,  that  he 
had  actually  arrived  with  his  troops  when  Cassius 
received  the  first  notice  of  his  march  ;  for  to  make 
the  more  despatch  he  had  left  M.  Favonius  at  the 
river  Haliacmon,  which  separates  Macedonia  from 
Thessaly,  with  eight  cohorts  to  guard  the  baggage 
of  the  legions,  and  ordered  him  to  erect  a  fort  there. 
At  the  same  time.  King  Cotus’s  cavalry,  which  had 
been  accustomed  to  make  inroads  into  Thessaly, 
came  pouring  on  Cassius’s  camp ;  who,  knowing  that 
Scipio  was  on  his  march,  and  believing  the  cavalry 
to  be  his,  retired  in  a  fright  to  the  mountains  that 
begird  Thessaly,  and  thence  directed  his  course 
towards  Ambracia.  Scipio  preparing  to  follow  him, 
received  letters  from  M.  Pavonius  that  Domitius 
was  coming  up  with  his  legions,  nor  would  it  be  pos¬ 
sible  for  him  to  maintain  the  post  he  was  in  without 
his  assistance.  Scipio,  on  this  intelligence,  changed 
his  resolution,  gave  over  the  pursuit  of  Cassius,  and 
advanced  to  the  relief  of  Favonius.  As  he  marched 
day  and  night  without  intermission,  he  arrived  so 
opportunely,  that  the  dust  of  Domitius’s  army  and 
his  advanced  parties  were  descried  at  the  same  time. 
Thus  Domitius’s  care  preserved  Cassius,  and  Scipio’s 
diligence  Favonius. 

32.  Scipio,  continuing  two  days  in  his  camp  on  the 
Haliacmon,  which  ran  between  him  and  the  army  of 
Domitius,  put  his  troops  in  motion  on  the  third,  and 
by  daybreak  forded  the  river.  Early  next  morning 
he  drew  up  his  troops  in  order  of  battle  at  the  head 
of  his  camp.  Domitius  was  not  averse  to  an  en¬ 
gagement  ;  but  as  between  the  two  camps  there  was 
a  plain  of  six  miles,  he  thought  that  the  fittest  place 
for  a  field  of  battle,  and  drew  up  his  men  at  some 
distance  from  Scipio’s  camp.  Scipio  would  not  stir 
from  his  post ;  yet  hardly  could  Domitius  restrain 
his  men  from  advancing  to  attack  him,  though  a 
rivulet  with  steep  banks,  that  ran  in  front  of  the 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


121 


enemy’s  camp,  opposed  their  passage.  Scipio,  ob¬ 
serving  the  keenness  and  alacrity  of  our  troops,  and 
fearing  that  next  day  he  should  either  be  forced  to 
fight  against  his  will  or  ignominiously  keep  within 
his  camp,  after  great  expectations  raised,  by  too 
hastily  crossing  the  river,  he  saw  all  his  projects 
defeated ;  and  decamping  in  great  silence  during  the 
night,  returned  to  his  former  station  beyond  the 
Haliacmon,  and  posted  himself  on  a  rising  ground 
near  the  river.  A  few  days  after,  he  formed  an  am¬ 
buscade  of  cavalry,  by  night,  in  a  place  where  our 
men  were  wont  to  forage ;  and  when  Q.  Varus,  who 
commanded  the  horse  under  Domitius,  came  next 
day,  according  to  custom,  suddenly  the  enemy  rose 
from  their  lurking  holes :  but  our  men  bravely  sus¬ 
tained  the  attack,  soon  recovered  their  ranks,  and  in 
their  turn  vigorously  charged  the  enemy.  About 
fourscore  fell  on  this  occasion;  the  rest  betook 
themselves  to  flight ;  and  our  men  returned  to  their 
camp,  with  the  loss  of  only  two  of  their  number. 

33.  After  this  rencounter,  Domitius,  hoping  to  draw 
Scipio  to  a  battle,  feigned  to  decamp  for  want  of  pro¬ 
visions  ;  and  having  made  the  usual  signal  for  re¬ 
treating,  after  a  march  of  three  miles,  drew  up  his 
cavalry  and  legions  in  a  convenient  plain,  shrouded 
from  the  enemy’s  view.  Scipio,  preparing  to  follow, 
sent  the  horse  and  light-armed  infantry  before  to 
explore  his  route,  and  examine  the  situation  of  the 
country.  When  they  were  advanced  a  little  way, 
and  their  first  squadrons  had  come  within  reach  of 
our  ambush,  beginning  to  suspect  something  from 
the  neighing  of  the  horses,  they  wheeled  about,  in 
order  to  retreat ;  which  the  troops  that  followed  ob¬ 
serving,  suddenly  halted.  Our  men,  finding  that  the 
ambush  was  discovered,  and  knowing  it  would  be  in 
vain  to  wait  for  the  rest  of  the  army,  fell  on  the  two 
squadrons  that  were  most  advanced.  M.  Opimius, 
general  of  the  horse  to  Domitius,  was  among  these, 

C.®s.  VoL.  II. — L 


122 


Caesar’s  commentaries. 


but  somehow  found  means  to  escape.  All  the  rest 
were  either  slain  or  made  prisoners. 

34.  Caesar,  having  drawn  off  his  garrisons  from  the 
seacoast,  as  we  have  related  above,  left  three  co¬ 
horts  at  Oricum  to  defend  the  town,  and  committed 
to  their  charge  the  galleys  he  had  brought  out  of 
Italy.  Acilius,  one  of  his  lieutenants,  had  the  com¬ 
mand  of  these  troops  ;  who,  for  the  greater  security, 
caused  the  ships  to  be  drawn  up  into  the  harbour 
b'ehind  the  town,  and  made  them  fast  to  the  shore. 
He  likewise  sank  a  transport  in  the  mouth  of  the 
haven,  behind  which  another  rode  at  anchor,  on 
whose  deck  a  tower  was  erected,  facing  the  entrance 
of  the  port,  and  filled  wdth  troops,  to  be  ready  in  case 
of  surprise.  Young  Pompey,  who  commanded  the 
Egyptian  fleet,  having  notice  of  this,  came  to  Ori¬ 
cum  ;  weighed  up  the  vessel  that  had  been  sunk  in 
the  mouth  of  the  harbour,  and,  after  an  obstinate 
resistance,  took  the  other,  which  had  been  placed 
there  by  Acilius  to  guard  the  haven.  He  then 
brought  forward  his  fleet,  on  which  he  had  raised 
towers,  to  fight  with  the  greater  advantage ;  and 
having  surrounded  the  town  on  all  sides,  attacked  it 
by  land  with  scaling  ladders,  and  by  sea  from  the 
tow'ers,  sending  fresh  men  continually  in  the  place 
of  those  that  were  fatigued,  and  thereby  obliging  us 
to  yield,  through  weariness  and  wounds.  At  the 
same  time  he  seized  an  eminence  on  the  other  side 
of  the  town,  which  seemed  a  kind  of  natural  mole, 
and  almost  formed  a  peninsula  over-against  Oricum  ; 
and  by  means  of  this  neck  of  land  carried  four  small 
galleys,  on  rollers,  into  the  inner  part  of  the  haven. 
Thus  the  galleys  that  were  made  fast  to  the  land, 
and  destitute  of  troops,  being  attacked  on  all  sides, 
four  were  carried  off,  and  the  rest  burned.  This 
affair  despatched,  he  left  D.  Laelius,  whom  he  had 
taken  from  the  command  of  the  Asiatic  fleet,  to  pre¬ 
vent  the  importation  of  provisions  from  Biblis  and 
Amantia;  and  sailing  from  Lissus,  attacked  and 


CIVIL  WAR - BOOK  III. 


123 


burned  the  thirty  transports  which  Antony  had  left 
in  that  haven.  He  endeavoured  likewise  to  take 
the  town;  but  the  Roman  citizens  of  that  district, 
aided  by  the  g-arrison  Caesar  had  left,  defended  it  so 
well,  that  at  the  end  of  three  days  he  retired  without 
effecting  his  purpose,  having  lost  some  men  in  the 
attempt. 

35.  Caesar,  being  informed  that  Pompey  was  at 
Asparagium,  marched  thither  with  his  army;  and 
having  taken  the  capital  of  the  Parthinians  by  the 
way,  where  Pompey  had  a  garrison,  arrived  the 
third  day  in  Macedonia,  and  encamped  at  a  small 
distance  from  the  enemy.  The  next  day  he  drew 
out  all  his  forces,  formed  them  before  his  camp,  and 
offered  Pompey  battle.  Finding  that  he  kept  within 
his  lines,  he  led  back  his  troops,  and  began  to  think 
of  pursuing  other  measures.  Accordingly,  on  the 
morrow,  by  a  long  circuit,  and  through  very  narrow 
and  difficult  ways,  he  marched,  with  all  his  forces, 
to  Dyrrhachium  ;  hoping  either  to  oblige  Pompey  to 
follow  him  thither,  or  cut  off  his  communication  with 
the  town,  where  he  had  laid  up  all  his  provisions 
and  magazines  of  war ;  which  happened  accordingly: 
for  Pompey,  at  first,  not  penetrating  his  design,  be¬ 
cause  he  counterfeited  a  route  different  from  what 
he  really  intended,  imagined  he  had  been  obliged  to 
decamp  for  want  of  provisions :  but  being  afterward 
informed  of  the  truth  by  his  scouts,  he  quitted  his 
camp  next  day,  in  hopes  to  prevent  him  by  taking  a 
nearer  way.  Caesar,  suspecting  what  might  happen, 
exhorted  his  soldiers  to  bear  the  fatigue  patiently; 
and  allowing  them  to  repose  during  only  a  small  part 
of  the  night,  arrived  next  morning  at  Dyrrhachium, 
where  he  immediately  formed  a  camp,  just  as  Pom¬ 
pey ’s  van  began  to  appear  at  a  distance. 

36.  Pompey,  thus  excluded  from  Dyrrhachium,  and 
unable  to  execute  his  first  design,  came  to  a  resolu¬ 
tion  of  encamping  on  an  eminence,  called  Petra, 
where  was  a  tolerable  harbour,  sheltered  from  some 


124 


CiESAR’s  COMMENTARIES. 


winds.  Here  he  ordered  part  of  his  fleet  to  attend 
him,  and  corn  and  provisions  to  be  brought  him  from 
Asia  and  the  other  provinces  subject  to  his  com¬ 
mand.  Caesar,  apprehending  the  war  would  run  into 
length,  and  despairing  of  the  supplies  from  Italy,  be¬ 
cause  the  coasts  were  so  strictly  guarded  by  Pom- 
pey’s  fleet,  and  his  own  galleys,  built  the  winter  be¬ 
fore  in  Sicily,  Gaul,  and  Italy,  were  not  yet  arrived, 
despatched  L.  Canuleius,  one  of  his  lieutenants,  to 
Epirus  for  corn.  And  because  that  country  lay  at  a 
great  distance  from  his  camp,  he  built  granaries  in 
several  places,  and  wrote  to  the  neighbouring  states 
to  carry  their  corn  thither.  He  likewise  ordered 
search  to  be  made  for  what  corn  could  be  found  in 
Lissus,  the  country  of  the  Parthinians,  and  the  other 
principalities  in  those  parts.  This  amounted  to 
very  little  ;  partly  occasioned  by  the  soil,  which  is 
rough  and  mountainous,  and  obliges  the  inhabitants 
often  to  import  grain ;  partly  because  Pompey,  fore¬ 
seeing  Caesar’s  wants,  had  some  days  before  rav¬ 
aged  the  country  of  the  Parthinians,  plundered  their 
houses,  and,  by  means  of  his  cavalry,  carried  off  all 
their  corn. 

37.  For  these  reasons,  Caesar  formed  a  project, 
which  the  very  nature  of  the  country  suggested. 
All  round  Pompey’s  camp,  at  a  small  distance,  were 
high  and  steep  hills.  Caesar  took  possession  of  those 
hills,  and  built  forts  on  them  ;  resolving,  as  the  na¬ 
ture  of  the  ground  would  allow,  to  draw  lines  of 
communication  from  one  fort  to  another,  and  enclose 
Pompey  within  his  works.  His  views  herein  were, 
first,  to  facilitate  the  passage  of  his  convoys,  which 
the  enemy’s  cavalry,  which  was  very  strong  and 
fine,  would  no  longer  cut  off ;  next,  to  distress  this 
very  cavalry  for  want  of  forage ;  and  lastly,  to  lessen 
the  great  reputation  and  high  idea  entertained  of 
Pompey,  when  it  should  be  reported  all  over  the 
world  that  he  had  suffered  himself  to  be  blockaded. 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


125 


and,  as  it  were,  imprisoned  by  Caesar’s  works,  and 
durst  not  hazard  a  battle  to  set  himself  at  liberty. 

38.  Pompey  would  neither  leave  the  sea  and  Dyr- 
rhachium,  where  he  had  all  his  magazines  and  en¬ 
gines  of  war,  and  whence  he  was  supplied  with  pro¬ 
visions  by  means  of  his  fleet,  nor  could  he  prevent 
the  progress  of  Caesar’s  works  without  fighting, 
which,  at  that  time,  he  was  determined  against.  He 
could  do  nothing  therefore  but  extend  himself,  by 
taking  as  many  hills,  and  as  large  a  circuit  of  country 
as  possible,  to  give  his  adversary  the  more  trouble, 
and  divide  his  forces.  This  he  did  by  raising  twenty- 
four  forts,  which  took  in  a  circumference  of  fifteen 
miles,  wherein  were  arable  and  pasture  lands,  to  feed 
his  horses  and  beasts  of  burden.  And  as  our  men 
had  carried  their  circumvallation  quite  round,  by 
drawing  lines  of  communication  from  fort  to  fort,  to 
prevent  the  sallies  of  the  enemy,  and  guard  against 
the  attacks  in  their  rear  ;  in  like  manner,  Pompey’s 
men  had  surrounded  themselves  with  lines,  to  hinder 
us  from  breaking  in  on  them,  and  charging  them 
behind.  They  even  perfected  their  works  first,  be¬ 
cause  they  had  more  hands,  and  a  less  circuit  to  en¬ 
close.  When  Caesar  endeavoured  to  gain  any  place, 
Pompey,  though  determined  not  to  oppose  him  with 
all  his  forces,  nor  hazard  a  general  action,  failed  not 
however  to  detach  parties  of  archers  and  slingers, 
who  wounded  great  numbers  of  our  men,  and  occa¬ 
sioned  such  a  dread  of  their  arrows,  that  almost  all 
the  soldiers  furnished  themselves  with  coats-of-mail, 
or  thick  leather,  to  guard  against  that  danger. 

39.  Both  parties  disputed  every  post  with  great 
obstinacy;  Csesar,  that  he  might  enclose  Pompey 
within  as  narrow  a  space  as  possible  ;  and  Pompey, 
that  he  might  have  liberty  to  extend  himself:  which 
occasioned  many  sharp  skirmishes.  In  one  of  these, 
Caesar’s  ninth  legion  having  possessed  themselves  of 
an  eminence,  which  they  began  to  fortify,  Pompey 
seized  the  opposite  mount,  with  a  resolution  to  hin- 

L2 


126 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


der  their  works.  As  the  access  on  one  side  was 
very  easy,  he  sent  first  some  archers  and  slingers, 
and  afterward  a  strong  detachment  of  light-armed 
foot,  plying  us,  at  the  same  time,  with  his  military 
engines,  which  obliged  our  men  to  desist,  as  they 
found  it  impossible  at  once  to  sustain  the  enemy’s 
charge,  and  go  forward  with  their  works.  Caesar, 
perceiving  that  his  men  were  wounded  from  all  sides, 
resolved  to  quit  the  place  and  retire.  But  as  the 
descent  by  which  he  must  retreat  was  pretty  steep, 
the  Pompeians  charged  him  briskly  in  drawing  oflf, 
imagining  he  gave  way  through  fear.  Pompey  went 
so  far  as  to  say  “  that  he  consented  to  be  accounted 
a  general  of  no  merit,  if  Caesar’s  men  got  otf  without 
considerable  loss.  Caesar,  concerned  about  the  re¬ 
treat  of  his  men,  ordered  hurdles  to  be  fixed  on  the 
ridge  of  the  hill  fronting  the  enemy :  behind  which 
he  dug  a  moderate  ditch,  and  rendered  the  place  as 
inaccessible  as  he  could,  on  all  sides.  When  this 
was  done,  he  began  to  file  off  the  legionary  soldiers, 
supporting  them  by  some  light-armed  troops,  posted 
on  their  flanks,  who,  with  arrows  and  stones,  might 
repulse  the  enemy.  Pompey’s  troops  failed  not  to 
pursue  them,  with  great  outcries  and  fierce  menaces, 
overturned  the  hurdles,  and  used  them  as  bridges  to 
get  over  the  ditch.  Which  Caesar  observing,  and 
fearing  some  disaster  might  ensue,  should  he  seem 
to  be  driven  from  a  post  which  he  quitted  voluntarily ; 
when  his  forces  were  got  half  down  the  hill,  encour¬ 
aging  them  by  Antony,  who  had  the  command  of 
that  legion,  he  gave  the  signal  to  face  about,  and  fall 
on  the  enemy.  Immediately  the  soldiers  of  the 
ninth  legion,  forming  themselves  into  close  order, 
launched  their  darts ;  and  advancing  briskly  up  the 
hill  against  the  enemy,  forced  them  to  give  ground, 
and  at  last  betake  themselves  to  flight ;  which  was 
not  a  little  incommoded  by  the  hurdles,  palisades, 
and  ditch  Caesar  had  thrown  up  to  stop  their  pursuit. 
But  our  men,  who  sought  only  to  secure  their  retreat, 


CIVIL  WAR. — BOOK  III. 


127 


having-  killed  several  of  the  enemy,  and  lost  only 
five  of  their  own  number,  retired  without  the  least 
disturbance,  and  enclosing  some  other  hills  within 
their  lines,  completed  the  circumvallation. 

40.  This  method  of  making  war  was  new  and  ex¬ 
traordinary  ;  as  weU  in  regard  to  the  number  of  forts, 
the  extent  of  the  circumvallation,  the  greatness  of 
the  works,  and  the  manner  of  attack  and  defence,  as 
on  other  accounts :  for  whoever  undertakes  to  invest 
another  is,  for  the  most  part,  moved  thereto  either 
by  some  previous  defeat  he  has  sustained,  the  know¬ 
ledge  of  his  weakness,  to  take  advantage  of  his  dis¬ 
tresses,  to  profit  by  a  superiority  of  forces ;  or,  in  fine, 
to  cut  off  his  provisions,  which  is  the  most  ordinary 
cause  of  these  attempts.  But  Caesar,  with  an  inferior 
force,  besieged  Pompey,  whose  troops  were  entire, 
in  good  order,  and  abounded  in  all  things :  for  ships 
arrived  every  day,  from  all  parts,  with  provisions ; 
nor  could  the  wind  blow  from  any  quarter  that  was 
not  favourable  to  some  of  them ;  whereas  Caesar’s 
army,  having  consumed  all  the  corn  round  about,  was 
reduced  to  the  last  necessities.  Nevertheless  the 
soldiers  bore  all  with  singular  patience  ;  remember¬ 
ing,  that  though  reduced  to  the  like  extremity  the 
year  before,  in  Spain,  they  had  yet,  by  their  assiduity 
and  perseverance,  put  an  end  to  a  very  formidable 
war.  They  called  to  mind  too  their  sufferings  at 
Alesia,  and  their  still  greater  distresses  before  Avari- 
cum,  by  which,  however,  they  triumphed  over  mighty 
nations.  When  barley  or  pulse  was  given  them 
instead  of  corn,  they  took  it  cheerfully,  and  thought 
themselves  regaled  when  they  got  any  cattle,  which 
Epirus  furnished  them  with  in  great  abundance. 
They  discovered  in  the  country  a  root,  called  chara, 
which  they  pounded  and  kneaded  with  milk,  so  as  to 
make  a  sort  of  bread  of  it.  This  furnished  a  plen¬ 
tiful  supply ;  and  when  their  adversaries  reproached 
them  with  their  want,  by  way  of  answer  to  their 
insults  they  threw  their  loaves  at  them. 


128 


CiESAR’s  COMMENTARIES. 


41.  By  this  time  the  corn  began  to  ripen,  and  the 
hopes  of  a  speedy  supply  supported  the  soldiers 
under  their  present  wants.  Nay,  they  were  often 
heard  to  say  one  to  another,  that  they  would  sooner 
live  on  the  bark  of  trees  than  let  Pompey  escape : 
for  they  were  informed  from  time  to  time,  by  de¬ 
serters,  that  their  horses  w^ere  almost  starved,  and 
the  rest  of  their  cattle  actually  dead ;  that  thte  troops 
themselves  were  very  sickly ;  partly  occasioned  by 
the  narrow  space  in  which  they  were  enclosed,  the 
number  and  noisome  smell  of  dead  carcasses,  and 
the  daily  fatigue  to  which  they  were  unaccustomed, 
partly  by  their  extreme  want  of  water.  For  Caesar 
had  either  turned  the  course  of  all  the  rivers  and 
brooks  that  ran  into  the  sea,  or  dammed  up  their 
currents.  And  as  the  country  was  mountainous, 
intermixed  with  deep  valleys,  by  driving  piles  into 
the  earth,  and  covering  them  with  mould,  he  stopped 
up  the  course  of  the  waters.  This  obliged  the  en¬ 
emy  to  search  for  low  and  marshy  places,  and  to 
dig  wells,  which  added  to  their  daily  labour.  The 
wells,  too,  when  discovered,  lay  at  a  considerable 
distance  from  some  parts  of  the  army,  and  were 
soon  dried  up  by  the  heat.  Caesar’s  army,  on  the 
contrary,  was  very  healthy,  abounded  in  water,  and 
had  plenty  of  all  kinds  of  provisions,  corn  excepted, 
which  they  hoped  to  be  soon  supplied  with,  as  the 
season  was  now  pretty  far  advanced,  and  harvest 
approached. 

42.  In  this  new  method  of  making  war,  new  strata¬ 
gems  were  every  day  put  in  practice  by  both  gen¬ 
erals.  Pompey’s  soldiers,  observing  by  the  fires  the 
place  where  our  cohorts  were  on  guard,  stole  thither 
privately  by  night,  and  pouring  on  them  a  flight  of 
arrows,  retired  instantly  to  their  camp,  which  obliged 
our  men  to  have  fires  in  one  place  and  keep  guard 
in  another. 

43.  Meanwhile  P.  Sylla,  whom  Caesar,  at  his  de¬ 
parture,  had  left  to  command  the  camp,  being  in- 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


129 


formed  of  what  passed,  came  to  the  assistance  of  the 
cohort  with  two  legions.  His  arrival  soon  put  the 
Pompeians  to  flight,  who  could  not  stand  the  very 
sight  and  shock  of  his  troops ;  but  seeing  their  first 
ranks  broken,  took  to  their  heels,  and  quitted  the 

Elace.  Sylla  checked  the  ardour  of  his  men,  whom 
e  would  not  suffer  to  continue  the  pursuit  too  far ; 
and  it  was  the  general  belief,  that  had  he  pursued 
the  enemy  warmly,  that  day  might  have  put  an  end 
to  the  war.  His  conduct,  however,  cannot  be  justly 
censured ;  for  the  difference  is  great  between  a  lieu¬ 
tenant  and  a  general :  the  one  is  tied  up  to  act  ac¬ 
cording  to  instructions ;  the  other,  free  from  restraint, 
is  at  liberty  to  lay  hold  of  all  advantages.  Sylla, 
who  was  left  by  Caesar  to  take  care  of  the  camp,  was 
satisfied  with  having  disengaged  his  own  men,  and 
had  no  intention  to  hazard  a  general  action,  which 
might  have  been  attended  with  ill  consequences,  and 
would  have  looked  like  arrogating  the  part  of  a 
general.  The  Pompeians  found  it  no  easy  matter  to 
make  good  their  retreat ;  for  having  advanced  from 
a  very  disadvantageous  post  to  the  summit  of  the 
hill,  they  had  reason  to  fear  our  men  would  charge 
them  in  descending;  and  the  rather,  as  it  was  very 
near  sunset,  for  they  had  protracted  the  affair  almost 
till  night,  in  hopes  of  accomplishing  their  design. 
Thus  Pompey,  compelled  by  necessity,  immediately 
took  possession  of  an  eminence,  at  such  a  distance 
from  our  fort  as  to  be  secure  from  darts  and  mili¬ 
tary  engines.  Here  he  encamped,  threw  up  an  in- 
trenchment,  and  drew  his  forces  together  to  defend 
the  place. 

44.  At  the  same  time  we  were  engaged  in  two 
other  places ;  for  Pompey  attacked  several  castles 
together,  to  divide  our  forces,  and  hinder  the  forts 
from  mutually  succouring  one  another.  In  one  of 
these,  Volcatius  Tullus,  with  three  cohorts,  sustained 
the  charge  of  a  whole  legion,  and  forced  them  to 
retire.  In  the  other,  the  Germans,  sallying  out  of 


130 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


their  intrenchments,  slew  several  of  the  enemy,  and 
returned  again  without  loss. 

45.  Thus  there  happened  no  less  than  six  actions 
in  one  day  ;  three  near  Dyrrhachium,  and  three  about 
the  lines.  In  computing  the  number  of  the  slain,  it 
appeared  that  Pompey  lost  about  two  thousand  men, 
with  several  volunteers  and  centurions,  among  whom 
was  Valerius  Flaccus,  the  son  of  Lucius,  who  had 
formerly  been  pretor  of  Asia.  We  gained  six  stan¬ 
dards,  v/ith  the  loss  of  no  more  than  twenty  men  in 
all  the  attacks ;  but  in  the  fort,  not  a  soldier  escaped 
being  wounded  ;  and  four  centurions  belonging  to  one 
cohort  lost  their  eyes.  As  a  proof  of  the  danger 
they  had  been  exposed  to,  and  the  efforts  they  had 
sustained,  they  brought  and  counted  to  Caesar  about 
thirty  thousand  arrows  that  had  been  shot  into  the 
fort,  and  showed  him  the  centurion  Scaeva’s  buckler, 
which  was  pierced  in  two  hundred  and  thirty  places. 
Caesar,  as  a  reward  for  his  services  both  to  himself 
and  the  republic,  presented  him  with  two  hundred 
thousand  ases,  and  advanced  him  directly  from  the 
eighth  rank  of  captains  to  the  first ;  it  appearing  that 
the  preservation  of  the  fort  was  chiefly  owing  to  his 
valour.  He  also  distributed  military  rewards  among 
the  other  officers  and  soldiers  of  that  cohort,  and 
assigned  them  double  pay,  and  a  double  allowance 
of  corn. 

46.  Pompey  laboured  all  night  at  his  fortifications, 
raised  redoubts  the  following  days,  and  having  car¬ 
ried  his  works  fifteen  feet  high,  covered  that  part  of 
his  camp  with  mantelets.  Five  days  after,  taking 
advantage  of  a  very  dark  night,  he  walled  up  the 
gates  of  his  camp,  rendered  all  the  avenues  imprac¬ 
ticable  ;  and  drawing  out  his  troops  in  great  silence 
about  midnight,  returned  to  his  former  works. 

47.  A^tolia,  Acarnania,  and  Arnphilochis,  having 
been  reduced  by  Cassius  Longinus  and  Calvisius 
Sabinus,  as  we  have  related  above,  Caesar  thought  it 
expedient  to  pursue  his  conquests,  and  attempt  to 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


131 


g’airi  Achaia,  Accordingly  he  despatched  Fufius  Ka- 
lenus  thither,  ordering  Sabinus  and  Cassius  to  join 
him,  with  the  cohorts  under  their  command.  Ruti- 
lius  Lupus,  Pompey’s  lieutenant  in  Achaia,  hearing 
of  their  approach,  resolved  to  fortify  the  isthmus, 
and  thereby  hinder  Fufius  from  entering  the  province. 
Delphos,  Thebes,  and  Orchomenus  voluntarily  sub¬ 
mitted  to  Kalenus  ;  some  states  he  obtained  by  force, 
and,  sending  deputies  to  the  rest,  endeavoured  to 
make  them  declare  for  Caesar.  These  negotiations 
found  sufficient  employment  for  Fufius. 

48.  Caesar,  meanwhile,  drew  up  his  army  every 
day,  offering  Pompey  battle  on  equal  ground ;  and, 
to  provoke  him  to  accept  it,  advanced  so  near  his 
camp  that  his  van  was  within  engine-shot  of  the 
rampart.  Pompey,  to  preserve  his  reputation,  drew 
out  his  legions  too,  but  posted  them  in  such  a  manner 
that  his  third  line  touched  the  rampart,  and  the  whole 
army  lay  under  cover  of  the  weapons  discharged 
from  thence. 

49.  While  these  things  passed  in  Achaia  and  at 
Dyrrhachium,  and  it  was  now  known  that  Scipio  had 
arrived  in  Macedonia,  Caesar,  still  adhering  to  his 
former  views  of  peace,  despatched  Clodius  to  him, 
an  intimate  friend  of  both,  whom  he  had  taken  into 
his  service  on  Scipio’s  recommendation.  At  his 
departure,  he  charged  him  with  letters  and  instruc¬ 
tions  to  this  effect :  “  That  he  had  tried  all  ways  to 
bring  about  a  peace ;  but  believed  he  had  hitherto 
miscarried,  through  the  fault  of  those  to  whom  his 
proposals  were  addressed,  because  they  dreaded  pre¬ 
senting  them  to  Pompey  at  an  improper  time ;  that 
he  knew  vScipio’s  authority  to  be  such  as  not  only 
privileged  him  to  advise  freely,  but  even  to  enforce 
his  counsels,  and  compel  the  obstinate  to  hearken  to 
reason ;  that  he  was  possessed  of  an  independent 
command,  and  had  an  army  at  his  disposal  to  give 
weight  to  his  interposition  ;  that  in  employing  it  for 
so  desirable  an  end,  he  would  gain  the  indisputable 


132 


CiESAR’s  COMMENTARIES. 


praise  of  having  restored  quiet  toltaly,  peace  to  the 
provinces,  and  saved  the  empire.”  Clodius  reported 
this  commission  to  Scipio,  and  at  first  met  with  a 
favourable  reception,  but  was  afterward  denied  au¬ 
dience  ;  for  Favonius  having  sharply  reprimanded 
Scipio,  as  we  learned  after  the  conclusion  of  the 
war,  the  negotiation  was  discontinued,  and  Clodius 
returned  to  Caesar  without  success. 

50.  Caesar,  the  more  effectually  to  shut  up  Pom- 
pey’s  horse  at  Dyrrhachium,  and  hinder  them  from 
foraging,  blocked  up  the  two  narrow  passes,  of 
which  we  have  spoken  with  strong  works,  and  raised 
forts  to  defend  them.  Pompey,  finding  his  cavalry 
rendered  by  this  means  unserviceable,  conveyed 
them  some  days  after  by  sea  to  his  camp  again. 
Forage  was  so  scarce  that  they  were  forced  to  have 
recourse  to  the  leaves  of  trees  and  the  roots  of 
green  reeds  bruised ;  for  the  corn  sown  within  their 
lines  was  all  consumed  ;  nor  had  they  had  any  sup¬ 
plies  but  what  came  a  long  way  about  by  sea,  from 
Corcyra  and  Acarnania ;  and  even  this  was  so  incon¬ 
siderable,  that  to  increase  the  quantity  they  were 
forced  to  mix  it  with  barley,  and  by  these  contri¬ 
vances  support  their  horses.  At  last,  all  expedients 
being  exhausted,  and  the  horses  dying  daily,  Pom¬ 
pey  thought  it  time  to  attempt  to  force  the  barricade, 
and  set  himself  at  liberty. 

51.  Among  the  cavalry  in  Caesar’s  camp  were  two 
brothers,  Allobrogians  by  birth,  named  Roscillus  and 

the  sons  of  Adbucillus,  who  had  long  held  the 
chief  sway  in  his  own  state  ;  men  of  singular  bravery, 
and  who  had  been  of  signal  service  to  Caesar  in  all 
his  Gallic  wars :  for  these  reasons  he  had  raised 
them  to  the  highest  offices  in  their  own  country,  got 
them  chosen  into  the  senate  before  they  were  of 
age,  given  them  lands  in  Gaul  taken  from  the  enemy, 
besides  pecuniary  rewards  to  a  great  value ;  inso¬ 
much  that  from  very  moderate  beginnings  they  had 
risen  to  vast  wealth.  These  men  were  not  only 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III.  133 

highly  honoured  by  Caesar  on  account  of  their  bra¬ 
very,  but  in  great  esteem  with  the  whole  army. 
But  presuming  on  Caesar’s  friendship,  and  foolishly 
elated  with  their  prosperity,  they  used  fflie  troopers 
ill,  defrauded  them  of  their  pay,  and  secreted  all  the 
plunder  to  their  own  use.  The  Gaulish  cavalry, 
offended  at  these  proceedings,  went  in  a  body  to 
Caesar,  and  openly  complained  of  the  two  brothers ; 
adding,  among  other  accusations,  that,  by  giving  in 
false  musters,  they  received  pay  for  more  men  than 
they  had.  Caesar,  not  thinking  it  a  proper  time  for 
animadversion,  and  regarding  them  greatly  on  ac¬ 
count  of  their  valour,  declined  all  public  notice  of 
the  affair,  and  contented  himself  with  reprimanding 
them  ill  private,  admonishing  them  to  expect  every 
thing  from  his  friendship,  and  to  measure  their  future 
hopes  by  the  experience  of  what  he  had  already 
done  for  them.  This  rebuke,  however,  disgusted 
them  greatly,  and  very  much  lessened  their  credit 
with  the  whole  army,  which  they  easily  perceived, 
as  well  from  the  raillery  they  were  often  forced  to 
bear,  as  in  consequence  of  the  secret  reproaches 
and  sense  of  their  own  minds.  Thus,  prompted  by 
shame,  and  perhaps  imagining  they  were  not  cleared, 
but  reserved  to  a  more  favourable  opportunit3q  they 
resolved  to  desert,  to  try  their  fortunes  elsewhere, 
and  search  for  new  friendships.  Having  imparted 
their  design  to  a  few  of  their  clients,  whom  they 
judged  fit  instruments  for  so  black  a  treason,  they 
first  attempted  to  murder  C.  Volusenus,  general  of 
the  cavalry  (as  was  afterward  known,  when  the 
war  was  over),  that  by  so  signal  a  piece  of  service 
they  might  the  more  effectually  recommend  them¬ 
selves  to  Pompey’s  favour.  But  finding  that  design 
attended  with  great  hazard,  and  that  no  favourable 
opportunity  offered  for  putting  it  in  execution,  they 
borrowed  all  the  money  they  could,  under  pretence 
of  reimbursing  the  troops,  and  making  restitution ; 
and  having  bought  up  a  great  number  of  horses,  went 
C^s.  VcL.  II.— M 


134 


C^SAR  S  COMMENTARIES. 


over  to  Pompey,  with  those  whom  they  ha,d  made 
acquainted  with  their  design.  As  they  were  persons 
of  noble  birth,  liberally  educated,  came  with  a  great 
train  of  hc4ses  and  servants,  had  been  highly  hon¬ 
oured  by  Caesar,  and  were  universally  esteemed  on 
account  of  their  valour,  Pompey  carried  them  osten¬ 
tatiously  over  all  the  camp,  triumphing  in  this  new 
and  unusual  acquisition ;  for  till  then  neither  horse 
nor  foot  soldier  had  deserted  from  Caesar  to  Pom¬ 
pey  ;  whereas  scarce  a  day  passed  without  some 
desertion  from  Porapey’s  army,  especially  among 
the  new  levies  in  Epirus,  Altolia,  and  those  coun¬ 
tries  that  had  declared  for  Ccesar.  The  brothers, 
being  well  acquainted  with  the  condition  of  Caesar’s 
camp,  what  was  wanting  to  complete  the  fortifica¬ 
tions,  where  the  foible  of  the  lines  lay,  the  particular 
times,  distance  of  places,  strength  and  vigilance  of 
the  guards,  with  the  temper  and  character  of  the 
officers  who  commanded  in  every  post,  made  an  ex¬ 
act  report  of  all  to  Pompey. 

52.  On  this  intelligence,  having  already  formed 
the  design  of  forcing  Caesar’s  lines,  he  ordered  the 
soldiers  to  make  coverings  of  osier  for  their  helmets, 
and  provide  themselves  with  fascines.  This  done, 
he  embarked  by  night,  in  boats  and  small  barks,  a 
great  number  of  light-armed  troops  and  archers,  with 
the  fascines  for  filling  up  Caesar’s  trenches  ;  and  hav¬ 
ing  drawn  together  sixty  cohorts  from  the  greater 
camp  and  forts,  led  them  about  midnight  towards 
that  part  of  the  enemy’s  lines  nearest  the  sea,  a 
good  distance  from  the  main  camp.  Thither  like¬ 
wise  he  despatched  the  barks,  on  board  of  which 
were  the  light-armed  troops  and  fascines,  together 
with  all  the  galleys  that  lay  at  Dyrrhachium,  giving 
each  their  particular  instructions.  Lentulus  Marcel- 
linus  the  questor,  with  the  ninth  legion,  had  charge 
of  this  part  of  the  fortifications ;  and  as  his  health 
was  but  infirm,  Caesar  had  joined  Fulvius  Posthumus 
with  him  in  the  command. 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


135 


53.  This  place  was  guarded  by  a  ditch  fifteen  feet 
broad,  with  a  rampart  towards  the  enemy,  ten  feet 
high,  and  of  equal  thickness.  Behind  this,  at  the 
distance  of  six  hundred  feet,  was  another  rampart, 
somewhat  lower  than  the  former,  and  fronting  the 
contrary  way.  Caesar,  apprehending  an  attack  from 
the  sea,  had  raised  this  double  rampart  some 
days  before,  that  he  might  be  able  to  defend  him¬ 
self  against  the  enemy,  should  they  charge  him  on 
both  sides  at  once.  But  the  extent  of  the  circum- 
vallation,  and  the  continued  labour  of  so  many  days 
in  enclosing  a  space  of  eighteen  miles,  had  not  al¬ 
lowed  us  time  to  finish  the  work.  Accordingly,  the 
line  of  communication  which  ran  along  the  seaside, 
and  was  to  have  joined  these  two  ramparts,  was  not 
yet  completed.  This  Pompey  was  informed  of  by 
the  Allobrogian  brothers,  which  proved  of  fatal  con¬ 
sequence  to  us  ;  for  while  some  cohorts  of  the  ninth 
legion  were  on  guard  near  the  sea,  suddenly  the 
Pompeians  arrived  about  daybreak,  and  surprised 
them  by  their  unexpected  appearance.  At  the  same 
time  the  troops  that  came  by  sea  launched  their  darts 
against  the  outward  rampart,  and  began  to  fill  up 
the  ditch  with  fascines ;  while  the  legionary  sol¬ 
diers,  planting  their  scaling-ladders  against  the  inner 
works,  and  plying  those  that  defended  them  with 
darts  and  engines,  spread  a  general  terror  over  that 
part  of  the  camp,  which  was  still  increased  by  the 
multitude  of  archers  that  came  pouring  on  them 
from  all  sides.  The  osiers  they  had  bound  round 
their  helmets  contributed  greatly  to  defend  them 
from  the  stones  thrown  down  from  the  rampart, 
which  were  the  only  weapons  we  had.  At  last,  all 
tilings  going  against  us,  and  our  resistance  becoming 
every  moment  more  languid,  the  enemy  discovered  the 
defect  before  spoken  of  in  our  lines,  and  landing  their 
men  between  the  two  ramparts  where  the  line  of 
{ommunication  towards  the  sea  remained  unfinishedi 


136  CAESARS  COMMENTARIES. 

they  attacked  our  soldiers  in  the  rear,  and  obliged 
them  to  abandon  both  sides  of  the  works. 

54.  Marcellinus,  hearing  of  this  disorder,  detached 
some  cohorts  to  sustain  the  flying  troops ;  but  as  the 
rout  was  become  general,  they  could  neither  per¬ 
suade  them  to  rally,  nor  were  able  themselves  to 
withstand  the  enemy’s  charge.  The  like  happened 
to  a  second  detachment ;  insomuch  that  the  several 
supplies  sent,  by  catching  the  general  terror,  served 
only  to  add  to  the  confusion  and  danger ;  for  the 
multitude  of  runaways  rendered  the  retreat  the  more 
difficult.  In  this  action  the  eagle-bearer  of  the  ninth 
legion,  finding  himself  dangerously  wounded,  and 
that  his  strength  began  to  fail,  called  to  some  troop¬ 
ers  who  passed  by,  and  said,  “  I  have  preserved  to 
the  last  moment  of  my  life,  with  the  greatest  care, 
this  eagle,  with  which  I  have  been  intrusted ;  and, 
now  I  am  dying,  I  return  it  to  Caesar,  with  the  same 
fidelity.  Carry  it  to  him,  I  beseech  you ;  nor  suffer 
Caesar’s  arms  to  experience,  in  losing  it,  an  igno¬ 
miny  with  which  they  have  been  hitherto  unac¬ 
quainted.”  Thus  the  eagle  was  preserved ;  but  all 
the  centurions  of  the  first  cohort  were  slain,  except 
the  first  captain  of  the  Principes. 

55.  And  now  the  Pompeians,  having  made  great 
slaughter  of  our  men,  approached  the  quarters  of 
Marcellinus,  to  the  no  small  terror  of  the  rest  of  the 
cohorts;  when  Mark  Antony,  who  commanded  in 
the  nearest  redoubts,  on  notice  of  what  passed,  was 
seen  descending  from  the  higher  ground,  at  the  head 
of  twelve  cohorts.  His  arrival  put  a  stop  to  the 
enemy’s  progress,  and  by  enabling  our  men  to  re¬ 
cover  from  their  extreme  terror,  restored  them  to 
their  wonted  courage.  Soon  after  Caesar  arrived  in 
person  with  some  troops,  being  apprized  of  the  at¬ 
tack  by  the  smoke  of  the  forts,  the  usual  signal  on 
these  occasions ;  and  perceiving  the  loss  he  had  sus¬ 
tained,  and  that  Pompey  had  forced  the  lines,  being 
able  to  forage,  and  having  an  easy  communication 


CIVIL  AVAR. - BOOK  III. 


137 


with  the  sea,  he  quitted  his  former  project,  which 
liad  proved  unsuccessful,  and  encamped  as  near 
Pompey  as  he  could. 

56.  When  the  intrenchments  were  finished,  Caesar 
had  notice  from  his  scouts  that  a  certain  number  of 
the  enemy’s  cohorts,  which  to  them  appeared  a  com¬ 
plete  legion,  were  retired  behind  a  wood,  and  seemed 
to  be  on  their  march  to  the  old  camp.  The  situa¬ 
tion  of  the  two  armies  Avas  this  ;  some  days  before, 
when  Caesar’s  ninth  legion  was  sent  to  oppose  a 
body  of  Pompey’s  troops,  they  thought  proper  to 
intrench  themselves  on  an  opposite  hill,  and  form  a 
camp  there.  This  camp  bordered  on  a  wood,  and 
was  not  above  four  hundred  paces  from  the  sea: 
but  afterward,  for  certain  reasons,  Caesar  removed 
a  little  beyond  that  post ;  and  Pompey,  a  few  days 
after,  took  possession  of  it.  But  as  his  design  was 
to  place  several  legions  there, — leaving  the  inner 
rampart  standing,  he  surrounded  it  with  greater 
Avorks.  Thus  the  smaller  camp,  enclosed  within  one 
of  larger  circumference,  served  by  way  of  castle  or 
citadel.  He  likewise  carried  an  intrenchment  from 
the  left  angle  of  the  camp  to  the  river,  through  a 
space  of  about  four  hundred  paces,  which  enabled 
him  to  water  freely,  and  without  danger.  But  he 
too,  soon  after,  changed  his  mind,  for  reasons  which 
it  is  not  needful  to  repeat  here  ;  and  abandoned  the 
place,  which  thereby  was  left  several  days  without 
troops,  though  the  fortifications  remained  entire. 

^  Hither  the  scouts  reported  they  saw  the  standard 
of  a  legion  carried;  which  was  likewise  confirmed 
by  those  who  Avere  stationed  in  the  higher  forts. 
The  place  was  about  five  hundred  paces  distant  from 
Pompey’s  new  camp.  Caesar,  desirous  to  repair  the 
loss  he  had  sustained,  and  hoping  he  might  be  able 
to  surprise  this  legion,  left  two  cohorts  in  his  in¬ 
trenchments,  to  prevent  any  suspicion  of  his  design, 
and  with  thirty-three  more,  among  which  number 
was  the  ninth  legion,  which  had  lost  many  centu- 

M2 


138 


Caesar’s  commentaries. 


rions  and  soldiers,  marched  by  a  different  route,  as 
privately  as  he  could,  against  the  legion  which  Pom- 
pey  had  lodged  in  the  lesser  camp.  Neither  was  he 
deceived  in  his  first  conjecture  :  for  he  arrived  be¬ 
fore  Pompey  could  have  notice  of  his  design ;  and 
though  the  intrenchments  were  strong,  yet  charging 
the  enemy  briskly  with  his  left  wing,  where  he  him¬ 
self  commanded  in  person,  he  quickly  drove  them 
from  the  rampart.  But  as  the  gates  were  secured 
by  a  barricade,  they  still  maintained  the  fight  here 
for  some  time,  our  men  endeavouring  to  break  in, 
and  the  enemy  to  defend  the  camp.  T.  Pulcia,  who 
betrayed  the  army  of  C.  Antony,  as  we  have  related 
above,  gave  signal  proofs  of  his  valour  on  this  oc¬ 
casion.  But  our  men  at  last  prevailed  ;  and,  having 
cut  down  the  barricade,  broke  first  into  the  greater 
camp,  and  afterward  into  the  fort  within  it,  whither 
the  legion  had  retired,  some  of  whom  were  slain 
endeavouring  to  defend  themselves. 

57.  But  fortune,  whose  influence  is  very  great,  as 
in  other  things  so  particularly  in  war,  often  effects 
mighty  changes  from  the  most  trifling  causes,  as 
happened  on  this  occasion;  for  the  cohorts  of 
Caesar’s  right  wing,  being  unacquainted  with  the 
situation  of  the  camp,  and  mistaking  the  rampart 
which  led  to  the  river  for  one  of  its  sides,  marched 
on  that  way  in  quest  of  a  gate ;  but  perceiving  at 
length  their  error,  and  that  nobody  defended  the  in- 
trenchment,  they  immediately  mounted  the  rampart, 
and  were  followed  by  the  whole  cavalry.  This  de¬ 
lay  saved  the  enemy :  for  Pompey,  having  notice 
of  what  passed,  brought  up  the  fifth  legion  to  sustain 
his  party ;  so  that  at  one  and  the  same  instant  his 
cavalry  approached*ours,  and  his  troops  were  seen 
advancing  in  order  of  battle,  by  those  who  had  taken 
possession  of  the  camp ;  which  quickly  changed  the 
face  of  affairs  :  for  Pompey’s  legion,  encouraged  by 
the  hope  of  speedy  succours,  sallied  by  the  Decu¬ 
man  port,  and  briskly  charged  our  cohorts.  On  the 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


139 


other  hand,  Caesar’s  cavalry,  who  had  entered  by  a 
narrow  breach  in  the  rampart,  foreseeing  that  a  re¬ 
treat  would  be  extremely  difficult,  began  betimes  to 
think  of  flying.  The  right  wing,  which  had  no  com¬ 
munication  with  the  left,  observing  the  consterna¬ 
tion  of  the  cavalry,  and  fearing  they  should  be  over¬ 
powered  within  the  camp,  retired  the  same  way  they 
had  entered.  Many,  to  avoid  being  engaged  in  the 
narrow  passes,  threw  themselves  from  the  rampart, 
which  was  ten  feet  high,  into  the  ditch ;  where  the 
first  ranks  being  trodden  to  death,  their  bodies  af¬ 
forded  a  safe  passage  to  those  that  followed.  The 
left  wing,  who,  from  the  rampart  whence  they  had 
driven  the  enemy,  saw  Pompey  advancing  against 
them,  and  their  own  men  flying,  fearing  to  be  en¬ 
tangled  in  the  defiles,  as  they  had  the  enemy  on 
them,  both  within  and  without  the  camp,  retreated 
the  same  way  they  came.  Nothing  was  to  be  seen 
but  consternation,  flying,  and  disorder ;  insomuch 
that  all  CaBsar’s  efforts  to  rally  his  troops  were  fruit¬ 
less.  If  he  seized  any  by  the  arm,  they  struggled 
till  they  got  away.  If  he  laid  hold  of  the  colours, 
they  left  them  in  his  hands.  Not  a  man  could  be 
prevailed  on  to  face  about. 

58.  In  this  calamity,  what  saved  the  army  from 
entire  destruction  was,  that  Pompey,  apprehending 
an  ambuscade  (probably  because  the  success  was 
beyond  his  hopes,  as  a  little  before  he  had  seen  his 
men  worsted  and  put  to  flight),  durst  not,  for  some 
time,  approach  the  intrenchments ;  and  his  cavalry 
were  retarded  in  the  pursuit  by  Cagsar’s  troops,  who 
were  possessed  of  all  the  gates  and  defiles.  Be  that 
as  it  may,  a  small  matter  proved  of  very  great  con¬ 
sequence  to  both  parties  :  for  the  intrenchment 
between  the  camp  and  the  river  stopped  the  course 
of  Caesar’s  victory,  when  he  had  already  forced 
Pompey’s  lines ;  and  the  same,  by  retarding  the 
pursuit  of  the  enemy,  saved  his  army  from  de¬ 
struction. 


140 


CiESAR’s  COMMENTARIES. 


59.  In  these  two  actions  Caesar  lost  nine  hundred 
and  sixty  private  men,  thirty  officers,  and  several 
knig-hts  of  note,  as  Flavins  Tuticanus  Gallus,  a  sena¬ 
tor’s  son;  C.  Felginus,  of  Placentia  ;  A.  Gravius,  of 
Piiteoli ;  and  M.  Sacrativir,  of  Capua.  But  the 
greatest  part  of  these  died  without  wounds,  being 
trodden  to  death  in  the  ditch,  about  the  works,  and 
on  the  banks  of  the  river,  occasioned  by  the  flight 
and  terror  of  their  own  men.  He  lost  also  thirty- 
two  colours.  Pompey  was  saluted  emperor  on  this 
occasion;  a  title  which  he  bore  ever  after,  and 
suffered  himself  to  be  accosted  by :  but  neither  in  the 
letters  which  he  wrote,  nor  in  his  consular  ensigns, 
did  he  think  proper  to  assume  the  laurel.  The 
prisoners  were  delivered  up  to  Labienus  at  his  own 
request ;  and  this  deserter,  brutal  and  cruel  as  usual, 
diverted  himself  with  insulting  them  in  their  ca¬ 
lamity  ;  and  asked  them,  sarcastically,  if  it  was  usual 
for  veterans  to  run  away ;  after  which  he  caused 
them  all  to  be  put  to  death. 

60.  This  success  gave  such  confidence  and  spirit 
to  the  Pompeian  party,  that  they  now  no  longer  took 
any  concern  about  the  conduct  of  the  war,  but  began 
to  consider  themselves  as  already  victorious.  They 
never  reflected  on  the  inconsiderable  number  of  our 
troops,  the  disadvantage  of  the  ground,  the  narrow 
passes  we  were  engaged  in,  by  their  having  first 
possession  of  the  camp,  the  double  danger,  both 
within  and  without  the  fortifications,  and  the  separa¬ 
tion  of  the  two  wings  of  the  army,  which  hindered 
them  from  mutually  succouring  one  another.  They 
forgot  that  the  advantage  they  had  gained  was  not 
the  effect  of  a  brisk  and  vigorous  attack ;  and  that 
our  men  had  suffered  more  by  crowding  on  one 
another  in  the  narrow  passes  than  by  the  sword  of 
the  enemy.  In  fine,  they  never  called  to  mind  the 
uncertain  chance  of  war,  and  on  what  minute  causes 
good  or  bad  success  often  depends  ;  how  a  ground¬ 
less  suspicion,  a  panic  terror,  or  a  religious  scruple, 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


141 


have  frequently  been  productive  of  the  most  fatal 
events  ;  when,  either  by  the  misconduct  of  a  general, 
or  the  terror  of  a  tribune,  some  false  persuasion  has 
been  suffered  to  take  root  in  an  army.  But,  as  if 
the  victory  had  been  purely  the  effect  of  their  valour, 
and  no  change  of  fortune  was  to  be  apprehended, 
they  everywhere  proclaimed,  and  made  public,  the 
success  of  this  day. 

61.  Caesar,  seeing  all  his  former  projects  discon¬ 
certed,  resolved  to  submit  to  fortune,  and  entirely 
change  the  manner  of  the  war.  He  therefore  called 
in  all  his  forces  from  the  forts,  gave  up  the  design 
of  enclosing  Pompey,  and  having  assembled  his 
army,  addressed  them  as  follows  :  “  That  they  ought 
not  to  be  discouraged,  or  give  way  to  consternation, 
on  what  had  lately  happened,  but  oppose  their  many 
successful  engagements  to  one  slight  and  incon¬ 
siderable  check :  that  fortune  had  already  befriended 
them  greatly,  in  the  reduction  of  Italy  without  blood¬ 
shed  ;  in  the  conquest  of  the  two  Spains,  though  de¬ 
fended  by  warlike  troops,  under  the  conduct  of  skil¬ 
ful  and  experienced  leaders ;  and  in  the  subjection 
of  the  neighbouring  provinces,  whence  they  could 
be  plentifully  supplied  with  corn.  In  fine,  they 
ought  to  call  to  mind  how  happily  they  had  passed 
into  Greece,  through  the  midst  of  the  enemy’s  fleets, 
though  possessed  of  all  the  coasts  and  havens.  If 
they  were  not  successful  in  every  thing,  they  must 
endeavour,  by  prudence,  to  overcome  the  disappoint 
ments  of  Fortune  ;  and  attribute  their  late  disaster 
to  the  caprice  of  that  goddess,  rather  than  to  any 
fault  on  their  side.  That  he  had  led  them  to  an  ad¬ 
vantageous  ground,  and  put  them  in  the  possession 
of  the  enemy’s  camp,  after  driving  them  from  all 
their  works.  If  either  some  sudden  consternation, 
the  mistaking  their  way,  or  any  other  mishap  had 
snatched  an  apparent  and  almost  certain  victory  out 
of  their  hands,  they  ought  to  exert  their  utmost 
endeavours  to  repair  that  disgrace ;  which  would 


142 


C^SAR  S  COMMENTARIES. 


turn  their  misfortunes  to  a  benefit,  as  happened  at 
Gergovia ;  where  those  who  at  first  dreaded  to  en¬ 
counter  the  enemy  demanded  earnestly  in  the  end 
to  be  led  to  battle.”  Having  made  this  speech,  he 
contented  himself  with  stigmatizing,  and  reducing  to 
private  men,  some  of  the  standard-bearers  ;  for  the 
whole  army  were  so  grieved  at  their  loss,  and  so 
desirous  of  expunging  the  stain  their  glory  had  re¬ 
ceived,  that  there  was  no  occasion  either  for  the 
tribunes  or  the  centurions  to  remind  them  of  their 
duty ;  nay,  they  even  undertook  to  punish  them¬ 
selves  by  the  severest  impositions,  and  demanded 
with  great  outcries  to  be  led  against  the  enemy; 
being  seconded  by  some  centurions  of  the  first  rank, 
who,  touched  by  their  remonstrances,  were  for  con¬ 
tinuing  in  the  post  they  then  possessed,  and  putting 
all  to  the  hazard  of  a  battle.  But  Caesar  did  not 
think  it  prudent  to  expose  to  an  action  troops  that 
had  been  just  worsted,  and  in  whom  might  remain 
too  deep  impressions  of  their  late  fright.  He  was 
for  allowing  them  time  to  recover  themselves ;  and, 
having  quitted  his  works,  thought  it  needful  to  pro¬ 
vide  for  the  security  of  his  convoys. 

62.  Accordingly,  after  proper  care  taken  of  the 
sick  and  wounded,  and  as  soon  as  night  approached, 
he  sent  all  the  baggage  privately  towards  Apollonia, 
under  a  guard  of  one  legion,  with  orders  not  to  halt 
till  they  had  reached  the  place.  This  affair  des¬ 
patched,  he  made  two  legions  remain  in  the  camp, 
and  marching  out  all  the  rest,  about  three  in  the 
morning,  at  several  gates,  ordered  them  to  follow 
the  same  route  the  baggage  had  taken.  Soon  after, 
that  his  departure  might  not  have  the  appearance  of 
a  flight,  and  yet  be  known  to  the  enemy  as  late  as 
possible,  he  ordered  the  usual  signal  to  be  given, 
and  setting  out  with  the  rest  of  his  forces,  lost  sight 
of  the  camp  in  a  moment.  Pompey,  hearing  of  his 
retreat,  prepared  to  follow  him  without  delay  ;  and 
hoping  to  surprise  the  army  in  its  march,  while  en 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOR  III. 


143 


cumbered  with  baggage,  and  not  yet  removed  from 
its  consternation,  drew  out  all  his  troops,  and  sent  his 
cavalry  before  to  retard  our  rear  ;  which,  however, 
he  could  not  overtake,  because  Caesar,  marching 
without  baggage,  had  got  a  great  way  before  him. 
But  when  we  came  to  the  river  Genusus,  we  found 
the  banks  so  steep  and  difficult,  that  before  all  the 
men  could  get  over,  Pompey’s  cavalry  came  up,  and 
fell  on  our  hindmost  battalions.  Caesar  sent  his 
horse  to  oppose  them,  intermixed  with  some  light¬ 
armed  troops ;  who  charged  with  such  vigour  and 
success  as  to  put  them  all  to  rout,  leave  a  consid¬ 
erable  number  dead  on  the  field,  and  return  without 
loss  to  the  main  body  of  their  army. 

63.  Having  completed  the  intended  march  of  that 
day,  and  brought  his  army  over  the  Genusus,  he  took 
up  his  quarters  in  his  old  camp  at  Asparagium, 
suffering  none  of  the  soldiers  to  stroll  without  the 
rampart,  and  charging  the  cavalry,  who  had  been 
sent  out  under  pretence  of  foraging,  to  return  im¬ 
mediately  to  the  Decuman  port.  Pompey,  likewise, 
having  completed  that  day’s  march,  encamped  at  his 
old  post  at  Asparagium ;  where  the  troops  having 
nothing  to  do,  because  the  works  were  still  entire, 
some  made  long  excursions  in  quest  of  wood  and 
forage ;  others,  who  had  come  almost  without  any 
baggage,  by  reason  the  march  was  undertaken  on  a 
sudden,  enticed  by  the  nearness  of  their  former 
camp,  laid  down  their  arms  in  their  tents,  quitted  the 
intrenchments,  and  went  to  fetch  what  they  had  left 
behind  them.  This  rendering  them  unable  to  pur¬ 
sue,  as  Caesar  had  foreseen,  about  noon  he  gave  the 
signal  for  decamping,  led  forth  his  troops,  and 
doubling  that  day’s  march,  gained  eight  miles  on 
Pompey,  who  could  not  follow  him  by  reason  his 
troops  were  dispersed. 

64.  Next  day  Caesar  decamped  again  at  three  in 
the  morning ;  having  sent  away  his  baggage  over 
night,  that  if  he  should  find  liiraself  under  a  necessity 


144 


CiESAR’s  COMMENTARIES. 


of  fighting,  he  might  have  his  army  clear  of  all  en 
cumbrance.  The  same  he  did  the  following  days ; 
by  which  means,  though  he  had  very  difficult  ways 
to  pass,  and  some  great  rivers  to  cross,  he  suffered 
no  loss  during  the  whole  march :  for  Pompey,  after 
the  first  day’s  hinderance,  endeavouring  in  vain  by 
long  and  forced  marches  to  overtake  Caesar,  gave 
over  the  pursuit  on  the  fourth,  and  began  to  think 
of  taking  other  measures. 

65.  Caesar  was  under  a  necessity  of  going  to  Apol- 
Ionia,  to  leave  his  wounded  there,  to  pay  his  army, 
confirm  his  friends  in  their  duty,  and  garrison  the 
towns  that  had  submitted.  But  he  took  no  longer 
time  to  these  affairs  than  the  importance  of  his  other 
engagements  would  allow :  for,  fearing  that  Pompey 
might  surprise  Domitius  Calvinus,  he  put  himself  in 
full  march  to  join  him.  The  scheme  he  proceeded 
on  was  this  :  that  if  Pompey  took  the  same  route  he 
must  leave  the  sea,  the  forces  he  had  at  Dyrrha- 
chium,  with  all  his  ammunition  and  provision ;  which 
would  bring  them  on  equal  terms  :  if  he  passed  into 
Italy,  Caesar  purposed  to  join  Domitius,  and  march 
to  its  defence  by  the  coast  of  Illyricum;  in  fine, 
should  he  fall  on  Apollonia  and  Oricum,  and  en¬ 
deavour  to  exclude  him  from  the  seacoast — in  that 
case  he  reckoned  to  oblige  him,  by  attacking  Metellus 
Scipio,  to  leave  every  thing  to  succour  him.  Caesar 
therefore  despatched  couriers  to  Domitius,  to  ac¬ 
quaint  him  with  his  design ;  and  leaving  four  cohorts 
at  Apollonia,  one  at  Lissus,  and  three  at  Oricum, 
with  the  sick  and  wounded,  began  his  march  through 
Epirus  and  Acarnania.  Pompey,  on  his  side,  guess¬ 
ing  Caesar’s  design,  made  what  haste  he  could  to  join 
Scipio,  that,  if  Caesar  should  march  that  way,  he 
might  prevent  his  being  overpowered;  but  should 
he  still  keep  near  Corcyra  and  the  sea,  because  of 
the  legions  and  cavalry  he  expected  from  Italy,  in 
that  case  he  purposed  to  fall  on  Domitius  with  aU  his 
forces. 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


145 


66.  For  these  reasons  both  generals  studied  des¬ 
patch,  as  well  to  afford  timely  succour  to  their 
friends,  as  not  to  miss  an  opportunity  of  distressing 
their  enemies.  But  Caesar  had  turned  off  to  Apol- 
lonia ;  whereas  Pompey  took  the  nearest  way 
through  Candavia  for  Macedonia.  It  happened,  too, 
very  unfortunately,  that  Domitius,  who  for  several 
days  had  been  encamped  near  Scipio,  quitted  that 
station  for  the  convenience  of  provisions,  and  was 
on  his  march  to  Heraclea  Sentica,  a  city  of  the 
Candavians ;  so  that  chance  seemed  to  throw  him 
directly  in  Pompey’s  way,  which  Caesar  had  not 
then  the  least  knowledge  of.  Pompey  too,  having 
sent  letters  through  all  the  states  and  provinces,  re¬ 
lating  to  the  action  at  Dyrrhachium,  with  representa¬ 
tions  that  far  exceeded  the  truth ;  a  rumour  began 
to  prevail  that  Caesar  had  been  defeated  with  the 
loss  of  almost  all  his  forces,  and  was  forced  to  fly 
before  Pompey.  These  reports  raised  him  many 
enemies  on  his  march,  and  induced  some  states  to 
throw  off  their  allegiance  ;  whence  it  happened  that 
the  couriers  mutually  sent  by  Caesar  and  Domitius 
were  all  intercepted.  But  the  Allobrogians  in  the 
train  of  ^Egus  and  Roscillus,  who,  as  we  have  seen 
before,  had  deserted  from  Caesar  to  Pompey,  meet¬ 
ing  some  of  Domitius’s  scouts,  either  out  of  ancient 
custom,  because  they  had  served  together  in  the 
Gallic  wars,  or  from  a  motive  of  vainglory,  informed 
them  of  all  that  had  passed ;  of  Pompey’s  victory, 
and  Caesar’s  retreat.  Advice  being  given  of  this  to 
Calvinus,  who  was  not  above  four  hours’  march  from 
the  enemy,  he  avoided  the  danger  by  a  timely  re¬ 
treat,  and  joined  Caesar  near  .^Eginium,  a  town  on 
the  borders  of  Thessaly. 

67.  After  the  junction  of  the  two  armies,  Caesar 
arrived  at  Gomphi,  the  first  town  of  Thessaly,  as 
you  come  from  Epirus.  A  few  months  before,  the 
inhabitants  had  of  their  own  accord  sent  ambassa¬ 
dors  to  Caesar,  to  make  an  offer  of  what  their  coun- 

Cits.  VoL.  II. — N 


146 


Caesar’s  commentaries. 


try  afforded,  and  petition  for  a  garrison.  But  the 
report  of  the  action  at  Dyrrhachium,  with  many 
groundless  additions,  had  by  this  time  reached  their 
ears.  And  therefore  Androsthenes,  pretor  of  Thes¬ 
saly,  choosing  rather  to  be  the  companion  of  Pom- 
pey’s  good  fortune,  than  associate  with  Caesar  in 
adversity,  ordered  all  the  people,  whether  slaves  or 
free,  to  assemble  in  the  town :  and  having  shut  the 
gates  against  Caesar,  sent  letters  to  Scipio  and  Pom- 
pey  to  come  to  his  assistance,  intimating  “  that  the 
town  was  strong  enough  to  hold  out  if  they  used 
despatch,  but  by  no  means  in  condition  to  sustain  a 
long  siege.”  Scipio,  on  advice  of  the  departure  of 
the  armies  from  Dyrrhachium,  had  come  to  Larissa 
with  his  legions  ;  and  Pompey  was  yet  far  enough 
distant  from  Thessaly.  Caesar,  having  fortified  his 
camp,  ordered  mantelets,  hurdles,  and  scaling  lad¬ 
ders  to  be  prepared  for  a  sudden  attack  ;  and  then 
exhorting  his  men,  represented  “  of  how  great  con¬ 
sequence  it  was  to  render  themselves  masters  of  an 
opulent  city,  abounding  in  all  things  needful  for  the 
supply  of  their  wants,  and  by  the  terror  of  whose 
punishment  other  states  would  be  awed  into  submis¬ 
sion  ;  and  this,  he  told  them,  must  be  done  quickly, 
before  any  succours  could  arrive.”  Accordingly, 
seizing  the  opportunity  offered  by  the  uncommon 
ardour  of  the  troops,  he  attacked  the  town  the  same 
day  about  three  in  the  afternoon ;  and  having  made 
himself  master  of  it  before  sunset,  gave  it  up  to  be 
plundered.  From  Gomphi  Caesar  marched  directly 
to  Metropolis,  and  arrived  before  they  were  ac¬ 
quainted  with  the  misfortune  of  their  neighbours. 

68.  The  Metropolitans,  at  first  following  the  exam¬ 
ple  of  Gomphi,  to  which  they  were  moved  by  the 
same  reports,  shut  their  gates  and  manned  the  walls. 
But  no  sooner  came  they  to  understand  the  fate  of 
their  neighbour  city,  by  some  prisoners  whom  Caesar 
had  produced  for  that  end,  than  immediately  they 
admitted  him  into  the  town.  He  suffered  no  hostili- 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


147 


ties  to  be  committed,  nor  any  harm  to  be  done  them : 
and  so  powerful  was  the  example,  from  the  different 
treatment  of  these  two  cities,  that  not  a  single  state 
in  Thessaly  refused  to  submit  to  Caesar,  and  receive 
his  orders,  except  Larissa,  which  was  awed  by  the 
numerous  army  of  Metellus  Scipio.  As  the  country 
was  good,  and  covered  with  corn,  which  was  near 
ripe,  Caesar  took  up  his  quarters  there,  judging  it  a 
proper  place  to  wait  for  Pompey  in,  and  render  the 
theatre  of  the  war. 

69.  A  few  days  after  Pompey  arrived  in  Thessaly, 
and  joining  Metellus  Scipio,  harangued  both  armies. 
He  first  thanked  his  own  for  their  late  services,  and 
then  turning  to  Scipio’s  troops,  exhorted  them  to  put 
in  for  their  share  of  the  booty,  which  the  victory 
already  obtained  gave  them  the  fairest  prospect  of 
Both  armies  being  received  into  one  camp,  he  shared 
all  the  honours  of  command  with  Scipio,  ordered  a 
pavilion  to  be  erected  for  him,  and  the  trumpets  to 
sound  before  it.  This  increase  of  Pompey’s  forces, 
by  the  conjunction  of  two  mighty  armies,  raised  the 
confidence  of  his  followers,  and  their  assurance  of 
victory,  to  such  a  degree  that  all  delays  were  con¬ 
sidered  as  a  hinderance  of  their  return  to  Italy  ;  inso¬ 
much,  that  if  Pompey  on  any  occasion  acted  with 
slowness  and  circumspection,  they  failed  not  to  cry 
out  “  that  he  industriously  protracted  an  affair,  for 
the  despatch  of  which  one  day  was  sufficient,  in  the 
view  of  gratifying  his  ambition  for  command,  and 
having  consular  and  pretorian  senators  among  the 
number  of  his  servants.”  Already  they  began  to 
dispute  about  rewards  and  dignities,  and  fixed  on  the 
persons  who  were  annually  to  succeed  to  the  con¬ 
sulship.  Others  sued  for  the  houses  and  estates  of 
those  who  had  followed  Caesar’s  party.  A  warm  de¬ 
bate  arose  in  council  in  relation  to  L.  Hirrus,  whom 
Pompey  had  sent  against  the  Parthians,  whether,  in 
the  next  election  of  pretors,  he  should  be  allowed  to 
stand  candidate  for  that  office  in  his  absence  ;  his 


148 


CiESAR’s  COMMENTARIES. 


friends  imploring-  Pompey  to  make  good  the  promise 
he  had  made  him  at  his  departure,  and  not  to  suffer 
him  to  be  deceived  by  depending  on  the  general’s 
honour ;  while  such  as  aspired  to  this  office  com¬ 
plained  publicly  that  a  promise  should  be  made  to 
any  one  candidate,  when  all  were  embarked  in  the 
same  cause,  and  shared  the  like  dangers.  Already 
Domitius,  Scipio,  and  Lentulus  Spinther  were  openly 
quarrelling  about  the  high-priesthood,  which  Caesar 
was  in  possession  of.  They  even  descended  to  per¬ 
sonal  abuse,  and  pleaded  their  several  pretensions  ; 
Lentulus  urging  the  respect  due  to  his  age ;  Domi¬ 
tius,  his  dignity,  and  the  interest  he  had  in  the  city ; 
and  Scipio,  his  alliance  with  Pompey.  Attius  Rufus 
impeached  L.  Afranius  before  Pompey,  charging  him 
with  havihg  occasioned  the  loss  of  the  army  in 
Spain  :  and  L.  Domitius  moved  in  council,  that  after 
the  victory,  all  the  senators  in  Pompey’s  army  and 
camps  should  be  appoitited  judges,  and  empowered  to 
proceed  against  those  who  had  staid  in  Italy,  or 
who  had  appeared  cool,  or  shown  any  indifference  to 
the  cause  ;  and  that  three  billets  should  be  given  to 
these  judges,  one  for  acquittaiice,  another  for  con¬ 
demnation,  and  a  third  for  a  pecuniary  fine.  In 
a  word,  nothing  was  thought  on  but  honours,  or 
profit,  or  vengeance  ;  nor  did  they  consider  by  what 
methods  they  were  to  conquer,  but  what  advantage 
they  should  make  of  victory. 

70.  Caesar,  having  provided  for  the  subsistence  of 
his  troops,  who  were  now  no  longer  fatigued,  and 
had  sufficiently  recovered  from  the  consternation  the 
different  actions  at  Dyrrhachium  had  thrown  them 
into,  thought  it  high  time  to  make  trial  how  Pompey 
stood  affected  to  an  engagement.  Accordingly,  he 
drew  out  his  men,  and  formed  them  in  OTder  of  bat¬ 
tle  ;  at  first  near  his  own  camp,  and  somewhat  dis¬ 
tant  from  the  enemy:  but  perceiving  this  had  no 
effect  on  Pompey,  who  still  maintained  his  post  on 
the  eminences,  he  each  day  drew  nearer,  and  by  that 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  IH. 


149 


conduct  animated  and  gave  fresh  courage  to  his 
soldiers.  His  cavalry  being  much  inferior  to  the 
enemy’s  in  number,  he  followed  the  method  already 
mentioned,  of  singling  out  the  strongest  and  nimblest 
of  his  foot  soldiers,  and  accustoming  them  to  fight 
intermixed  with  the  horse  ;  in  which  way  of  combat 
they  were  become  very  expert  by  daily  practice. 
This  disposition,  joined  to  constant  exercise,  so  im- 
boldened  his  cavalry,  that  though  but  a  thousand  in 
number,  they  would  on  occasion  sustain  the  charge 
of  Pompey’s  seven  thousand,  even  in  an  open  plain, 
and  appear  not  greatly  dismayed  at  their  multitude ; 
nay,  they  actually  got  the  better  in  a  skirmish  that 
happened  between  them,  and  killed  JEgus  the  Allo- 
brogian,  one  of  the  two  brothers  who  deserted  to 
Pompey,  with  several  others  of  his  party. 

71.  Pompey,  whose  camp  was  on  an  eminence, 
drew  up  his  army  at  the  foot  of  the  mountain,  ex¬ 
pecting,  as  may  be  presumed,  that  Caesar  would  at¬ 
tack  him  in  that  advantageous  situation.  But  Caesar, 
despairing  to  draw  Pompey  to  battle  on  equal  terms, 
thought  it  would  be  his  best  course  to  decamp,  and 
be  always  on  the  march ;  in  hopes  that  by  frequent 
shifting  his  ground,  he  might  the  better  be  supplied 
with  provisions ;  and  that  as  the  enemy  would  not 
fail  following  him,  in  the  frequent  marches  he  should 
make,  he  might  perhaps  find  an  opportunity  of  attack¬ 
ing  them,  and  forcing  them  to  fight :  at  least  he  was 
sure  of  harassing  Pompey’s  army,  little  accustomed 
to  these  continued  fatigues.  Accordingly,  the  order 
for  marching  was  given,  and  the  tents  struck  ;  when 
Caesar  perceived  that  Pompey’s  army,  which  had 
quitted  their  intrenchments,  had  advanced  farther  to¬ 
wards  the  plain  than  usual,  so  that  he  might  engage 
them  at  a  less  disadvantage  :  whereon,  addressing 
himself  to  his  soldiers,  who  were  just  ready  to  march 
out  of  their  trenches,  “  Let  us  no  longer  think,”  said 
he,  “  of  marching ;  now  is  the  time  for  fighting,  so 
long  wished  for  ;  let  us  therefore  arm  ourselves  with 

N2 


150 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


courage,  and  not  miss  so  favourable  an  opportunity.” 
This  said,  he  immediately  drew  out  his  forces. 

72.  Pompey  likewise,  as  was  afterward  known, 
had  resolved  to  offer  battle,  in  compliance  with  the 
repeated  importunities  of  his  friends.  He  even  said 
in  a  council  of  war,  held  some  days  before,  that 
Caesar’s  army  would  be  defeated  before  the  infantry 
came  to  engage.  And  when  some  expressed  their 
surprise  at  this  speech,  “  I  know,”  said  he,  “  that 
what  I  promise  appears  almost  incredible  ;  but  hear 
the  reasons  on  which  I  ground  my  confidence,  that 
you  may  advance  to  battle  with  the  greater  assur¬ 
ance.  I  have  persuaded  the  cavalry,  and  obtained 
their  promise  for  the  performance,  that  as  soon  as  the 
armies  are  formed,  they  shall  fall  on  Caesar’s  right 
wing,  which  they  will  easily  be  able  to  outflank  and 
surround.  This  must  infallibly  occasion  the  imme¬ 
diate  rout  of  that  wing,  and  consequently  of  the  rest 
of  Caesar’s  troops,  without  danger  or  loss  on  our  side. 
Nor  will  the  execution  be  attended  with  any  diffi¬ 
culty,  as  we  are  so  much  superior  to  them  in  horse. 
Be  ready  therefore  for  battle  ;  and  since  the  so  much 
desired  opportunity  of  fighting  is  come,  take  care 
not  to  fall  short  of  the  good  opinion  the  world  en¬ 
tertains  of  your  valour  and  experience.”  Labienus 
spoke  next,  highly  applauding  this  scheme  of  Pom¬ 
pey,  and  expressing  the  greatest  contempt  of  Caesar’s 
army ;  “  Think  not,”  says  he,  “  addressing  himself 
to  Pompey,  that  these  are  the  legions  which  con¬ 
quered  Gaul  and  Germany.  1  was  present  in  all 
those  battles,  and  can,  of  my  own  knowledge,  affirm, 
that  but  a  very  small  part  of  that  army  now  re¬ 
mains  :  great  numbers  have  been  killed,  as  must  of 
necessity  happen  in  such  a  variety  of  conflicts ; 
many  perished  during  the  autumnal  pestilence  in 
Apulia ;  many  are  returned  to  their  own  habitations, 
and  not  a  few  were  left  behind  to  guard  Italy.  Have 
you  not  heard  that  the  cohorts  in  garrison  at  Brun- 
dusium  are  made  up  of  invalids  1  The  forces  which 


CIVIL  WAR. — BOOK  III. 


151 


you  now  behold  are  composed  of  new  levies,  raised 
in  Lombardy  and  the  colonies  beyond  the  Po ;  for 
the  veterans,  in  whom  consisted  the  main  strength 
of  the  army,  perished  all  in  the  two  defeats  at  Dyr- 
rhachium.”  Having  finished  this  speech,  he  took  an 
oath,  which  he  proffered  to  all  that  were  present, 
never  to  return  to  camp  otherwise  than  victori¬ 
ous.  Pompey  commended  his  zeal,  took  the  oath 
himself,  and  the  rest  followed  his  example,  without 
hesitation.  After  these  engagements,  taken  publicly 
in  council,  they  all  departed.  Ml  of  joy  and  expecta¬ 
tion  ;  considering  themselves  as  already  victorious, 
and  relying  entirely  on  the  ability  of  their  general ; 
who,  in  an  affair  of  that  importance,  they  were  con¬ 
fident  would  promise  nothing  without  an  assurance 
of  success. 

73.  When  Caesar  approached  Pompey’s  camp,  he 
found  his  army  drawn  up  in  this  manner :  in  the  left 
wing  were  the  two  legions  delivered  by  Caesar,  at 
the  beginning  of  the  quarrel,  in  consequence  of  a 
decree  of  the  senate :  one  of  which  was  called  the 
first,  the  other  the  third  legion ;  and  here  Pompey 
commanded  in  person.  Scipio  was  in  the  centre, 
with  the  legions  he  had  brought  out  of  Syria.  The 
Cilician  legion,  joined  to  the  Spanish  cohorts,  brought 
over  by  Afranius,  formed  the  right  wing.  These 
Pompey  esteemed  his  best  troops,  distributing  the 
less  expert  between  the  wings  and  the  main  body. 
He  had  in  all  a  hundred  and  ten  cohorts,  amounting 
to  five-and-forty  thousand ;  besides  two  cohorts  of 
volunteers,  who  had  served  under  him  in  former 
wars  ;  and  who,  out  of  affection  to  their  old  general, 
though  their  legal  time  was  expired,  flocked  to  his 
standard  on  this  occasion,  and  were  dispersed  among 
the  whole  army.  His  other  seven  cohorts  were  left 
to  guard  the  camp  and  the  adjoining  forts.  As  the 
Enipeus,  a  river  with  very  steep  banks,  covered  his 
right  wing,  he  placed  all  his  horse,  slingers,  and 
archers  in  the  left. 

74.  Caesar,  observing  his  ancient  custom,  placed 


152 


cjdsar’s  commentaries. 


the  tenth  legion  in  the  right,  and  the  ninth  in  the 
left  wing.  As  this  last  had  been  considerably  weak¬ 
ened  by  the  several  actions  at  Dyrrhachium,  he 
joined  the  eighth  to  it  in  such  manner  that  they 
formed,  as  it  were,  but  one  legion,  and  had  orders 
mutually  to  relieve  each  other.  His  whole  army 
amounted  to  fourscore  cohorts,  making  in  all  twenty- 
two  thousand  men;  besides  two  cohorts  left  to 
guard  the  camp.  Domitius  Calvinus  was  in  the 
centre,  Mark  Antony  on  the  left,  and  P.  Sylla  on 
the  right.  Caesar  took  his  post  opposite  to  Pom- 
pey,  at  the  head  of  the  tenth  legion.  And  as  he 
had  observed  the  disposition  of  the  enemy  con¬ 
trived  to  outflank  his  right  wing,  to  obviate  that 
inconvenience  he  made  a  draught  of  six  cohorts 
from  his  rear  line,  formed  them  into  a  separate 
body,  and  opposed  them  to  Pompey’s  horse ;  in¬ 
structing  them  in  the  part  they  were  to  act,  and 
admonishing  them  that  the  success  of  that  day 
would  depend  chiefly  on  their  courage.  At  the 
same  time,  he  charged  the  whole  army,  and  in  par¬ 
ticular  the  third  line,  not  to  advance  to  battle  with¬ 
out  orders  ;  which,  when  he  saw  it  proper,  he  would 
give,  by  making  the  usual  signal. 

75.  When  he  was  exhorting  them  to  battle,  as 
military  custom  required,  and  reminding  them  of  the 
many  favours  they  had,  on  all  occasions,  received  at 
his  hands,  he  chiefly  took  care  to  observe,  “  that 
they  had  themselves  been  witnesses  of  his  earnest 
endeavours  after  peace  ;  that  he  had  employed  Va- 
tinius  to  solicit  a  conference  with  Labienus,  and  sent 
A.  Clodius  to  treat  with  Scipio  ;  that  he  had  pressed 
Libo,  in  the  warmest  manner,  at  Oricum,  to  grant  him 
a  safe-conduct  for  his  ambassadors :  in  a  word,  that 
he  had  left  nothing  unattempted  to  avoid  wasting  the 
blood  of  his  soldiers,  and  to  spare  the  commonwealth 
the  loss  of  one  of  her  armies.”  After  this  speech, 
observing  his  soldiers  ardent  for  the  fight,  he  ordered 
the  trumpets  to  sound  a  charge.  Among  the  volun¬ 
teers  in  Ceesar’s  army  was  one  Crastinus,  a  man  of 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


153 


distinguished  courage,  who,  the  year  before,  had 
been  first  centurion  of  the  tenth  legion.  This  brave 
officer,  as  soon  as  the  signal  was  given,  calling  to 
those  next  him,  “  Follow  me,”  said  he,  “  you  that 
were  formerly  under  my  command,  and  acquit  your¬ 
selves  of  the  duty  you  owe  to  your  general.  This 
one  battle  more  will  crown  the  work,  by  restoring 
him  to  his  proper  dignity,  and  us  to  the  enjoyment 
of  our  freedom.”  At  the  same  time,  turning  to 
Caesar,  “  General,”  said  he,  “  this  day  you  shall  be 
satisfied  with  my  behaviour,  and,  whether  I  live  or 
die,  I  will  take  care  to  deserve  your  commenda¬ 
tions.”  So  saying,  he  marched  up  to  the  enemy, 
and  began  the  attack  at  the  head  of  a  hundred  and 
twenty  volunteers. 

76.  Between  the  two  armies  there  was  an  inter¬ 
val  sufficient  for  the  onset :  but  Pompey  had  given 
his  troops  orders  to  keep  their  ground,  that  Caesar’s 
army  might  have  all  that  way  to  come.  This  he  is 
said  to  have  done  by  the  advice  of  C.  Triarius,  that 
the  enemy’s  ranks  might  be  broken,  and  themselves 
put  out  of  breath,  by  having  so  far  to  run ;  of  which 
disorder  he  hoped  to  make  an  advantage.  He  was 
besides  of  opinion  that  our  javelins  would  have  less 
effect,  by  the  troops  continuing  in  their  post,  than  if 
they  sprang  forward  at  the  very  time  they  were 
launched ;  and  as  the  soldiers  would  have  twice  as 
far  to  run  as  usual,  they  must  be  weary  and  breath¬ 
less  by  the  time  they  came  up  with  the  first  line. 
But  herein  Pompey  seems  to  have  acted  without 
sufficient  reason ;  because  there  is  a  certain  alacrity 
and  ardour  of  mind  naturally  planted  in  every  man, 
which  is  inflamed  by  the  desire  of  fighting;  and 
which  an  able  general,  far  from  endeavouring  to  re¬ 
press,  will,  by  all  the  methods  he  can  devise,  foment 
and  cherish.  Nor  was  it  a  vain  institution  of  our 
ancestors,  that  the  trumpets  should  sound  on  every 
side,  and  the  whole  army  raise  a  shout,  in  order  to 
animate  the  courage  of  their  own  men,  and  strike 


154 


C.ESAR  S  COMMENTARIES. 


terror  nto  the  enemy.  Caesar’s  soldiers  entirely  de¬ 
feated  Pompey’s  hopes  by  their  good  discipline  and 
experience ;  for,  perceiving  the  enemy  did  not  stir, 
they  halted,  of  their  own  accord,  in  the  midst  of  their 
career ;  and  having  taken  a  moment’s  breath,  put 
themselves  a  second  time  in  motion,  marched  up  in 
good  order,  flung  their  javelins,  and  then  betook 
themselves  to  their  swords.  Nor  did  Pompey’s  men 
act  with  less  presence  of  mind ;  for  they  sustained 
our  attack,  kept  their  ranks,  bore  the  discharge  of 
our  darts  ;  and  having  launched  their  own,  imme¬ 
diately  had  recourse  to  their  swords.  At  this  instant, 
Pompey’s  horse,  accompanied  by  the  archers  and 
slingers,  attacked  Caesar’s ;  and  having  compelled 
them  to  give  ground,  began  to  extend  themselves  to 
the  left,  in  order  to  flank  the  infantrj\  Whereon 
Caesar  gave  the  appointed  signal  to  the  six  cohorts, 
who  fell  on  the  enemy’s  horse  with  such  fury,  that 
they  not  only  drove  them  from  the  field  of  battle, 
but  even  compelled  them  to  seek  refuge  in  the  high¬ 
est  mountains.  The  archers  and  slingers,  deprived 
of  their  protection,  were  soon  after  cut  to  pieces. 
Meanwhile  the  six  cohorts,  not  content  with  this 
success,  wheeled  round  on  the  enemy’s  left  wing, 
and  began  to  charge  it  in  the  rear  :  whereon  Caesar, 
perceiving  the  victory  so  far  advanced,  to  complete 
it,  brought  up  his  third  line,  which  till  then  had  not 
engaged.  Pompey’s  infantry,  being  thus  doubly  at¬ 
tacked,  in  front  by  fresh  troops,  and  in  rear  by  the 
victorious  cohorts,  could  no  longer  resist,  but  fled  to 
their  camp.  Nor  was  Caesar  mistaken  in  his  con¬ 
jecture  when,  in  exhorting  his  men,  he  declared  that 
victory  would  depend  chiefly  on  the  six  cohorts 
which  formed  the  body  of  reserve,  and  were  sta¬ 
tioned  to  oppose  the  enemy’s  horse  ;  for  by  them 
\Vere  their  cavalry  defeated,  their  archers  and  sling¬ 
ers  cut  to  pieces,  and  their  left  wing  surrounded  and 
forced  to  fly. 

77.  Pompey,  seeing  his  cavalry  routed,  and  that 


CIVIL  WAR. — BOOK  III. 


155 


part  of  the  army  on  which  he  chiefly  depended  put 
into  disorder,  despaired  of  being  able  to  restore  the 
battle,  and  quitted  the  field.  Repairing  immediately 
to  his  camp,  he  said  aloud  to  the  centurions  who 
guarded  the  pretorian  gate,  so  as  all  the  soldiers 
might  hear  him,  “  Take  care  of  the  camp,  and  defend 
it  vigorously  in  case  of  an  attack.  I  go  to  visit  the 
other  gates,  and  give  orders  for  their  defence.” 
This  said,  he  retired  to  his  tent,  despairing  of  suc¬ 
cess,  yet  waiting  the  event.  Caesar,  having  forced 
the  Pompeians  to  seek  refuge  in  their  camp,  and  not 
willing  to  allow  them  time  to  recover  from  their 
consternation,  exhorted  his  troops  to  make  the  best 
of  their  present  victory,  and  vigorously  attack  the 
enemy’s  intrenchments.  Though  the  battle  had 
lasted  till  noon,  the  weather  being  extremely  hot, 
yet,  prepared  to  encounter  all  difficulties,  they  cheer¬ 
fully  complied  with  his  orders.  The  camp  was 
bravely  defended  for  some  time  by  the  cohorts  left 
to  guard  it,  and  particularly  by  a  great  number  of 
Thracians,  and  other  barbarians,  who  made  a  very 
stout  resistance  :  for  as  to  such  troops  as  had  there 
sought  refuge  from  the  field  of  battle,  they  were  to 
too  great  a  consternation  to  think  of  anything  more 
than  a  safe  retreat.  It  was  not  however  possible 
for  the  troops  posted  on  the  rampart  long  to  stand 
the  multitude  of  darts  continually  poured  on  them  ; 
which,  in  the  end,  obliged  them  to  retire  covered 
with  wounds,  and  under  the  conduct  of  their  tribunes 
and  centurions  seek  shelter  in  the  mountains  adjoin¬ 
ing  to  the  camp. 

78.  On  entering  Pompey’s  camp  we  found  tables 
ready  covered,  sideboards  loaded  with  plate,  and 
tents  adorned  with  branches  of  myrtle ;  that  of  L, 
Lentulus,  with  some  others,  was  shaded  with  ivy. 
Every  thing  gave  proofs  of  the  highest  luxury,  and 
an  assured  expectation  of  victory ;  whence  it  was 
easy  to  see  that  they  little  dreamed  of  the  issue  of 
that  day,  since,  intent  only  on  voluptuous  refine- 


156 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


ments,  they  pretended  with  troops  immersed  in 
luxury  to  oppose  Caesar’s  army,  accustomed  to  fa¬ 
tigue,  and  inured  to  the  want  of  necessaries. 

79.  Pompey,  finding  our  men  had  forced  his  in- 
trenchments,  mounted  his  horse,  quitted  his  armour 
for  a  habit  more  suitable  to  his  ill  fortune,  and  with¬ 
drawing  by  the  Decuman  port,  rode  full  speed  to 
Larissa.  Nor  did  he  stop  there  ;  but  continuing  his 
flight,  day  and  night  without  intermission,  he  arrived 
at  the  seaside,  with  thirty  horse,  and  went  on  board 
a  little  bark  ;  often  complaining,  “  that  he  had  been 
so  far  deceived  in  the  opinion  of  his  followers,  as  to 
see  those  very  men  from  whom  he  expected  victory 
the  first  to  fly,  and  in  a  manner  betray  him  into  the 
hands  of  his  enemies.” 

80.  Caesar,  having  mastered  the  enemy’s  camp,  re¬ 
quested  his  soldiers  not  to  leave  the  victory  imper¬ 
fect,  by  busying  themselves  about  the  plunder.  Find¬ 
ing  them  ready  to  obey,  he  began  a  line  of  circum- 
vallation  round  the  mountain.  The  Pompeians 
quickly  abandoned  a  post  which,  for  want  of  water, 
was  not  tenable,  and  endeavoured  to  reach  the  city 
of  Larissa :  whereon  Caesar,  dividing  his  army,  left 
one  part  in  Pompey’s  camp,  sent  back  another  to 
his  own  camp,  and  having  with  four  legions  taken  a 
nearer  road  than  that  by  which  the  enemy  passed, 
he  found  means  to  intercept  them,  and,  after  six 
miles’  march,  drew  up  in  order  of  battle.  But  the 
Pompeians  once  more  found  protection  from  a  moun¬ 
tain,  at  the  foot  of  which  ran  a  rivulet.  Though 
Caesar’s  troops  were  greatly  fatigued  by  fighting 
the  whole  day,  before  night  he  had  flung  up  some 
works,  sufficient  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  having 
any  communication  with  the  rivulet.  As  by  this 
step  they  were  cut  off  from  all  hopes  of  relief,  or 
of  escaping,  they  sent  deputies  to  treat  about  a  sur¬ 
render.  Affairs  continued  in  this  situation  all  that 
night,  of  which  some  few  senators,  who  had  ac¬ 
companied  them,  took  the  advantage  to  make  their 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


157 


escape.  At  break  of  day  they  all,  by  Caesar’s  order, 
came  down  into  the  plain,  and  delivered  up  their 
arms ;  humbly  imploring  his  goodness,  and  suing  for 
mercy.  Caesar  spoke  to  them  with  great  mildness, 
and  to  alleviate  their  apprehensions,  cited  various  in¬ 
stances  of  his  clemency,  which  he  had,  on  so  many 
occasions,  made  evident.  In  fact,  he  gave  them 
their  lives,  and  forbade  his  soldiers  to  offer  them 
any  violence,  or  to  take  any  thing  from  them.  He 
then  sent  for  the  legions  which  had  passed  the 
night  in  camp,  to  relieve  those  that  had  accompanied 
him  in  the  pursuit ;  and  being  determined  to  follow 
Pompey,  began  his  march,  and  arrived  the  same  day 
at  Larissa. 

81.  This  battle  cost  Caesar  no  more  than  two 
hundred  soldiers ;  but  he  lost  thirty  centurions,  men 
of  singular  courage.  Among  these  latter  was  Cras- 
tinus,  whose  gallantry  and  intrepidity,  in  marching 
up  to  battle,  has  been  taken  notice  of.  This  brave 
officer,  fighting,  regardless  of  danger,  received  a 
wound  in  the  mouth  from  a  sword.  Nor  was  he 
deceived  in  promising  himself  Caesar’s  approbation, 
who  was  thoroughly  sensible  of  his  merit,  and 
greatly  applauded  his  behaviour  in  this  action.  On 
Pompey’s  side  there  fell  about  fifteen  thousand  :  but 
upwards  of  four-and-twenty  thousand  were  taken 
prisoners  :  for  the  cohorts  that  guarded  the  forts 
surrendered  to  Sylla;  though  many  escaped  into 
the  adjacent  countries.  One  hundred  and  eighty 
colours  were  taken,  and  nine  eagles.  L.  Domitius, 
flying  towards  the  mountains,  and  growing  faint 
through  the  fatigue,  was  overtaken  and  killed  by 
some  horsemen. 

82.  About  this  time  D.  Laelius  arrived  with  his 
fleet  at  Brundusium,  and  possessed  himself  of  the 
island  over-against  the  harbour,  as  Libo  had  done 
before.  Vatinius,  who  commanded  in  the  place, 
having  equipped  several  boats,  endeavoured  to  entice 
some  of  Laelius’s  ships  within  the  haven,  and  took  a 

C^s.  VoL.  II. — O 


158 


CiESAR’s  COMMENTARIES. 


five-benched  galley,  with  two  smaller  vessels,  that 
had  ventured  too  far  into  the  port ;  then  disposing 
his  cavalry  along  the  shore,  he  prevented  the  enemy 
from  getting  fresh  water.  But  Laelius,  having  chosen 
a  more  convenient  season  of  the  year  for  sailing, 
brought  water  in  transports  from  Corcyra  and  Dyr- 
rhachium ;  still  keeping  to  his  purpose,  from  which 
neither  the  disgrace  of  losing  his  ships  nor  the  want 
of  necessaries  could  divert  him,  till  he  received  in¬ 
telligence  of  the  battle  of  Pharsalia. 

83.  Much  about  the  same  time  Cassius  arrived  in 
Sicily,  with  the  Syrian,  Phenician,  and  Cilician 
fleets.  And  as  Caesar’s  fleet  was  divided  into  two 
parts,  in  one  of  which  P.  Sulpicius  the  pretor  com¬ 
manded  at  Vibo,  in  the  straits ;  in  the  other  M. 
Pomponius  at  Messana :  Cassius  had  arrived  at 
Messana  with  his  fleet  before  Pomponius  had  notice 
of  his  coming :  and  finding  him  unprepared,  without 
guards,  order,  or  discipline,  he  took  the  opportunity 
of  a  favourable  wind,  and  sent  several  fireships 
against  him,  which  consumed  his  whole  fleet,  thirty- 
five  in  number,  twenty  of  which  were  decked.  The 
terror  occasioned  by  this  blow  was  so  great,  that 
though  there  was  an  entire  legion  in  garrison  at 
Messana,  they  durst  scarce  look  the  enemy  in  the 
face ;  and  would  doubtless  have  delivered  up  the 
town,  had  not  the  news  of  Caesar’s  victory  reached 
them,  by  means  of  the  cavalry  stationed  along  the 
coast.  Cassius  then  sailed  for  Sulpicius’s  fleet  at 
Vibo,  which  finding  at  anchor  near  the  shore,  by 
reason  the  consternation  had  become  general  over 
the  whole  island,  he  put  the  same  stratagem  in 
practice  as  before :  for  taking  the  advantage  of  a  fa¬ 
vourable  wind,  he  made  forty  fireships  advance 
against  them,  and  the  flame  catching  hold  on  both 
sides,  quickly  reduced  five  galleys  to  ashes.  The 
conflagration,  continuing  to  spread,  roused  the  in¬ 
dignation  of  some  veteran  soldiers,  who  had  been 
left  to  guard  the  ships.  Accordingly  they  went  on 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


159 


board,  weighed  anchor,  and  attacking  the  enemy, 
took  two  quinqueremes,  in  one  of  which  was  Cassius 
himself ;  but  he  escaped  in  a  boat.  Two  three- 
benched  galleys  were  sunk  ;  and  soon  after  he  was 
informed  of  the  defeat  at  Pharsalia,  by  some  of 
Pompey’s  own  followers ;  for  hitherto  he  had  re¬ 
garded  it  as  a  false  report,  spread  about  by  Caesar’s 
lieutenants  and  friends.  On  this  intelligence  he 
quitted  Sicily,  and  retired  with  his  fleet. 

84.  Caesar,  laying  all  other  thoughts  aside,  deter¬ 
mined  to  pursue  Pompey,  whithersoever  he  should 
retire,  to  prevent  his  drawing  together  fresh  forces, 
and  renewing  the  war.  He  marched  every  day  as 
far  as  the  body  of  cavalry  he  had  with  him  could 
hold  out,  and  was  followed,  by  shorter  marches,  by 
a  single  legion.  Pompey  had  issued  a  proclamation 
at  Amphipolis,  enjoining  all  the  youth  of  the  prov¬ 
ince,  whether  Greeks  or  Romans,  to  join  him  in 
arms.  But  whether  this  was  with  intent  to  con¬ 
ceal  his  real  design  of  retreating  much  farther,  or 
to  try  to  maintain  his  ground  in  Macedonia,  if  no¬ 
body  pursued  him,  is  hard  to  determine.  Here  he 
lay  one  night  at  anchor,  sending  to  what  friends  he 
had  in  the  town,  and  raising  all  the  money  he  pos¬ 
sibly  could.  But  being  informed  of  Cassar’s  ap¬ 
proach,  he  departed  with  all  expedition,  and  came 
in  a  few  days  to  Mitylene.  Here  he  was  detained 
two  days  by  the  badness  of  the  weather ;  and  having 
increased  his  fleet  with  a  few  galleys,  sailed  to 
Cilicia,  and  thence  to  Cyprus.  There  he  was  in¬ 
formed  that  the  Antiochians,  and  Roman  citizens 
trading  thither,  had  with  joint  consent  seized  the 
castle,  and  sent  deputies  to  such  of  his  followers  as 
had  taken  refuge  in  the  neighbouring  states,  not  to 
come  near  Antioch  at  their  peril.  The  same  had 
happened  at  Rhodes  to  L.  Lentulus  the  consul  of 
the  foregoing  year,  to  P.  Lentulus,  a  consular  sen¬ 
ator,  and  to  some  other  persons  of  distinction ;  who, 
following  Pompey  in  his  flight,  and  arriving  at  that 


160 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


island,  were  refused  admittance  into  the  town  and 
harbour,  and  received  an  order  to  withdraw  immedi¬ 
ately,  which  they  were  necessitated  to  comply  with ; 
for  the  fame  of  Caesar’s  approach  had  now  reached 
the  neighbouring  states. 

85.  On  this  intelligence  Pompey  laid  aside  his  de¬ 
sign  of  going  into  Syria,  seized  all  the  money  he 
found  in  the  public  bank,  borrowed  as  much  more  as 
he  could  of  his  friends,  sent  great  quantities  of  brass 
on  board  for  military  uses,  and  having  raised  two 
thousand  soldiers  among  the  public  officers,  mer¬ 
chants,  and  his  own  servants,  sailed  for  Pelusium. 
Here,  by  accident,  was  King  Ptolemy,  a  minor, 
warring  with  a  great  army  against  his  sister  Cleo¬ 
patra  ;  whom,  some  months  before,  by  the  assistance 
of  his  friends,  he  had  expelled  the  kingdom,  and 
was  then  encamped  not  far  distant  from  her.  Pom¬ 
pey  sent  to  demand  his  protection,  and  a  safe  re¬ 
treat  into  Alexandria,  in  consideration  of  the  friend¬ 
ship  that  had  subsisted  between  him  and  his  father. 
The  messengers,  after  discharging  their  commission, 
began  to  converse  freely  with  the  king’s  troops, 
exhorting  them  to  assist  Pompey,  and  not  despise 
him  in  his  adverse  fortune.  Among  these  troops 
were  many  of  Pompey’s  old  soldiers,  whom  Gabi- 
nius,  having  draughted  out  of  the  Syrian  army,  had 
carried  to  Alexandria,  and  on  the  conclusion  of  the 
war  left  there  with  the  young  king’s  father.  The 
king’s  ministers,  who  had  the  care  of  the  govern¬ 
ment  during  his  minority,  being  informed  of  this, 
either  out  of  fear,  as  they  afterward  pretended,  lest 
Pompey  should  debauch  the  army,  and  thereby 
render  himself  master  of  Alexandria  and  Egypt,  or 
despising  his  low  condition  (as  friends  in  bad  for¬ 
tune  often  turn  enemies),  spoke  favourably  to  the 
deputies  in  public,  and  invited  Pompey  to  the  court; 
but  privately  despatched  Achillas,  captain  of  the 
king’s  guards,  a  man  of  singular  boldness,  and  L. 
Septimius,  a  military  tribune,  with  orders  to  murder 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


161 


him.  They  accosted  him  with  an  air  of  frankness, 
especially  Septimius,  who  had  served  under  him  as  a 
centurion  in  the  war  with  the  pirates  ;  and,  inviting 
him  into  the  boat,  treacherously  slew  him.  L.  Len- 
tulus  was  likewise  seized  by  the  king’s  command, 
and  put  to  death  in  prison. 

86.  When  Caesar  arrived  in  Asia,  he  found  that 
T.  Ampins,  having  formed  the  design  of  seizing  the 
treasures  of  the  Ephesian  Diana,  and  summoned  all 
the  senators  in  the  province  to  bear  witness  to  the 
sum  taken,  had  quitted  that  project  on  Caesar’s  ap¬ 
proach,  and  betaken  himself  to  flight.  Thus  was 
the  temple  of  Ephesus  a  second  time  saved  from 
plunder  by  Caesar.  It  was  remarked  in  the  temple 
of  Minerva  at  Elis,  that  the  very  day  Caesar  gained 
the  battle  of  Pharsalia,  the  image  of  victory,  which 
before  stood  fronting  the  statue  of  the  goddess, 
turned  towards  the  portal  of  the  temple.  The  same 
day,  at  Antioch,  in  Syria,  such  a  noise  of  fighting 
and  trumpets  was  ueard  two  several  times,  that  the 
inhabitants  ran  to  arms,  and  manned  their  walls. 
The  like  happened  at  Ptolemais.  At  Pergamus,  in  the 
inner  recesses  of  the  temple,  called  by  the  Greeks 
Adyta,  where  none  but  priests  are  allowed  to  enter, 
the  sound  of  cymbals  was  heard :  and  in  the  temple 
of  Victory  at  Trallis,  where  a  statue  was  conse¬ 
crated  to  Caesar,  a  palm  sprouted  between  the  join¬ 
ing  of  the  stones  that  arched  the  roof. 

87.  Caesar,  after  a  short  stay  in  Asia,  hearing  that 
Pompey  had  been  seen  at  Cyprus,  and  thence  con¬ 
jecturing  that  he  was  gone  for  Egypt,  because  of  the 
interest  he  had  in  that  kingdom,  and  the  advantages 
it  would  afford  him,  left  Rhodes,  with  a  convoy  of 
ten  Rhodian  galleys,  and  a  few  others  from  Asia, 
having  on  board  two  legions,  one  of  which  he  had 
ordered  to  follow  him  from  Thessaly,  the  other  de¬ 
tached  from  Fufius’s  army  in  Achaia,  and  eight  hun¬ 
dred  horse.  In  these  legions  were  no  more  than 
three  thousand  two  hundred  men :  the  rest,  fatigued 

02 


162 


Cesar’s  commentaries. 


with  the  length  of  the  march,  or  weakened  with 
wounds,  had  not  been  able  to  follow  him.  But 
Caesar,  depending  on  the  reputation  of  his  former 
exploits,  scrupled  not  to  trust  the  safety  of  his  per¬ 
son  to  a  feeble  escort,  believing  no  place  would 
dare  to  attempt  any  thing  against  him.  At  Alex¬ 
andria  he  was  informed  of  Pompey’s  death;  and, 
on  landing,  was  accosted  in  a  clamorous  manner  by 
the  soldiers  whom  Ptolemy  had  left  to  garrison  the 
city :  and  he  observed  that  the  mob  appeared  dis¬ 
satisfied  to  see  the  fasces  carried  before  him,  which 
they  interpreted  a  degradation  of  the  sovereign 
authority.  Though  this  tumult  was  appeased,  yet 
each  day  produced  some  fresh  disturbance,  and 
many  of  the  Roman  soldiers  were  murdered  in  all 
parts  of  the  city. 

88.  For  these  reasons,  he  sent  into  Asia  for  some 
of  the  legions  which  he  had  raised  out  of  the  re¬ 
mains  of  Pompey’s  army ;  being  himself  necessarily 
detained  by  the  Etesian  winds,  which  are  directly 
contrary  to  any  passage  by  sea  from  Alexandria. 
Meantime,  considering  the  difference  between  Ptol¬ 
emy  and  his  sister  as  subject  to  the  cognizance  of 
the  Roman  people,  and  of  him  as  consul — and  the 
rather  because  the  alliance  with  Ptolemy  the  father 
had  been  contracted  during  his  former  consulship — 
he  gave  the  king  and  Cleopatra  to  understand  that 
it  was  his  pleasure  they  should  dismiss  their  troops, 
and,  instead  of  having  recourse  to  arms,  come  and 
plead  their  cause  before  him. 

89.  Pothinus,  the  eunuch,  governor  to  the  young 
king,  had  the  chief  management  of  affairs  during  his 
minority.  This  minister  complained  bitterly  to  his 
friends  that  the  king  should  be  summoned  to  plead 
his  cause  before  Cfesar :  afterward,  finding  among 
those  that  sided  with  the  king  some  who  were  dis¬ 
posed  to  enter  into  his  views,  he  privately  sent  for 
the  army  from  Pelusium  to  Alexandria,  and  con¬ 
ferred  the  chief  command  on  Achillas — ^the  same 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III. 


163 


we  have  spoken  of  before, — inciting  him  by  letters 
and  promises,  both  in  the  king’s  name  and  his  own, 
to  execute  such  orders  as  he  should  receive  from 
him.  Ptolemy  the  father,  by  his  will,  had  ap¬ 
pointed  the  eldest  of  his  two  sons  and  his  elder 
daughter  joint  heirs  of  the  kingdom.  For  the  more 
certain  accomplishment  of  his  design,  he  in  the 
same  will  implored  the  protection  of  the  Roman 
people ;  adjuring  them  by  all  the  gods,  and  the  trea¬ 
ties  he  had  made  at  Rome,  to  see  it  put  in  execution. 
A  copy  of  this  will  was  sent  by  ambassadors  to 
Rome,  to  be  deposited  in  the  public  treasury ;  but 
the  domestic  troubles  preventing  it,  it  was  left  in 
the  hands  of  Pompey.  The  original,  signed  and 
sealed,  was  kept  at  Alexandria. 

90.  While  this  affair  was  debated  before  Caesar, 
who  passionately  desired  to  terminate  the  matter 
amicably,  and  to  the  satisfaction  of  both  parties,  he 
was  informed  that  the  king’s  army,  with  all  the  cav¬ 
alry,  were  arrived  at  Alexandria.  Caesar’s  forces 
were  by  no  means  sufficient  to  give  battle  without 
the  town ;  and  therefore  the  only  course  left  was 
to  secure  the  most  convenient  posts  within  the  city 
till  he  should  get  acquainted  with  Achillas’s  designs. 
Meantime,  he  ordered  all  the  soldiers  to  their  arms, 
and  admonished  the  king  to  send  some  persons 
of  the  greatest  authority  to  Achillas  to  forbid  his 
approach.  Dioscorides  and  Serapion,  who  had  both 
been  ambassadors  at  Rome,  and  in  great  credit  with 
Ptolemy  the  father,  were  deputed  to  this  office  :  but 
no  sooner  did  they  come  before  A  chillas,  than,  with¬ 
out  giving  them  a  hearing,  or  inquiring  after  the 
message  they  brought,  he  ordered  them  to  be  seized 
and  put  to  death.  One  was  killed  on  the  spot ;  and 
the  other,  having  received  a  dangerous  wound,  was 
carried  off  for  dead  by  his  attendants.  On  hearing 
this,  Caesar  took  care  to  secure  the  king’s  person ; 
Ihe  authority  of  whose  name  would  authorize  his 


164 


CjEsar’s  commentaries. 


proceedings,  and  occasion  Achillas  and  his  asso¬ 
ciates  to  be  esteemed  seditious  and  rebellious. 

91.  Acliillas’s  army  was  far  from  being  contempt¬ 
ible,  whether  we  regard  their  number,  courage,  or 
experience  in  war.  It  amounted  to  twenty  thou¬ 
sand  effective  men,  many  of  whom  were  originally 
Romans,  brought  into  the  country  by  Gabinius  when 
he  came  to  settle  Auletes  on  the  throne  ;  and  who, 
having  afterward  married  and  settled  in  Alexandria, 
were  devoted  to  the  Ptolemean  interest.  There 
were  also  some  brigades  raised  in  Syria  and  Cilicia, 
together  with  a  considerable  number  of  renegade 
slaves,  who  had  deserted  their  masters  and  found 
protection  in  Egypt  by  entering  into  the  service. 
If  any  of  these  was  seized  by  his  master,  their  com¬ 
panions  flocked  to  his  rescue,  regarding  his  safety 
as  a  common  cause,  because  they  were  all  embarked 
in  the  like  guilt.  These  would  often  take  on  them 
to  put  to  death  the  king’s  ministers,  to  plunder  the 
rich  for  the  sake  of  increasing  their  pay,  to  invest 
the  royal  palace,  to  banish  some,  and  send  for 
others  home,  with  other  liberties  of  the  like  nature 
which  the  Alexandrian  army  claims  by  a  kind  of 
prescription.  Besides  these,  he  had  likewise  two 
thousand  horse,  who,  during  the  late  troubles,  and 
the  wars  that  ensued,  had  had  opportunities  of 
inuring  themselves  to  arms.  These  had  restored 
Ptolemy  the  father  to  his  kingdom,  killed  Bibulus’s 
two  sons,  warred  against  the  Egyptians  with  suc¬ 
cess,  and  acquired  a  thorough  experience  in  military 
affairs. 

92.  Achillas,  trusting  to  the  valour  of  his  troops, 
and  despising  the  handful  of  men  that  followed 
Caesar,  quickly  made  himself  master  of  Alexandria, 
— the  palace  only  excepted,  where  Caesar  thought 
proper  to  make  his  stand,  and  which  he  attacked 
briskly,  though  without  effect.  But  it  was  on  the 
side  of  the  harbour  that  the  greatest  efforts  were 


CIVIL  WAR. - BOOK  III, 


165 


made.  On  that,  in  effect,  the  victory  depended. 
Besides  two-and-twenty  constant  guard-ships,  there 
were  in  the  port  fifty  galleys,  from  three  to  five 
banks  of  oars,  which  the  year  before  had  been  sent 
to  Pompey’s  assistance,  and  were  returned  since 
the  battle  of  Pharsalia.  Had  Achillas  been  once 
master  of  these  vessels,  he  might  have  cut  Caesar 
off  from  all  communication  with  the  ocean,  and 
consequently  from  all  hopes  of  receiving  supplies 
of  victuals  or  forces.  Thus  the  Egyptians,  in  hopes 
of  a  complete  victory,  and  the  Romans,  to  avoid  a 
certain  ruin,  exerted  themselves  with  incredible 
vigour.  At  length,  Caesar  carried  his  point,  and  not 
only  set  fire  to  the  vessels  above  mentioned,  but  to 
all  that  were  in  the  arsenals,  after  which  he  passed 
some  troops  into  the  Isle  of  Pharos. 

93.  The  Pharos  is  a  tower  of  prodigious  height 
and  wonderful  workmanship,  built  in  an  island  from 
whence  it  takes  its  name.  This  island,  lying  over- 
against  Alexandria,  makes  a  haven,  and  is  joined  to 
the  continent  by  a  causeway  of  nine  hundred  paces, 
and  by  a  bridge.  Here  dwell  several  Egyptians, 
who  have  built  a  town,  and  live  by  pillaging  the 
ships  that  are  thrown  on  their  coast  either  by  mis¬ 
take  or  tempest.  As  it  is  situate  at  the  entrance 
of  the  port,  which  is  but  narrow,  it  absolutely  com¬ 
mands  it.  Caesar,  knowing  the  importance  of  this 
post,  while  the  enemy  were  engaged  in  the  assault, 
landed  some  troops  there,  seized  the  tower,  and  put 
a  garrison  into  it ;  thereby  securing  a  safe  reception 
for  the  supplies  he  had  sent  for  on  all  sides.  In  the 
other  quarters  of  the  town  the  fight  was  main¬ 
tained  with  equal  advantage,  neither  party  losing 
ground,  because  of  the  narrowness  of  the  passes, 
which  enabled  them  easily  to  support  themselves. 
After  a  few  men  killed  on  both  sides,  Caesar,  having 
secured  the  most  necessary  places,  fortified  them 
in  the  night.  In  this  quarter  was  a  small  part  of  the 
king’s  palace,  where  Caesar  was  lodged  on  his  first 


166  CiESAR’s  COMMENTARIES. 

arrival ;  and  adjoining  thereto  a  theatre,  that  served 
instead  of  a  citadel,  and  had  a  communication  with 
the  port  and  other  arsenals.  These  works  he  in¬ 
creased  afterward,  that  they  might  serve  instead 
of  a  rampart,  to  prevent  his  being  obliged  to  fight 
against  his  will.  Meantime,  Ptolemy’s  youngest 
daughter,  hoping  the  throne  would  be  vacant,  fled 
from  the  palace  to  Achillas,  and  joined  with  him  in 
the  prosecution  of  the  war.  But  they  soon  dis¬ 
agreed  about  the  command,  which  increased  the 
largesses  to  the  soldiers,  each  party  endeavouring 
to  gain  them  by  large  presents.  During  these 
transactions,  Pothinus,  Ptolemy’s  governor,  and  re¬ 
gent  of  the  kingdom,  being  discovered  in  a  clandes¬ 
tine  correspondence  with  4chinas,  whom  he  en¬ 
couraged  to  the  vigorous  prosecution  of  his  enter¬ 
prise,  Caesar  ordered  him  to  be  put  to  death.  Such 
was  the  commencement  of  the  Alexandrian  war. 


/ 


AI  EXANURIAN^  WAR. 


\ 


/ 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 

1 .  The  war  thus  commencing  at  Alexandria,  Caesar 
sent  to  Rhodes,  Syria,  and  Cilicia  for  his  fleet ;  to 
Crete,  for  archers ;  and  to  Malchus,  king  of  the  Na- 
batheans,  for  cavalry :  he  likewise  ordered  military 
engines  to  be  provided,  corn  to  be  brought,  and 
forces  despatched  to  him  with  all  diligence.  Mean¬ 
while,  he  was  daily  employed  in  augmenting  his 
works ;  and  such  parts  of  the  town  as  appeared  less 
tenable  were  strengthened  with  tortoises  and  man¬ 
telets.  Openings  were  made  in  the  walls,  through 
which  the  battering  rams  might  play ;  and  whatever 
houses  were  thrown  down,  or  taken  by  force,  were 
brought  within  the  intrenchments :  for  Alexandria 
is  in  a  manner  secure  from  fire,  because  the  inhabit¬ 
ants  use  no  wood  in  their  buildings,  the  houses 
being  all  vaulted,  and  roofed  with  tile  or  pavement. 
Cae.sar’s  principal  aim  was,  to  enclose  with  works 
the  smallest  part  of  the  town,  separated  from  the 
rest  by  a  morass  towards  the  south :  for  thus  the 
army  would  lie  closer  together,  be  subject  to  one 
command,  and  could  readily  despatch  relief  where 
it  was  most  wanted.  Above  all,  he  by  this  means 
made  sure  of  water  and  forage,  which  was  of  so  much 
the  more  consequence  as  he  was  ill  provided  of  the 
one,  and  wholly  destitute  of  the  other.  The  morass, 

CflCS.  VoL.  II. — P 


170  HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 

on  the  contrary,  served  abundantly  to  supply  him 
with  both. 

2.  Nor  were  the  Alexandrians  remiss  on  their 
side,  or  less  active  in  the  conduct  of  their  affairs. 
They  had  sent  deputies  and  commissioners  into  all 
parts,  where  the  power  and  territories  of  Egypt  ex¬ 
tend,  with  orders  to  levy  troops.  They  had  car¬ 
ried  vast  quantities  of  darts  and  engines  into  the 
town,  and  drawn  together  an  innumerable  multitude 
of  soldiers.  Yet  not  contented  with  all  these  prepa¬ 
rations,  they  established  workshops  in  every  part 
of  the  city,  for  the  making  of  arms ;  and  enlisted 
all  the  slaves  that  were  of  age,  the  richer  citizens 
paying  and  maintaining  them.  With  these  they 
guarded  the  remoter  parts  of  the  town ;  while  the 
veteran  cohorts,  exempt  from  all  other  service, 
were  quartered  in  the  squares  and  open  places ;  that 
on  whatever  side  an  attack  should  be  made,  they 
-  might  be  at  hand  to  give  relief,  and  march  fresh  and 
■entire  to  the  charge.  All  the  avenues  and  passes 
were  shut  up  by  a  triple  wall,  built  of  square  stones, 
and  carried  to  the  height  of  forty  feet.  The  lower 
parts  of  the  town  were  defended  by  very  high  tow¬ 
ers  of  ten  stories :  besides  which,  they  had  like¬ 
wise  contrived  a  kind  of  moving  towers,  which  con¬ 
sisted  of  the  same  number  of  stories ;  and  being 
fitted  with  ropes  and  wheels,  could  by  means  of 
horses,  as  the  streets  of  Alexandria  were  quite  even 
and  level,  be  conveyed  wherever  their  service  was 
necessary.  The  city,  abounding  in  every  thing,  and 
being  very  rich,  furnished  ample  materials  for  these 
several  works ;  and  as  the  people  were  extremely 
ingenious,  and  quick  of  apprehension,  they  so  well  co¬ 
pied  v/hat  they  saw  done  by  us,  that  our  men  seemed 
rather  to  imitate  them.  They  even  invented  many 
things  themselves,  and  at  once  invested  our  works 
and  defended  their  own.  Their  chiefs  everywhere 
represented,  “  that  the  people  of  Rome  were  endea¬ 
vouring  by  degrees  to  steal  into  the  possession  of 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 


171 


Egypt ;  that  a  few  years  before  Gabinius  had  come 
thither  with  an  army ;  that  Pompey  had  chosen  it 
for  the  place  of  his  retreat;  that  Caesar  was  now 
among  them  with  a  considerable  body  of  troops, 
and,  notwithstanding  his  rival’s  death,  made  no 
offers  to  return ;  that  if  they  did  not  therefore  find 
means  to  expel  him,  they  would  soon,  from  a  king¬ 
dom,  be  reduced  to  a  Roman  province ;  that  no 
time  was  to  be  lost  in  this  attempt,  because  the  sea¬ 
son  of  the  year  having  put  a  stop  to  navigation,  he 
could  receive  no  supplies  from  beyond  sea.” 

3.  Meanwhile  a  division  arising  between  Achillas, 
who  commanded  the  veteran  army,  and  Arsinoe,  the 
youngest  daughter  of  King  Ptolemy,  as  has  been  de¬ 
monstrated  above ;  while  they  mutually  endeavoured 
to  supplant  one  another,  each  striving  to  engross 
the  supreme  authority ;  Arsinoe,  by  the  assistance 
of  the  slave  Ganymed,  her  governor,  at  length  pre¬ 
vailed,  and  caused  Achillas  to  be  slain.  After  his 
death,  being  possessed  of  the  whole  power  without 
a  rival,  she  raised  Ganymed  to  the  command  of  the 
army ;  who,  on  his  entrance  into  that  high  office, 
augmented  the  allowance  of  the  troops,  and  with 
equal  diligence  discharged  all  other  parts  of  his 
duty. 

4.  Alexandria  is  almost  quite  hollow  underneath, 
occasioned  by  the  many  aqueducts  to  the  Nile,  that 
furnish  private  houses  with  water;  where,  being 
received  in  cisterns,  it  settles  by  degrees,  and  be¬ 
comes  perfectly  clear.  This  is  preserved  for  the 
use  of  the  master  and  his  family ;  for  the  water  of 
the  Nile,  being  extremely  thick  and  muddy,  is  apt 
to  breed  many  distempers :  the  common  people, 
however,  are  forced  to  be  contented  with  it,  be¬ 
cause  there  is  not  a  single  spring  in  the  whole  city. 
The  river  was  in  that  part  of  the  town  where  the 
Alexandrians  were  masters;  hence  Ganymed  con¬ 
ceived  that  a  way  might  be  found  to  deprive  the 
Romans  of  water ;  because,  being  distributed  into 


172 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


several  streets,  for  the  more  easy  defence  of  the 
works,  they  made  use  of  that  which  was  preserved 
in  the  cisterns  of  private  houses.  With  this  view, 
he  began  a  great  and  difficult  work;  for  having 
stopped  up  all  the  canals  by  which  his  own  cisterns 
were  supplied,  he  drew  vast  quantities  of  water  out 
of  the  sea,  by  the  help  of  wheels  and  other  engines, 
pouring  it  continually  into  the  canals  of  CcEsar’s 
quarter.  The  cisterns  in  the  nearest  houses  soon 
began  to  taste  salter  than  ordinary,  and  occasioned 
great  wonder  among  the  men,  who  could  not  think 
from  what  cause  it  proceeded.  They  were  even 
ready  to  disbelieve  their  senses,  when  those  who 
were  quartered  a  little  lower  in  the  town  assured 
them  that  they  found  the  water  the  same  as  before. 
This  put  them  on  comparing  the  cisterns  one  with 
another,  and  by  trial  they  easily  perceived  the  dif¬ 
ference.  But  in  a  little  time  the  water  in  the  nearest 
houses  became  quite  unfit  for  use,  and  tliat  lower 
down  grew  daily  more  tainted  and  brackish;  on 
which  a  terror  ensued  among  the  troops,  that  they 
fancied  themselves  reduced  to  the  last  extremity. 
Some  complained  of  Caesar’s  delay,  that  he  did  not  or¬ 
der  them  immediately  to  repair  to  their  ships  ;  others 
dreaded  a  yet  greater  misfortune,  as  it  would  be 
impossible  to  conceal  their  design  of  retreating  from 
the  Alexandrians,  who  were  so  near  them  ;  and  no 
less  so  to  embark  in  the  face  of  a  vigorous  and  pur¬ 
suing  enemy.  There  were  besides  a  great  number 
of  the  townsmen  in  Caesar’s  quarter,  whom  he  had 
not  thought  proper  to  force  from  their  houses,  be¬ 
cause  they  openly  pretended  to  be  in  his  interest, 
and  to  have  quitted  the  party  of  their  fellow-citizens. 
But  to  offer  here  at  a  defence  either  of  the  sincerity 
or  conduct  of  these  Alexandrians  would  be  only 
labour  in  vain ;  since  all  who  know  the  genius  and 
temper  of  the  people  must  be  satisfied  that  they 
are  the  fittest  instruments  in  the  world  for  treason. 

5.  Caesar  laboured  to  remove  his  soldiers’  fears,  by 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 


173 


encouraging  and  reasoning  the  case  with  them. 
“  They  might  easily,”  he  told  them,  “  find  water  by 
digging  wells,  as  all  seacoasts  naturally  abounded 
with  fresh  springs :  that  if  Egypt  was  singular  in 
this  respect,  and  differed  from  every  other  soil,  yet 
still,  as  the  sea  was  open,  and  the  enemy  without  a 
fleet,  there  was  nothing  to  hinder  their  fetching  it  at 
pleasure  in  their  ships,  either  from  Paraetonium  on 
the  left,  or  Pharos  on  the  right ;  which  two  places 
lying  different  ways,  the  wind  could  never  exclude 
them  from  both  at  the  same  time ;  that  a  retreat  was 
on  no  account  to  be  thought  of,  not  only  by  those 
who  had  a  concern  for  their  honour,  but  even  by 
such  as  regarded  nothing  but  life  ;  that  it  was  with 
the  utmost  difiiculty  they  could  defend  themselves 
behind  their  works;  but  if  they  once  quitted  that 
advantage,  neither  in  number  nor  situation  would 
they  be  a  match  for  the  enemy :  that  to  embark 
would  require  much  time,  and  be  attended  with  great 
danger,  especially  where  it  must  be  managed  by 
little  boats :  that  the  Alexandrians,  on  the  contrary, 
were  nimble  and  active,  and  thoroughly  acquainted 
with  the  streets  and  buildings  :  that,  flushed  with  so 
manifest  an  advantage,  they  would  not  fail  to  run 
before,  seize  all  the  advantageous  posts,  possess 
themselves  of  the  tops  of  the  houses,  and  by  an¬ 
noying  them  in  their  retreat,  effectually  prevent  their 
getting  on  board ;  that  they  might  therefore  think 
no  more  of  retiring,  but  place  all  their  hopes  of 
safety  in  victory.”  Having  by  this  speech  reassured 
his  men,  he  ordered  the  centurions  to  lay  aside  all 
other  cares,  and  apply  themselves  day  and  night  to 
the  digging  of  wells.  The  work  once  begun,  they 
pushed  it  on  so  vigorously  that  the  very  first  night 
abundance  of  fresh  water  was  found.  Thus  with 
labour  on  our  side,  the  mighty  presets  and  painful 
attempts  of  the  Alexandrians  were  entirely  frus¬ 
trated. 

6.  During  these  transactions,  the  thirty -seventh. 

P  2 


174 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


legion,  composed  of  Pompey’s  veterans  that  had 
surrendered  to  Ceosar,  embarking  by  order  of  Domi- 
tius  Calvinus,  with  arms,  darts,  provisions,  and  mili¬ 
tary  engines,  arrived  on  the  coast  of  Africa  a  little 
above  Alexandria.  An  easterly  wind,  which  con¬ 
tinued  to  blow  for  several  days  together,  hindered 
their  being  able  to  gain  the  port ;  but  all  along  that 
coast  it  is  very  safe  riding  at  anchor.  Being  detained, 
however,  longer  than  they  expected,  and  pressed 
with  want  of  water,  they  gave  notice  of  it  to  Caesar, 
by  a  despatch  sloop.  Caesar,  that  he  might  himself 
be  able  to  determine  what  was  best  to  be  done,  went 
on  board  one  of  the  ships  in  the  harbour,  and 
ordered  the  whole  fleet  to  follow.  He  took  none  of 
the  land-forces  with  him,  because  he  was  unwilling 
to  leave  the  works  unguarded  during  his  absence. 
Being  arrived  at  that  part  of  the  coast  known  by  the 
name  of  Cherronesus,  he  sent  some  mariners  on 
shore  to  fetch  water.  Part  of  these,  venturing  too 
far  into  the  country  for  the  sake  of  plunder,  were 
intercepted  by  the  enemy’s  horse.  From  them  the 
Egyptians  learned  that  Caesar  himself  w^as  on  board, 
without  any  soldiers.  On  this  information,  they 
thought  fortune  had  thrown  a  fair  occasion  in  their 
way  of  attempting  something  with  success ;  they 
therefore  manned  all  the  ships  that  were  in  con¬ 
dition  to  sail,  and  met  Caesar  on  his  return.  He 
declined  fighting  that  day,  for  two  reasons ;  because 
he  had  no  soldiers  on  board,  and  it  was  past  four  in 
the  afternoon.  The  night,  he  was  sensible,  must 
be  highly  advantageous  to  his  enemies,  who  were 
perfectly  well  acquainted  with  the  coast :  and  he 
would  himself  be  deprived  of  the  benefit  of  encoura¬ 
ging  his  men,  which  could  not  be  done  with  any  effect 
in  the  dark,  where  courage  and  cowardice  must  re¬ 
main  equally  unknown.  He  therefore  drew  all  his 
ships  towards  the  shore,  where  he  imagined  the 
enemy  would  not  follow  him. 

7.  There  was  one  Rhodian  galley  in  Caesar’s  right 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 


175 


Wing,  considerably  distant  from  the  rest :  this  being 
observed  by  the  enemy,  they  came  forward  with 
four  decked  ships,  and  several  open  barks,  to  attack 
her.  Caesar  was  obliged  to  advance  to  her  relief, 
that  he  might  not  suffer  the  disgrace  of  seeing  one 
of  his  galleys  sunk  before  his  eyes  ;  though,  had  he 
left  her  to  perish,  she  seemed  to  deserve  it  for  her 
rashness.  The  attack  was  sustained  with  great 
courage  by  the  Rhodians,  who,  though  at  all  times 
distinguished  by  their  valour  and  experience  in  en¬ 
gagements  at  sea,  yet  exerted  themselves  in  a  par¬ 
ticular  manner  on  this  occasion,  that  they  might  not 
draw  on  themselves  the  charge  of  having  occasioned 
a  misfortune  to  the  fleet.  Accordingly  they  ob¬ 
tained  a  complete  victory,  took  one  four-benched 
galley,  sunk  another,  disabled  a  third,  and  slew  all 
that  were  on  board,  besides  a  great  number  belong¬ 
ing  to  the  other  ships.  Nay,  had  not  night  inter¬ 
posed,  Caesar  would  have  made  himself  master  of 
their  whole  fleet.  During  the  consternation  that 
followed  on  this  defeat,  Caesar,  finding  the  contrary 
winds  to  abate,  took  the  transports  in  tow,  and  ad¬ 
vanced  with  the  victorious  fleet  to  Alexandria. 

8.  The  Alexandrians,  disheartened  at  this  loss,  as 
finding  themselves  now  worsted,  not  by  the  superior 
valour  of  the  soldiers,  but  by  the  skill  and  ability  of 
the  mariners,  retired  to  the  tops  of  their  houses, 
and  blocked  up  the  entrance  of  their  streets,  as 
fearing  our  fleet  might  attack  them  even  by  land. 
But  soon  after,  Ganymed  assuring  them  in  council 
that  he  would  not  only  restore  the  vessels  they  had 
lost,  but  even  increase  their  number,  they  began  to 
repair  their  old  ships  with  great  expectation  and 
confidence,  and  resolved  to  apply  more  than  ever  to 
the  putting  their  fleet  in  a  good  condition;  and  al¬ 
though  they  had  lost  above  a  hundred  and  ten  ships 
in  the  port  and  arsenal,  yet  did  not  all  this  discour¬ 
age  them ;  because,  by  making  themselves  masters 
at  sea,  they  saw  they  would  have  it  in  their  power 


176 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


to  hinder  Caesar’s  receiving'  any  reinforcements  or 
supplies.  Besides,  being  naturally  mariners,  born 
on  the  seacoast,  and  exercised  from  their  infancy 
in  naval  affairs,  they  were  desirous  to  return  to  that 
wherein  their  true  and  proper  strength  lay,  remem¬ 
bering  the  advantages  they  had  formerly  gained, 
even  with  their  little  ships.  They  therefore  ap¬ 
plied  themselves  with  all  diligence  to  the  equipping 
a  fleet. 

9.  Vessels  were  stationed  at  all  the  mouths  of  the 
Nile  for  receiving  and  gathering  in  the  customs. 
Several  old  ships  were  likewise  lodged  in  the  king’s 
private  arsenals,  where  they  had  remained  unrigged 
for  many  years.  These  last  they  refitted,  and  re¬ 
called  the  former  to  Alexandria.  To  supply  them¬ 
selves  with  oars,  they  uncovered  the  porticoes,  acad- 
err.ies,  and  public  buildings,  and  made  use  of  the 
planks  they  furnished.  Their  natural  ingenuity,  and 
the  abundance  of  all  things  to  be  met  with  in  the 
city,  supplied  every  want.  In  fine,  they  had  no 
long  navigation  to  provide  for,  and  were  only  solicit¬ 
ous  about  present  exigences,  foreseeing  they  would 
have  no  occasion  to  fight  but  in  the  port.  In  a  few 
days,  therefore,  contrary  to  all  expectation,  they  had 
fitted  out  twenty-two  quadriremes,  and  five  quin- 
queremes.  To  these  they  added  a  great  number  of 
small  open  barks  ;  and  employing  the  rowers  in  the 
harbour  to  practise  and  exercise  themselves,  put  a 
sufficient  number  of  soldiers  on  board,  and  prepared 
every  thing  necessary  for  an  engagement.  Caesar 
had  nine  Rhodian  galleys  (for,  of  the  ten  which 
were  sent,  one  was  shipwrecked  on  the  coast  of 
Egypt),  eight  from  Pontus,  five  from  Lycia,  and 
twelve  out  of  Asia.  Of  these,  ten  were  quadri¬ 
remes,  and  five  quinqueremes ;  the  rest  were  of  an 
inferior  bulk,  and  for  the  most  part  without  decks. 
Yet,  trusting  to  the  valour  of  his  soldiers,  and  know¬ 
ing  the  strength  of  the  enemy,  he  prepared  for  an 
engagement. 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 


177 


10.  When  both  sides  were  come  to  have  sufficient 
confidence  in  their  own  strength,  Caesar  sailed  round 
Pharos,  and  formed  in  line  of  battle  over-against  the 
enemy.  The  Rhodian  galleys  were  in  his  right 
wing,  and  those  of  Pontus  in  his  left.  Between  these 
he  left  a  space  of  four  hundred  paces,  to  serve  for 
the  extending  and  working  the  vessels.  This  dispo¬ 
sition  being  made,  he  drew  up  the  rest  of  the  fleet 
as  a  reserve,  giving  them  the  necessary  orders,  and 
distributing  them  in  such  manner,  that  every  ship 
followed  that  to  which  she  was  appointed  to  give 
succour.  The  Alexandrians  came  forth  with  great 
f^onfidence ;  and  drew  up  their  fleet,  placing  their 
cwenty-two  quadriremes  in  front,  and  disposing  the 
rest  behind  them  in  a  second  line,  by  way  of  reserve. 
They  had,  besides,  a  great  number  of  boats  and 
smaller  vessels  that  carried  fire  and  combustible 
weapons,  with  design  to  fright  us  by  their  number, 
cries,  and  flaming  darts.  Between  the  two  fleets 
were  certain  flats,  separated  by  very  narrow  chan¬ 
nels,  and  which  are  said  to  be  on  the  African  coast, 
as  being  in  that  division  of  Alexandria  which  belongs 
to  Africa.  Both  sides  waited  which  should  first  pass 
these  shallows,  because  whoever  entered  the  narrow 
channels  between  them,  in  case  of  any  misfortune, 
would  find  it  very  difficult  either  to  retreat,  or  work 
the  ships  to  advantage. 

11.  Euphranor  commanded  the  Rhodian  fleet ;  who, 
for  valour  and  greatness  of  mind,  deserved  rather 
to  be  ranked  among  the  Romans  than  the  Grecians. 
The  Rhodians  had  raised  him  to  the  post  of  admiral, 
on  account  of  his  known  courage  and  experience. 
He,  perceiving  Caesar’s  design,  addressed  him  to 
this  effect:  “You  seem  afraid  of  passing  the  shal¬ 
lows  first,  lest  you  should  be  thereby  forced  to  come 
to  an  engagement  before  the  rest  of  the  fleet  can  be 
brought  up.  Leave  the  matter  to  us ;  we  will  sus¬ 
tain  the  fight,  and  I  hope  too  without  disappointing 
your  expectations,  until  the  whole  fleet  gets  clear  of 


178 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


the  shallows.  It  is  both  dishonourable  and  afflicting, 
that  they  should  so  long  continue  in  our  sight  with 
an  air  of  triumph.”  Caesar,  encouraging  him  in  his 
design,  and  bestowing  many  praises  on  him,  gave  the 
signal  i’or  engaging.  Four  Rhodian  ships  having 
passed  the  shallows,  the  Alexandrians  gathered  round 
and  attacked  them.  They  maintained  the  fight  with 
great  bravery,  disengaging  themselves  by  their  art 
and  address,  and  working  their  ships  with  so  much 
skill,  that  notwithstanding  the  inequality  of  number, 
none  ot  the  enemy  were  suffered  to  run  alongside, 
or  break  their  oars.  Meantime  the  rest  of  the  fleet 
came  up;  when,  on  account  of  the  narrowness  of 
the  place,  art  becoming  useless,  the  success  de¬ 
pended  wholly  on  valour.  The  Alexandrians  and  Ro¬ 
mans  who  were  in  the  town,  laying  aside  all  thoughts 
of  attack  and  defence,  mounted  the  tops  of  the 
houses,  and  all  the  eminences  that  would  give  a 
view  of  the  fight,  addressing  the  gods  by  vows  and 
prayers  for  victory. 

12.  The  event  of  the  battle  was  by  no  means 
equal.  A  defeat  would  have  deprived  us  of  all  re¬ 
source  either  by  land  or  sea ;  and  even  victory  itself 
would  not  much  better  our  condition.  The  Alexan¬ 
drians,  on  the  contrary,  by  a  victory,  gained  every 
thing ;  and  if  defeated,  might  yet  again  have  recourse 
to  fortune.  It  was  likewise  a  matter  of  the  highest 
concern,  to  see  the  safety  of  all  depend  on  the 
bravery  of  a  few,  whose  want  of  courage  would  ex¬ 
pose  their  whole  party  to  destruction.  This  Caesar 
had  often  represented  to  his  troops  during  the  pre¬ 
ceding  days,  that  they  might  be  thereby  induced  to 
fight  with  the  more  resolution,  when  they  knew  the 
common  safety  to  depend  on  their  bravery.  Every 
man  said  the  same  to  his  comrade,  companion,  and 
friend;  requesting  him  not  to  disappoint  the  ex¬ 
pectation  of  those  who  had  chosen  him  preferably  to 
others  for  the  defence  of  the  common  interest.  Ac¬ 
cordingly  they  fought  with  so  much  resolution,  that 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 


179 


neither  the  art  nor  address  of  the  Egyptians,  a  mari¬ 
time  and  seafaring  people,  could  stand  them  in  any 
stead,  nor  the  multitude  of  their  ships  be  of  service 
to  them ;  nor  the  valour  of  those  selected  for  this 
engagement  stand  in  competition  with  the  determined 
courage  of  the  Romans.  In  this  action  a  quinque- 
reme  was  taken,  and  a  bireme,  with  all  the  soldiers 
and  mariners  on  board,  besides  three  sunk,  without 
any  loss  on  our  side.  The  rest  fled  towards  the 
town,  sheltering  themselves  under  the  mole  and  forts, 
whither  we  durst  not  pursue  them. 

13.  To  deprive  the  enemy  of  this  resource  for  the 
future,  Caesar  thought  it  by  all  means  necessary  to 
render  himself  master  of  the  mole  and  island :  for, 
having  already  in  great  measure  completed  his  works 
within  the  town,  he  was  in  hopes  of  being  able  to 
defend  himself  both  in  the  island  and  city.  This 
resolution  being  taken,  he  put  into  boats  and  small 
vessels  ten  cohorts,  a  select  body  of  light-armed 
infantry,  and  such  of  the  Gallic  cavalry  as  he 
thought  most  for  his  purpose,  and  sent  them  against 
the  island ;  while,  at  the  same  time,  to  occasion  a 
diversion,  he  attacked  it  on  the  other  with  his  fleet, 
promising  great  rewards  to  those  who  should  first 
render  themselves  masters  of  it.  At  first  the  attack 
was  brisk,  and  the  defence  vigorous  ;  for  they  both 
annoyed  our  men  from  the  tops  of  the  houses,  and 
gallantly  maintained  their  ground  along  the  shore, 
which,  being  steep  and  craggy,  our  men  could  find 
no  way  of  approach ;  all  the  more  accessible  ave¬ 
nues  being  skilfully  defended  by  small  boats,  and 
five  galleys,  properly  stationed  for  that  purpose. 
But  when,  after  examining  the  approaches,  and 
sounding  the  shallows,  a  few  of  our  men  got  on  the 
shore  and  were  followed  by  others,  who  pushed  the 
islanders  without  intermission,  the  Pharians  at  last 
betook  themselves  to  flight.  On  this,  abandoning  the 
defence  of  the  port  they  quitted  their  ships,  and  re¬ 
tired  into  the  town,  to  provide  for  the  security  of 


180 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


their  houses.  But  they  could  not  long  maintain 
their  ground  there ;  though,  to  compare  small  things 
with  great,  their  buildings  resembled  those  of  Alex¬ 
andria,  and  their  towers  were  high,  and  joined  to¬ 
gether  so  as  to  form  a  kind  of  wall ;  and  our  men 
had  neither  ladders,  fascines,  nor  any  weapons  for 
assault.  But  fear  often  deprives  men  of  counsel  and 
strength,  as  happened  on  this  occasion.  Those  who 
had  ventured  to  oppose  us  on  even  ground,  terrified 
by  the  loss  of  a  few  men,  and  the  general  rout,  durst 
not  face  us  from  a  height  of  thirty  feet ;  but  throw¬ 
ing  themselves  from  the  mole  into  the  sea,  endeav¬ 
oured  to  gain  the  town,  though  above  eight  hundred 
paces  distant.  Many  however  were  slain,  and  about 
six  hundred  taken. 

14.  Caesar,  giving  up  the  plunder  to  the  soldiers, 
ordered  the  houses  to  be  demolished ;  but  fortified 
the  castle  at  the  end  of  the  bridge  next  the  island, 
and  placed  a  garrison  in  it.  This  the  Pharians  had 
abandoned :  but  the  other,  towards  the  town,  which 
was  considerably  stronger,  was  still  held  by  the 
Alexandrians.  Caesar  attacked  it  next  day ;  because, 
by  getting  possession  of  these  two  forts,  he  would 
be  entirely  master  of  the  port,  and  prevent  sudden 
excursions  and  piracies.  Already  he  had,  by  means 
of  his  arrows  and  engines,  forced  the  garrison  to 
abandon  the  place,  and  retire  towards  the  town.  He 
had  also  landed  three  cohorts,  which  was  all  the 
place  would  contain ;  and  disposed  the  rest  of  his 
troops  aboard  to  sustain  them.  He  then  fortified  the 
bridge  on  the  side  of  the  enemy,  built  an  arch  across 
the  entrance  of  the  port,  and  filled  it  up  in  such  a 
manner  with  stones,  that  not  the  smallest  boat 
could  pass.  When  the  work  was  almost  finished, 
the  Alexandrians  sailed  in  crowds  from  the  town, 
and  drew  up,  in  an  open  place,  over-against  the 
intrenchment  we  had  cast  up  at  the  head  of  the 
bridge.  At  the  same  time,  the  vessels,  which  they 
had  been  wont  to  make  pass  under  the  bridge,  to  set 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 


181 


fire  to  our  ships  of  burden,  were  ranged  along  the 
mole.  Our  men  fought  from  the  bridge  and  the  mole ; 
the  enemy  from  the  area,  over-against  the  bridge, 
and  f rom  their  ships,  by  the  side  of  the  mole.  While 
Caesar,  attentive  to  what  passed,  was  exhorting  his 
troops,  a  number  of  rowers  and  mariners,  quitting 
their  ships,  threw  themselves  on  the  mole ;  partly 
out  of  curiosity,  partly  to  have  a  share  in  the  action. 
At  first,  with  stones  and  slings,  they  forced  the 
enemy’s  ships  from  the  mole,  and  seemed  to  do  still 
greater  execution  with  their  darts  :  but  when,  some 
time  after,  a  few  Alexandrians  found  means  to  land, 
and  attack  them  in  flank,  as  they  had  left  their  ships 
without  order  or  discipline,  so  they  soon  began  to 
fly  with  precipitation.  The  Alexandrians,  encouraged 
by  this  success,  landed  in  great  numbers,  and  vigor¬ 
ously  pushed  our  men,  who  were  by  this  time  in 
great  confusion.  Those  that  remained  in  the  galleys, 
perceiving  this,  drew  up  the  ladders,  and  put  off  from 
the  shore,  to  prevent  the  enemies  boarding  them. 
The  three  cohorts,  who  were  at  the  head  of  the 
mole  to  guard  the  bridge,  astonished  at  this  disorder, 
the  cries  they  heard  behind  them,  and  the  general 
rout  of  their  party;  unable,  besides,  to  bear  up 
against  the  multitude  of  darts  which  came  pouring 
on  them,  and  fearing  to  be  surrounded,  and  have 
their  retreat  cut  off  by  the  departure  of  their  ships, 
abandoned  the  defence  of  the  bridge,  and  ran  with 
all  the  speed  they  could  towards  the  galleys.  Some, 
getting  on  board  the  nearest  vessel,  overloaded  and 
sunk  them  :  part,  making  head  against  the  enemy, 
and  uncertain  what  course  to  take,  were  cut  to 
pieces  by  the  Alexandrians :  others,  more  fortunate, 
got  to  the  ships  that  rode  at  anchor ;  and  a  few,  by 
the  help  of  their  bucklers,  swam  to  the  nearest  ves¬ 
sels.  Caesar,  endeavouring  to  reanimate  his  men, 
and  lead  them  back  to  the  defence  of  the  works,  was 
exposed  to  the  same  danger  with  the  rest :  when, 
finding  them  universally  to  give  ground,  he  retreated 
C.;ES.  VpL.  II. — Q 


182 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


to  his  own  g’alley ;  whither  such  a  multitude  followed, 
and  crowded  after  him,  that  it  was  impossible  either 
to  work  or  put  her  oif.  Foreseeing-  what  must  hap¬ 
pen,  he  flung  himself  into  the  sea  and  swam  to  a  ship 
that  lay  at  some  distance.  Hence  despatching  boats 
to  succour  his  men,  he,  by  that  means,  preserved  a 
small  number.  His  own  ship,  sunk  by  the  multitude 
that  crowded  into  her,  perished  with  all  that  were 
on  board.  We  lost  in  this  action  about  four  hundred 
legionary  soldiers,  and  somewhat  above  that  number 
of  sailors  and  rowers.  The  Alexandrians  secured 
the  fort  by  strong  works,  and  a  great  number  of  en¬ 
gines  ;  and  having  cleared  away  the  stones  with 
which  Caesar  had  Mocked  up  the  port,  enjoyed  hence¬ 
forward  a  free  and  open  navigation. 

15.  Our  men,  instead  of  being  disheartened  at  this 
loss,  seemed  rather  roused  and  animated  by  it.  They 
were  making  continual  sallies  on  the  enemy,  to  de¬ 
stroy  or  check  the  progress  of  their  works  ;  fell  on 
them  as  often  as  they  had  an  opportunity  ;  and  never 
failed  to  intercept  them  when  they  ventured  to  ad¬ 
vance  beyond  their  fortifications.  In  short,  the  le¬ 
gions  were  so  bent  on  fighting,  that  they  even  out¬ 
stripped  the  orders  and  exhortations  of  Caesar.  They 
were  inconsolable  for  their  late  disgrace,  and  impa¬ 
tient  to  come  to  blows  with  the  enemy ;  insomuch, 
that  he  found  it  rather  necessary  to  restrain  and 
check  their  ardour,  than  incite  them  to  action. 

16.  The  Alexandrians,  perceiving  that  success 
confirmed  the  Romans,  and  that  adverse  fortune  only 
animated  them  the  more ;  as  they  knew  of  no  me¬ 
dium  between  these  on  which  to  ground  any  further 
hopes,  resolved,  either  by  the  advice  of  the  friends 
of  their  king  who  were  in  Caesar’s  quarter,  or  of 
their  motion ;  or,  perhaps,  on  an  intimation  from  the 
king  himself,  suggested  to  him  by  secret  emissaries, 
to  send  ambasadors  to  Caesar  to  demand  their  king. 
They  represented  “  that  the  people,  weary  of  sub¬ 
jection  to  a  woman  of  living  under  a  precarious 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 


183 


government,  and  submitting  to  the  cruel  laws  of  the 
tyrant  Ganymed,  instead  of  obeying  their  own  lawful 
king,  desired  nothing  so  much  as  to  have  him  among 
them :  that,  in  granting  their  request,  he  would  pave 
the  way  to  an  alliance,  and  extinguish  all  the  fears 
and  objections  that  had  hitherto  obstructed  it.” 
Though  Caesar  knew  the  nation  to  be  false  and  per¬ 
fidious,  seldom  speaking  as  they  really  thought,  he 
judged  it  best  however  to  comply  with  their  desire. 
He  even  flattered  himself  that  his  condescension  in 
sending  back  their  king  at  their  request,  would  pre¬ 
vail  on  them  to  be  faithful ;  or,  as  was  more  agree¬ 
able  to  their  character,  if  they  only  wanted  the  king 
to  head  their  army,  at  least  it  would  be  more  for  his 
honour  and  credit  to  have  to  do  with  a  monarch,  than 
with  a  band  of  slaves  and  fugitives.  Accordingly 
he  sent  Ptolemy  to  them,  exhorting  him  to  take  the 
government  into  his  own  hands,  and  consult  the 
welfare  of  so  fair  and  illustrious  a  kingdom,  defaced 
by  hideous  ruins  and  conflagrations ; — that  he  would 
make  his  subjects  sensible  of  their  duty,  preserve 
them  from  the  destruction  that  threatened  them,  and 
act  with  fidelity  towards  himself  and  the  Romans, 
who  put  so  much  confidence  in  him  as  to  send  him 
among  armed  enemies.  Then  taking  him  by  the 
hand,  he  told  him  he  was  at  liberty  to  depart.  But 
the  young  prince,  thoroughly  versed  in  the  art  of 
dissimulation,  and  no  way  degenerating  from  the 
character  of  his  nation,  entreated  Caesar,  with  tears, 
not  to  send  him  back  ;  for  that  his  company  was  to 
him  preferable  to  a  kingdom.  Caesar,  moved  at  his 
concern,  dried  up  his  tears  ;  and  telling  him,  if  these 
were  his  real  sentiments,  they  would  soon  meet 
again,  dismissed  him.  The  king,  like  a  wild  beast 
escaped  out  of  confinement,  carried  on  the  war  with 
such  acrimony  against  Caesar,  that  the  tears  he  shed 
at  parting  seemed  to  have  been  tears  of  joy.  Caesar’s 
lieutenants,  friends,  centurions,  and  soldiers  were 
not  a  little  pleased  at  this;  because,  through  his 


184 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


easiness  of  temper,  he  had  suifered  himself  to  be 
imposed  on  by  a  child:  as  if,  in  truth,  Caesar’s 
behaviour  on  this  occasion  had  been  the  effect  of 
easiness  of  temper,  and  not  of  the  most  consum¬ 
mate  prudence. 

17.  When  the  Alexandrians  found  that  the  resti¬ 
tution  of  their  king  had  neither  rendered  their  own 
party  stronger,  nor  the  Romans  weaker;  that  the 
troops  despised  the  youth  and  weakness  of  their 
king ;  and  that  their  affairs  were  no  way  bettered  by 
his  presence ;  they  were  greatly  discouraged :  the 
rather  because  a  report  ran,  that  a  great  body  of 
troops  was  marching  by  land  from  Syria  and  Cilicia 
to  Caesar’s  assistance,  of  which  he  had  not  as  yet 
himself  received  information.  This  howev  er  did  not 
hinder  their  design  of  intercepting  the  convoys  that 
came  to  him  by  sea.  To  this  end,  having  equipped 
some  ships,  they  ordered  them  to  cruise  before  the 
Canopic  branch  of  the  Nile,  by  which  they  thought 
it  most  likely  our  supplies  would  arrive.  Caesar, 
who  was  informed  of  it,  sent  likewise  his  fleet  to 
sea,  under  the  comrnand  of  Tiberius  Nero.  The 
Rhodian  galleys  made  part  of  this  squadron,  headed 
by  Euphranor  their  admiral,  without  whom  he  had 
little  hopes  of  success  from  any  maritime  expedition. 
But  fortune,  which  often  reserves  the  heaviest  dis¬ 
asters  for  those  who  have  been  loaded  with  her 
highest  favours,  encountered  Euphranor,  on  this  oc¬ 
casion,  with  an  aspect  very  different  from  what  she 
had  hitherto  worn :  for  when  our  ships  had  arrived 
at  Canopus,  and  the  fleets  drawn  up  on  each  side 
had  begun  the  engagement,  Euphranor,  according  to 
custom,  having  made  the  first  attack,  and  pierced 
and  sunk  one  of  the  enemy’s  ships ;  as  he  pursued 
the  next  a  considerable  way,  without  being  suffi¬ 
ciently  sustained  by  those  that  followed  him,  he  was 
surrounded  by  the  Alexandrians.  None  of  the  fleet 
advanced  to  his  relief,  either  out  of  fear  for  their  own 
safety,  or  because  they  imagined  he  would  easily 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 


185 


be  able  to  extricate  himself  by  his  courag-e  and  good 
fortune.  Accordingly  he  alone  behaved  well  in  this 
action ;  and,  being  abandoned  by  all  the  rest,  per¬ 
ished  with  his  victorious  galley. 

18.  About  the  same  time,  Mithridates  of  Perga- 
mus,  a  man  of  illustrious  descent,  distinguished  for 
his  bravery  and  knowledge  in  the  art  of  war,  and 
who  bore  a  very  high  place  in  the  friendship  and 
confidence  of  Caesar;  having  been  sent  in  the  begin¬ 
ning  of  the  Alexandrian  war  to  raise  succours  in 
Syria  and  Cilicia,  arrived  by  land  at  the  head  of  a 
great  body  of  troops,  which  his  diligence,  and  the 
affection  of  these  two  provinces,  had  enabled  him  to 
draw  together  in  a  very  short  time.  He  conducted 
them  first  to  Pelusium,  a  city  which  joins  Syria  to 
Egypt.  Achillas,  who  was  perfectly  well  acquainted 
with  its  importance,  had  seized  and  put  a  strong  gar¬ 
rison  into  it.  For  Egypt  is  considered  as  defended 
on  all  sides  by  strong  barriers ;  towards  the  sea  by 
the  Pharos,  and  towards  Syria  by  Pelusium,  which 
are  accounted  the  two  keys  of  that  kingdom.  He 
attacked  it  so  briskly  with  a  large  body  of  troops, 
fresh  men  continually  succeeding  in  the  place  of 
those  that  were  fatigued ;  and  urged  the  assault  with 
so  much  firmness  and  perseverance,  that  he  carried 
it  the  same  day,  and  placed  a  garrison  in  it.  Thence 
he  pursued  his  march  to  Alexandria,  reducing  all  the 
provinces  through  which  he  passed,  and  conciliating 
them  to  Caesar,  by  that  authority  which  always  ac¬ 
companies  victory. 

19.  Not  far  from  Alexandria  lies  Delta,  the  most 
celebrated  province  of  Egypt,  which  borrows  its 
name  from  the  Greek  letter  so  called :  for  the  Nile, 
dividing  the  two  channels,  which  gradually  run  off 
as  they  approach  the  sea,  into  which  they  at  last 
discharge  themselves,  at  a  considerable  distance 
from  one  another,  leaves  an  intermediate  space  in 
form  of  a  triangle.  The  king,  understanding  that 
Mitliridates  approached  this  place,  and  knowing  he 

Q  2 


186 


HIRTIUS’S  COMM'ENTARIES. 


must  pass  the  river,  sent  a  great  body  of  troops 
against  him,  sufficient,  as  he  thought,  if  not  to  over¬ 
whelm  and  crush  him,  at  least  to  stop  his  march ; 
for  though  he  earnestly  desired  to  see  him  defeated, 
yet  he  thought  it  a  great  point  gained  to  hinder  his 
junction  with  Caesar.  The  troops  that  first  passed 
the  river,  and  came  up  with  Mithridates,  attacked 
him  immediately,  that  they  might  alone  have  the 
honour  of  the  victory.  Mithridates  at  first  confined 
himself  to  the  defence  of  his  camp,  which  he  had 
with  great  prudence  fortified  according  to  the  custom 
of  the  Romans ;  but  observing  that  they  advanced 
insolently  and  without  caution,  he  sallied  on  them 
from  all  parts,  and  put  a  great  number  of  them  to  the 
sword  ;  insomuch,  that  but  for  their  knowledge  of  the 
places,  and  the  neighbourhood  of  the  vessels  in  which 
they  had  passed  the  river,  they  must  have  been  all 
destroyed.  But,  recovering  by  degrees  from  their 
terror,  and  joining  the  troops  that  followed  them, 
they  again  prepared  to  attack  Mithridates. 

20.  Mitliridates  sent  to  inform  Caesar  of  what  had 
happened ;  the  king  was  likewise  informed  on  his 
side.  Thus,  much  about  the  same  time,  Ptolemy 
set  out  to  crush  Mithridates,  and  Caesar  to  relieve 
him.  The  king  made  use  of  the  more  expeditious 
conveyance  of  the  Nile,  where  he  had  a  large  fleet 
in  readiness.  Caesar  declined  the  navigation  of  the 
river,  that  he  might  not  be  obliged  to  %ht  the  ene¬ 
my’s  fleet ;  and,  coasting  along  the  African  shore, 
found  means  to  join  the  victorious  troops  of  Mithri¬ 
dates  before  Ptolemy  could  attack  him. 

21.  The  king  had  encamped  in  a  very  dangerous 
place,  being  an  eminence  surrounded  on  all  sides  by 
a  plain.  Three  of  its  sides  were  secured  by  various 
defences.  One  adjoined  to  the  Nile,  the  other  was 
steep  and  inaccessible,  and  the  third  was  defended 
by  a  morass.  Between  Ptolemy’s  camp  and  Caesar’s 
route  lay  a  narrow  river  with  very  high  banks,  which 
discharged  itself  into  the  Nile.  This  river  was  aboin: 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 


187 


seven  miles  from  the  king’s  camp ;  who,  undei stand¬ 
ing  that  Caesar  directed  his  march  that  way,  sent 
all  his  cavalry,  with  a  choice  body  of  light-armed 
foot,  to  hinder  Caesar  from  passing,  and  maintain  an 
unequal  fight  from  the  banks,  where  courage  had 
no  opportunity  to  exert  itself,  and  cowardice  ran  no 
hazard.  Our  men,  both  horse  and  foot,  were  ex¬ 
tremely  mortified  that  the  Alexandrians  should  so 
long  maintain  their  ground  against  them.  Where¬ 
fore  the  German  cavalry,  dispersing  in  quest  of  a 
ford,  some  found  means  to  swim  the  river  where 
the  banks  were  lowest ;  and  the  legionaries  at  the 
same  time  cutting  down  several  large  trees  that 
reached  from  one  bank  to  another,  and  throwing 
them  into  the  water,  by  their  help  got  to  the  other 
side.  The  enemy,  unable  to  sustain  their  first  charge, 
betook  themselves  to  flight,  but  in  vain ;  for  very  few 
returned  to  the  king,  being  almost  all  cut  to  pieces 
in  the  pursuit. 

22.  Caesar,  on  this  success,  judging  that  his  sudden 
approach  must  strike  great  terror  into  the  Alexan¬ 
drians,  advanced  towards  their  camp  with  his  victo¬ 
rious  army ;  but  finding  it  well  intrenched,  strongly 
fortified  by  nature,  and  the  ramparts  crowded  with 
armed  soldiers,  he  did  not  think  proper  to  attack  it 
at  that  time,  as  his  troops  were  very  much  fatigued, 
both  by  their  march  and  the  late  battle ;  and  there¬ 
fore  encamped  at  a  small  distance  from  the  enemy. 
Next  day  he  attacked  a  fort,  in  a  village  not  far  off, 
which  the  king  had  joined  to  his  camp  by  a  line  of 
communication,  with  a  view  of  keeping  possession 
of  the  village.  He  employed  his  whole  army  in  this 
assault ;  not  because  it  would  have  been  difficult  to 
carry  it  with  a  few  forces  ;  but  with  design  of  falling 
immediately  on  the  enemy’s  camp,  during  the  alarm 
the  loss  of  this  fort  must  give  them.  Accordingly 
the  Romans,  in  continuing  the  pursuit  of  those  that 
fled  from  the  fort,  arrived  at  last  before  the  Alexan¬ 
drian  camp,  where  a  furious  battle  ensued.  There 


188 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


were  two  approaches  by  which  it  might  be  attacked : 
one  by  the  plain,  of  which  we  have  spoken  before ; 
the  other  by  a  narrow  pass  between  their  camp  and 
the  Nile.  The  first,  which  was  much  the  easiest, 
was  defended  by  a  numerous  body  of  their  best 
troops ;  and  the  access  on  the  side  of  the  Nile  gave 
the  enemy  great  advantages  in  distressing  and  wound¬ 
ing  our  men ;  for  they  were  exposed  to  a  double 
shower  of  darts :  in  front,  from  the  rampart ;  behind, 
from  the  river;  where  the  enemy  had  stationed  a 
great  number  of  ships,  furnished  with  archers  and 
slingers,  that  kept  a  continual  discharge.  Caesar 
observing  that  his  troops  fought  with  the  utmost 
ardour,  and  yet  made  no  great  progress,  on  account 
of  the  disadvantage  of  the  ground  ;  as  he  saw  they 
had  left  the  highest  part  of  their  camp  unguarded, 
because,  being  sufficiently  fortified  by  nature,  they 
had  all  crowded  to  the  other  attacks,  partly  to  have 
a  share  in  the  action,  partly  to  be  spectators  of  the 
issue  ;  he  ordered  some  cohorts  to  wheel  round  the 
camp,  and  gain  that  ascent ;  appointing  Carsulenus 
to  command  them,  a  brave  officer,  and  well  acquainted 
with  the  service.  When  they  had  reached  the  place, 
where  they  found  but  very  few  to  defend  it,  our  men 
attacked  them  so  briskly,  that  the  Alexandrians,  ter¬ 
rified  by  the  cries  they  heard  behind  them,  and  seeing 
themselves  attacked  both  in  front  and  rear,  fled  in 
the  utmost  consternation  on  all  sides.  Our  men, 
animated  by  the  confusion  of  the  enemy,  entered  the 
camp  in  several  places  at  the  same  time ;  and  run¬ 
ning  down  from  the  higher  ground,  put  a  great  num¬ 
ber  of  them  to  the  sword.  The  Alexandrians,  en¬ 
deavouring  to  escape,  threw  themselves  in  crowds 
over  the  rampart  next  the  river.  The  foremost 
tumbling  into  the  ditch,  where  they  were  crushed  to 
death,  furnished  an  easy  passage  for  those  that  fol¬ 
lowed.  The  king  made  his  escape  the  same  way ; 
but  by  the  crowd  that  followed  him,  the  ship  to 
which  he  fled  was  overloaded  and  sunk. 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 


189 


23.  After  this  speedy  and  successful  action,  Caesar, 
in  confidence  of  so  great  a  victory,  marched  the 
nearest  way  by  land  to  Alexandria  with  his  cavalry, 
and  entered  triumphant  into  that  part  of  the  town 
possessed  by  the  enemy.  He  was  not  mistaken  in 
thinking  that  the  Alexandrians,  on  hearing  of  the 
issue  of  the  battle,  would  give  over  all  thoughts  of 
war.  Accordingly,  as  soon  as  he  was  arrived,  he 
reaped  the  just  fruit  of  his  valour  and  magnanimity ; 
for  the  Alexandrians,  throwing  down  their  arms, 
abandoning  their  works,  and  assuming  the  habit  of 
suppliants,  came  forth  to  surrender  themselves  to 
Cassar,  preceded  by  all  those  sacred  symbols  of  reli¬ 
gion  with  which  they  were  wont  to  mollify  their 
offended  kings.  Caesar,  accepting  their  submission, 
and  encouraging  them,  advanced  through  the  ene¬ 
my’s  works  into  his  own  quarter  of  the  town,  where 
he  was  received  with  the  universal  congratulations 
of  his  party,  who  were  no  less  overjoyed  at  his 
arrival  and  presence,  than  at  the  happy  issue  of 
the  war. 

24.  Caesar  having  thus  made  himself  master  of 
Alexandria  and  Egypt,  lodged  the  government  in  the 
hands  of  those  to  whom  Ptolemy  had  bequeathed  it 
by  will,  appointing  the  people  of  Rome  his  executors, 
and  requesting  them  to  confirm  his  choice ;  for  the 
eldest  of  his  two  sons  being  dead,  he  settled  the  king¬ 
dom  on  the  youngest,  in  conjunction  with  his  sister 
Cleopatra,  who  had  always  continued  faithful  to  the 
Romans.  The  younger,  Arsinoe,  in  whose  name 
Ganymed,  as  we  have  seen,  reigned  for  some  time, 
he  thought  proper  to  banish  the  kingdom,  that  she 
might  not  raise  any  new  disturbance  before  the  king’s 
authority  should  be  firmly  established.  Things  thus 
settled,  he  carried  the  sixth  legion  with  him  into 
Syria,  leaving  the  rest  to  support  the  authority  of 
the  king  and  queen,  who  neither  stood  well  in  the 
affections  of  their  subjects,  on  account  of  their  at¬ 
tachment  to  Caesar,  nor  could  be  supposed  to  have 


190 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES, 


given  any  fixed  foundation  to  their  power,  in  an 
administration  of  only  a  few  days’  continuance.  It 
was  also  for  the  honour  and  interest  of  the  republic, 
that  if  they  continued  faithful,  our  forces  should  pro¬ 
tect  them ;  if  otherwise,  should  be  in  a  condition  to 
restrain  them.  Having  thus  settled  the  kingdom,  he 
marched  by  land  into  Syria. 

25.  While  these  things  passed  in  Egypt,  King  De- 
jotarus  applied  to  Domitius  Calvinus,  to  whom  Caesar 
had  intrusted  the  government  of  Asia  and  the  neigh¬ 
bouring  provinces,  beseeching  him  “  not  to  suffer 
Pharnaces  to  seize  and  lay  waste  the  Lesser  Arme¬ 
nia,  which  was  his  kingdom  ;  or  Cappadocia,  which 
belonged  to  Ariobarzanes  ;  because,  unless  they  were 
delivered  from  these  insults,  it  would  be  impossible 
for  them  to  execute  Caesar’s  orders,  or  raise  the 
money  they  stood  engaged  to  pay.”  Domitius,  who 
was  not  only  sensible  of  the  necessity  of  money  to 
defray  the  expenses  of  the  war,  but  likewise  thought 
it  dishonourable  to  the  people  of  Rome  and  Caesar, 
as  well  as  infamous  to  himself,  to  suffer  the  dominions 
of  allies  and  friends  to  be  usurped  by  a  foreign  prince  ; 
sent  ambassadors  to  Pharnaces,  to  acquaint  him, 
“  that  he  must  withdraw  immediately  out  of  Armenia 
and  Cappadocia,  and  no  longer  insult  the  majesty 
and  right  of  the  Roman  people,  engaged  in  a  civil 
war.”  But  believing  that  his  deputation  would  have 
greater  weight,  if  he  was  ready  to  second  it  himself 
at  the  head  of  an  army ;  he  repaired  to  the  legions 
which  were  then  in  Asia,  ordering  two  of  them  into 
Egypt,  at  Caesar’s  desire,  and  carrying  the  thirty- 
sixth  along  with  him.  To  this  Dejotarus  added  two 
more,  which  he  had  trained  up  for  several  years  ac¬ 
cording  to  our  discipline,  and  a  hundred  horse.  The 
like  number  of  horse  were  furnished  by  Ariobarzanes. 
At  the  same  time,  he  sent  P.  Sextius  to  C.  Plaetorius 
the  questor,  for  the  legion  which  had  been  lately 
levied  in  Pontus  ;  and  Quinctius  Patisius  into  Cilicia, 
to  draw  thence  a  body  of  auxiliary  troops.  All  these 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR.  19i 

forces  had  orders  to  rendezvous,  as  soon  as  possible 
at  Com  ana. 

26.  Meanwhile,  his  ambassadors  returned  with- 
Pharnaces’  answer,  “  That  he  had  quitted  Cappa¬ 
docia  ;  but  kept  possession  of  the  Lesser  Armenia, 
as  his  own  by  right  of  inheritance  ;  however,  he  was 
willing  to  submit  all  to  the  decision  of  Caesar,  to  whose 
commands  he  would  pay  immediate  obedience.”  C. 
Domitius,  sensible  that  he  had  quitted  Cappadocia, 
not  voluntarily,  but  out  of  necessity;  because  he 
could  more  easily  defend  Armenia,  which  lay  con¬ 
tiguous  to  his  own  kingdom,  than  Cappadocia,  which 
was  more  remote ;  and  because  believing,  at  first, 
that  Domitius  had  brought  all  the  three  legions  along 
with  him,  on  hearing  that  two  were  gone  to  Caesar, 
he  seemed  more  determined  to  keep  possession; 
insisted  “  on  his  quitting  Armenia  likewise,  the  rea¬ 
son  ill  both  cases  being  the  same ;  nor  was  it  just 
to  demand  that  the  matter  should  be  postponed  till 
Caesar’s  return,  unless  things  were  put  in  the  con¬ 
dition  in  which  they  were  at  first.”  Having  returned 
this  answer,  he  advanced  towards  Armenia  with  the 
forces  above-mentioned,  directing  his  march  along 
the  hills :  for  from  Pontus,  by  way  of  Comana,  runs 
a  woody  ridge  of  hills,  that  extend  as  far  as  Armenia 
the  Less,  dividing  it  from  Cappadocia.  The  advan¬ 
tages  he  had  in  view  by  such  a  march  were,  that 
he  would  thereby  effectually  prevent  all  surprises, 
and  be  plentifully  furnished  with  provisions  from 
Cappadocia. 

27.  Meantime  Pharnaces  was  perpetually  sending 
ambassadors  to  Domitius  with  presents,  and  to  treat  of 
peace.  All  these  he  firmly  rejected,  telling  the  de¬ 
puties  “  that  nothing  was  more  sacred  with  him  than 
the  majesty  of  the  Roman  people,  and  the  rights  of 
their  allies.”  After  a  long  march  he  reached  Nicop- 
olis,  a  city  of  Armenia  the  Less,  situated  in  a  plain, 
having  mountains,  however,  on  its  two  sides,  at  a 
considerable  distance.  Here  he  encamped,  about 


192 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


seven  miles  from  the  town.  Between  his  camp  and 
Nicopolis  lay  a  difficult  and  narrow  pass,  where 
Pharnaces  placed  a  chosen  body  of  foot  and  all  his 
horse,  in  ambuscade.  He  ordered  a  great  number 
of  cattle  to  be  dispersed  in  the  pass,  and  the  towns¬ 
men  and  peasants  to  show  themselves  ;  that  if  Do- 
mitius  entered  the  defile  as  a  friend,  he  might  have 
no  suspicion  of  an  ambuscade,  when  he  saw  the 
men  and  flocks  dispersed,  without  apprehension,  in 
the  fields ;  or  if  he  should  come  as  an  enemy,  that 
the  soldiers,  quitting  their  ranks  to  piUage,  might 
fall  an  easy  prey  to  his  troops. 

28.  While  this  design  was  going  forward,  he  never 
ceased  sending  ambassadors  to  Domitius,  with  pro¬ 
posals  of  peace  and  amity,  as  fancying,  by  this  means, 
the  more  easy  to  ensnare  him.  The  expectation  of 
peace  kept  Domitius  in  his  camp  ;  so  that  Pharnaces, 
disappointed  of  his  hopes,  and  fbaring  the  ambus¬ 
cade  might  be  discovered,  drew  off  his  troops.  Next 
day  Domitius  approached  Nicopolis,  and  encamped 
near  the  town.  While  our  men  were  working  at 
the  trenches,  Pharnaces  drew  up  his  army  in  order 
of  battle,  forming  his  front  into  one  line,  according 
to  the  custom  of  the  country,  and  securing  his  wings 
with  a  triple  body  of  reserves.  Domitius,  ordering 
part  of  the  troops  to  continue  under  arms  before  the 
rampart,  completed  the  fortifications  of  his  camp. 

29.  Next  night  Pharnaces,  having  intercepted  the 
couriers  who  brought  Domitius  an  account  of  the 
posture  of  affairs  at  Alexandria,  understood  that 
CjEsar  was  in  great  danger,  and  requested  Domitius 
to  send  him  succours  speedily,  and  come  himself  to 
Alexandria  by  the  way  of  Syria.  Pharnaces,  on 
this  intelligence,  imagined  that  protracting  the  time 
would  be  equivalent  to  a  victory ;  because  Domitius, 
he  supposed,  must  very  soon  depart.  He  therefore 
dug  two  ditches,  four  feet  deep,  at  a  moderate  dis¬ 
tance  from  each  other,  on  that  side  where  lay  the 
easiest  access  to  the  town,  and  our  forces  might 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 


193 


with  most  advantage  attack  him ;  resolving  not  to 
advance  beyond  them.  Between  these  he  constantly 
drew  up  his  army,  placing  all  his  cavalry  on  the 
wings  without  them,  which  greatly  exceeded  ours 
in  number,  and  would  otherwise  have  been  useless. 

30.  Domitius,  more  concerned  at  Caesar’s  danger 
than  his  own,  and  believing  he  could  not  retire  with 
safety,  should  he  now  desire  the  conditions  he  had 
rejected,  or  march  away  without  any  apparent  cause, 
drew  his  forces  out  of  the  camp,  and  ranged  them  in 
order  of  battle.  He  placed  the  thirty-sixth  legion 
on  the  right,  that  of  Pontus  on  the  left,  and  those 
of  Dejotarus  in  the  main  body ;  drawing  them  up 
with  a  very  narrow  front,  and  posting  the  rest  of  the 
cohorts  to  sustain  the  wings.  The  armies  thus 
drawn  up  on  each  side,  they  prepared  for  battle  ;  and 
the  signal  being  given  at  the  same  time  by  both 
parties,  the  engagement  began.  The  conflict  was 
sharp  and  various  :  for  the  thirty-sixth  legion,  falling 
on  the  king’s  cavalry  that  was  drawn  up  without  the 
ditch,  charged  them  so  successfully  that  they  drove 
them  to  the  very  walls  of  the  town,  passed  the  ditch, 
and  attacked  their  infantry  behind.  But  on  the  other 
side,  the  legion  of  Pontus  having  given  way,  the  second 
line,  which  advanced  to  sustain  them,  fetching  a  com¬ 
pass  round  the  ditch,  in  order  to  attack  the  enemy  in 
flank,  was  overwhelmed  and  borne  down  by  a  shower 
of  darts,  in  endeavouring  to  pass  it.  The  legions 
of  Dejotarus  scarce  made  any  resistance ;  so  that 
the  victorious  right  wing  and  main  body  of  the  king’s 
army  fell  on  the  thirty-sixth  legion,  which  yet  made 
a  brave  stand  ;  and  though  surrounded  by  the  forces 
of  the  enemy,  with  wonderful  presence  of  mind  cast 
themselves  into  an  orb,  and  retired  to  the  foot  of  a 
mountain,  whither  Pharnaces  did  not  think  fit  to 
pursue  them,  because  of  the  disadvantage  of  the 
place.  Thus  the  legion  of  Pontus,  being  almost 
wholly  cut  off,  with  great  part  of  those  of  Dejotarus, 
the  thirty-sixth  legion  retreated  to  an  eminence, 

Ca:s.  Vol.  IL — R 


194 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


with  the  loss  of  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  men. 
Several  Roman  knights  of  illustrious  rank  fell  in 
this  battle.  Domitius,  after  this  defeat,  rallied  the 
remains  of  his  broken  army,  and  retreated,  by  safe 
ways,  through  Cappadocia  into  Asia. 

31.  Pharnaces,  elated  with  this  success,  and  hoping 
that  Caesar  would  never  be  able  to  extricate  himself 
at  Alexandria,  entered  Pontus  with  all  his  forces. 
There,  acting  as  conqueror  and  king,  and  promising 
himself  a  happier  destiny  than  his  father,  he  ravaged 
their  towns,  seized  the  effects  of  the  Roman  citizens 
and  natives,  inflicted  punishments  worse  than  death 
on  such  as  were  distinguished  by  their  age  or  beauty; 
and  having  made  himself  master  of  all  Pontus,  as 
there  was  no  one  to  oppose  his  progress,  boasted 
that  he  had  recovered  his  father’s  kingdom. 

32.  About  the  same  time  we  received  a  consider¬ 
able  check  in  Illyricum ;  which  province  Q.  Corni- 
ficius,  Caesar’s  questor,  had  defended  the  preceding 
month,  not  only  without  insult,  but  even  with  hon¬ 
our,  and  a  conduct  worthy  of  praise.  Caesar  had 
sent  him  thither  the  summer  before  with  two  le¬ 
gions  ;  and  though  it  was  of  itself  little  able  to  sub¬ 
sist  an  army,  and  at  that  time  in  particular  almost 
’totally  ruined  by  the  neighbourhood  of  so  many 
wars,  yet  by  his  prudence,  vigilance,  and  uncommon 
care,  he  defended  and  kept  possession  of  it ;  for  he 
made  himself  master  of  several  forts,  built  on  emi¬ 
nences  whose  advantageous  situation  tempted  the 
inhabitants  to  make  descents  and  inroads  on  the 
country,  and  gave  the  plunder  of  them  to  his  soldiers ; 
which,  though  but  inconsiderable,  yet  as  they  were 
no  strangers  to  the  distress  and  ill  condition  of  the 
province,  did  not  cease  to  be  grateful ;  the  rather,  as 
it  was  the  fruit  of  their  own  valour.  And  when, 
after  the  battle  of  Pharsalia,  Octavius  had  retreated 
to  that  coast  with  a  large  fleet,  Cornificius,  with 
some  vessels  of  the  Judertini,  who  had  always  con¬ 
tinued  faithful  to  the  commonwealth,  made  himself 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 


195 


master  of  the  greatest  part  of  his  ships,  which, 
joined  to  those  of  the  Judertini,  rendered  him  capa¬ 
ble  of  sustaining  even  a  naval  engagement :  and 
while  Caesar,  victorious,  was  pursuing  Pompey  to 
the  remotest  parts  of  the  earth,  on  advice  that  the 
enemy  had,  for  the  most  part,  retired  into  Illyricum, 
on  account  of  its  neighbourhood  to  Macedonia,  and 
were  there  uniting  into  a  body,  he  wrote  to  Gabinius, 
“  To  repair  directly  thither  with  the  new-raised  le¬ 
gions,  and  join  Cornificius,that  in  case  of  any  danger 
to  the  province,  they  might  be  the  better  able  to 
protect  it ;  but  if  less  forces  sufficed,  to  march  into 
Macedonia,  which  he  foresaw  would  never  be  free 
from  commotions  so  long  as  Pompey  lived.” 

33.  Gabinius,  whether  he  imagined  the  province 
better  provided  than  it  really  was,  or  depended  much 
on  the  auspicious  fortune  of  Caesar,  or  confided  in 
his  own  valour  and  abilities,  having  often  terminated 
with  success  difficult  and  dangerous  wars,  marched 
into  Illyricum  in  the  middle  of  winter,  and  the  most 
difficult  season  of  the  year ;  where,  not  finding  suffi¬ 
cient  subsistence  in  the  province,  which  was  partly 
ruined,  partly  ill-affected ;  and  having  no  supplies 
by  sea,  because  the  season  of  'he  year  had  put  a  stop 
to  navigation,  he  found  himself  compelled  to  carry 
on  the  war,  not  according  to  his  own  inclination, 
but  as  necessity  allowed.  As  he  was  therefore 
obliged  to  lay  siege  to  forts  and  castles  in  a  very 
rude  season,  he  received  many  checks,  and  fell  under 
such  contempt  with  the  barbarians  that,  retiring  to 
Salona,  a  maritime  city,  inhabited  by  a  set  of  brave 
and  faithful  Romans,  he  was  attacked  on  his  march ; 
and  after  the  loss  of  two  thousand  soldiers,  thirty- 
eight  centurions,  and  four  tribunes,  got  to  Salona 
with  the  rest ;  where  his  wants  continually  increas¬ 
ing,  he  died  a  few  days  after.  His  misfortunes  and 
sudden  death  gave  Octavius  great  hopes  of  master¬ 
ing  the  province :  but  fortune,  whose  influence  is 
so  great  in  matters  of  war,  joined  to  the  diligence 


196 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


of  Cornificius,  and  the  valour  of  Vatinius,  soon  put 
an  end  to  his  triumphs. 

34.  For  Vatinius,  who  was  then  at  Brundusium, 
having  intelligence  of  what  passed  in  lllyricum  by 
letters  from  Cornificius,  who  pressed  him  to  come 
to  the  assistance  of  the  province,  and  informed  him 
that  Octavius  had  leagued  with  the  barbarians,  and 
in  several  places  attacked  our  garrisons,  partly  by 
sea  with  his  fleet,  partly  by  land,  with  the  troops 
of  the  barbarians :  Vatinius,  I  say,  on  notice  of  these 
things,  though  extremely  weakened  by  sickness,  in¬ 
somuch  that  his  strength  of  body  no  way  answered 
his  resolution  and  greatness  of  mind — yet,  by  his 
valour,  surmounted  all  opposition,  the  force  of  his 
distemper,  the  rigour  of  the  season,  and  the  diffi¬ 
culties  of  a  sudden  preparation :  for  having  himself 
but  a  very  few  galleys,  he  wrote  Q.  Kalenus,  in 
Achaia,  to  furnish  him  with  a  squadron  of  ships ; 
but  these  not  coming  with  that  despatch  which  the 
danger  our  army  was  in  required,  because  Octavius 
pressed  hard  on  them,  he  fastened  beaks  to  all  the 
barks  and  vessels  that  lay  in  the  port,  whose  number 
was  considerable  enough,  though  they  were  not 
sufficiently  large  for  an  engagement.  Joining  these 
to  what  galleys  he  had,  and  putting  the  veteran  sol¬ 
diers  aboard,  whereof  he  had  a  great  number,  who 
had  been  left  sick  at  Brundusium  when  the  army 
went  over  to  Greece,  he  sailed  for  lllyricum  ;  where, 
having  subjected  several  maritime  states  that  had 
declared  for  Octavius,  and  neglecting  such  as  con¬ 
tinued  obstinate  in  their  revolt,  because  he  would 
suffer  nothing  to  retard  his  design  of  meeting  the 
enemy, — he  came  up  with  Octavius  before  Epidau- 
rus  ;  and  obliging  him  to  raise  the  siege,  which  he 
was  carrying  on  with  great  vigour  by  sea  and  land, 
joined  the  garrison  to  his  own  forces. 

35.  Octavius,  understanding  that  Vatinius’s  fleet 
consisted  mostly  of  small  barks,  and  confiding  in  the 
strength  of  his  own,  stopped  at  the  isle  of  Tauris 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 


197 


Vatinius  followed  him  thither,  not  imagining  he 
would  halt  at  that  place,  but  because  he  was  deter¬ 
mined  to  pursue  him  wherever  he  went.  Yatinius, 
who  had  no  suspicion  of  an  enemy,  and  whose  ships 
were  moreover  dispersed  by  a  tempest,  perceived, 
as  he  approached  the  isle,  a  vessel  filled  with  sol¬ 
diers,  that  advanced  towards  him  with  full  sails. 
On  this  he  gave  orders  for  furling  the  sails,  lowering 
the  sail-yards,  and  arming  the  soldiers ;  and  hoisting 
a  flag  as  a  signal  for  battle,  intimated  to  the  ships 
that  followed  to  do  the  same.  Our  men  prepared 
themselves  in  the  best  manner  their  sudden  surprise 
would  allow,  while  Octavius  advanced  in  good  order 
from  the  port.  The  two  fleets  drew  up.  Octavius 
had  the  advantage  as  to  disposition,  and  Vatinius  in 
the  bravery  of  his  troops. 

36.  Vatinius,  finding  himself  inferior  to  the  en¬ 
emy,  both  in  the  number  and  largeness  of  his  ships, 
resolved  to  commit  the  affair  to  fortune,  and  there¬ 
fore,  in  his  own  quinquereme,  attacked  Octavius  in 
his  four-benched  galley.  This  he  did  with  such  vio¬ 
lence,  and  the  shock  was  so  great,  that  the  beak  of 
Octavius’s  galley  was  broke.  The  battle  raged  with 
great  fury  likewise  in  other  places,  but  chiefly  round 
the  two  admirals  ;  for  as  the  ships  on  each  side  ad¬ 
vanced  to  sustain  those  that  fought,  a  close  and 
furious  conflict  ensued  in  a  very  narrow  sea,  where 
the  nearer  the  vessels  approached,  the  more  hadVa- 
tinius’s  soldiers  the  advantage  ;  for,  with  admirable 
courage  they  leaped  into  the  enemy’s  ships,  and 
forcing  them  by  this  means  to  an  equal  combat,  soon 
mastered  them  by  their  superior  valour.  Octavius’s 
galley  was  sunk ;  many  others  were  taken,  or  suf¬ 
fered  the  same  fate.  The  soldiers  were  partly  slain 
in  the  ships,  partly  thrown  overboard  into  the  sea 
Octavius  got  into  a  boat,  which,  sinking  under  the 
multitude  that  crowded  after  him,  he  himself,  though 
wounded,  swam  to  his  brigantine,  where  being  taken, 
up,  and  night  having  put  an  end  to  the  battle,  as  the 


198  HIRTirs’s  COMMENTARIES. 

wind  blew  very  strong,  he  spread  all  his  sails  and 
fled.  A  few  of  his  ships  that  had  the  good  fortune 
to  escape,  followed  him. 

37.  Vatinius,  seeing  the  enemy  entirely  defeated, 
sounded  a  retreat,  and  entered  victorious  the  port 
whence  Octavius  had  sailed  to  fight  him,  without  the 
loss  of  a  single  vessel.  He  took  in  this  battle  one 
quinquereme,  two  triremes,  eight  two-benched  gal¬ 
leys,  and  a  great  number  of  rowers.  The  next  day 
was  employed  in  repairing  his  own  fleet  and  the 
ships  he  had  taken  from  the  enemy :  after  which  he 
sailed  for  the  island  of  Issa,  imagining  Octavius 
would  retire  thither  after  his  defeat.  In  this  island 
was  a  flourishing  city,  well  affected  to  Octavius, 
which  however  surrendered  to  Vatinius  on  the 
first  summons.  Here  he  understood  that  Octavius, 
attended  by  a  few  small  barks,  had  sailed,  with  a  fair 
wind,  for  Greece,  whence  he  intended  to  pass  on  to 
Sicily,  and  afterward  to  Africa.  Vatinius,  having 
in  so  short  a  space  successfully  terminated  the  affairs 
of  Illyricum,  restored  the  province  in  a  peaceable 
condition  to  Cornificius,  and  driven  the  enemy’s 
fleet  out  of  those  seas,  returned  victorious  to  Brun- 
dusium,  with  his  army  and  fleet  in  good  condition. 

38.  While  Caesar  besieged  Pompey  at  Dyrrha- 
chium,  triumphed  at  Pharsalia,  and  carried  on  the 
war  with  so  much  danger  at  Alexandria,  Cassius 
Longinus,  who  had  been  left  in  Spain  as  propretor 
of  the  farther  province,  either  through  his  natural 
disposition,  or  out  of  a  hatred  he  had  contracted  to 
the  province,  because  of  a  wound  he  had  treacher¬ 
ously  received  there  when  questor,  drew  on  him¬ 
self  the  general  dislike  of  the  people.  He  discerned 
this  temper  among  them,  partly  from  a  conscious¬ 
ness  that  he  deserved  it,  partly  from  the  manifest 
indications  they  gave  of  their  discontent.  To  secure 
himself  against  their  disaffection,  he  endeavoured  to 
gain  the  love  of  the  soldiers ;  and  having  for  this 
purpose  assembled  them  together,  he  promised  them 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 


199 


a  hundred  sesterces  a  man.  Soon  after,  having 
made  himself  master  of  Medobrega,  a  town  in  Lusi¬ 
tania,  and  of  Mount  Herminius,  whither  the  Medo- 
bregians  had  retired;  and  being  on  that  occasion 
saluted  Imperator  by  the  army,  he  gave  them  an¬ 
other  hundred  sesterces  each.  These,  accompanied 
with  other  considerable  largesses  in  great  number, 
seemed  for  the  present  to  increase  the  good  will  of 
the  army ;  but  tended  gradually  and  imperceptibly 
to  the  relaxation  of  military  discipline. 

39.  Cassius,  having  sent  his  ^rmy  into  winter- 
quarters,  fixed  his  residence  at  Cordova  for  the  ad¬ 
ministration  of  justice.  Being  greatly  in  debt,  he 
resolved  to  pay  it  by  laying  heavy  impositions  on 
the  province  ;  and  according  to  the  custom  of  prodi¬ 
gals,  made  his  liberalities  a  pretence  to  justily  the 
most  exorbitant  demands.  He  taxed  the  rich  at  dis¬ 
cretion,  and  compelled  them  to  pay,  without  the 
least  regard  to  their  remonstrances  ;  frequently  im¬ 
proving  light  and  trifling  offences  as  a  handle  for  all 
manner  of  extortions.  All  methods  of  gain  were 
pursued,  whether  great  and  apparent,  or  mean  and 
sordid.  None  that  had  any  thing  to  lose  could  es¬ 
cape  accusation ;  insomuch,  that  the  plunder  of  their 
private  fortunes  was  aggravated  by  the  dangers  they 
were  exposed  to  from  pretended  crimes. 

40.  Thus  Longinus,  acting  the  same  part  when 
proconsul  which  he  had  done  when  questor,  drew 
on  himself  the  like  conspiracies  against  his  life. 
Even  his  own  dependents  concurred  in  the  general 
hatred  ;  who,  though  the  ministers  of  his  rapine,  yet 
hated  the  man  by  whose  authority  they  committed 
those  crimes.  The  odium  still  increased  on  his 
raising  a  fifth  legion,  w'hich  added  to  the  expense 
and  burden  of  the  province.  The  cavalry  was  aug¬ 
mented  to  three  thousand,  with  costly  ornaments 
and  equipage  ;  nor  had  the  people  any  respite  from 
his  extortions. 

41.  Meanwhile  he  received  orders  from  Caesar  to 


200  HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 

transport  his  array  into  Africa,  and  march  through 
Mauritania  towards  Numidia,  because  King  Juba  had 
sent  considerable  succours  to  Pompey,  and  was  pre¬ 
paring  to  send  more.  These  letters  filled  him  with 
an  insolent  joy,  for  the  opportunity  they  offered  him 
of  pillaging  new  provinces  and  a  wealthy  kingdom. 
He  therefore  hastened  into  Lusitania  to  assemble 
his  legions,  and  draw  together  a  body  of  auxiliaries ; 
appointing  certain  persons  to  provide  corn,  ships, 
and  money,  that  nothing  might  retard  him  at  his  re¬ 
turn,  which  was  much  sooner  than  expected ;  for 
when  interest  called,  Cassius  wanted  neither  indus¬ 
try  nor  vigilance.  , 

42.  Having  got  his  army  together,  and  encamped 
near  Cordova,  he  made  a  speech  to  his  soldiers, 
wherein  he  acquainted  them  with  the  orders  he  had 
received  from  Caesar,  and  promised  them  a  hundred 
sesterces  each  when  they  should  arrive  in  Maurita¬ 
nia.  The  fifth  legion,  he  told  them,  was  to  remain 
in  Spain.  Having  ended  his  speech,  he  returned  to 
Cordova.  The  same  day,  about  noon,  as  he  went 
to  the  hall  of  justice,  one  Minutius  Silo,  a  client  of 
L.  Racilius,  presented  him  with  a  paper,  in  a  sol¬ 
dier’s  habit,  as  if  he  had  some  request  to  make : 
then  retiring  behind  Racilius  (who  walked  beside 
Cassius),  as  if  waiting  for  an  answer,  he  insensibly 
drew  near ;  and  a  favourable  opportunity  offering, 
seized  Cassius  with  his  left  hand,  and  wounded  him 
twice  with  a  dagger  in  his  right.  The  noise  this 
occasioned  was  as  a  signal  to  the  conspirators,  who 
all  rushed  on  him  in  a  body.  Miinatius  Plancus 
killed  the  lictor  that  was  next  Longinus,  and  wounded 
Q.  Cassius,  his  lieutenant.  T.  Vasius  and  L.  Mer- 
gilio  seconded  their  countryman  Plancus  ;  for  they 
were  all  Italians.  L.  Licinius  Squillus  flew  on  Lon¬ 
ginus  himself,  and  gave  him  several  slight  wounds 
as  he  lay  on  the  ground.  By  this  time  his  guards 
came  up  to  his  assistance  (for  he  always  had  a  body 
of  veterans,  armed  with  darts,  to  attend  him),  and 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 


201 


surrounded  the  rest  of  the  conspirators,  who  were 
advancing  to  complete  the  assassination.  Of  this 
number  were  Calpurnius  Salvianus  and  Manilius 
Tusculus.  Cassius  was  carried  home ;  and  Minii- 
tius  Silo,  stumbling  on  a  stone  as  he  endeavoured 
to  make  his  escape,  was  taken  and  brought  to  him. 
Racilius  retired  to  the  neighbouring  house  of  a  friend 
till  he  should  have  certain  information  of  the  fate 
of  Cassius.  L.  I.aterensis,  not  doubting  but  he  was 
despatched,  rati,  in  a  transport  of  joy,  to  the  camp, 
to  congratulate  the  second  and  the  new-raised  le¬ 
gions  on  it,  who,  he  knew,  bore  a  particular  hatred 
to  Cassius ;  and  who,  immediately  on  this  intelli¬ 
gence,  placed  him  on  the  tribunal,  and  proclaimed 
him  pretor ;  for  there  was  not  a  native  of  the  prov¬ 
ince,  nor  a  soldier  of  the  new-raised  legion,  nor  a 
person  who  by  long  residence  was  naturalized  to 
the  province,  of  which  kind  the  second  legion  con¬ 
sisted,  who  did  not  join  in  the  general  hatred  of  Cas¬ 
sius.  Meantime  Laterensis  was  informed  that  Cas¬ 
sius  was  still  alive  ;  at  which  being  rather  grieved 
than  disconcerted,  he  immediately  so  far  recovered 
himself  as  to  go  and  wait  on  him.  By  this  time  the 
thirtieth  legion,  having  notice  of  what  had  passed, 
marched  to  Cordova  to  the  assistance  of  their 
general.  The  twenty-first  and  fifth  followed  their 
example.  As  only  two  legions  remained  in  the 
camp,  the  second,  fearing  they  should  be  left  alone, 
and  thereby  have  their  sentiments  known,  did  the 
same :  but  the  new-raised  legion  continued  firm,  nor 
could  be  induced  by  any  motives  of  fear  to  stir  from 
its  place.  Cassius  ordered  all  the  accomplices  of 
the  conspiracy  to  be  seized,  and  sent  back  the  fifth 
legion  to  the  camp,  retaining  the  other  three.  By 
the  confession  of  Minutius,  he  learned  that  L.  Ra¬ 
cilius,  L.  Laterensis,  and  Annius  Scapula,  a  man  of 
great  authority  and  credit  in  the  province,  and 
equally  in  his  confidence  with  Laterensis  and  Ra¬ 
cilius,  were  concerned  in  the  plot :  nor  did  he  long 


202 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


defer  his  revenge,  but  ordered  them  to  be  put  to 
death.  He  delivered  Minutius  to  be  racked  by  his 
freedmen;  likewise  Calpurnius  Salvianus;  who,  turn¬ 
ing  evidence,  increased  the  number  of  the  conspira¬ 
tors — justly,  as  some  think;  but  others  pretend  that 
he  was  forced.  L.  Mergilio  was  likewise  put  to  the 
torture.  Squillus  impeached  many  others,  who  were 
all  condemned  to  die,  except  such  as  redeemed  their 
lives  by  a  fine  :  for  he  pardoned  Calpurnius  for  ten, 
and  Q.  Sextius  for  fifty  thousand  sesterces ;  who, 
though  deeply  guilty,  yet  having  in  this  manner  es¬ 
caped  death,  showed  Cassius  to  be  no  less  covetous 
than  cruel. 

43.  Some  days  after  he  received  letters  from 
Caesar,  with  an  account  of  Pompey’s  defeat  and 
flight ;  which  news  equally  affected  him  with  joy 
and  sorrow.  Caesar’s  success  gave  him  pleasure  ; 
but  the  conclusion  of  the  war  would  put  an  end  to 
his  rapines :  insomuch  that  he  was  uncertain  which 
to  wish  for,  victory  or  an  unbounded  licentiousness. 
When  he  was  cured  of  his  wounds,  he  sent  to  all 
who  were  indebted  to  him  in  any  sums,  add  insisted 
on  immediate  payment.  Such  as  were  taxed  too 
low  had  orders  to  furnish  larger  sums.  Such  Ro¬ 
man  citizens  as  had  been  levied  in  the  several  colo¬ 
nies  of  the  province,  and  were  alarmed  at  the  thoughts 
of  a  foreign  expedition,  obtained  their  discharge  for 
a  certain  sum.  This  brought  in  a  vast  revenue,  but 
greatly  increased  the  general  hatred.  He  after¬ 
ward  reviewed  the  army ;  sent  the  legions  and  aux¬ 
iliaries  designed  for  Africa  towards  the  Straits  Of 
Hercules,  and  went  himself  to  Seville  to  examine 
the  condition  of  the  fleet.  He  staid  there  some 
time,  in  consequence  of  an  edict  he  had  published, 
ordering  all  who  had  not  paid  the  sums  in  which 
they  were  amerced  to  repair  to  him  thither ;  which 
created  a  universal  murmuring  and  discontent. 

44.  In  the  mean  time,  L.  Titius,  a  military  tribune 
of  the  new-raised  legion,  sent  him  notice  of  a 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 


203 


report,  that  the  thirtieth  leg-ion,  one  of  those  he  was 
carrying  with  him  to  Africa,  had  mutinied  at  Ilurgis, 
killed  some  of  the  centurions  that  opposed  them, 
and  were  gone  over  to  the  second  legion,  who 
marched  another  way  towards  the  straits.  On  this 
intelligence  he  set  out  by  night,  with  five  cohorts  of 
the  twenty-first  legion,  and  came  up  with  them  in 
the  morning.  He  staid  there  that  day,  to  consult 
what  was  proper  to  be  done,  and  then  went  to  Car¬ 
mona,  where  he  found  the  thirtieth  and  twenty-first 
legions,  with  four  cohorts  of  the  fifth,  and  all  the 
cavalry,  assembled.  Here  he  learned  that  the  new- 
raised  legion  had  surprised  four  cohorts,  near  Obu- 
cula,  and  forced  them  along  with  them  to  the  second 
legion,  where  all  joining,  they  had  chosen  T.  Tho- 
rius,  an  Italian,  for  their  general.  Having  instantly 
called  a  council,  he  sent  Marcellus  to  Cordova,  to 
secure  that  town,  and  Q.  Cassius,  his  lieutenant,  to 
Seville.  A  few  days  after,  news  was  brought  that 
Cordova  had  revolted,  and  that  Marcellus,  either 
voluntarily,  or  through  force  (for  the  reports  were 
various),  had  joined  them  ;  as  likewise  the  two  co¬ 
horts  of  the  fifth  legion  that  were  in  garrison  there. 
Cassius,  provoked  at  these  mutinies,  decamped,  and 
the  next  day  came  to  Segovia,  on  the  river  Xenil. 
There  summoning  an  assembly,  to  sound  the  dispo¬ 
sition  of  the  troops,  he  found  that  it  was  not  out  of 
any  regard  to  him,  but  to  Caesar,  though  absent,  that 
they  continued  faithful,  and  were  ready  to  undergo 
any  danger  for  the  recovery  of  the  province. 

45.  Meantime  Thorius  marched  the  veteran  le¬ 
gions  to  Cordova ;  and  that  the  revolt  might  not  ap¬ 
pear  to  spring  from  a  seditious  inclination  in  him  or 
the  soldiers,  as  likewise  to  oppose  an  equal  authority 
to  that  of  Q.  Cassius,  who  was  drawing  together  a 
great  force  in  Caesar’s  name,  he  publicly  gave  out 
that  his  design  was  to  recover  the  province  for  Pom- 
pey.  Nay,  perhaps  he  was  really  influenced  by  a 
love  for  Pompey,  whose  naiDe  was  dear  to  those 


204  HIRTIUs’s  COMMENTARIES. 

legions  that  had  served  under  Varro.  Be  this  as  it 
will,  Thorius  at  least  made  it  his  pretence  ;  and  the 
soldiers  were  so  infatuated  with  the  thought,  that 
they  had  Pompey’s  name  inscribed  on  their  bucklers. 
The  citizens  of  Cordova,  men,  women,  and  children, 
came  out  to  meet  the  legions ;  “  begging  they  would 
not  enter  Cordova  as  enemies,  seeing  they  joined 
with  them  in  their  aversion  to  Cassius,  and  only 
desired  they  might  not  be  obliged  to  act  against 
Caesar.” 

46.  The  soldiers,  moved  by  the  prayers  and  tears 
of  so  great  a  multitude,  and  seeing  they  stood  in  no 
need  of  Pompey’s  name  and  memory  to  spirit  up  a 
revolt  against  Cassius,  as  he  was  equally  odious  to 
the  partisans  of  both  parties,  neither  being  able  to 
prevail  with  Marcellus,  or  the  people  of  Cordova,  to 
declare  against  Caesar ;  they  erased  Pompey’s  name 
from  their  bucklers,  chose  Marcellus  their  com¬ 
mander,  joined  the  citizens  of  Cordova,  and  en¬ 
camped  near  the  town.  Two  days  after,  Cassius 
encamped  on  an  eminence,  on  this  side  the  Baetis, 
about  four  miles  from  Cordova,  and  within  view  of 
the  town;  whence  he  sent  letters  to  Bogud,  in 
Mauritania,  and  M.  Lepidus,  proconsul  of  Hither 
Spain,  to  come  to  his  assistance  as  soon  as  possible, 
for  Caesar’s  sake.  Meanwhile  he  ravaged  the  coun¬ 
try,  and  set  fire  to  the  buildings  round  Cordova. 

47.  The  legions  under  Marcellus,  provoked  at  this 
indignity,  ran  to  him  and  begged  to  be  led  against 
the  enemy,  that  they  might  have  an  opportunity  of 
fighting  them  before  they  could  have  time  to  destroy, 
with  fire  and  sword,  the  rich  and  noble  possessions 
of  the  Cordovians.  Marcellus,  though  averse  to 
battle,  which,  whoever  was  victorious,  must  turn  to 
Caesar’s  detriment,  yet,  unable  to  restrain  the  le¬ 
gions,  crossed  the  Baetis,  and  drew  up  his  men. 
Cassius  did  the  same,  on  a  rising  ground ;  but  as  he 
would  not  quit  his  advantageous  post,  Marcellus  per¬ 
suaded  his  men  to  return  to  their  camp.  He  had 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 


205 


already  begun  to  retire,  when  Cassius,  knowing  him¬ 
self  to  be  stronger  in  cavalry,  fell  on  the  legionaries 
with  his  horse,  and  made  a  considerable  slaughter  in 
their  rear,  on  the  banks  of  the  river.  This  check 
making  Marcellus  sensible  of  the  mistake  he  had 
committed  in  passing  the  river,  he  removed  his 
camp  to  the  other  side,  where  both  armies  fre¬ 
quently  drew  up,  but  did  not  engage  on  account  of 
the  inequality  of  the  ground. 

48.  Marcellus  was  stronger  in  foot,  for  he  com¬ 
manded  veteran  soldiers  of  great  experience  in  war: 
Cassius  depended  more  on  the  fidelity  than  the  cour¬ 
age  of  his  troops.  The  two  camps  being  very  near 
each  other,  Marcellus  seized  a  spot  of  ground,  where 
he  built  a  fort,  very  convenient  for  depriving  the 
enemy  of  water.  Longinus,  apprehending  he  should 
be  besieged  in  a  country  where  all  were  against  him, 
quitted  his  camp  in  the  night,  and  by  a  quick  march 
reached  Ulla,  a  town  on  which  he  thought  he  could 
rely.  There  he  encamped,  so  near  the  walls  that 
both  by  the  situation  of  the  place  (for  Ulla  stands 
on  an  eminence)  and  the  defence  of  the  town  he 
was  on  all  sides  secure  from  an  attack.  Marcellus 
followed  him,  and  encamped  as  near  the  town  as  pos¬ 
sible.  Having  taken  a  view  of  the  place,  he  found 
himself  reduced,  by  necessity,  to  do  what  was  most 
agreeable  to  his  own  inclination;  and  neither  en¬ 
gage  Cassius,  which  the  ardour  of  his  soldiers  would 
have  forced  him  to,  had  it  been  possible,  nor  suffer 
him  by  his  excursions  to  infest  the  territories  of 
other  states,  as  he  had  done  that  of  Cordova.  He 
therefore  raised  redoubts  in  proper  places,  and  con¬ 
tinued  his  works  quite  round  the  town,  enclosing 
both  Ulla  and  Cassius  within  his  lines.  But  before 
they  were  finished,  Cassius  sent  out  all  his  cavalry, 
who  he  imagined  might  do  him  great  service,  by 
cutting  off  Marcellus’s  provisions  and  forage ;  and 
could  only  be  a  useless  encumbrance  on  him,  by  con- 

Cacs.  Vol.  H. — S 


206  HIRTIUs’s  COMMENTARIES. 

suming-  his  provisions,  if  he  was  shut  up  in  his 
camp. 

49.  A  few  days  after,  King  Bogud,  having  received 
Cassius’  letter,  came  and  joined  him  with  all  his 
forces,  consisting  of  one  legion,  and  seven  auxiliary 
cohorts ;  for,  as  commonly  happens  in  civil  dissen¬ 
sions,  some  of  the  states  of  Spain  at  that  time  fa¬ 
voured  Cassius,  but  yet  a  greater  number  Marcellus. 
Bogud  came  up  to  the  advanced  works  of  Marcellus, 
where  many  sharp  skirmishes  happened,  with  vari¬ 
ous  success :  however,  Marcellus  still  kept  posses¬ 
sion  of  his  works. 

50.  Meanwhile  Lepidus,  from  the  higher  province, 
with  thirty-five  legionary  cohorts,  and  a  great  body 
of  horse  and  auxiliaries,  came  to  Ulla,  with  a  de¬ 
sign  to  adjust  the  differences  between  Cassius  and 
Marcellus.  Marcellus  submitted  without  hesitation ; 
but  Cassius  kept  within  his  works,  either  because 
he  thought  his  cause  the  justest,  or  from  apprehen¬ 
sion  that  his  adversary’s  submission  had  prepos¬ 
sessed  Lepidus  in  his  favour.  Lepidus  encamped 
with  Marcellus,  at  TJlla,  prevented  a  battle,  invited 
Cassius  in  to  his  camp,  and  engaged  his  honour  to 
act  without  prejudice.  Cassius  hesitated  long,  but  at 
last  desired  that  the  circumvallation  should  be  lev¬ 
elled,  and  free  egress  given  him.  The  truce  was  not 
only  concluded,  but  the  works  demolished,  and  the 
guards  drawn  off ;  when  King  Bogud  attacked  one  of 
Marcellus’s  forts,  that  lay  nearest  to  his  camp,  un¬ 
known  to  any  (unless  perhaps  Longinus,  who  was 
not  exempt  from  suspicion  on  this  occasion),  and 
slew  a  great  number  of  his  men :  and  had  not  Lepi¬ 
dus  interposed,  much  mischief  would  have  been 
done. 

51.  A  free  passage  being  made  for  Cassius,  Mar¬ 
cellus  joined  camps  with  Lepidus  ;  and  both  together 
marched  for  Cordova,  while  Cassius  retired  to  Car¬ 
mona.  At  the  same  time,  Trebonius,  the  proconsul, 
came  to  take  possession  of  the  province.  Cassius, 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 


207 


having  notice  of  his  arrival,  sent  his  legions  and 
cavalry  into  winter-quarters,  and  hastened,  Avitli  all 
his  effects,  to  Melaca,  where  he  embarked  immedi¬ 
ately,  though  it  was  the  winter  season,  that  he  might 
not,  as  he  pretended,  come  into  the  power  of  Mar- 
cellus,  Lepidus,  and  Trebonius ;  as  his  friends  gave 
out,  to  avoid  passing  through  a  province  great  part 
of  which  had  revolted  from  him ;  but,  as  was  more 
generally  believed,  to  secure  the  money  he  had 
amassed  by  his  numberless  extortions.  The  wind 
favouring  him  as  far  as  could  be  expected  at  that 
season  of  the  year,  he  put  into  the  Iberus,  to  avoid 
sailing  in  the  night ;  and  thence  continuing  his  voy¬ 
age,  which  he  thought  he  might  do  with  safety, 
though  the  wind  blew  considerably  fresher,  he  was 
encountered  by  such  a  storm,  at  the  mouth  of  the 
river,  that  being  neither  able  to  return,  because  of 
the  stream,  nor  stem  the  fury  of  the  waves,  the 
ship  and  all  that  were  in  her  perished. 

52.  Caesar,  arriving  in  Syria  from  Egypt,  and  un¬ 
derstanding  by  those  who  attended  him  there  from 
Rome,  and  the  letters  he  received,  at  the  same  time, 
that  the  government  was  on  a  very  bad  footing,  and 
all  the  affairs  of  the  commonwealth  managed  indis¬ 
creetly, — that  the  contests  of  the  tribunes  were  pro¬ 
ducing  perpetual  seditions,  and  the  remissness  of  the 
officers  of  the  legions  destroying  military  discipline, — 
all  which  required  his  speedy  presence  to  redress, — 
thought  it  yet  first  incumbent  on  him  to  settle  the 
state  of  the  provinces  through  which  he  passed ; 
that,  freeing  them  from  domestic  contentions,  and 
the  fear  of  a  foreign  enemy,  the  laws  might  have  a 
free  course.  This  he  hoped  soon  to  effect  in  Syria, 
Cilicia,  and  Asia,  because  these  provinces  were  not 
involved  in  war.  In  Bithynia  and  Pontus,  indeed, 
he  expected  more  trouble,  because  he  understood 
Pharnaces  still  continued  in  Pontus,  and  was  not 
likely  to  quit  it  easily,  being  flushed  with  the  victory 
he  had  obtained  over  Domitius  Calvinus.  He  made 


208 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


a  short  stay  in  most  states  of  note,  distributing 
rewards  both  publicly  and  privately  to  such  as  de¬ 
served  them ;  determining  old  controversies ;  and 
receiving  into  his  protection  the  kings,  princes,  and 
potentates,  as  well  of  the  provinces  as  of  the  neigh¬ 
bouring  countries :  and  having  settled  the  necessary 
regulations  for  the  defence  of  the  country,  he  dis¬ 
missed  them,  fully  satisfied  with  himself  and  the 
republic. 

53.  After  a  stay  of  some  days  in  those  parts,  he 
named  Sextus  Caesar,  his  friend  and  relation,  to  the 
command  of  Syria,  and  the  legions  appointed  to 
guard  it ;  and  sailed  himself  for  Cilicia,  with  the 
fleet  he  had  brought  from  Egypt.  He  summoned 
the  states  to  assemble  at  Tarsus,  the  strongest  and 
finest  city  of  the  province ;  where,  having  settled 
every  thing  that  regarded  either  it  or  the  neighbour¬ 
ing  countries,  his  warlike  ardour  would  not  suffer 
him  to  tarry  longer ;  but,  marching  through  Cappa¬ 
docia  with  the  utmost  expedition,  where  he  stopped 
two  days  at  Mazaca,  he  arrived  at  Comana,  renowned 
for  the  ancient  and  sacred  temple  of  Bellona,  where 
she  is  worshipped  with  so  much  veneration  that 
her  priest  is  accounted  next  in  power  and  dignity  to 
the  king.  He  conferred  this  dignity  on  Lycomedes 
of  Bithynia,  descended  of  the  ancient  kings  of  Cap¬ 
padocia,  who  demanded  it  in  right  of  inheritance ; 
his  ancestors  having  lost  it  on  occasion  of  the 
sceptre’s  being  transferred  to  another  line.  As  for 
Ariobarzanes,  and  his  brother  Ariarates,  who  had 
both  deserved  well  of  the  commonwealth,  he  con¬ 
firmed  the  first  in  his  kingdom,  and  put  the  other 
under  his  protection;  after  which  he  pursued  his 
march  with  the  same  despatch. 

54.  On  his  approaching  Pontus,  and  the  frontiers 
of  Gallogrfecia,  Dejotarus,  tetrarch  of  that  province 
(whose  title  however  was  disputed  by  the  neighbour¬ 
ing  tetrarchs),  and  king  of  the  Lesser  Armenia,  lay¬ 
ing  aside  the  regal  ornaments,  and  assuming  the 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 


209 


habit,  not  only  of  a  private  person,  but  even  of  a 
criminal,  came  in  a  suppliant  manner  to  Caesar,  “  to 
beg  forgiveness  for  obeying  and  assisting  Pompey, 
at  a  time  when  Caesar  could  afford  him  no  protec¬ 
tion  ;  urging  that  it  was  his  business  to  obey  the 
governors  who  were  present,  without  pretending 
to  judge  of  the  disputes  of  the  people  of  Rome.” 
Caesar,  after  putting  him  in  mind  “  of  the  many  ser¬ 
vices  he  had  done  him,  and  the  decrees  he  had  pro¬ 
cured  in  his  favour  when  consul;  that  his  defection 
could  claim  no  excuse  from  want  of  information, 
because  one  of  his  industry  and  prudence  could  not 
but  know  who  was  master  of  Italy  and  Rome,  where 
the  senate,  the  people,  and  the  majesty  of  the  re¬ 
public  resided ;  who  in  fine  was  consul  after  Mar- 
cellus  and  Lentulus ;  told  him,  that  he  would  not¬ 
withstanding  forgive  his  present  fault,  in  considera¬ 
tion  of  his  past  services,  the  former  Mendship  that 
had  subsisted  between  them,  the  respect  due  to  his 
age,  and  the  solicitation  of  those  who  interceded  in 
his  behalf :  adding,  that  he  would  defer  the  contro¬ 
versy  relating  to  the  tetrarchate  to  another  time.” 
He  restored  him  the  royal  habit,  and  commanded 
him  to  join  him  with  all  his  cavalry,  and  the  legion 
he  had  trained  up  after  the  Roman  manner. 

55.  When  he  had  arrived  in  Pontus,  and  had 
drawn  all  his  forces  together,  which  were  not  very 
considerable  either  for  their  number  or  discipline 
(for,  except  the  sixth  legion,  composed  of  veteran 
soldiers,  which  he  had  brought  with  him  from  Alexan¬ 
dria,  and  which,  by  its  many  labours  and  dangers,  the 
length  of  its  marches  and  voyages,  and  the  frequent 
wars  in  which  it  had  been  engaged,  was  reduced  to 
less  than  a  thousand  men,  he  had  only  the  legion  of 
Dejotarus,  and  two  more  that  had  been  in  the  late 
battle  between  Domitius  and  Pharnaces),  ambassa¬ 
dors  arrived  from  Pharnaces,  “  to  entreat  that  Caesar 
would  not  look  on  him  as  an  enemy,  he  being  ready 
to  submit  to  all  his  commands.”  Particularly  they 

S  2 


210 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


represented,  “  that  Pharnaces  had  granted  no  aid  to 
Pompey,  as  Dejotarus  had  done,  whom  he  liad  nev¬ 
ertheless  pardoned,”  Caesar  replied,  “  that  Phar¬ 
naces  should  meet  with  the  utmost  justice  if  he 
performed  his  promises ;  but  at  the  same  time  ad¬ 
monished  the  ambassadors,  in  gentle  terms,  to  for¬ 
bear  mentioning  Dejotarus,  and  not  to  overrate  the 
having  refused  aid  to  Pompey.  He  told  them  he 
was  always  ready  to  forgive  the  suppliant,  but  would 
never  look  on  private  services  to  himself  as  an 
atonement  for  public  injuries  done  the  province; 
that  Pharnaces’  refusal  of  aiding  Pompey  had  turned 
chiefly  to  his  own  advantage,  as  he  had  thereby 
avoided  all  share  in  the  disaster  of  Pharsalia :  that 
he  was  however  willing  to  forgive  the  injuries  done 
to  the  Roman  citizens  in  Pontus,  because  it  was 
now  too  late  to  think  of  redressing  them ;  as  he 
could  neither  restore  life  to  the  dead,  or  manhood  to 
those  he  had  deprived  of  it,  by  a  punishment  more 
intolerable  to  the  Romans  than  death  itself :  but  that 
he  must  quit  Pontus  immediately,  send  back  the 
farmers  of  the  revenues,  and  restore  to  the  Romans 
and  their  allies  what  he  unjustly  detained  from  them. 
These  things  performed,  he  might  then  send  the 
presents  which  successful  generals  were  wont  to 
receive  from  their  friends”  (for  Pharnaces  had  sent 
him  a  golden  crown).  With  this  answer  he  dis¬ 
missed  the  ambassadors. 

56.  Pharnaces  promised  every  thing  ;  but  hoping 
that  Caesar,  who  was  in  haste  to  be  gone,  would  give 
easy  credit  to  whatever  he  said,  that  he  might  the 
sooner  set  out  on  more  urgent  affairs  (for  everybody 
knew  that  his  presence  was  much  wanted  at  Rome), 
he  performed  but  slowly,  wanted  to  protract  the  day 
of  his  departure,  demanded  other  conditions,  and, 
in  fine,  endeavoured  to  elude  his  engagements. 
Caesar,  perceiving  his  drift,  did  now,  out  of  neces¬ 
sity,  what  he  was  usually  wont  to  do  through  incli- 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR.  211 

nation,  and  resolved  to  decide  the  affair  as  soon  as 
possible  by  a  battle. 

57.  Ziela  is  a  town  of  Pontus,  well  fortified, 
though  situated  in  a  plain  ;  for  a  natural  eminence, 
as  if  raised  by  art,  sustains  the  walls  on  all  sides. 
AU  around  are  a  great  number  of  large  mountains, 
intersected  by  valleys.  The  highest  of  these,  famed 
by  the  victory  of  Mithridates,  the  defeat  of  Triarius, 
and  the  destruction  of  our  army,  is  not  above  three 
miles  from  Ziela,  and  has  a  ridge  that  almost  ex¬ 
tends  to  the  town.  Here  Pharnaces  lodged  himself, 
with  all  his  forces,  repairing  the  fortifications  of  a 
camp  which  had  proved  so  fortunate  to  his  father. 

58.  Caesar  encamped  about  five  miles  from  the 
enemy ;  and  observing  that  the  valleys  which  de¬ 
fended  the  king’s  camp  would  likewise  defend  his 
own,  at  the  same  distance,  if  the  enemy,  who  were 
much  nearer,  did  not  seize  them  before  him,  he  or¬ 
dered  a  great  quantity  of  fascines  to  be  brought 
within  the  intrenchments.  This  being  quickly  per¬ 
formed,  next  night,  at  the  fourth  watch,  leaving  all 
the  baggage  in  the  camp,  he  set  out  with  the  legions, 
and  arriving  at  daybreak,  unsuspected  by  the  enemy, 
possessed  himself  of  the  same  post  where  Mithri¬ 
dates  had  defeated  Triarius.  Hither  he  commanded 
all  the  fascines  to  be  brought,  employing  the  ser¬ 
vants  of  the  army  for  that  purpose,  that  the  soldiers 
might  not  be  called  off  from  the  works,  because  the 
valley  which  divided  the  eminence  where  he  was  in¬ 
trenching  himself  from  the  enemy  was  not  above  a 
mile  over. 

59.  Pharnaces,  perceiving  this  next  morning, 
ranged  all  his  troops  in  order  of  battle  before  his 
camp.  But  the  approach  towards  us  was  so  dan¬ 
gerous  that  Caesar  concluded  it  to  be  no  more  than 
a  review ;  or  done  with  design  to  retard  his  works 
by  keeping  a  great  number  of  his  men  under  arms ; 
or  perhaps  for  ostentation,  to  show  that  he  trusted 
no  less  to  his  army  than  the  advantage  of  his  post. 


212 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


Therefore,  keeping  only  his  first  line  in  order  of 
battle,  he  commanded  the  rest  of  the  army  to  go  on 
with  the  works.  But  Pharnaces,  either  prompted 
by  the  place  itself,  which  had  been  so  fortunate  to 
his  father;  or  induced  by  favourable  omens,  as  we 
were  afterward  told ;  or  despising  the  small  number 
of  our  men  that  were  in  arms — for  he  took  all  that 
were  employed  in  carrying  materials  to  the  works 
to  be  soldiers, — or  confiding  in  his  veteran  army, 
who  valued  themselves  on  having  defeated  the 
twenty-second  legion ;  and,  at  the  same  time,  con¬ 
temning  our  troops,  whom  he  had  worsted  under 
Domitius ;  was  determined  on  a  battle,  and  to  that 
end  began  to  cross  the  valley.  Cfesar  at  first 
laughed  at  his  ostentation  in  crowding  his  army 
into  so  narrow  a  place,  where  no  enemy  in  his 
right  senses  would  have  ventured;  while,  in  the 
mean  time,  Pharnaces  continued  his  march,  and 
began  to  ascend  the  steep  hill  on  which  Caesar  was 
posted. 

60.  Caesar,  astonished  at  his  incredible  rashness 
and  confidence,  and  finding  himself  suddenly  and 
unexpectedly  attacked,  called  off  his  soldiers  from 
the  works,  ordered  them  to  arms,  opposed  the 
legions  to  the  enemy,  and  ranged  his  troops  in 
order  of  battle.  The  suddenness  of  the  thing  oc¬ 
casioned  some  terror  at  first;  and  the  chariots, 
armed  with  scythes,  falling  in  with  our  ranks  before 
they  were  completed,  disordered  them  considerably  : 
however,  the  multitude  of  darts  discharged  against 
them  soon  put  a  stop  to  their  career.  The  enemy’s 
army  followed  them  close,  and  began  the  battle 
with  a  shout.  Our  advantageous  situation,  but  es¬ 
pecially  the  assistance  of  the  gods,  who  preside 
over  all  the  events  of  war — and  more  particularly 
those  where  human  conduct  can  be  of  no  service — 
favoured  us  greatly  on  this  occasion. 

61.  After  a  sharp  and  obstinate  conflict,  victory 
began  to  declare  for  us  on  the  right  wing,  where 


ALEXANDRIAN  WAR. 


213 


the  sixth  legion  was  posted.  The  enemy  there  was 
totally  overthrown,  but  in  the  centre  and  left  the 
battle  was  long  and  doubtful:  however,  with  the 
assistance  of  the  same  gods,  we  at  last  prevailed 
there  also,  and  drove  them  with  the  utmost  precipi¬ 
tation  down  the  hill  which  they  had  so  easily  as¬ 
cended  before.  Great  numbers  being  slain,  and 
many  crushed  by  the  flight  of  their  own  troops, 
such  as  had  the  good  fortune  to  escape  were  never¬ 
theless  obliged  to  throw  away  their  arms  ;  so  that, 
having  crossed  the  valley,  and  got  on  the  opposite 
ascent,  they  could  yet,  because  unarmed,  derive  no 
benefit  from  the  advantage  of  the  ground.  Our 
men,  flushed  with  victory,  made  no  scruple  to  fol¬ 
low  them,  and  even  attack  their  camp ;  which  they 
soon  forced,  notwithstanding  the  resistance  made 
by  the  cohorts  left  by  Pharnaces  to  guard  it. 
Almost  the  whole  army  was  cut  to  pieces  or  made 
prisoners.  Pharnaces  himself  escaped  with  a  few 
horse  ;  and  had  not  our  soldiers  been  detained  some 
time  by  the  assault  of  the  camp,  he  must  certainly 
have  fallen  alive  into  C2esar’s  hands. 

62.  Though  Caesar  was  accustomed  to  victory, 
yet  the  present  success  gave  him  no  small  joy ;  be¬ 
cause  he  had  so  speedily  put  an  end  to  a  very  great 
war.  The  remembrance,  too,  of  the  danger  to 
which  he  had  been  exposed,  enhanced  the  pleasure, 
as  he  had  obtained  an  easy  victory  in  a  very  diffi¬ 
cult  conjuncture.  Having  thus  recovered  Pontus, 
and  abandoned  the  plunder  of  the  enemy’s  camp  to 
the  soldiers,  he  set  out  next  day  with  a  guard  of 
light  horse.  The  sixth  legion  had  orders  to  return 
to  Italy,  to  receive  the  honours  and  rewards  they 
had  merited :  the  auxiliary  troops  of  Dejotarus  were 
sent  home  :  and  Caelius  Vincianus  was  left  with  two 
legions  to  protect  the  kingdom  of  Pontus. 

63.  Through  Gallograecia  and  Bithynia  he  went 
into  Asia,  settling  all  the  controversies  of  the  prov¬ 
inces  as  he  passed,  and  establishing  the  limits  and 


\ 

214  HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 

jurisdictions  of  the  several  king-s,  states,  and 
tetrarchs.  Mithridates  of  Pergamus,  who  had  so 
speedily  and  successfully  served  him  in  Egypt,  as 
we  have  related  above — a  man  of  royal  descent  and 
education  (for  Mithridates,  king  of  all  Asia,  out  of 
regard  to  his  birth,  had  carried  him  along  with  him 
when  very  young,  and  kept  him  in  his  camp  several 
years) — was  appointed  king  of  Bosphorus,  which 
had  belonged  to  Pharnaces:  and  thus  w^ere  the 
provinces  of  the  Roman  people  screened  from  the 
attempts  of  barbarous  and  hostile  kings  by  the  in¬ 
terposition  of  a  prince  steadily  attached  to  the  in¬ 
terests  of  the  republic.  To  this  was  added  the 
tetrarchate  of  Gallograecia,  which  belonged  to  him 
of  right,  though  it  had  been  possessed  for  some 
years  by  Dejotarus.  Thus  Caesar,  staying  nowhere 
longer  than  the  necessity  of  atfairs  required,  and 
having  settled  all  things  relating  to  the  provinces 
with  the  utmost  success  and  despatch,  returned  to 
Italy  much  sooner  than  was  expected. 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


HlRTtUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


AFRICAN  WAR. 

1  CiESAR,  setting  out  for  Rome,  advanced  by 
moderate  journeys  towards  Sicily ;  and,  continuing 
his  march  without  intermission,  arrived  on  the  nine¬ 
teenth  of  December  at  Lilybaeum.  Designing  to 
embark  immediately,  though  he  had  only  one  legion 
of  new  levies,  and  not  quite  six  hundred  horse,  he 
ordered  his  tent  to  be  pitched  so  near  the  seaside 
that  the  waves  flowed  up  to  the  very  foot  of  it. 
This  he  did  with  a  view  to  take  away  all  hopes  of 
delay,  and  keep  his  men  in  readiness  at  a  day  or  an 
hour’s  warnihg.  The  wind  at  that  time  proving 
contrary,  he  nevertheless  suffered  none  of  the  sol¬ 
diers  or  mariners  to  come  on  shore,  that  he  might 
lose  no  opportunity  of  sailing, — the  rather  because 
the  inhabitants  of  the  province  were  perpetually 
talking  of  the  mighty  forces  of  the  enemy :  a  cavalry 
not  to  be  numbered, — four  legions  headed  by  Juba, 
together  with  a  body  of  light-armed  troops,— ten 
legions  under  the  command  of  Scipio, — a  hundred 
and  twenty  elephants,  and  fleets  in  abundance. 

Yet  all  these  reports  alarmed  him  not,,  nor  aught 
abated  his  resolution  and  confidence.  Meantime,  the 
number  of  galleys  and  transports  increased  daily ;  the 
new-levied  legions  flocked  in  to  him  from-  all  parts  : 
among  the  rest  the.  fifth,  a  veteran  legion,  and  about 
two  thousand  horse. 

C^s.  VoL.  II.— T 


218 


HlRTIUs’s  COMMENTARIES. 


2.  Having  got  together  six  legions,  and  about  two 
thousand  horse,  he  embarked  the  legions  as  fast  as 
they  arrived  in  the  galleys,  and  the  cavalry  in  the 
transports ;  then,  sending  the  greatest  part  of  the 
fleet  before,  with  orders  to  sail  for  the  island 
of  Aponiana,  not  far  from  Lilybaeum,  he  himself 
continued  a  little  longer  in  Sicily,  to  expose  to 
public  sale  some  confiscated  estates.  Leaving  all 
other  affairs  to  the  care  of  Allienus  the  prefer — who 
then  commanded  in  the  island — and  strictly  charging 
him  to  use  the  utmost  expedition  in  embarking  the 
remainder  of  the  troops,  he  set  sail  the  twenty- 
seventh  of  December,  and  soon  came  up  with  the  rest 
of  the  fleet.  As  the  wind  was  favourable,  and  afforded 
a  quick  passage,  he  arrived  the  fourth  day  within 
sight  of  Africa,  attended  by  a  few  galleys, — for  the 
transports,  being  mostly  dispersed  and  scattered  by 
the  winds,  were  driven  different  ways.  Passing 
Clupea  and  Neapolis  with  the  fleet,  he  continued 
for  some  time  to  coast  along  the  shore,  leaving 
many  towns  and  castles  behind  him. 

■3.  When  he  came  before  Adrumetum — where  the 
enemy  had  a  garrison,  commanded  by  C.  Considius, 
and  where  Cn.  Piso  appeared  on  the  shore  towards 
Clupea  with  the  cavalry  of  Adrumetum  and  about 
two  thousand  Moors — having  stopped  awhile,  facing 
the  port,  till  the  rest  of  the  fleet  should  come  up, 
he  landed  his  men,  though  their  number  at  that  time 
did  not  exceed  three  thousand  foot,  and  a  hundred 
and  fifty  horse.  There  encamping,  before  the  town, 
he  continued  quiet  in  his  intrenchments,  without 
offering  any  act  of  hostility,  or  suffering  his  men  to 
plunder  the  country.  Meantime,  the  inhabitants 
manned  the  walls,  and  assembled  in  great  numbers 
before  the  gates  to  defend  the  town,  whose  garrison 
amounted  to  two  legions.  Caesar,  having  taken  a 
view  of  the  place,  and  thoroughly  examined  its 
situation  on  all  sides,  returned  to  his  camp.  Some 
blamed  his  conduct  on  this  occasion,  and  charged 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


219 


him  with  a  considerable  oversight  in  not  appointing 
a  place  of  rendezvous  to  the  pilots  and  captains 
of  the  fleet ;  or,  at  least,  not  delivering  them  sealed 
instructions,  according  to  his  usual  custom,  which, 
being  opened  at  a  certain  time,  might  have  directed 
them  where  to  assemble.  But  in  this  Caesar  acted 
not  without  design :  for  as  he  knew  of  no  port  in 
Africa  that  was  clear  of  the  enemy’s  forces,  and 
where  the  fleet  might  rendezvous  in  security,  he 
chose  to  rely  entirely  on  fortune,  and  land  where 
occasion  offered. 

4.  In  the  mean  time,  L.  Plancus,  one  of  Caesar’s 
lieutenants,  desired  leave  to  treat  with  Considius, 
and  try,  if  possible,  to  bring  him  to  reason.  Leave 
being  granted  accordingly,  he  wrote  him  a  letter, 
and  sent  it  into  the  town  by  a  messenger.  When 
the  messenger  arrived  and  presented  the  letter,  Con¬ 
sidius,  demanding  whence  it  came,  and  being  told 
from  Caesar,  the  Roman  general  answered  that  he 
knew  no  general  of  the  Roman  forces  but  Scipio. 
Then  commanding  the  messenger  to  be  immediately 
slain  in  his  presence,  he  delivered  the  letter,  un¬ 
opened,  to  a  trusty  partisan,  with  orders  to  carry  it 
directly  to  Scipio. 

5.  Caesar  had  now  continued  a  day  and  a  night  be¬ 
fore  the  town,  without  receiving  any  answer  from 
Considius  ;  the  rest  of  the  forces  were  not  yet  ar¬ 
rived  ;  his  cavalry  was  very  inconsiderable ;  the 
troops  he  had  with  him  were  mostly  new  levies,  and 
not  sufficiently  numerous  to  invest  the  place :  neither 
did  he  think  it  advisable,  on  his  first  landing,  to  expose 
the  army  to  wounds  and  fatigue  ;  more  especially 
as  the  town  was  strongly  fortified,  extremely  diffi¬ 
cult  of  access,  and  the  garrison  full  of  spirits,  in  ex¬ 
pectation  of  a  great  body  of  horse,  who  were  said 
to  be  on  their  march  to  join  them.  For  all  these 
reasons  he  determined  not  to  attempt  a  siege  ;  lest, 
while  he  pursued  that  design,  the  enemy’s  cavalry 
should  come  behind  and  surround  him.  But  as  he 


220 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


was  drawing  off  his  men,  the  garrison  made  a  sudden 
sally :  and  Juba’s  horse,  whom  he  had  sent  to  re¬ 
ceive  their  pay,  happening  just  then  to  come  up, 
they  jointly  took  possession  of  the  camp  Caesar  had 
left,  and  began  to  harass  his  rear.  This  being  per¬ 
ceived,  the  legionaries  immediately  halted ;  and  the 
cavalry,  though  few  in  number,  boldly  charged  the 
vast  multitude  of  the  enemy.  On  this  occasion  it 
was  that  less  than  thirty  Gallic  horse,  by  an  incredi¬ 
ble  and  astonishing  effort  of  valour,  repulsed  two 
thousand  Moors,  and  drove  them  quite  within  the 
town.  Having  thus  compelled  the  enemy  to  retire, 
and  shelter  themselves  behind  their  walls,  Caesar 
resumed  his  intended  march :  but  observing  that 
they  often  repeated  their  sallies,  renewing  the  pur¬ 
suit  from  time  to  time,  and  again  flying  when  at¬ 
tacked  by  the  horse  ;  he  posted  some  veteran  co¬ 
horts  with  part  of  the  cavalry  in  the  rear,  to  cover 
his  retreat,  and  so  proceeded  slowly  on  his  march. 
The  farther  he  advanced  from  Adrumetum  the  less 
eager  were  the  Numidians  to  pursue.  Meantime, 
deputies  arrived  from  the  several  towns  and  castles 
on  the  road,  offering  to  furnish  him  with  corn,  and 
receive  his  commands.  Towards  the  evening  of 
that  day,  which  was  the  first  of  January,  he  reached 
Ruspina,  and  there  fixed  his  camp. 

6.  Thence  he  removed,  and  came  before  Leptis, 
a  free  city,  and  governed  by  its  own  laws.  Here  he 
was  also  met  by  deputies  from  the  town,  who  came, 
in  the  name  of  the  inhabitants,  to  make  an  offer  of 
their  submission  and  services.  Whereon,  placing 
centurions  and  a  guard  before  the  gates,  to  prevent 
the  soldiers  from  entering,  or  offering  violence  to 
any  of  the  inhabitants,  he  himself  encamped  towards 
the  shore,  not  far  distant  from  the  town.  Hither 
by  accident  arrived  some  of  the  galleys  and  trans¬ 
ports,  by  whom  he  was  informed  that  the  rest  of 
the  fleet,  uncertain  what  course  to  pursue,  had  been 
steering  for  Utica.  This  obliged  him  to  keep  with 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


221 


bhe  army  near  the  sea,  and  avoid  marching  into  the 
inland  provinces,  that  he  might  be  at  hand  to  join 
his  troops  on  their  arrival.  He  likewise  sent  the 
cavalry  back  to  their  ships,  probably  to  hinder  the 
country  from  being  plundered,  and  ordered  fresh 
water  to  be  carried  to  them  on  board.  Meanwhile, 
the  rowers,  who  were  employed  in  this  service, 
were  suddenly  and  unexpectedly  attacked  by  the 
Moorish  horse,  who  killed  some,  and  wounded 
many  with  their  darts :  for  the  manner  of  these 
barbarians  is  to  lie  in  ambush  with  their  horses 
among  the  valleys,  and  suddenly  launch  on  an  en¬ 
emy  ;  they  seldom  choosing  to  engage  hand  to  hand 
in  a  plain. 

7.  In  the  mean  time,  Caesar  despatched  letters  and 
messengers  into  Sardinia  and  the  neighbouring  prov¬ 
inces,  with  orders  as  soon  as  the  letters  came  to 
hand  to  send  supplies  of  men,  corn,  and  warlike 
stores ;  and,  having  unloaded  part  of  the  fleet,  de¬ 
tached  it,  with  Rabirius  Posthumus,  into  Sicily,  to 
bring  over  the  second  embarkation.  At  the  same 
time  he  ordered  out  ten  galleys  to  get  intelligence 
of  the  transports  that  had  missed  their  way,  and 
maintain  the  freedom  of  the  sea.  C.  Sallustius 
Crispus,  the  pretor,  was  likewise  sent  out  at  the 
head  of  a  squadron  to  seize  Cercina,  then  in  the 
hands  of  the  enemy,  because  he  heard  there  was 
great  store  of  corn  in  that  island :  in  giving  these 
orders  and  instructions,  he  used  all  possible  en¬ 
deavours  to  leave  no  room  for  excuse  or  delay. 
Meanwhile,  having  informed  himself,  from  the  de¬ 
serters  and  natives,  of  the  condition  of  Scipio  and 
his  followers,  and  understanding  that  they  were  at 
the  Avhole  charge  of  maintaining  Juba’s  cavalry,  he 
could  not  but  pity  the  infatuation  of  men  who  thus 
rather  chose  to  be  tributaries  to  the  King  of  Numidia 
than  securely  enjoy  their  fortunes  at  home  with  their 
fellow-citizens. 

8.  The  third  of  January  he  decamped ;  and,  leaving 

T2 


222 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


six  cohorts  at  Leptis,  under  the  command  of  Sa- 
serna,  returned  with  the  rest  of  the  forces  to  Ruspina, 
whence  he  had  come  the  day  before.  Here  he  de¬ 
posited  the  bag-gage  of  the  army;  and,  marching 
out  with  a  light  body  of  troops  to  forage,  ordered 
the  inhabitants  to  follow  with  their  horses  and 
carriages.  Having  by  this  means  got  together  a 
great  quantity  of  corn,  he  came  back  to  Ruspina. 
His  design  was,  as  far  as  I  can  judge,  that  by  keep¬ 
ing  possession  of  the  maritime  cities,  and  providing 
them  with  garrisons,  he  might  secure  a  retreat  for 
his  fleet. 

9.  Leaving  therefore  P.  Saserna,  the  brother  of 
him  who  commanded  at  Leptis,  to  take  charge  of 
the  town,  with  one  legion,  and  ordering  all  the  wood 
that  could  be  found  to  be  carried  into  the  place ;  he 
set  out  from  Ruspina  with  seven  cohorts,  part  of  the 
veteran  legions  who  had  behaved  so  well  in  the  fleet 
under  Sulpicius  and  Vatinius ;  and  marching  directly 
for  the  port,  which  lies  at  about  two  miles’  distance, 
embarked  with  them  in  the  evening,  without  im¬ 
parting  his  intentions  to  the  army,  who  were  ex¬ 
tremely  inquisitive  concerning  the  general’s  design. 
His  departure  occasioned  the  utmost  sadness  and 
consternation  among  the  troops ;  for  being  few  in 
number,  mostly  new  levies,  and  those  not  all  suffered 
to  land,  they  saw  themselves  exposed,  on  a  foreign 
coast,  to  the  mighty  forces  of  a  crafty  nation,  sup¬ 
ported  by  an  innumerable  cavalry.  Nor  had  they 
any  resource  in  their  present  circumstances,  or  ex¬ 
pectation  of  safety  in  their  own  conduct ;  but  de¬ 
rived  all  their  hope  from  the  alacrity,  vigour,  and 
wonderful  cheerfulness  that  appeared  in  the  general’s 
countenance  ;  for  he  was  of  an  intrepid  spirit,  and 
behaved  with  undaunted  resolution  and  confidence. 
On  his  conduct  therefore  they  entirely  relied,  and 
promised  themselves  to  a  man,  that  under  so  able 
and  experienced  a  leader  all  ditflculties  would  vanish 
■before  them. 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


223 


10.  Caesar,  having  continued  the  whole  night  on 
board,  about  daybreak  prepared  to  set  sail ;  when, 
all  on  a  sudden,  the  part  of  the  fleet  that  had  given 
so  much  concern  appeared  unexpectedly  in  view. 
Wherefore,  ordering  his  men  to  quit  their  ships  im¬ 
mediately,  and  receive  the  rest  of  the  troops  in  arms 
on  the  shore,  he  made  the  new  fleet  enter  the  port 
with  the  utmost  diligence  ;  and  landing  all  the  forces, 
horse  and  foot,  returned  again  to  Ruspina.  Here 
he  established  his  camp ;  and  taking  with  him  thirty 
cohorts,  without  baggage,  advanced  into  the  country 
to  forage.  Thus  was  Caesar’s  purpose  at  length 
discovered ;  that  he  meant,  unknown  to  the  enemy, 
to  have  sailed  to  the  assistance  of  the  transports 
that  had  missed  their  way,  lest  they  should  unex¬ 
pectedly  fall  in  with  the  African  fleet.  Nor  would 
he  even  impart  his  design  to  his  own  soldiers  left 
behind  in  garrison,  from  an  apprehension,  that  when 
they  came  to  reflect  on  their  own  weakness  and  the 
strength  of  the  enemy,  they  might  too  much  give 
way  to  fear. 

1 1 .  Caesar  had  not  marched  above  three  miles  from 
his  camp,  when  he  was  informed  by  his  scouts,  and 
some  advanced  parties  of  horse,  that  the  enemy’s 
forces  were  in  view.  At  the  same  time  a  great 
cloud  of  dust  began  to  appear.  On  this  intelligence, 
Caesar  ordered  all  his  horse,  of  which  he  had  at  that 
time  but  a  very  small  number,  to  advance,  as  like¬ 
wise  his  archers,  only  a  few  of  whom  had  followed 
him  from  the  camp ;  and  the  legions  to  march  after 
him  in  order  of  battle,  while  he  went  forward  at  the 
head  of  a  small  party.  Soon  after,  having  dis¬ 
covered  the  enemy  at  some  distance, he  commanded 
the  soldiers  to  repair  to  their  arms,  and  prepare  for 
battle.  Their  number  in  all  did  not  exceed  thirty 
cohorts,  with  about  four  hundred  horse,  and  the 
archers. 

12.  Meanwhile  the  enemy,  under  the  command 
of  Labienus  and  the  two  Pacidii,  drew  up,  with  a 


224 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


very  larg'e  front,  consisting  mostly  of  horse,  whom 
they  intermixed  with  light-armed  Numidians  and 
archers ;  forming  themselves  in  such  close  order, 
that  Caesar’s  army,  at  a  distance,  mistook  them  all 
for  infantry ;  and  strengthening  their  right  and  left 
with  many  squadrons  of  horse.  Caesar  drew  up  his 
army  in  one  line,  obliged  to  it  by  the  smallness  of 
his  numbers ;  covering  his  front  with  his  archers, 
and  placing  his  cavalry  in  the  two  wings,  with  par¬ 
ticular  instructions  not  to  suffer  themselves  to  be 
surrounded  by  the  enemy’s  numerous  horse;  for 
he  imagined  that  he  was  to  have  to  do  only  with 
infantry. 

13.  As  both  sides  stood  in  expectation  of  the  sig¬ 
nal,  and  Caesar  chose  to  continue  without  stirring 
from  his  post,  as  being  sensible  that  with  such  few 
troops  against  so  great  a  force  he  must  depend  more 
on  conduct  and  contrivance  than  on  strength ;  on  a 
sudden,  the  enemy  began  to  extend  themselves, 
spread  out  on  the  hills  on  every  side,  and  prepared 
to  surround  our  horse,  who  were  hardly  able  to 
maintain  their  ground  against  them.  Meanwhile 
both  the  main  bodies  advancing  to  engage,  the 
enemy’s  cavalry,  intermixed  with  some  light-armed 
Numidians,  suddenly  sprang  forward,  and  attacked 
the  legions  with  a  shower  of  darts.  Our  men  pre¬ 
paring  to  return  the  charge,  their  horse  retreated  a 
little,  while  the  foot  continued  to  maintain  their 
ground,  till  the  others,  having  rallied,  came  on  again, 
with  fresh  vigour,  to  sustain  them. 

14.  Caesar,  perceiving  that  his  ranks  were  in  dan¬ 
ger  of  being  broken  by  this  new  way  of  fighting  (for 
our  foot  in  pursuing  the  enemy’s  horse,  as  they  re¬ 
treated,  being  forced  to  advance  a  considerable  way 
beyond  their  colours,  were  flanked  by  the  light¬ 
armed  Numidians ;  while,  at  the  same  time,  they 
could  do  but  little  execution  against  the  cavalry,  by 
reason  of  the  quickness  wherewith  they  retired), 
gave  express  orders  that  no  soldier  should  advance 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


225 


above  four  feet  beyond  the  ensig-ns.  Meanwhile 
Labienus’s  cavalry,  confiding  in  their  numbers,  en¬ 
deavoured  to  surround  those  of  Caesar,  who,  being 
few  in  number,  and  overpowered  by  the  multitude 
of  the  enemy,  were  forced  to  give  ground  a  little, 
their  horses  being  almost  all  wounded.  The  enemy, 
encouraged  by  this,  pressed  on  more  and  more ;  so 
that,  in  an  instant,  the  legions,  being  surrounded  on  all 
sides,  were  obliged  to  cast  themselves  into  an  orb, 
and  fight  as  if  enclosed  in  barriers. 

15.  Labienus,  with  his  head  uncovered,  advanced 
on  horseback  to  the  front  of  the  battle,  to  encourage 
his  men.  Sometimes  addressing  Caesar’s  legions : 
“  So  ho !  you  raw  soldiers  there!”  says  he,  “why 
so  fierce  1  Has  he  infatuated  you  too  with  his 
words  1  Truly  he  has  brought  you  into  a  fine  con¬ 
dition  !  I  pity  you  sincerely.”  On  this,  one  of  the 
soldiers,  “  I  am  none  of  your  raw  warriors,  but  a  vete¬ 
ran  of  the  tenth  legion.” — “Where’s  your  standard!” 
replied  Labienus. — “  I’ll  soon  make  you  sensible 
who  I  am,”  answered  the  soldier.  Then  pulling  off 
his  helmet,  to  discover  himself,  he  threw  a  javelin, 
with  all  his  strength,  at  Labienus,  which  wounding 
his  horse  severely  in  the  breast,  “  Know,  Labienus,” 
says  he,  “  that  this  dart  was  thrown  by  a  soldier  of 
the  tenth  legion.”  However,  the  whole  army  was 
not  a  little  daunted,  especially  the  new  levies  ;  and 
began  to  cast  their  eyes  on  Caesar,  minding  nothing, 
for  the  present,  but  to  defend  themselves  from  the 
enemy’s  darts. 

16.  Caesar  meanwhile,  perceiving  the  enemy’s 
design,  endeavoured  to  extend  his  order  of  battle 
as  much  as  possible,  directing  the  cohorts  to  face 
about  alternately  to  the  right  and  left.  By  this 
means  he  broke  the  enemy’s  circle  with  his  right 
and  left  wings ;  and  attacking  one  part  of  them,  thus 
separated  from  the  other,  with  his  horse  and  foot, 
at  last  put  them  to  flight.  He  pursued  them  but  a 
little  way,  fearing  an  ambuscade,  and  returned  again 


226 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMEXTARIES. 


to  his  own  men.  The  same  was  done  by  the  other 
division  of  Caesar’s  horse  and  foot ;  so  that  the 
enemy  being  driven  back,  on  all  sides,  he  retreated 
towards  his  camp  in  order  of  battle. 

17.  Meanwhile  M.  Petreius  and  Cn.  Piso,  with 
eleven  hundred  select  Numidian  horse,  and  a  con¬ 
siderable  body  of  foot,  arrived  to  the  assistance  of 
the  enemy ;  who,  recovering  from  their  terror  on 
this  reinforcement,  and  again  resuming  courage,  fell 
on  the  rear  of  the  legions  as  they  retreated,  and  en¬ 
deavoured  to  hinder  them  from  reaching  their  camp. 
Ceesar,  perceiving  this,  ordered  his  men  to  wheel 
about  and  renew  the  battle.  As  the  enemy  still 
pursued  their  former  plan,  and  avoided  a  close  en¬ 
gagement,  Caesar,  considering  that  the  horses  had 
not  yet  recovered  the  fatigue  of  their  late  voyage, 
that  they  were  besides  weakened  with  thirst,  weari¬ 
ness,  and  wounds,  and  of  course  unfit  for  a  vigorous 
and  long  pursuit,  which  even  the  time  of  the  day 
would  not  allow,  ordered  both  horse  and  foot  to  fall 
at  once  briskly  on  the  enemy,  and  not  slacken  the 
pursuit  till  they  had  driven  them  quite  beyond  the 
farthest  hills,  and  taken  possession  of  them  them¬ 
selves.  Accordingly,  on  a  signal  given,  the  enemy 
fighting  in  a  faint  and  careless  manner,  he  sud¬ 
denly  charged  them  with  his  horse  and  foot ;  who 
in  a  moment  driving  them  from  the  field,  and  over 
the  adjoining  hill,  kept  possession  of  that  post  for 
some  time,  and  then  retired  slowly,  in  order  of  battle, 
to  their  camp.  The  enemy,  who  in  this  last  attack 
had  been  very  rudely  handled,  thought  proper  like¬ 
wise  to  do  the  same. 

18.  The  action  being  over,  a  great  number  of  de¬ 
serters,  of  all  kinds,  flocked  to  Caesar’s  camp,  besides 
multitudes  of  horse  and  foot  that  were  made  pris¬ 
oners.  By  them  we  learned,  that  it  was  the  design 
of  the  enemy  to  have  astonished  our  raw  troops 
with  their  new  and  uncommon  manner  of  fighting ; 
and  after  surrounding  them  with  their  cavalry, to  have 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


227 


cut  them  to  pieces,  as  they  had  done  Curio ;  and 
that  they  had  marched  against  us  expressly  with 
that  intention.  Labienus  had  even  said,  in  the 
council  of  war,  that  he  would  lead  such  a  numerous 
body  of  troops  against  us  as  should  fatigue  us  with 
the  very  slaughter,  and  defeat  us  even  in  the  bosom 
of  victory  ;  for  he  relied  more  on  the  number  than 
the  valour  of  his  troops.  He  had  heard  of  the  mu¬ 
tiny  of  the  veteran  legions  at  Rome,  and  their  re¬ 
fusal  to  go  into  Africa ;  and  was  likewise  well  as¬ 
sured  of  the  fidelity  of  his  troops,  who  had  served 
three  years  under  him  in  Africa.  He  had  a  great 
number  of  Numidian  cavalry  and  light-armed  troops, 
besides  the  Gallic  and  German  horse,  whom  he  had 
drawn  together  out  of  the  remains  of  Pompey’s 
army,  and  carried  over  with  him  from  Brundusium  : 
he  had  likewise  the  freedmen  raised  in  the  country, 
and  trained  to  fight  on  horseback ;  and  the  multi¬ 
tude  of  Juba’s  forces,  his  hundred  and  twenty  ele¬ 
phants,  his  innumerable  cavalry  and  legionaries, 
amounting  to  about  twelve  thousand.  Imboldened 
by  the  hope  such  mighty  forces  raised  in  him,  on 
the  fourth  of  January,  six  days  after  Caesar’s  arrival, 
he  came  against  him,  with  sixteen  hundred  Gallic 
and  German  horse,  nine  hundred  under  Petreius, 
eight  thousand  Numidians,  four  times  that  number 
of  light-armed  foot,  with  a  multitude  of  archers  and 
slingers.  The  battle  lasted  from  eleven  till  sunset, 
during  which  Petreius,  receiving  a  dangerous  wound, 
was  obliged  to  quit  the  field. 

19.  Meantime  Caesar  fortified  his  camp  with  much 
greater  care,  reinforced  the  guards,  and  threw  up 
two  intrenchments  ;  one  from  Ruspina  quite  to  the 
sea,  the  other  from  his  camp  to  the  sea  likewise  ; 
to  secure  the  communication,  and  receive  supplies 
without  danger.  He  landed  a  great  number  of  darts 
and  military  engines,  armed  part  of  the  mariners, 
Gauls,  Rhodians,  and  others,  that,  after  the  example 
of  the  enemy,  he  might  have  a  number  of  light- 


228 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


armed  troops  to  intermix  with  his  cavalry.  He 
likewise  strengthened  his  army  with  a  great  number 
of  Syrian  and  Iturean  archers,  whom  he  drew  from 
the  fleet  to  his  camp :  for  he  understood  that  within 
three  days  Scipio  was  expected,  with  all  his  forces, 
consisting  of  eight  legions  and  four  thousand  horse. 
At  the  same  time  he  established  workshops,  made 
a  great  number  of  darts  and  arrows,  provided  him¬ 
self  with  leaden  bullets  and  palisades,  wrote  to 
Sicily  for  hurdles  and  wood  to  make  rams,  because 
he  had  none  in  Africa,  and  likewise  gave  orders  for 
sending  corn ;  for  the  harvest  in  that  country  was 
like  to  be  inconsiderable,  the  enemy  having  taken 
all  the  labourers  into  their  service  the  year  before, 
and  stored  up  the  grain  in  a  few  fortified  towns, 
after  demolishing  the  rest,  forcing  the  inhabitants 
into  the  garrisoned  places,  and  laying  waste  the 
whole  country. 

20.  In  this  necessity,  by  soothing  the  people,  he 
obtained  a  small  supply,  and  husbanded  it  with  care. 
Meantime  he  was  very  exact  in  visiting  the  works, 
and  relieving  the  guards.  Labienus  sent  his  sick 
and  wounded,  of  which  the  number  was  very  con¬ 
siderable,  in  wagons,  to  Adrumetum.  Meanwhile 
Caesar’s  transports,  unacquainted  with  the  coast,  or 
where  their  general  had  landed,  wandered  up  and 
down  in  great  uncertainty ;  and  being  attacked,  one 
after  another,  by  the  enemy’s  coasters,  were,  for  the 
most  part,  either  taken  or  burned.  Caesar,  being  in¬ 
formed  of  this,  stationed  his  fleet  along  the  coast 
and  islands  for  the  security  of  his  convoys. 

21.  Meanw’^hile  M.  Cato,  who  commanded  in  Utica, 
never  ceased  urging  and  exhorting  young  Pompey, 
in  words  to  this  effect :  “  Your  father,  when  he  was 
at  your  age,  and  observed  the  commonwealth  op¬ 
pressed  by  wicked  and  daring  men,  and  the  honest 
party  either  slain  or  driven  by  banishment  from 
their  country  and  relations,  incited  by  the  greatness 
of  his  mind,  and  the  love  of  glory,  though  then  very 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


229 


young,  and  only  a  private  man,  had  yet  the  courage 
to  rally  the  remains  of  his  father’s  army,  and  deliver 
Rome  from  the  yoke  of  slavery  and  tyranny  under 
which  it  groaned.  He  also  recovered  Sicily,  Africa, 
Numidia,  Mauritania,  with  amazing  despatch ;  and 
by  that  means  gained  an  illustrious  and  extensive 
reputation  among  all  nations,  and  triumphed  at  three- 
and-twenty,  while  but  a  Roman  knight.  Nor  did  he 
enter  on  the  administration  of  public  affairs  distin¬ 
guished  by  the  shining  exploits  of  his  father,  or  the 
fame  and  reputation  of  his  ancestors,  or  the  hon¬ 
ours  and  dignities  of  the  state.  You,  on  the  con¬ 
trary,  possessed  of  these  honours,  and  the  reputa¬ 
tion  acquired  by  your  father;  sufficiently  distin¬ 
guished  by  your  own  industry  and  greatness  of  mind ; 
will  you  not  bestir  yourself,  join  your  father’s  friends, 
and  vindicate  your  own  liberty,  that  of  the  common¬ 
wealth,  of  every  good  and  honest  manl”  The 
youth,  roused  by  the  remonstrances  of  that  grave 
and  worthy  senator,  got  together  about  thirty  sail, 
of  all  sorts,  of  which  some  few  were  ships  of  war ; 
and  sailing  from  Utica  to  Mauritania,  invaded  the 
kingdom  of  Bogud ;  and  leaving  his  baggage  behind 
him,  with  an  army  of  two  thousand  men,  partly 
freemen,  partly  slaves,  some  armed,  some  not,  ap¬ 
proached  the  town  of  Ascurum,  in  which  the  king 
had  a  garrison.  The  inhabitants  suffered  him  to  ad¬ 
vance  to  the  very  walls  and  gates ;  when,  sallying 
out,  all  on  a  sudden,  they  drove  him  quite  back  to 
his  ships.  This  ill  success  determined  him  to  leave 
that  coast ;  nor  did  he  afterward  land  in  any  place, 
but  steered  directly  for  the  Balearean  isles. 

22.  Meantime,  Scipio,  leaving  a  strong  garrison  at 
Utica,  began  his  march,  with  the  forces  we  have  de¬ 
scribed  above,  and  encamped  first  at  Adrumetum ; 
when,  after  a  stay  of  a  few  days,  setting  out  in  the 
night,  he  joined  Petreius  and  Labienus,  lodging  ail 
the  forces  in  one  camp,  about  three  miles  distant 
from  Caesar’s.  Their  cavalry  were  making  contin- 

Ca:s.  Vol.  II. — U 


230 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


ual  excursions  to  our  very  works,  intercepted  those 
who  ventured  too  far  in  quest  of  wood  or  water, 
and  obliged  us  to  keep  within  our  intrenchments. 
This  soon  occasioned  a  great  scarcity  of  provisions 
among  Caesar’s  men,  because  no  supplies  had  yet 
arrived  from  Sicily  or  Sardinia.  The  season,  too, 
was  dangerous  for  navigation,  and  he  did  not  possess 
above  six  miles  every  way  in  Africa,  which  also 
greatly  straitened  him  for  want  of  forage.  The 
veteran  soldiers  and  cavalry,  who  had  been  engaged 
in  many  wars,  both  by  sea  and  land,  and  often  strug¬ 
gled  with  wants  and  misfortunes  of  this  kind,  gather¬ 
ing  sea-weed  and  washing  it  in  fresh  water,  by 
that  means  subsisted  their  horses  and  cattle. 

23.  While  things  were  in  this  situation.  King  Juba, 
being  informed  of  Coesar’s  difficulties,  and  the  few 
troops  he  had  with  him,  resolved  not  to  allow  him 
time  to  remedy  his  wants  or  to  increase  his  army. 
Accordingly  he  left  his  kingdom  at  the  head  of  a 
great  body  of  horse  and  foot,  and  marched  to  join 
his  allies.  Meantime,  P.  Sitius  and  King  Bogud, 
having  intelligence  of  Juba’s  march,  joined  their 
forces,  entered  Numidia,  and  laying  siege  to  Cirta, 
the  most  opulent  city  in  the  country,  carried  it  in  a 
few  days,  with  two  others  belonging  to  the  Getu- 
lians.  They  had  offered  the  inhabitants  leave  to  de¬ 
part  in  safety,  if  they  would  peaceably  deliver  up 
the  towns;  but  these  conditions  being  rejected,  they 
were  taken  by  storm,  and  the  citizens  all  put  to  the 
sword.  They  then  fell  to  ravaging  the  country,  and 
laying  all  the  cities  under  contribution;  of  which 
Juba  having  intelligence,  though  he  was  on  the  point 
of  joining  Scipio  and  the  other  chiefs,  he  deter¬ 
mined  to  return  to  the  relief  of  his  own  kingdom, 
rather  than  run  the  hazard  of  being  driven  from  it 
while  he  was  assisting  others,  and  perhaps,  after  all, 
miscarry  too  his  designs  against  Caesar.  He  there¬ 
fore  retired  with  his  troops,  leaving  only  thirty  ele- 


AFRICAN  WAR.  231 

phants  behind  him,  and  marched  to  the  relief  of  his 
own  cities  and  territories. 

24,  Meanwhile,  Cjesar,  knowing  that  the  province 
still  doubted  of  his  arrival,  and  imagined  that  not 
himself  in  person,  but  some  of  his  lieutenants,  had 
come  over  with  the  forces  lately  sent,  despatched 
letters  to  all  the  several  states,  to  inform  them  of  his 
presence.  On  this,  many  persons  of  rank  fled  to  his 
camp,  complaining  of  the  barbarity  and  cruelty  of  the 
enemy.  Hitherto  he  had  continued  quiet  in  his  post ; 
but,  touched  with  their  fears,  and  a  sense  of  their  suf¬ 
ferings,  he  resolved  to  take  the  field  as  soon  as  the 
weather  would  permit,  and  he  could  draw  his  troops 
together.  He  immediately  despatched  letters  into 
Sicily,  to  Allienus  and  Rabirius  Posthumus,  the 
pretors,  that  without  delay  or  excuse,  either  of  the 
winter  or  the  winds,  they  must  send  over  the  rest 
of  the  troops,  to  save  Africa  from  utter  ruin  ;  be¬ 
cause,  without  some  speedy  remedy,  not  a  single 
house  would  be  left  standing,  nor  any  thing  escape 
the  fury  and  ravages  of  the  enemy.  But  such  was 
his  impatience,  and  so  long  did  the  time  appear,  that 
from  the  day  the  letters  were  sent,  he  complained 
without  ceasing  of  the  delay  of  the  fleet,  and  had 
his  eyes  night  and  day  turned  towards  the  sea.  Nor 
ought  we  to  wonder  at  his  behaviour  on  this  occasion ; 
for  he  saw  the  villages  burned,  the  country  laid  waste, 
the  cattle  destroyed,  the  towns  plundered,  the  prin¬ 
cipal  citizens  either  slain  or  put  in  chains,  and  their 
children  dragged  into  servitude  under  the  name  of 
hostages ;  nor  could  he,  amid  all  this  scene  of  mis¬ 
ery,  afford  any  relief  to  those  who  implored  his 
protection,  because  of  the  small  number  of  his 
forces.  He  kept  the  soldiers  however  at  work  on 
the  intrenchments,  built  forts  and  redoubts,  and  car¬ 
ried  on  his  lines  quite  to  the  sea. 

25.  Meanwhile,  Scipio  made  use  of  the  following 
contrivance  for  training  and  disciplining  his  ele¬ 
phants.  He  drew  up  two  parties  in  order  of  battle; 
one  of  slingers,  who  were  to  act  as  enemies,  and 


232  HIRTIUs’s  COMMENTARIES. 

dischai^e  small  stones  against  the  elephants;  and 
fronting  them  the  elephants  themselves,  in  one  line, 
with  his  whole  army  behind  them  in  battle  array ; 
that  when  the  enemy,  by  their  discharge  of  stones, 
had  frightened  the  elephants,  and  forced  them  to 
turn  on  their  own  men,  they  might  again  be  made 
to  face  the  enemy  by  the  volleys  of  stones  from  the 
army  behind  them.  The  work  however  went  on  but 
slowly ;  because  these  animals,  after  many  years’ 
teaching,  are  often  no  less  prejudicial  to  those  who 
bring  them  into  the  field  than  to  the  enemy  against 
whom  they  were  intended. 

26.  While  the  two  generals  were  thus  employed 
near  Ruspina,  C.  VirgiliusPretorius,  who  commanded 
in  Thapsus,  a  maritime  city,  observing  some  of 
Caesar’s  transports  that  had  missed  their  way,  un¬ 
certain  where  he  had  landed  or  held  his  camp,  and 
thinking  that  a  fair  opportunity  offered  of  destroying 
them,  manned  a  galley  that  was  in  port  with  sol¬ 
diers  and  archers,  and  joining  with  it  a  few  armed 
barks,  began  to  pursue  Caesar’s  ships.  Though  he 
was  repulsed  on  several  occasions,  he  still  pursued 
his  design ;  and  at  last  fell  in  with  one,  on  board  of 
which  were  two  young  Spaniards,  of  the  name  of 
Titus,  who  were  tribunes  of  the  fifth  legion,  and 
whose  father  had  been  made  a  senator  by  Caesar. 
There  was  with  them  a  centurion  of  the  same  legion, 
T.  Salienus  by  name,  who  had  invested  the  house 
of  M.  Messala,  Caesar’s  lieutenant,  at  Messana,  and 
expressed  himself  in  very  seditious  language  ;  nay, 
even  seized  the  money  and  ornaments  destined  for 
Caesar’s  triumph,  and  for  that  reason  dreaded  his  re¬ 
sentment.  He,  conscious  of  his  demerits,  persuaded 
the  young  men  to  surrender  themselves  to  Virgilius, 
by  whom  they  were  sent,  under  a  strong  guard,  to 
Scipio,  and  three  days  after  put  to  death.  It  is  said 
that  the  elder  Titus  begged  of  the  centurions  who 
were  charged  with  the  execution  that  he  might  be 
first  put  to  death ;  which  being  easily  granted,  they 
both  suffered  according  to  their  sentence. 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


233 


27.  The  cavalry  that  mounted  guard  in  the  two 
camps  were  continually  skirmishing  with  one  an¬ 
other.  Sometimes,  too,  the  German  and  Gallic  cav¬ 
alry  of  Labienus  entered  into  discourse  with  those  of 
Caesar.  Meantime,  Labienus,  with  a  party  of  horse, 
endeavoured  to  surprise  the  town  of  Leptis,  which 
Saserna  guarded  with  three  cohorts  ;  but  was  easily 
repulsed,  because  the  town  was  strongly  fortified, 
and  well  provided  with  warlike  engines ;  but  at  sev¬ 
eral  times  he  renewed  the  attempt.  One  day,  as  a 
strong  squadron  of  the  enemy  had  posted  them¬ 
selves  before  the  gate,  their  officer  being  slain  by  an 
arrow  discharged  from  a  scorpion,  the  rest  were 
terrified  and  took  to  flight ;  by  which  means  the 
town  was  delivered  from  any  further  attempts. 

28.  At  the  same  time,  Scipio  daily  drew  up  his 
troops  in  order  of  battle,  about  three  hundred  paces 
from  his  camp ;  and  after  continuing  in  arms  the 
greatest  part  of  the  day,  retreated  again  to  his  camp 
in  the  evening.  This  he  did  several  times,  no  one 
meanwhile  offering  to  stir  out  of  CaBsar’s  camp,  or 
approach  his  forces ;  which  forbearance  and  tran¬ 
quillity  gave  him  such  a  contempt  of  Caesar  and  his 
army,  that,  drawing  out  all  his  forces,  and  his  thirty 
elephants,  with  towers  on  their  backs,  and  extending 
his  horse  and  foot  as  wide  as  possible,  he  approached 
quite  up  to  Caesar’s  intrenchments.  On  this,  Caesar 
quietly,  and  without  noise  or  confusion,  recalled  to 
his  camp  all  that  were  gone  out  either  in  quest  of 
forage,  wood,  or  to  work  on  the  fortifications  :  he 
likewise  ordered  the  cavalry  that  were  on  guard 
not  to  quit  their  post  until  the  enemy  were  within 
reach  of  dart ;  and  if  they  then  persisted  to  advance, 
to  retire  in  good  order  within  the  intrenchments. 
The  rest  of  the  cavalry  were  enjoined  to  hold  them¬ 
selves  in  readiness  on  the  first  notice.  These  orders 
were  not  given  by  himself  in  person,  or  after  view¬ 
ing  the  disposition  of  the  enemy  from  the  rampart ; 
but  sitting  in  his  tent,  and  informing  himself  of  their 

U2 


234 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


motions  by  his  scouts ;  such  was  his  consummate 
knowledge  in  the  art  of  war  that  he  gave  all  the 
necessary  directions  by  his  officers.  He  very  well 
knew,  that,  whatever  confidence  the  enemy  might 
have  in  their  numbers,  they  would  yet  never  dare  to  at¬ 
tack  the  camp  of  a  general  who  had  so  often  repulsed, 
terrified,  and  put  them  to  flight ;  who  had  frequently 
pardoned  and  granted  them  their  lives ;  and  whose 
very  name  had  weight  and  authority  enough  to  intim¬ 
idate  their  army.  He  was  besides  well  intrenched 
with  a  high  rampart  and  deep  ditch,  the  approaches  to 
which  were  rendered  so  difficult  by  the  sharp  spikes 
which  he  had  disposed  in  a  very  artful  manner,  that 
they  were  even  sufficient  of  themselves  to  keep  off  the 
enemy.  He  was  likewise  well  provided  with  military 
engines,  and  all  sorts  of  weapons  necessary  for  a 
vigorous  defence,  which  compensated  in  some  mea¬ 
sure  for  the  fewness  of  his  troops  and  the  inexpe¬ 
rience  of  his  new  levies.  His  forbearance  therefore 
did  not  proceed  from  fear,  or  any  distrust  of  the  val¬ 
our  of  his  troops ;  but  because  he  was  unwilling  to 
purchase  a  bloody  victory  over  the  shattered  re¬ 
mains  of  his  dispersed  enemies,  after  such  a  senes 
of  great  actions,  conquests,  and  triumphs  ;  and  there¬ 
fore  resolved  to  bear  their  insults  and  bravadoes, 
till  the  arrival  of  his  veteran  legions  by  the  second 
embarkation. 

29.  Scipio,  after  a  short  stay  before  the  intrench- 
ments,  as  if  in  contempt  of  Caesar,  withdrew  slowly 
to  his  camp ;  and  having  called  the  soldiers  together, 
enlarged  on  the  terror  and  despair  of  the  enemy ; 
when,  encouraging  his  men,  he  assured  them  of  a 
complete  victory  in  a  short  time.  Caesar  made  his 
soldiers  again  return  to  the  works ;  and  under  pre¬ 
tence  of  fortifying  his  camp,  inured  the  new  levies 
to  labour  and  fatigue.  Meantime,  the  Numidians 
and  Getulians  deserted  daily  from  Scipio’s  camp. 
Part  returned  home ;  part  came  over  to  Caesar,  be¬ 
cause  they  understood  he  was  related  to  C.  Marius 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


235 


from  whom  their  ancestors  had  received  consider¬ 
able  favours.  Of  these  he  selected  some  of  distin¬ 
guished  rank,  and  sent  them  home,  with  letters  to 
their  countrymen,  exhorting  them  to  levy  troops  for 
their  own  defence,  and  not  listen  to  the  suggestions 
of  his  enemies. 

30.  While  these  things  passed  near  Ruspina,  depu¬ 
ties  from  Acilla,  and  all  the  neighbouring  towns, 
arrived  in  Caesar’s  camp,  with  offers  of  submission, 
and  to  supply  him  with  corn  and  other  necessaries, 
if  he  would  send  garrisons  to  protect  them  from  the 
enemy.  Caesar  readily  complied  with  their  demands  ; 
and  having  assigned  a  garrison,  sent  C.  Messius,  who 
had  been  edile,  to  command  in  Acilla.  On  intelli¬ 
gence  of  this,  Considius  Longus,  who  was  at  Ad- 
rumetum  with  two  legions  and  seven  hundred  horse, 
leaving  a  garrison  in  that  city,  posted  to  Acilla  at 
the  head  of  eight  cohorts ;  but  Messius,  having  ac¬ 
complished  his  march  with  great  expedition,  arrived 
first  at  the  place.  When  Considius  therefore  ap¬ 
proached,  and  found  Caesar’s  garrison  in  possession 
of  the  town,  not  daring  to  make  any  attempt,  he  re¬ 
turned  again  to  Adrumetuni.  But  some  days  after, 
Labienus  having  sent  him  a  reinforcement  of  horse, 
he  found  himself  in  a  condition  to  renew  the  siege. 

31.  Much  about  the  same  time,  C.  Saliustius  Cris- 
pus,  who,  as  we  have  seen,  had  been  sent  a  few  days 
before  to  Cercina  with  a  fleet,  arrived  in  that  island. 
On  which,  C.  Decimus,  the  questor,  who,  with  a  strong 
party  of  his  own  domestics,  had  charge  of  the  mag¬ 
azines  erected  there,  went  on  board  a  small  vessel, 
and  fled.  Saliustius  meanwhile  was  well  received 
by  the  Cercinates ;  and  finding  great  store  of  corn 
in  the  island,  loaded  all  the  ships  then  in  the  port, 
whose  number  was  very  considerable,  and  despatched 
them  to  Caesar’s  camp.  At  the  same  time,  Alli- 
enus,  the  proconsul,  put  on  board  the  transports  at 
Lilybaeum  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth  legions,  with 
eight  hundred  Gallic  horse,  and  a  thousand  archers 


236 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


and  slingers,  and  sent  them  over  into  Africa.  This 
fleet  meeting’  with  a  favourable  wind,  arrived  in  four 
days  at  Ruspina,  w^here  Caesar  had  his  camp.  Thus 
he  experienced  a  double  pleasure  on  this  occasion ; 
receiving  at  one  and  the  same  time  both  a  supply 
of  provisions  and  a  reinforcement  of  troops  :  which 
animated  the  soldiers,  and  delivered  them  from  the 
apprehensions  of  want.  Having  landed  the  legions 
and  cavalry,  he  allowed  them  some  time  to  recover 
from  the  fatigue  and  sickness  of  their  voyage,  and 
then  distributed  them  into  the  forts  and  along  the 
works. 

32.  Scipio  and  the  other  generals  were  greatly 
surprised  at  Caesar’s  conduct,  and  could  not  conceive 
how  one  who  had  always  been  forward  and  active 
in  w'ar  should  all  of  a  sudden  change  his  measures ; 
which  they  therefore  suspected  must  proceed  from 
some  very  powerful  reasons.  Uneasy  and  disturbed 
to  see  him  so  patient,  they  made  choice  of  two  Ge- 
tulians,  on  whose  fidelity  they  thought  they  could 
rely ;  and  promising  them  great  rewards,  sent  them, 
under  the  name  of  deserters,  to  get  intelligence  of 
Caesar’s  designs.  When  they  were  brought  before 
him,  they  begged  they  might  have  leave  to  speak 
without  offence  ;  'which  being  granted,  “  It  is  now  a 
long  time,  great  general,”  said  they,  “  since  many  of 
us  Getulians,  clients  of  C.  Marius,  and  almost  all 
Roman  citizens  of  the  fourth  and  sixth  legions,  have 
wished  for  an  opportunity  to  come  over  to  you ;  but 
have  hitherto  been  prevented  by  the  guards  of  Nu- 
midian  horse.  Now  we  gladly  embrace  the  occasion ; 
being  sent  by  Scipio,  under  the  name  of  deserters,  to 
discover  what  ditches  and  traps  you  have  prepared 
for  his  elephants,  how  you  intend  to  oppose  these 
animals,  and  what  dispositions  you  are  making  for 
battle.”  Caesar  commended  them,  rewarded  them 
liberally,  and  sent  them  to  the  other  deserters.  We 
had  soon  a  proof  of  the  truth  of  what  they  had  ad* 
vanced ;  for,  next  day,  a  great  many  soldiers  of  these 


AFRICAN  WAR.  237 

legions  mentioned  by  the  Getulians  deserted  to  Cae¬ 
sar’s  camp. 

33.  While  affairs  were  in  this  posture  at  Ruspina, 
M.  Cato,  who  commanded  in  Utica,  was  daily  en¬ 
listing  freedmen,  Africans,  slaves,  and  all  that  were 
of  age  to  bear  arms,  and  sending  them  without  inter¬ 
mission  to  Scipio’s  camp.  Meanwhile  deputies  from 
the  town  of  Tisdra  came  to  Caesar,  to  inform  him 
that  some  Italian  merchants  had  brought  three  hun¬ 
dred  thousand  bushels  of  corn  into  that  city ;  and  to 
demand  a  garrison  as  well  for  their  own  defence  as 
to  secure  the  corn.  Caesar  thanked  the  deputies, 
promised  to  send  the  garrison  they  desired,  and, 
having  encouraged  them,  sent  them  back  to  their 
fellow-citizens.  Meantime  P.  Sitius  entered  Nu- 
midia  with  his  troops,  and  made  himself  master  of  a 
castle  situated  on  a  mountain,  where  Juba  had  laid 
up  a  great  quantity  of  provisions,  and  other  things 
necessary  for  carrying  on  the  war. 

34.  Caesar,  having  increased  his  forces  with  two 
veteran  legions,  and  all  the  cavalry  and  light-armed 
troops  that  had  arrived  in  the  second  embarkation, 
detached  six  transports  to  Lilybaeum,  to  bring  over 
the  rest  of  the  army.  On  the  twenty-seventh  of 
January,  ordering  the  scouts  and  lictors  to  attend 
him  at  six  in  the  evening,  he  drew  out  all  the  legions 
at  midnight,  and  directed  his  march  towards  Ruspina, 
where  he  had  a  garrison,  and  which  had  first  declared 
in  his  favour,  no  one  knowing  or  having  the  least 
suspicion  of  his  design.  Thence  he  continued  his 
route,  by  the  left  of  the  camp,  along  the  sea,  and 
passed  a  little  declivity,  which  opened  into  a  fine 
plain,  extending  fifteen  miles,  and  bordered  on  a  chain 
of  mountains  of  moderate  height,  that  formed  a  kind 
of  theatre.  In  this  ridge  were  some  hills  that  rose 
higher  than  the  rest,  where  forts  and  watch-towers 
had  formerly  been  erected,  and  at  the  farthest  of 
which  Scipio’s  outguards  were  posted. 

35.  Caesar,  having  gained  the  ridge,  began  to  raise 


238 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


redoubts  on  the  several  eminences,  which  he  exe¬ 
cuted  in  less  than  half  an  hour.  When  he  was  near 
the  last,  which  bordered  on  the  enemy’s  camp,  and. 
where,  as  we  have  said,  Scipio  had  his  outguard  of 
Niimidians,  he  stopped  a  moment ;  and  having  taken 
a  view  of  the  ground,  and  posted  his  cavalry  in  the 
most  commodious  situation,  he  ordered  the  legions 
to  throw  up  an  intrenchment  along  the  middle  of  the 
ridge,  from  the  place  at  which  he  was  arrived  to 
that  whence  he  set  out.  This  being  observed  by 
Scipio  and  Labienus,  they  drew  all  their  cavalry  out 
of  the  camp,  formed  them  in  order  of  battle,  and, 
advancing  about  a  thousand  paces,  posted  their  in¬ 
fantry,  by  way  of  a  second  line,  somewhat  less  than 
half  a  mile  from  their  camp. 

36.  Caesar,  unmoved  by  the  appearance  of  the 
enemy’s  forces,  encouraged  his  men  to  go  on  with 
the  work.  But  when  he  perceived  that  they  were 
within  fifteen  hundred  paces  of  the  intrenchment, 
and  that  their  design  was  to  interrupt  and  disturb  the 
soldiers,  and  oblige  him  to  draw  them  off  from  the 
work ;  he  oraered  a  squadron  of  Spanish  cavalry, 
sustained  by  some  light-aimed  infantry,  to  attack 
the  Numidian  guard  on  the  nearest  eminence,  and 
drive  them  from  that  post.  They  easily  possessed 
themselves  of  the  place,  the  Numidians  being  partly 
killed  and  partly  made  prisoners.  This  being  per¬ 
ceived  by  Labienus,  that  he  might  the  more  effect¬ 
ually  succour  the  fugitives,  he  wheeled  off  almost 
the  whole  right  wing  of  the  horse.  Caesar  waited 
till  he  was  at  a  considerable  distance  from  his  own 
men,  and  then  detached  his  left  wing  to  intercept  his 
return. 

37.  In  the  plain  where  this  happened  was  a  large 
villa,  with  four  turrets,  which  prevented  Labienus 
from  seeing  that  he  was  surrounded ;  he  had  there¬ 
fore  no  apprehension  of  the  approach  of  Caesar’s 
horse  till  he  found  himself  charged  in  the  rear, 
which  struck  such  a  sudden  terror  into  the  Numidian 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


239 


cavalry  that  they  immediately  betook  themselves 
to  flisfht.  The  Gauls  and  Germans  who  stood  their 
ground,  being  surrounded  on  all  sides,  were  entirely 
cut  off.  This  being  perceived  by  Scipio’s  legions, 
wlio  were  drawn  up  in  order  of  battle  before  the 
camp,  they  fled,  in  the  utmost  terror  and  confusion. 
Scipio  and  his  forces  being  driven  from  the  plain  and 
the  hills,  Caesar  sounded  a  retreat,  and  ordered  all 
the  cavalry  to  retire  behind  the  works.  When  the 
field  was  cleared,  he  could  not  forbear  admiring  the 
huge  bodies  of  the  Gauls  and  Germans,  who  partly, 
induced  by  the  authority  of  Labienus,  had  followed 
him  out  of  Gaul,  partly  had  been  drawn  over  by 
promises  and  rewards.  Some,  being  made  prisoners 
ill  the  battle  with  Curio,  and  having  their  lives  granted 
them,  continued  faithful,  out  of  gratitude.  Their 
bodies,  of  surprising  shape  and  largeness,  lay  scat¬ 
tered  all  over  the  plain. 

38.  Next  day,  Caesar  drew  all  his  forces  together, 
and  formed  them  in  order  of  battle  on  the  plain. 
Scipio,  discouraged  by  so  unexpected  a  check,  and 
the  numbers  of  his  wounded  and  slain,  kept  within 
his  lines.  Caesar,  with  his  army  in  battalia,  marched 
along  the  roots  of  the  hills,  and  gradually  approached 
liis  trenches.  The  legions  were  by  this  time  got 
within  a  mile  of  Uzita,  a  town  possessed  by  Scipio, 
whence  he  had  his  water  and  other  conveniences 
for  his  army.  Resolving  therefore  to  preserve  it  at 
all  hazards,  he  brought  forth  his  whole  army,  and 
drew  them  up  in  four  lines,  forming  the  first  of  cav¬ 
alry,  supported  by  elephants  with  castles  on  their 
backs.  Caesar,  believing  that  Scipio  approached 
with  design  to  give  battle,  continued  where  he  was 
posted,  not  far  from  the  town.  Scipio  meanwhile, 
having  the  town  in  centre  of  his  front,  extended  his 
two  wings,  where  were  his  elephants,  in  full  view 
of  our  army. 

39.  When  Caesar  had  waited  till  sunset,  without 
finding  that  Scipio  stirred  from  his  post,  who  seemed 


a40  HIRTItJs’s  COMMENTARIES. 

rather  disposed  to  defend  himself  by  his  advan¬ 
tageous  situation  than  hazard  a  battle  in  the  open 
field,  he  did  not  think  proper  to  advance  farther 
that  day,  because  the  enemy  had  a  strong  garrison 
of  Numidians  in  the  town,  which  besides  covered 
the  centre  of  their  front ;  and  he  foresaw  great  dif¬ 
ficulty  in  forming,  at  the  same  time,  an  attacK  on 
the  town,  and  opposing  their  right  and  left,  with  the 
advantage  of  the  ground ;  especially  as  the  soldiers 
had  continued  under  arms,  and  fasted  since  morn¬ 
ing.  Having  therefore  led  back  his  troops  to  their 
camp,  he  resolved  next  day  to  extend  his  lines  near 
the  town. 

40.  Meantime  Considius,  who  besieged  eight  mer¬ 
cenary  cohorts  of  Numidians  and  Getulians  in  Acilla, 
where  C.  Messius  commanded,  after  continuing  long 
before  the  place,  and  seeing  all  his  works  burned 
and  destroyed  by  the  enemy,  on  the  report  of  the 
late  battle  of  the  cavalry,  set  fire  to  his  corn,  de¬ 
stroyed  his  wine,  oil,  and  other  stores ;  and  aban¬ 
doning  the  siege  of  Acilla,  divided  his  forces  with 
Scipio,  and  retired,  through  the  kingdom  of  Juba,  to 
Adrumetum. 

41.  Meanwhile  one  of  the  transports  belonging  to 
the  second  embarkation,  in  which  were  Q.  Cominius 
and  L.  Ticida,  a  Roman  knight,  being  separated  from 
the  rest  of  the  fleet  in  a  storm,  and  driven  to  Thapsus, 
was  taken  by  Virgilius,  and  all  the  persons  on  board 
sent  to  Scipio.  A  three-benched  galley  likewise, 
belonging  to  the  same  fleet,  being  forced  by  the 
winds  to  jEgimurum,  was  intercepted  by  the  squad¬ 
ron  under  Varus  and  M.  Octavius.  In  this  vessel 
were  some  veteran  soldiers,  with  a  centurion,  and  a 
few  new  levies;  whom  Varus  treated  respectfully, 
and  sent,  under  a  guard,  to  Scipio.  When  they  came 
into  his  presence,  and  appeared  before  his  tribunal, 
“  I  am  satisfied,”  said  he,  “  it  is  not  by  your  own 
inclination,  but  at  the  instigation  of  your  wicked 
general,  that  you  impiously  wage  war  on  your  fellow- 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


241 


citizens,  and  on  the  honestest  part  of  the  republic. 
If  therefore,  now  that  fortune  has  put  you  in  our 
power,  you  will  take  this  opportunity  to  unite  with 
the  good  citizens  in  the  defence  of  the  common¬ 
weal,  I  not  only  promise  you  your  life,  but  you  may 
expect  to  be  rewarded.  Let  me  know  what  you 
think  of  the  proposal.”  Scipio,  having  ended  his 
speech,  and  expecting  a  thankful  return  to  so  gra¬ 
cious  an  offer,  permitted  them  to  reply ;  when  the 
centurion,  who  on  this  occasion  was  spokesman, 
thus  addressed  him  :  “  Scipio,”  said  he  (“  for  I  can¬ 
not  give  you  the  appellation  of  general),  I  return 
you  my  hearty  thanks  for  the  good  treatment  you 
are  willing  to  show  to  prisoners  of  war ;  and  perhaps 
I  might  accept  of  your  kindness,  were  it  not  to  be 
purchased  at  the  expense  of  a  horrible  crime. 
What  I  shall  I  carry  arms,  and  fight  against  Caesar, 
my  general,  under  whom  I  have  served  as  centurion ; 
and  against  his  victorious  army,  to  whose  renown  I 
have  so  many  years  endeavoured  to  contribute  by 
my  valour  1  It  is  what  1  will  never  do ;  and  even 
advise  you  not  to  push  the  war  any  farther.  You 
know  not  what  troops  you  have  to  deal  with,  nor 
the  difference  between  them  and  yours  ;  of  which,  if 
you  please,  I  will  give  you  an  indisputable  instance. 
Do  you  pick  out  the  best  cohort  you  have  in  your 
army ;  and  give  me  only  ten  of  my  comrades,  which 
are  now  your  prisoners,  to  engage  them.  You  shall 
see,  by  the  success,  what  you  are  to  expect  from 
your  soldiers.”  When  the  centurion  had  made  this 
reply,  Scipio,  incensed  at  his  boldness,  and  resenting 
the  affront,  made  a  sign  to  some  of  his  officers  to 
kill  him  on  the  spot,  which  was  immediately  put  in 
execution.  At  the  same  time,  ordering  the  other 
veteran  soldiers  to  be  separated  from  the  nev/  levies, 
“  Carry  away,”  said  he,  “  these  villains,  pampered 
with  the  blood  of  their  fellow-citizens.”  Accord¬ 
ingly  they  were  conducted  without  the  rampart,  and 
cruelly  massacred.  The  new-raised  soldiers  were 
C.ffis.  VoL.  II. — X 


242 


HIRTIUs’s  COMMENTARIES. 


distributed  among  his  legions;  and  Cominius  and 
Ticida  forbid  to  appear  in  his  presence.  Caesar, 
concerned  for  this  misfortune,  broke,  with  igno¬ 
miny,  the  officers,  whose  instructions  being  to  se¬ 
cure  the  coast,  and  advance  to  a  certain  distance 
into  the  main  sea,  to  protect  and  facilitate  the  ap¬ 
proach  of  the  transports,  had  been  negligent  on  that 
important  station. 

42.  About  this  time  a  most  incredible  accident 
befell  Caesar’s  army :  for  the  Pleiades  being  set,  about 
nine  at  night,  a  terrible  storm  arose,  attended  with 
hail  of  an  uncommon  size.  But  what  contributed  to 
render  this  misfortune  the  greater,  was  that  Caesar 
had  not,  like  other  generals,  put  his  troops  into 
winter-quarters  ;  but  was  every  three  or  four  days 
changing  his  camp,  to  gain  ground  on  the  enemy ; 
which  keeping  the  soldiers  continually  employed, 
they  were  utterly  unprovided  of  any  conveniences 
to  protect  them  from  the  inclemency  of  the  weather. 
Besides,  neither  officer  nor  soldier  had  been  per¬ 
mitted  to  take  their  equipages  or  utensils  with  them, 
nor  so  much  as  a  vessel,  or  a  single  slave,  when  they 
parted  from  Sicily ;  and  so  far  had  they  been  from 
acquiring  or  providing  themselves  with  any  thing  in 
Africa,  that  by  reason  of  the  great  scarcity  of  pro¬ 
visions  they  had  even  consumed  their  former  stores. 
Impoverished  by  these  accidents,  very  few  of  them 
had  tents  :  the  rest  had  made  themselves  a  kind  of 
covering,  either  by  spreading  their  clothes,  or  with 
mats  and  rushes.  But  these  being  soon  penetrated 
by  the  storm  and  hail,  the  soldiers  had  no  resource 
left,  but  wandered  up  and  down  the  camp,  covering 
their  heads  with  their  bucklers,  to  shelter  them  from 
the  weather.  In  a  short  time  the  whole  camp  was 
under  water,  the  fires  extinguished,  and  all  their  pro¬ 
visions  washed  away  or  spoiled.  The  same  night, 
the  shafts  of  the  javelins  belonging  to  the  fifth  legion, 
of  their  own  accord,  took  fire. 

43.  In  the  mean  time,  King  Juba,  having  received 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


243 


advice  of  the  horse  engagement  with  Scipio,  and 
being  earnestly  solicited,  by  letters  from  that  general, 
to  come  to  his  assistance,  left  Sabura  at  home,  with 
part  of  the  army,  to  carry  on  the  war  against  Sitins  : 
and  imagining  his  name  and  presence  sufficient  to 
free  Scipio’s  troops  from  the  dread  they  had  of  Cae¬ 
sar,  began  his  march,  with  three  legions,  eight  hun¬ 
dred  horse,  a  body  of  Numidian  cavalry,  great  num¬ 
bers  of  light-armed  infantry,  and  thirty  elephants. 
When  he  arrived,  he  lodged  himself,  with  all  his 
forces,  in  a  separate  camp,  at  no  great  distance  from 
that  of  Scipio.  Caesar’s  army  had,  for  some  time 
past,  been  possessed  with  no  small  terror  of  Juba’s 
forces  ;  and  the  report  of  his  approach  had  increased 
the  inquietude,  and  produced  a  general  suspense  and 
expectation  among  the  troops  :  but  his  arrival,  and 
the  appearance  of  his  camp,  soon  dispelled  all  these 
apprehensions ;  and  they  as  much  despised  the  king 
of  Mauritania,  now  he  was  present,  as  they  had 
feared  him  when  at  a  distance.  It  was  easy  to  be 
seen,  however,  that  the  reinforcement  brought  by 
the  king  greatly  raised  the  courage  and  confidence 
of  Scipio  :  for  next  day,  drawing  out  all  his  own  and 
the  royal  forces,  with  sixty  elephants,  he  ranged 
them  in  order  of  battle  with  great  ostentation,  ad¬ 
vanced  a  little  beyond  his  intrenchments,  and,  after 
a  short  stay,  retreated  to  his  camp. 

44.  Caesar,  knowing  that  Scipio  had  received  all 
the  supplies  he  expected,  and  judging  he  would  no 
longer  decline  coming  to  an  engagement,  began  to 
advance  along  the  ridge  with  his  forces,  extend  his 
lines,  secure  them  with  redoubts,  and  possess  him¬ 
self  of  the  eminences  between  him  and  Scipio.  The 
enemy,  confiding  in  their  numbers,  seized  a  neigh¬ 
bouring  hill,  and  thereby  prevented  the  progress  of 
our  works.  Labienus  had  formed  the  design  of  se¬ 
curing  this  post :  and  as  it  lay  nearest  his  quarters, 
soon  got  thither.  Caesar  had  the  same  project  in 
view ;  but  before  he  could  reach  the  place,  was  ne- 


244 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


cessitated  to  pass  a  broad  and  deep  valley,  of  rugged 
descent,  broken  with  caves,  and  beyond  which  was 
a  thick  grove  of  olives.  Labienus,  perceiving  that 
Caesar  must  march  this  way,  and  having  a  perfect 
knowledge  of  the  country,  placed  himself  in  ambush, 
with  the  light-armed  foot  and  part  of  the  cavalry.  At 
the  same  time,  he  disposed  some  horse  behind  the 
hills,  that  when  he  should  fall  unexpectedly  on 
Caesar’s  foot,  they  might  suddenly  advance  from  be¬ 
hind  the  mountain.  Thus  the  enemy,  attacked  in 
front  and  rear,  surrounded  with  danger  on  all  sides, 
and  unable  either  to  retreat  or  advance,  would,  he 
imagined,  fall  an  easy  prey  to  his  victorious  troops. 
Caesar,  who  had  no  suspicion  of  the  ambuscade, 
sent  his  cavalry  before ;  and  arriving  at  the  place, 
Labienus’s  men,  either  forgetting  or  neglecting  the 
orders  of  their  general,  or  fearing  to  be  trampled  to 
death  in  the  ditch  by  our  cavalry,  began  to  issue 
in  small  parties  from  the  rock,  and  ascend  the  hill. 
Caesar’s  horse,  pursuing  them,  slew  some,  and  took 
others  prisoners :  then  making  towards  the  hill, 
drove  thence  Labienus’s  detachment,  and  immediate¬ 
ly  took  possession.  Labienus,  followed  by  a  small 
party  of  horse,  escaped  with  great  difficulty. 

45.  The  cavalry  having  thus  cleared  the  mountain, 
Caesar  resolved  to  intrench  himself  there,  and  dis¬ 
tributed  the  work  to  the  legions.  He  then  ordered 
two  lines  of  communication  to  be  drawn  from  the 
greater  camp,  across  the  plain  on  the  side  of  Uzita, 
which  stood  between  him  and  the  enemy,  and  was 
garrisoned  by  a  detachment  of  Scipio’s  army.  These 
lines  were  so  contrived  as  to  meet  at  the  right  and 
left  angles  of  the  town.  His  design  in  this  work 
was,  that  when  he  approached  the  town  with  his 
troops,  and  began  to  attack  it,  these  lines  might  se¬ 
cure  his  flanks,  and  hinder  the  enemy’s  horse  from 
surrounding  him,  and  compelling  him  to  abandon  the 
siege.  It  likewise  gave  his  men  more  frequent 
opportunities  of  conversing  with  the  enemy,  and 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


245 


facilitated  the  means  of  desertion  to  such  as  favoured 
his  cause ;  many  of  whom  had  already  come  over, 
though  not  without  great  danger  to  themselves.  He 
wanted  also,  by  drawing  nearer  the  enemy,  to  see 
how  they  stood  inclined  to  a  battle.  Add  to  all  these 
reasons,  that  the  place  itself  being  very  low,  he 
might  there  sink  some  wells  ;  whereas  before  he 
had  a  long  and  troublesome  way  to  send  for  water. 
While  the  legions  were  employed  in  these  works, 
part  of  the  army  stood  ready  drawn  up  before  the 
trenches,  and  had  frequent  skirmishes  with  the 
Numidian  horse  and  light-armed  foot. 

46.  In  the  evening,  when  Caesar  was  drawing  off 
his  legions  from  the  works,  Juba,  Scipio,  and  Labie- 
nus,  at  the  head  of  all  their  horse  and  light-armed 
foot,  fell  furiously  on  his  cavalry  ;  who,  overwhelmed 
by  the  sudden  and  general  attack  of  so  great  a  mul¬ 
titude,  were  forced  to  give  ground  a  little.  But  the 
event  was  very  different  from  what  the  enemy  ex¬ 
pected:  for  Caesar  leading  back  his  legions  to  the 
assistance  of  his  cavalry,  they  immediately  rallied, 
turned  on  the  Numidians,  and  charging  them  vigor¬ 
ously  while  they  were  dispersed  and  disordered  with 
the  pursuit,  drove  them  with  great  slaughter  to  the 
king’s  camp:  and  had  not  night  intervened,  and  the 
dust  raised  by  the  wind  obstructed  the  prospect,  Juba 
and  Labienus  would  both  have  fallen  into  Caesar’s 
hands,  and  their  whole  cavalry  and  light-armed 
infantry  been  cut  off.  Meanwhile  Scipio’s  men  of 
the  fourth  and  sixth  legions  left  him  in  crowds ;  some 
deserting  to  Caesar’s  camp,  others  flying  to  such 
places  as  were  most  convenient  for  them.  Curio’s 
horse  likewise,  distrusting  Scipio  and  his  troops, 
followed  the  same  counsel. 

47.  While  these  things  passed  near  Uzita,  the 
ninth  and  tenth  legions,  sailing  in  transports  from 
Sicily,  when  they  came  before  Ruspina,  observing 
Caesar’s  ships  that  lay  at  anchor  about  Thapsus,  and 
fearing  it  might  be  the  enemy’s  fleet  stationed  there 

X  2 


246 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


to  intercept  them,  they  imprudently  stood  out  to 
sea ;  and,  after  being  long  tossed  by  the  winds, 
provisions  and  water  failing  them,  at  last  arrived  at 
Caesar’s  camp. 

48.  Soon  after  they  were  landed,  Caesar,  calling 
to  mind  their  licentious  behaviour  in  Italy,  and  the 
rapines  of  some  of  their  officers,  seized  the  pretence 
furnished  by  C.  Avienus,  a  military  tribune  of  the 
tenth  legion,  who,  when  he  set  out  from  Sicily, 
filled  a  ship  entirely  with  his  own  equipage  and  at¬ 
tendants,  without  taking  on  board  one  single  soldier. 
Wherefore  summoning  all  the  military  tribunes  and 
centurions  to  appear  before  his  tribunal  the  next 
day,  he  addressed  them  in  these  terms :  “  I  could 
have  wished  that  those  whose  insolence  and  former 
licentious  character  have  given  me  cause  of  com¬ 
plaint  had  been  capable  of  amendment,  and  of 
making  a  good  use  of  my  mildness,  patience,  and 
moderation :  but  since  they  know  not  how  to  confine 
themselves  within  bounds,  I  intend  to  make  an  ex¬ 
ample  of  them,  according  to  the  law  of  arms,  in 
order  that  others  may  be  taught  a  better  conduct. 
You,  C.  Avienus,  when  you  were  in  Italy,  instigated 
the  soldiers  of  the  Roman  people  to  revolt  from  the 
republic  ;  you  have  been  guilty  of  rapines  and  plun¬ 
ders  in  the  municipal  towns ;  and  you  have  never 
been  of  any  real  service,  either  to  the  com¬ 
monwealth  or  to  your  general :  lastly,  in  lieu  of 
soldiers,  you  have  crowded  the  transports  with  your 
slaves  and  equipage ;  so  that,  through  your  fault, 
the  republic  fails  in  soldiers,  who  at  this  time  are 
not  only  useful,  but  necessary.  For  all  these  causes, 
I  break  you  with  ignominy,  and  order  you  to  leave 
Africa  this  very  day.  In  like  manner  I  break  you, 
A.  Fonteius,  because  you  have  behaved  yourself  as 
a  seditious  officer,  and  as  a  bad  citizen.  You,  T. 
Salienus,  M.  Tiro,  C.  Clusinus,  have  attained  the 
rank  of  centurions  through  my  indulgence,  and  not 
through  your  own  merit ;  and  since  you  have  been 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


247 


invested  with  that  rank,  have  neither  shown  bravery 
in  war,  nor  good  conduct  in  peace.  Instead  of  en¬ 
deavouring  to  act  according  to  the  rules  of  modesty 
and  decency,  your  whole  study  has  been  to  stir  up 
the  soldiers  against  your  general.  I  therefore  think 
you  unworthy  of  continuing  centurions  in  my  army  : 
I  break  you,  and  order  you  to  quit  Africa  as  soon 
as  possible.  Having  concluded  this  speech,  he  de¬ 
livered  them  over  to  some  centurions,  with  orders 
to  confine  them  separately  on  board  a  ship,  allowing 
each  of  them  a  single  slave  to  wait  on  them. 

49.  Meantime  the  Getulian  deserters,  whom  Caesar 
had  sent  home  with  letters  and  instructions,  as  we 
have  related  above,  arrived  among  their  country¬ 
men  ;  who,  partly  swayed  by  their  authority,  partly 
by  the  name  and  reputation  of  Caesar,  revolted  from 
Juba  ;  and  speedily  and  unanimously  taking  up  arms, 
scrupled  not  to  act  in  opposition  to  their  king.  Juba 
having  thus  three  wars  to  sustain,  was  compelled  to 
detach  six  cohorts  from  the  army  destined  to  act 
against  Caesar,  and  send  them  to  defend  the  frontiers 
of  his  kingdom  against  the  Getulians. 

50.  Caesar,  having  finished  his  lines  of  communi¬ 
cation,  and  pushed  them  so  near  the  town  as  to  be 
just  without  reach  of  dart,  intrenched  himself  there. 
He  caused  warlike  engines  in  great  numbers  to  be 
placed  in  the  front  of  his  works,  wherewith  he 
played  perpetually  against  the  town ;  and  to  increase 
the  enemy’s  apprehension,  drew  up  five  legions  out 
of  his  other  camp.  This  opportunity  gave  several 
persons  of  rank,  in  both  armies,  a  desire  to  see  and 
converse  with  their  friends,  which  Caesar  foresaw 
would  turn  to  his  advantage ;  for  the  chief  officers 
of  the  Getulian  horse,  with  other  illustrious  men  of 
that  nation,  whose  fathers  had  served  under  C. 
Marius,  and  from  his  bounty  obtained  considerable 
estates  in  their  country,  but  after  Sylla’s  victory  had 
been  made  tributaries  to  KingHiempsal ; — takingthe 
opportunity  of  the  night,  when  the  fires  were  lighted, 


248  HIRTIUs’s  COMMENTARIES. 

with  their  horses  and  servants,  to  the  number  of 
about  a  thousand,  came  over  to  Caesar’s  camp  neai 
Uzita. 

51.  As  this  accident  could  not  but  disturb  Scipio 
and  his  followers,  they  perceived,  much  about  the 
same  time,  M.  Aquinius  in  discourse  with  C.  Saserna. 
Scipio  sent  him  word  that  he  did  not  do  well  to 
correspond  with  the  enemy.  Aquinius  paid  no  atten¬ 
tion  to  this  reprimand,  but  pursued  his  discourse. 
Soon  after,  one  of  Juba’s  guards  came  to  him, 
and  told  him,  in  the  hearing  of  Saserna,  “  the  king 
forbids  you  to  continue  this  conversation.”  He  no 
sooner  received  this  order,  than  immediately  he  re¬ 
tired,  for  fear  of  offending  the  king.  One  cannot 
wonder  enough  at  this  step  in  a  Roman  citizen,  who 
had  already  attained  to  considerable  honou#  in  the 
commonwealth;  that  though  neither  banished  his 
country,  nor  stripped  of  his  possessions,  he  should 
pay  a  more  ready  obedience  to  the  orders  of  a  foreign 
prince  than  those  of  Scipio ;  and  choose  rather  to 
behold  the  destruction  of  his  party  than  return  into 
the  bosom  of  his  country.  Nor  was  Juba’s  arro¬ 
gance  confined  to  M.  Aquinius,  a  new  man,  and  incon¬ 
siderable  senator ;  but  reached  even  Scipio  himself, 
a  man  of  illustrious  birth,  distinguished  honours,  and 
high  dignity  in  the  state :  for  as  Scipio,  before  the 
king’s  arrival,  always  w^ore  a  purple  coat  of  mail ; 
Juba  is  reported  to  have  told  him,  that  he  ought  not 
to  wear  the  same  habit  as  he  did.  Accordingly 
Scipio  changed  his  purple  robe  for  a  white  one, 
submitting  to  the  caprice  of  a  haughty  barbarian 
monarch. 

52.  Next  day  they  drew  out  all  their  forces  from 
both  camps ;  and  forming  them  on  an  eminence  not 
far  from  Caesar’s  camp,  continued  thus  in  order  of 
battle.  Caesar  likewise  drew  out  his  men,  and  dis¬ 
posed  them  in  battle  array  before  his  lines ;  not 
doubting  but  the  enemy,  who  exceeded  him  in  num¬ 
ber  of  troops,  and  had  been  so  considerably  reinforced 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


249 


by  the  arrival  of  King  Juba,  would  advance  to  attack 
him.  Wherefore  having  rode  through  the  ranks, 
encouraged  his  men,  and  given  them  the  signal  of 
battle,  he  staid  expecting  the  enemy’s  charge :  for 
he  did  not  think  it  advisable  to  remove  far  from  his 
lines ;  because  the  enemy  having  a  strong  garrison 
in  Uzita,  which  was  opposite  to  his  right  wing,  he 
could  not  advance  beyond  that  place  without  ex¬ 
posing  his  flank  to  a  sally  from  the  town.  Besides, 
the  access  to  Scipio’s  army  was  rough  and  difficult, 
and  would  have  disordered  his  troops  before  they 
gave  the  onset. 

53.  And  here  it  may  not  be  improper  to  describe 
the  order  of  battle  of  both  armies.  Scipio’s  troops 
were  drawn  up  in  this  manner ;  he  posted  his  own 
legions,  and  those  of  Juba,  in  the  front ;  behind  them 
the  Numidians,  as  a  body  of  reserve ;  but  in  so  verj^ 
thin  ranks,  and  so  far  extended  in  length,  that  to  see 
them  at  a  distance,  you  would  have  taken  the  main 
battle  for  a  simple  line  of  legionaries,  which  was 
doubled  only  on  the  wings.  The  elephants  were 
placed  at  equal  distances  on  the  right  and  left, 
sustained  by  the  light-armed  troops  and  auxiliary 
Numidians.  All  the  bridled  cavalry  were  on  the 
right ;  for  the  left  was  covered  by  the  town  of  Uzita, 
nor  had  the  cavalry  room  to  extend  themselves  on 
that  side.  Accordingly  he  stationed  the  Numidian 
horse,  with  an  incredible  multitude  of  light-armed 
foot,  about  a  thousand  paces  from  his  right,  towards 
the  foot  of  a  mountain,  considerably  removed  from 
his  own  and  the  enemy’s  troops.  His  design  in  this 
was,  that  during  the  progress  of  the  battle,  the 
cavalry,  having  room  to  extend  themselves,  might 
wheel  round  on  Caesar’s  left,  and  disorder  it  with 
their  darts.  Such  was  Scipio’s  disposition.  Caesar’s 
order  of  battle,  to  describe  it  from  left  to  right,  was 
as  follows ;  the  ninth  and  seventh  legions  formed 
the  left  wing ;  the  thirteenth,  fourteenth,  twenty- 
eighth,  and  twenty-sixth,  the  main  body ;  and  the 


250 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


thirtieth  and  twenty-ninth  the  right.  His  second  line 
on  the  right  consisted  partly  of  the  cohorts  of  those 
legions  we  have  already  mentioned,  partly  of  the 
new  levies.  His  third  line  was  posted  to  the  left, 
extending  as  far  as  the  middle  legion  of  the  main 
body,  and  so  disposed,  that  the  left  wing  formed  a 
triple  order  of  battle.  The  reason  of  this  disposition 
was,  because  his  right  wing  being  defended  by  the 
works,  it  behooved  him  to  make  his  left  the  stronger, 
that  they  might  be  a  match  for  the  numerous  cavalry 
of  the  enemy ;  for  which  reason  he  had  placed  all 
his  horse  there,  intermixed  with  light-armed  foot ; 
and  as  he  could  not  rely  much  on  them,  had  detached 
the  fifth  legion  to  sustain  them.  The  archers  were 
dispersed  up  and  down  the  field,  but  principally  in  the 
two  wings. 

54.  The  two  armies  thus  facing  one  another  in 
order  of  battle,  with  a  space  of  no  more  than  three 
hundred  paces  between,  continued  so  posted  from 
morning  till  night  without  fighting,  of  which  perhaps 
there  never  was  an  instance  b^efore.  But  when 
Caesar  began  to  retreat  within  his  lines,  suddenly 
all  the  Numidian  and  Getulian  horse  without  bridles, 
who  were  posted  behind  the  enemy’s  army,  made  a 
motion  to  the  right,  and  began  to  approach  Caesar’s 
camp  on  the  mountain ;  while  the  regular  cavalry 
under  Labienus,  continued  in  their  post,  to  keep  our 
legions  in  check.  On  this,  part  of  Caesar’s  cavalry, 
with  the  light-armed  foot,  advancing  hastily,  and 
without  orders,  against  the  Getulians,  and  venturing 
to  pass  the  morass,  found  themselves  unable  to  deal 
with  the  superior  multitude  of  the  enemy ;  and  being 
abandoned  by  the  light-armed  troops,  were  forced 
to  retreat  in  great  disorder,  after  the  loss  of  one 
trooper,  twenty-six  light-armed  foot,  and  many  of 
their  horses  wounded.  Scipio,  overjoyed  at  this 
success,  returned  towards  night  to  his  camp.  But 
as  fortune’s  favours  are  seldom  permanent  to  those 
engaged  in  the  trade  of  war,  the  day  after,  a  party 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


251 


of  horse  sent  by  Cassar  to  Leptius  in  quest  of  pro¬ 
visions,  falling  in  unexpectedly  with  some  Numidian 
and  Getulian  stragglers,  killed  or  made  prisoners 
about  a  hundred  of  them.  Caesar,  meanwhile,  omitted 
not  every  day  to  draw  out  his  men,  and  labour  at  the 
works ;  carrying  a  ditch  and  rampart  quite  across 
the  plain,  to  prevent  the  incursion  of  the  enemy. 
Nor  was  Scipio  less  active  in  forwarding  his  works, 
and  securing  his  communication  with  the  mountain. 
Thus  both  generals  were  busied  about  their  in- 
trenchments  ;  yet  seldom  a  day  passed  without  some 
skirmish  between  the  cavalry. 

55.  In  tlie  mean  time.  Varus,  on  notice  that  the 
seventh  and  eighth  legions  had  sailed  from  Sicily, 
speedily  equipped  the  fleet  he  had  brought  to  winter 
at  Utica;  and  manning  it  with  Getulian  rowers  and 
mariners,  went  out  a  cruising,  and  came  before 
Adruraetum  with  fifty-five  ships.  Caesar,  who  knew 
nothing  of  his  arrival,  sent  L.  Cispius,  with  a  squad¬ 
ron  of  twenty-seven  sail,  to  cruise  about  Thapsus, 
for  the  security  of  his  convoys ;  and  likewise  des¬ 
patched  Q.  Aquila  to  Adrumetum,  with  thirteen 
galleys,  on  the  same  errand.  Cispius  soon  reached 
the  station  appointed  to  him  ;  but  Aquila,  being 
attacked  by  a  storm,  could  not  double  the  cape, 
which  obliged  him  to  put  into  a  creek  at  some  dis 
tance,  that  afforded  convenient  shelter.  The  rest 
of  the  fleet  anchored  before  Leptis,  where  the 
mariners  went  on  shore,  some  to  refresh  themselves, 
others  to  buy  provisions  in  the  towns,  and  left  their 
ships  quite  defenceless.  Varus,  having  notice  of 
this  from  the  deserters,  and  resolving  to  take  advan¬ 
tage  of  the  enemy’s  negligence,  left  Adrumetum 
about  nine  at  night ;  and  arriving  early  next  morning 
with  his  whole  fleet  before  Leptis,  burned  all  the 
transports  that  were  out  at  sea,  and  took  without 
opposition  two  five-benched  galleys,  in  which  were 
none  to  defend  them. 

56.  Caesar  had  an  account  brought  him  of  this  un- 


252 


IfflRTIUs’s  COMMENTARIES. 


lucky  accident  as  he  was  inspecting  the  works  of 
his  camp.  Whereon,  he  immediately  took  horse, 
went  full  speed  to  Leptis,  which  was  but  two  leagues 
distant,  and  going  on  board  a  brigantine,  ordered  all 
the  ships  in  the  port  to  follow  him,  and,  in  this  manner^ 
put  to  sea.  He  soon  came  up  with  Aquila,  whom 
he  found  dismayed  and  terrified  at  the  number  of 
ships  he  had  to  oppose  ;  and  continuing  his  course, 
began  to  pursue  the  enemy’s  fleet.  Meantime  V arus, 
astonished  at  Caesar’s  boldness  and  despatch,  tacked 
about  with  his  whole  fleet,  and  made  the  best  of  his 
way  for  Adrumetum :  but  Caesar,  after  four  miles’ 
sail,  came  up  with  him,  recovered  one  of  his  galleys, 
with  the  crew  and  a  hundred  and  thirty  men  left  to 
guard  her ;  and  took  a  three-benched  galley  belonging 
to  the  enemy,  with  all  the  soldiers  and  mariners  on 
board.  The  rest  of  the  fleet  doubled  the  cape,  and 
made  the  port  of  Adrumetum.  Caesar  could  not 
double  the  cape  with  the  same  wind ;  but  keeping 
the  sea  all  night,  appeared  early  next  morning  be¬ 
fore  Adrumetum.  He  set  fire  to  all  the  transports 
without  the  haven ;  took  what  galleys  he  found  there, 
or  forced  them  into  the  harbour ;  and  having  waited 
some  time  to  offer  the  enemy  battle,  returned  again 
to  his  camp.  On  board  the  ship  he  had  taken  was 
P.  Vestrius,  a  Roman  knight,  and  P.  Ligarius  Afra- 
nius,  the  same  who  had  prosecuted  the  war  against 
him  in  Spain,  and  who,  instead  of  acknowledging 
the  conqueror’s  generosity,  in  granting  him  his 
liberty,  had  joined  Pompey  in  Greece  ;  and  after  the 
battle  of  Pharsalia,  had  gone  into  Africa  to  Varus, 
there  to  continue  in  the  service  of  the  same  cause. 
Csesar,  to  punish  his  perfidy  and  breach  of  oath, 
gave  immediate  orders  for  his  execution :  but  he 
pardoned  P.  Vestrius,  because  his  brother  had  paid 
his  ransom  at  Rome ;  and  he  made  it  appear,  that 
being  taken  in  Nasidius’  fleet,  and  condemned  to 
die.  Varus  had  saved  his  life,  since  which  no  oppor¬ 
tunity  had  offered  of  making  his  escape. 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


253 


57.  It  is  usual  for  the  people  of  Africa  to  deposite 
their  corn  privately  in  vaults,  under  ground,  to  se¬ 
cure  it  in  time  of  war,  and  guard  it  from  the  sudden 
incursions  of  an  enemy.  Caesar,  having  intelligence 
of  this  from  a  spy,  drew  out  two  legions,  with  a 
party  of  cavalry,  at  midnight,  and  sent  them  about 
ten  miles  off,  whence  they  returned,  loaded  with 
corn,  to  the  camp.  Labienus,  being  informed  of  it, 
marched  about  seven  miles,  through  the  mountains 
Caesar  had  passed  the  day  before,  and  there  encamped 
wtth  two  legions ;  where  expecting  that  Caesar 
would  often  come  the  same  way  in  quest  of  corn, 
he  daily  lay  in  ambush,  with  a  great  body  of  horse 
and  light-armed  foot.  Caesar,  having  notice  of  this 
from  the  deserters,  suffered  not  a  day  to  pass,  till 
the  enemy,  by  repeating  the  practice  often,  had 
abated  a  little  of  their  circumspection.  Then  issuing 
unexpectedly  one  morning,  by  the  Decuman  port, 
with  eight  veteran  legions,  and  a  party  of  horse,  he 
ordered  the  cavalry  to  march  before ;  who  coming 
suddenly  on  the  enemy’s  light-armed  foot,  that  lay 
in  ambush  among  the  valleys,  slew  about  five  hun¬ 
dred,  and  put  the  rest  to  flight.  Meantime  Labienus 
advanced,  with  all  his  cavalry,  to  support  the  run¬ 
aways,  and  was  on  the  point  of  overpowering  our 
small  party  with  his  numbers,  when  suddenly  Caesar 
appeared  with  the  legions,  in  order  of  battle.  This 
sight  checked  the  ardour  of  Labienus,  who.  thought 
proper  to  sound  a  retreat.  The  day  after,  Juba 
ordered  all  the  Numidians  who  had  deserted  their 
post  and  fled  to  their  camp,  to  be  crucified. 

58.  Meanwhile  Caesar,  being  straitened  for  want 
of  corn,  recalled  all  his  forces  to  the  camp ;  and 
having  left  garrisons  at  Leptis,  Ruspina,.and  Acilla, 
ordered  Cispius  and  Aquila  to  cruise  with  their  fleets, 
the  one  before  Adrumetum  the  other  before  Thap- 
sus,  and  set  fire  to  his  camp  at  Uzita,  he  set  out,  in 
order  of  battle,  at  three  in  the  morning,  disposed  his 
baggage  in  the  left,  and  came  to  Agar,  a  town  that 

CiES,  VoL.  II. — Y 


254 


HIRTIUs’s  COMMENTARIES. 


had  been  often  vigorously  attacked  by  the  Getulians, 
and  as  valiantly  defended  by  the  inhabitants.  There 
encamping  in  the  plain  before  the  town,  he  went, 
with  part  of  his  army,  round  the  country  in  quest 
of  provisions ;  and  having  found  store  of  barley, 
oil,  wine,  and  tigs,  with  a  small  quantity  of  wheat, 
after  allowing  the  troops  some  time  to  refresh  them¬ 
selves,  he  returned  to  his  camp.  Scipio  meanwhile 
hearing  of  Caesar’s  departure,  followed  him  along 
the  hills,  with  all  his  forces,  and  posted  himself 
about  six  miles  off,  in  three  different  camps. 

59.  The  town  of  Zeta,  lying  on  Scipio’s  side  of 
the  country,  was  not  above  ten  miles  from  his  camp , 
but  might  be  about  eighteen  from  that  of  Caesar. 
Scipio  had  sent  two  legions  thither  to  forage  ;  which 
Caesar  having  intelligence  of  from  a  deserter,  re¬ 
moved  his  camp  from  the  plain  to  a  hill,  for  the 
greater  security ;  and  leaving  some  troops  to  guard 
it,  marched  at  three  in  the  morning,  with  the  rest 
of  his  forces,  passed  the  enemy’s  camp,  and  pos¬ 
sessed  himself  of  the  town.  Scipio’s  legions  were 
gone  further  into  the  country  to  forage ;  against 
whom  setting  out  immediately,  he  found  the  whole 
army  come  up  to  their  assistance,  which  obliged  him 
to  give  over  the  pursuit.  He  took,  on  this  occasion, 
C.  Mutius  Reginus,  a  Roman  knight,  Scipio’s  intimate 
friend,  and  governor  of  the  town ;  also  P.  Atrius,  a 
Roman  knight  likewise,  of  the  province  of  Utica, 
with  twenty-two  camels  belonging  to  king  Juba. 
Then  leaving  a  garrison  in  the  place,  under  the 
command  of  Oppius,  his  lieutenant,  he  set  out  on 
his  return  to  his  own  camp. 

60.  As  he  drew  near  Scipio’s  camp,  by  which  he 
was  necessitated  to  pass,  Labienus  and  Afranius, 
who  lay  in  ambuscade  among  the  nearest  hills,  with 
ail  their  cavalry  and  light-armed  infantry,  started  up 
and  attacked  his  rear.  Caesar,  detaching  his  cavalry 
to  receive  their  charge,  ordered  the  legions  to  throw 
.all  their  baggage  into  a  heap,  and  face  about  on  the 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


255 


enemy.  No  sooner  was  this  order  executed,  than 
on  the  first  charge  of  the  legions,  the  enemy’s  horse 
and  light-armed  foot  began  to  give  way,  and  were, 
with  incredible  ease,  driven  from  the  higher  ground. 
But  when  Caesar,  imagining  them  sufficiently  de¬ 
terred  from  any  further  attempts,  began  to  pursue 
his  march,  they  again  issued  from  the  hills  ;  and  the 
Numidians,  with  the  light-armed  infantry,  who  are 
wonderfully  nimble,  and  accustom  themselves  to 
fight  intermixed  with  the  horse,  with  whom  they 
keep  an  equal  pace  either  in  advancing  or  retiring, 
fell  a  second  time  on  our  foot.  As  they  repeated 
this  often,  pressing  on  our  rear  when  we  marched, 
and  retiring  when  we  endeavoured  to  engage,  always 
keeping  at  a  certain  distance,  and  with  singular  care 
avoiding  a  close  fight,  as  holding  it  enough  to  wound 
us  with  their  darts ;  Caesar  plainly  saw  that  their 
whole  aim  was,  to  oblige  him  to  encamp  in  that 
place,  where  no  water  was  to  be  had ;  that  his  sol¬ 
diers,  who  had  tasted  nothing  from  three  in  the 
morning  till  four  in  the  afternoon,  might  perish  with 
hunger,  and  the  cattle  with  thirst.  Sunset  now  ap¬ 
proached;  when  Caesar,  finding  he  had  not  gained 
a  hundred  paces  complete  in  four  hours,  and  that 
by  keeping  his  cavalry  in  the  rear  he  lost  many 
horse,  ordered  the  legions  to  fall  behind,  and  close  the 
march.  Proceeding  thus,  with  a  slow  and  gentle  pace, 
he  found  the  legions  fitter  to  sustain  the  enemy’s 
charge.  Meantime  the  Numidian  horse,  wheeling 
round  the  hills  to  the  right  and  left,  threatened  to  en¬ 
close  Caesar’s  forces  with  their  numbers,  while  part 
continued  to  harass  his  rear:  and  if  but  three  or 
four  veteran  soldiers  faced  about,  and  darted  their 
javelins  at  the  enemy,  no  less  than  two  thousand  of 
them  would  take  to  flight ;  but  suddenly  rallying, 
returned  to  the  fight,  and  charged  the  legionaries 
with  their  darts.  Thus  Caesar,  one  while  marching 
forward,  one  while  halting,  and  going  on  but  slowly, 
reached  the  camp  safe,  about  seven  that  evening, 


256 


HIRTIUS  S  COMMENTARIES. 


having  only  ten  men  wounded.  Labienus  too  re 
treated  to  his  camp,  after  having  thoroughly  fatigued 
his  troops  with  the  pursuit ;  in  which,  besides  a 
great  number  wounded,  his  loss  amounted  to  about 
three  hundred  men.  And  Scipio  withdrew  his  legions 
and  elephants,  whom,  for  the  greater  terror,  he  had 
ranged  before  his  camp  within  view  of  Caesar’s  army. 

61.  Caesar,  having  such  an  enemy  to  deal  with, 
was  necessitated  to  instruct  his  soldiers,  not  like  a 
general  of  a  veteran  army,  which  had  been  victo¬ 
rious  in  so  many  battles,  but  like  a  fencing-master, 
training  up  his  gladiators, — with  what  foot  they  must 
advance  or  retire,  when  they  were  to  oppose  and 
make  good  their  ground,  when  to  counterfeit  an 
attack ;  at  what  place  and  in  what  manner  to  launch 
their  javelins :  for  the  enemy’s  light-armed  troops 
gave  wonderful  trouble  and  disquiet  to  our  army; 
because  they  not  only  deterred  the  cavalry  from  the 
encounter,  by  killing  their  horses  with  their  javelins, 
but  likewise  wearied  out  the  legionary  soldiers  by 
their  swiftness  ;  for  as  often  as  these  heavy-armed 
troops  advanced  to  attack  them,  they  evaded  the 
danger  by  a  quick  retreat.  This  gave  Caesar  no 
small  trouble ;  because  as  often  as  he  engaged  with 
his  cavalry,  without  being  sustained  by  the  infantry, 
he  found  himself  by  no  means  a  match  for  the  ene¬ 
my’s  horse,  supported  by  their  light-armed  foot :  and 
as  he  had  no  experience  of  the  strength  of  their  le¬ 
gions,  he  foresaw  still  greater  difficulties  when  these 
should  be  united,  as  the  shock  must  then  be  wonder¬ 
ful.  The  number  too  and  size  of  the  elephants  greatly 
increased  the  terror  of  the  soldiers  ;  for  which,  how¬ 
ever,  he  found  a  remedy  in  causing  some  of  those 
animals  to  be  brought  over  from  Italy,  that  his  men 
might  be  accustomed  to  the  sight  of  them,  know 
their  strength  and  courage,  and  in  what  part  of  the 
body  they  were  most  likely  to  be  wounded  :  for  as 
the  elephants  were  covered  with  trappings  and  orna¬ 
ments,  it  was  necessary  to  inform  them  what  parts 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


257 


of  the  body  remained  naked,  that  they  might  direct 
their  darts  thither.  It  was  likewise  needful  to  fa¬ 
miliarize  his  horses  to  the  cry,  smell,  and  figure  of 
these  animals  ;  in  all  which  he  succeeded  to  a  won¬ 
der  :  for  the  soldiers  quickly  came  to  touch  them 
with  their  hands,  and  to  be  sensible  of  their  tardi¬ 
ness  ;  and  the  cavalry  attacked  them  with  blunted 
darts,  and  by  degrees  brought  their  horses  to  endure 
their  presence.  For  these  reasons  already  men¬ 
tioned,  Caesar  was  not  without  his  anxieties,  and 
proceeded  with  more  slowness  and  circumspection 
than  usual,  abating  considerably  of  his  wonted  ex¬ 
pedition  and  celerity.  Nor  ought  we  to  wonder ; 
for  in  Gaul  his  troops  had  been  accustomed  to  figb^ 
in  a  champaign  country,  against  an  open  undesign- 
ing  enemy,  who  despised  artifice,  and  valued  them¬ 
selves  only  on  their  bravery :  but  now  he  was  to 
habituate  his  soldiers  to  the  arts  and  contrivances 
of  a  crafty  enemy,  and  teach  them  what  to  pursue, 
and  what  to  avoid.  The  sooner  therefore  to  instruct 
them  in  these  matters,  he  took  care  not  to  confine 
his  legions  to  one  place  ;  but  under  pretence  of 
foraging,  engaged  them  in  frequent  marches  and 
counter-marches;  knowing  well  that  the  enemy 
would  take  care  not  to  lose  sight  of  him.  Three 
days  after,  he  drew  up  his  forces  with  great  art,  and 
marching  past  Scipio’s  camp,  waited  for  him  in  an 
open  plain ;  but  seeing  that  he  still  declined  a  battle 
he  retreated  to  his  camp  in  the  evening. 

62.  Meantime  ambassadors  arrived  from  the  town 
of  Vacca,  bordering  on  Zeta,  of  which  we  have  ob¬ 
served  Caesar  had  possessed  himself.  They  re¬ 
quested  and  entreated  that  he  would  send  them  a 
garrison,  promising  to  furnish  many  of  the  necessa¬ 
ries  of  war.  At  the  same  time,  by  an  uncommon! 
piece  of  good  fortune  for  Caesar,  a  deserter  informed 
him  that  Juba  had  by  a  quick  march  reached  the 
town,  massacred  the  inhabitants,  and  abandoned  the 
place  itself  to  the  plunder  of  his  soldiers.  Thus 

Y2 


258 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


was  Caesar’s  g-arrison  prevented  from  setting  out, 
and  by  that  means  saved  from  destruction. 

63.  Caesar,  having  reviewed  his  army  the  eigh¬ 
teenth  of  Fei)ruary,  advanced  next  day,  with  all  his 
forces,  five  miles  beyond  his  camp,  and  remained  a 
considerable  time  in  order  of  battle,  two  miles  from 
Scipio’s.  When  he  had  waited  sufficiently  long  to 
invite  the  enemy  to  an  engagement,  finding  them 
still  decline  it,  he  led  back  his  troops.  Next  day  he 
decamped,  and  directed  his  march  towards  Sarsura, 
where  Scipio  had  a  garrison  of  Numidians  and  a 
magazine  of  corn.  Labienus,  being  informed  of  this 
motion,  fell  on  his  rear  with  the  cavalry  and  light¬ 
armed  troops  ;  and  having  made  himself  master  of 
pc^rt  of  the  baggage,  was  encouraged  to  attack  the 
legions  themselves,  believing  they  would  fall  an 
easy  prey,  under  the  load  and  encumbrance  of  a 
march.  But  Caesar,  from  a  foresight  of  what  might 
happen,  had  ordered  three  hundred  men  out  of  each 
legion  to  hold  themselves  in  readiness  for  action. 
These  being  sent  against  Labienus,  he  was  so  terri¬ 
fied  at  their  approach  that  he  shamefully  took  to 
flight,  great  numbers  of  his  men  being  killed  or 
wounded.  The  legionaries  returned  to  their  stand¬ 
ards,  and  pursued  their  march.  Labienus  still  fol¬ 
lowed  us  at  a  distance  along  the  summit  of  the 
mountains,  and  kept  hovering  on  our  right. 

64.  Caesar,  arriving  before  Sarsura,  took  it  in  pres¬ 
ence  of  the  enemy,  who  durst  not  advance  to  it? 
relief ;  and  put  to  the  sword  the  garrison  which  had 
been  left  there  by  Scipio,  under  the  command  of  P. 
Cornelius,  who,  after  a  vigorous  defence,  was  sur¬ 
rounded  and  slain.  Having  given  all  the  corn  in  the 
place  to  the  army,  he  marched  next  day  to  Tisdra, 
where  Considius  was,  with  a  strong  garrison,  and 
his  cohort  of  gladiators.  Caesar,  having  taken  a 
view  of  the  town,  and  being  deterred  from  besieging 
it  for  want  of  corn,  set  out  immediately,  and  after  a 
jnarch  of  four  miles,  encamped  near  a  river.  Here 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


259 


he  staid  about  four  days,  and  then  returned  to  his 
former  camp  at  Agar.  Scipio  did  the  same,  and  re¬ 
treated  to  his  old  quarters. 

65.  Meantime  the  Thabenenses,  a  nation  situated 
in  the  extreme  confines  of  Juba’s  kingdom,  along  the 
seacoast,  and  who  had  been  accustomed  to  live  in 
subjection  to  that  monarch,  having  massacred  the 
garrison  left  there  by  the  king,  sent  deputies  to 
C2esar  to  inform  him  of  what  they  had  done,  and  to 
beg  he  would  take  under  his  protection  a  city  which 
deserved  so  well  of  the  Roman  people.  Caesar,  ap¬ 
proving  their  conduct,  sent  M.  Crispus  the  tribune, 
with  a  cohort,  a  party  of  archers,  and  a  great  num¬ 
ber  of  warlike  engines,  to  charge  himself  with  the 
defence  of  Thabena. 

66.  A  t  the  same  time  the  legionary  soldiers,  who, 
either  on  account  of  sickness,  or  for  other  reasons, 
had  not  been  able  to  come  over  into  Africa  with  the 
rest,  to  the  number  of  four  thousand  foot,  four  hun¬ 
dred  horse,  and  a  thousand  archers  and  slingers, 
now  arrived  all  together.  With  these  and  his 
former  troops  he  advanced  into  a  plain  eight  miles 
distant  from  his  own  camp,  and  four  from  that  of 
Scipio,  where  he  waited  the  enemy  in  order  of 
battle. 

67.  The  town  of  Tegea  was  below  Scipio’s  camp, 
where  he  had  a  garrison  of  four  hundred  horse. 
These  he  drew  up  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  town ; 
and  bringing  forth  his  legions,  formed  them  in  order 
of  battle  on  a  hill  somewhat  lower  than  his  camp, 
and  which  was  about  a  thousand  paces  distant  from 
it.  After  he  had  continued  a  considerable  time  in 
this  posture,  without  offering  to  make  any  attempt, 
Caesar  sent  some  squadrons  of  horse,  supported  by 
his  light-armed  infantry,  archers,  and  slingers,  to 
charge  the  enemy’s  cavalry,  who  were  posted  before 
the  town.  Our  men,  advancing  on  the  spur,  Paci- 
dius  began  to  extend  his  front,  that  he  might  at  once 
surround  and  give  us  a  warm  reception.  On  this, 


260 


HIRTIUS'S  COMMENTARIES 


Caesar  detached  three  hundred  legionaries  to  our  as¬ 
sistance,  while  at  the  same  time  Lahienus  was  con¬ 
tinually  sending  fresh  reinforcements  to  replace 
those  that  were  wounded  or  fatigued.  Our  cavalry, 
who  were  only  four  hundred  in  number,  not  being 
able  to  sustain  the  charge  of  four  thousand,  and 
being  besides  greatly  incommoded  by  the  light¬ 
armed  Numidians,  began  at  last  to  give  ground; 
which  Caesar  observing,  detached  the  other  wing  to 
their  assistance,  who,  joining  those  that  were  like  to 
be  overpowered,  they  fell  in  a  body  on  the  enemy,  put 
them  to  flight,  slew  or  wounded  great  numbers,  pur¬ 
sued  them  three  miles  quite  to  the  mountains,  and 
then  returned  to  their  own  men.  Caesar  continued 
in  order  of  battle  till  four  in  the  afternoon,  and  then 
retreated  to  his  camp  without  the  loss  of  a  man.  In 
this  action  Pacidius  received  a  dangerous  wound  in 
the  head,  and  had  many  of  his  best  officers  either 
killed  or  wounded. 

68.  When  he  found  that  the  enemy  were  by  no 
means  to  be  prevailed  with  to  fight  him  on  equal 
terms,  and  that  he  could  not  encamp  nearer  them 
for  want  of  water,  in  consideration  of  which  alone, 
and  not  from  any  confidence  in  their  numbers,  the 
Africans  had  dared  to  despise  him ;  he  decamped 
the  fourteenth  of  April  at  midnight,  marched  sixteen 
miles  beyond  Agar  to  Thapsus,  where  Virgilius  com¬ 
manded  with  a  strong  garrison,  and  there  fixed  his 
camp.  The  very  first  day  he  began  the  circumval- 
lation,  and  raised  redoubts  in  proper  places,  as  well 
for  his  own  security,  as  to  prevent  any  succours  from 
entering  the  town.  This  step  reduced  Scipio  to  the 
necessity  of  fighting,  to  avoid  the  disgrace  of  aban¬ 
doning  Virgilius  and  the  Thapsitani,  who  had  all  along 
remained  firm  to  his  party:  and  therefore  following 
Caesar  without  delay,  he  posted  himself  in  two  camps, 
eight  miles  from  Thapsus. 

69.  Between  a  morass  and  the  sea  was  a  narrow 
pass  of  about  fifteen  hundred  paces,  by  which  Scipio 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


261 


hoped  to  throw  succours  into  the  place :  but  Caesar, 
from  a  foresight  of  what  might  happen,  had  the  day 
before  raised  a  very  strong  fort  at  the  entrance  of  it, 
where  he  left  a  triple  garrison ;  and  encamping  with 
the  rest  of  his  troops  in  form  of  a  half-moon,  carried 
his  works  round  the  town.  Scipio,  disappointed  of 
his  design,  passed  the  day  and  night  following  a  little 
above  the  morass ;  but  early  next  morning  advanced 
within  a  small  aistance  of  our  fort,  where  he  began 
to  intrench  himself  about  fifteen  hundred  paces  from 
the  sea.  Caesar,  being  informed  of  this,  drew  off 
his  men  from  the  works  ;  and,  leaving  Asprenas,  the 
proconsul,  with  two  legions  to  guard  the  camp  and 
Daggage,  marched  all  the  rest  of  his  forces  with  the 
utmost  expedition  to  the  place  where  the  enemy 
were  posted.  He  left  part  of  the  fleet  before  Thap- 
sus,  and  ordered  the  rest  to  make  as  near  the  shore 
as  possible  towards  the  enemy’s  rear,  observing  the 
signal  he  should  give  them  ;  on  which  they  were  to 
raise  a  sudden  shout,  that  the  enemy,  alarmed  and 
disturbed  by  the  noise  behind  them,  might  be  forced 
to  face  about. 

70.  When  Caesar  came  to  the  place,  he  found 
Scipio’s  army  in  order  of  battle  before  the  intrench- 
ments,  the  elephants  posted  in  the  two  wings,  and 
part  of  the  soldiers  employed  in  fortifying  the  camp. 
On  sight  of  this  disposition  he  drew  up  his  army  in 
three  lines,  placed  the  second  and  tenth  legions  in 
the  right  wing,  the  eighth  and  ninth  in  the  left,  five 
legions  in  the  centre,  covered  his  flanks  with  five 
cohorts  posted  over-against  the  elephants,  disposed 
the  archers  and  slingers  in  the  two  wings,  and  in¬ 
termingled  the  light-armed  troops  with  his  cav¬ 
alry.  He  himself  on  foot  went  from  rank  to  rank 
to  rouse  the  courage  of  the  veterans,  putting  them 
in  mind  of  their  former  bravery,  and  animating  them 
by  his  soothing  address.  He  exhorted  the  new  levies 
to  emulate  the  bravery  of  the  veterans,  and  endeav- 


262  HIRTIUs’s  COMMENTARIES. 

our  by  a  victory  to  attain  the  same  degree  of  glory 
and  renown. 

71.  As  he  ran  from  rank  to  rank,  he  observed  the 
enemy  very  uneasy,  hurrying  from  place  to  place, 
one  while  retiring  behind  the  rampart,  another 
coming  out  again  in  great  tumult  and  confusion. 
As  the  same  was  observed  by  many  others  in  the 
army,  his  lieutenants  and  volunteers  begged  him  to 
give  the  sign  of  battle,  as  the  immortal  gods  prom¬ 
ised  him  a  certain  victory.  While  he  hesitated  with 
himself,  and  strove  to  repress  their  eagerness  and 
desires,  as  being  unwilling  to  yield  to  the  importu¬ 
nity  of  men  whose  duty  it  was  to  wait  his  orders,  on 
a  sudden  a  trumpet  in  the  right  wing,  without  his 
leave,  and  compelled  by  the  soldiers,  sounded  a 
charge.  On  this,  all  the  cohorts  ran  to  battle,  in 
spite  of  the  endeavours  of  the  centurions,  who  strove 
to  restrain  them  by  force,  but  to  no  purpose.  Caesar, 
perceiving  that  the  ardour  of  his  soldiers  would 
admit  of  no  restraint,  giving  good  fortune  for  the 
word,  spurred  on  his  horse,  and  charged  the  enemy’s 
front.  On  the  right  wing  the  archers  and  slingers 
poured  their  javelins  without  intermission  on  the 
elephants,  and  by  the  noise  of  their  slings  and  stones 
so  terrified  these  unruly  animals,  that,  turning  on 
their  own  men,  they  trod  them  down  in  heaps,  and 
rushed  through  the  gates  of  the  camp,  that  were  but 
half-finished.  At  the  same  time  the  Mauritanian 
horse,  who  were  in  the  same  wing  with  the  elephants, 
seeing  themselves  deprived  of  their  assistance,  be¬ 
took  themselves  to  flight.  Whereon  the  legions, 
wheeling  round  the  elephants,  soon  mastered  the 
enemy’s  intrenchments.  Some  few  that  made  re¬ 
sistance  were  slain :  the  rest  fled  with  all  expedition 
to  the  camp  they  had  quitted  the  day  before. 

72.  And  here  we  must  not  omit  taking  notice  of 
the  bravery  of  a  veteran  soldier  of  the  fifth  legion : 
for  when  an  elephant  which  had  been  wounded,  in 
the  left  wing,  and  roused  to  fury  by  the  pain,  ran 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


263 


against  an  unarmed  sutler,  threw  him  under  his  feet, 
and  leaning  on  him  with  his  whole  weight,  brandish¬ 
ing  his  trunk,  and  raising  hideous  cries,  crushed 
him  to  death,  the  soldier  could  not  refrain  from  at¬ 
tacking  the  animal.  The  elephant,  seeing  him  ad¬ 
vance  with  his  javelin  in  his  hand,  quitted  the  dead 
body  of  the  sutler,  and  seizing  him  with  his  trunk, 
wheeled  him  round  in  the  air.  But  the  soldier,  amid 
all  the  danger,  losing  nothing  of  his  courage,  ceased 
not  with  his  sword  to  strike  at  the  elephant’s  trunk ; 
who,  at  last,  overcome  with  the  pain,  quitted  his 
prey,  and  fled  to  the  rest  with  hideous  cries. 

73.  Meanwhile  the  garrison  of  Thapsus,  either 
designing  to  assist  their  friends,  or  abandon  the 
town,  sallied  by  the  gate  next  the  sea,  and  wading 
navel  deep  in  the  water,  endeavoured  to  reach  the 
land;  but  the  servants  and  followers  of  the  camp, 
attacking  them  with  darts  and  stones,  obliged  them 
to  return  again  to  the  town.  Scipio’s  camp  mean¬ 
while  being  forced,  and  his  men  flying  on  all  sides, 
the  legions  instantly  began  the  pursuit,  that  they 
might  have  no  time  to  rally.  When  they  arrived  at 
their  former  camp,  by  means  of  which  they  hoped  to 
defend  themselves,  they  began  to  think  of  choosing 
a  commander,  to  whose  authority  and  orders  they 
might  submit ;  but  finding  none  on  whom  they  could 
rely,  they  threw  down  their  arms,  and  fled  to  Juba’s 
quarter.  This  being  likewise  possessed  by  our  men, 
they  retired  to  a  hill ;  where,  despairing  of  safety, 
they  endeavoured  to  soften  their  enemies,  saluting 
them  by  the  name  of  brethren.  But  this  stood  them 
in  little  stead :  for  the  veterans,  transported  with 
rage  and  anger,  were  not  only  deaf  to  the  cries  of 
their  enemies,  but  even  killed  or  wounded  several 
citizens  of  distinction  in  their  own  army,  whom  they 
upbraided  as  authors  of  the  war.  Of  this  number 
was  Tullius  Rufus,  the  questor,  whom  a  soldier  know¬ 
ingly  ran  through  with  a  javelin ;  and  Pompeius 
Rufus,  who  was  wounded  with  a  sword  in  the  arm, 


264 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


and  would  doubtless  have  been  slain,  had  he  not 
speedily  fled  to  Caesar  for  protection.  This  made 
several  Roman  knights  and  senators  retire  from  the 
battle,  lest  the  soldiers,  who  after  so  signal  a  victory 
assumed  an  unbounded  license,  should  be  induced  by 
the  hopes  of  impunity  to  wreak  their  fury  on  them 
likewise.  In  short,  all  Scipio’s  soldiers,  though  they 
implored  the  protection  of  Caesar,  were  yet,  in  the 
very  sight  of  that  general,  and  amid  his  entreaties 
to  his  men  to  spare  them,  universally,  and  without 
exception,  put  to  the  sword. 

74.  Caesar,  having  made  himself  master  of  the 
enemy’s  three  camps,  killed  ten  thousand  of  them, 
and  put  the  rest  to  flight,  retreated  to  his  own  quar¬ 
ters,  with  the  loss  of  no  more  than  fifty  men,  and  a 
few  wounded.  In  his  way  he  appeared  before  Thap- 
sus,  and  ranged  all  the  elephants  he  had  taken  in  the 
battle,  amounting  to  sixty-four,  with  their  ornaments, 
trappings,  and  castles,  in  full  view  of  the  place.  He 
was  in  hopes,  by  this  evidence  of  his  success,  to  in¬ 
duce  Virgilius  to  a  surrender :  he  even  called  and 
invited  him  to  submit,  reminding  him  of  his  clemency 
and  mildness ;  but  no  answer  being  given,  he  retired 
from  before  the  town.  Next  day,  after  returning 
thanks  to  the  gods,  he  assembled  his  army  before 
Thapsus,  praised  his  soldiers  in  presence  of  the 
inhabitants,  rewarded  the  victorious,  and  from  his  tri¬ 
bunal  extended  his  bounty  to  every  one,  according 
to  their  merit  and  services.  Setting  out  thence  im¬ 
mediately,  he  left  the  proconsul  C.  Rebellius,  with 
three  legions,  to  continue  the  siege,  and  sent  Cn. 
Domitius  with  two  to  invest  Tisdra,  where  Con- 
sidius  commanded.  Then  ordering  M.  Messala  to 
go  before  with  the  cavalry,  he  began  his  march  to 
Utica. 

75.  Scipio’s  cavalry,  who  had  escaped  out  of  the 
battle,  taking  the  road  to  Utica,  arrived  at  Parada ; 
but  being  refused  admittance  by  the  inhabitants,  who 
heard  of  Caesar’s  victory,  they  forced  the  gates, 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


265 


lighted  a  great  fire  in  the  middle  of  the  forum,  and 
threw  all  the  inhabitants  into  it,  without  distinction 
of  age  or  sex,  with  their  effects ;  avenging  in  this 
manner,  by  an  unheard-of  cruelty,  the  affront  they 
had  received.  Thence  they  marched  directly  to 
Utica,  M.  Cato,  some  time  before,  distrusting  the 
inhabitants  of  that  city,  because  of  the  privileges 
granted  them  by  the  Julian  law,  had  disarmed  and 
expelled  the  populace,  obliging  them  to  dwell  with¬ 
out  the  warlike  gate,  in  a  small  camp  environed 
with  a  slight  intrenchment,  round  which  he  had 
planted  guards,  while  at  the  same  time  he  held  the 
senators  under  confinement.  The  cavalry  attacked 
their  camp,  as  knowing  them  to  be  well-wishers 
to  Caesar,  and  to  avenge,  by  their  destruction,  the 
shame  of  their  own  defeat.  But  the  people,  animated 
by  Caesar’s  victory,  repulsed  them  with  stones  and 
clubs :  they  therefore  threw  themselves  into  the 
town,  killed  many  of  the  inhabitants,  and  pillaged 
their  houses,  Cato,  unable  to  prevail  with  them  to 
abstain  from  rapine  and  slaughter,  and  undertake 
the  defence  of  the  town,  as  he  was  not  ignorant 
what  they  aimed  at,  gave  each  a  hundred  sesterces 
to  make  them  quiet.  Sylla  Faustus  did  the  same 
out  of  his  own  money;  and  marching  with  them 
from  Utica,  advanced  into  the  kingdom  of  Juba. 

76.  A  great  many  others  that  had  escaped  out  of 
the  battle,  fled  to  Utica.  These  Cato  assembled, 
with  three  hundred  more  who  had  furnished  Scipio 
with  money  for  carrying  on  the  war,  and  exhorted 
them  to  set  their  slaves  free,  and  in  conjunction 
with  them  defend  the  town.  But  finding  that  though 
part  assembled,  the  rest  were  terrified  and  deter¬ 
mined  to  fly,  he  gave  over  the  attempt,  and  furnished 
them  with  ships  to  facilitate  their  escape.  He  him¬ 
self,  having  settled  all  his  affairs  with  the  utmost 
care,  and  commended  his  children  to  L,  C2esar,  his 
questor,  without  the  least  indication  which  might 
ffive  cause  of  suspicion,  or  any  change  in  his  coun- 

C^a.  VoL.  II.--Z 


266 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


tenance  and  beha-vloiir,  privately  carried  a  sword 
into  his  chamber  when  he  went  to  sleep,  and  stabbed 
himself  with  it.  But  the  wound  not  proving  mortal, 
and  the  noise  of  his  fall  creating  a  suspicion,  a  physi¬ 
cian,  with  some  friends,  broke  into  his  chamber,  and 
endeavoured  to  bind  up  the  wound ;  which  he  no 
sooner  was  sensible  of,  than,  tearing  it  open  again 
with  his  own  hands,  he  expired  with  undaunted  reso¬ 
lution  and  presence  of  mind.  The  Uticans,  though 
they  hated  his  party,  yet,  in  consideration  of  his 
singular  integrity,  his  behaviour,  so  different  from 
that  of  the  other  chiefs,  and  the  wonderful  fortifica¬ 
tions  he  had  directed  to  defend  their  town,  interred 
him  honourably.  L.  Caesar,  that  he  might  procure 
some  advantages  by  his  death,  assembled  the  peo¬ 
ple  ;  and  after  haranguing  them,  exhorted  them  to 
open  their  gates,  and  throw  themselves  on  Caesar’s 
clemency,  from  which  they  had  the  greatest  rea¬ 
son  to  hope  the  best.  This  advice  being  followed, 
he  came  forth  to  meet  Caesar.  Messala,  having 
reached  Utica,  according  to  his  orders,  placed  guards 
at  the  gates. 

77.  Meanwhile  Caesar,  leaving  Thapsus,  came  to 
Usceta,  where  Scipio  had  laid  up  great  store  of  corn, 
arms,  darts,  and  other  warlike  provisions,  under  a 
small  guard.  He  soon  made  himself  master  of  the 
place,  and  marched  directly  to  Adrumetum,  which  he 
entered  without  opposition.  He  took  an  account 
of  the  arms,  provisions,  and  money  in  the  town ;  par¬ 
doned  Q.  Ligarius  and  C.  Considius ;  and  leaving 
Livineius  Regulus  there,  with  one  legion,  set  out  the 
same  day  for  Utica.  L.  Caesar,  meeting  him  by  the 
way,  threw  himself  at  his  feet,  and  only  begged  for 
his  life.  Caesar,  according  to  his  wonted  clemency, 
easily  pardoned  him  ;  as  he  did  likewise  Caecina,  C. 
Ateius,  P.  Atrius,  L.  Colla,  father  and  son,  M.  Ep- 
pius,  M.  Aquinius,  Cato’s  son,  and  the  children  of 
Damasippus.  He  arrived  at  Utica  in  the  evening, 


AFRICAN  WAR.  267 

by  torcb-light,  and  continued  all  that  night  without 
the  town. 

78.  Next  morning  early  he  entered  the  place, 
summoned  an  assembly  of  the  people,  and  thanked 
them  for  the  affection  they  had  shown  to  his  cause. 
At  the  same  time,  he  censured  severely  and  enlarged 
on  the  crime  of  the  Roman  citizens  and  merchants, 
and  the  rest  of  the  three  hundred  who  had  furnished 
Scipio  and  Varus  with  money;  but  concluded  with 
telling  them  that  they  might  show  themselves  with¬ 
out  fear,  as  he  was  determined  to  grant  them  their 
lives,  and  content  himself  with  exposing  their  effects 
to  sale  ;  yet  so,  that  he  would  give  them  notice  when 
their  goods  were  to  be  sold,  and  the  liberty  of  re¬ 
deeming  them  on  payment  of  a  certain  fine.  The 
merchants,  half-dead  with  fear,  and  conscious  that 
they  merited  death,  hearing  on  what  terms  life  was 
offered  them,  greedily  accepted  the  condition,  and 
entreated  Caesar  that  he  would  impose  a  certain  sum 
in  gross  on  all  the  three  hundred.  Accordingly  he 
amerced  them  in  two  hundred  thousand  sesterces, 
to  be  paid  to  the  republic,  at  six  equal  payments, 
within  the  space  of  three  years.  They  all  accepted 
the  condition ;  and,  considering  that  day  as  a  second 
nativity,  joyfully  returned  thanks  to  Caesar. 

79.  Meanwhile  King  Juba,  who  had  escaped  from 
the  battle  with  Petreius,  hiding  himself  all  day  in  the 
villages,  and  travelling  only  by  night,  arrived  at  last 
in  Numidia.  When  he  came  to  Zama,  his  ordinary 
place  of  residence,  where  were  his  wives  and  chil¬ 
dren,  with  all  his  treasures,  and  whatever  he  held 
most  valuable,  and  which  he  had  strongly  fortified 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  inhabitants,  having 
heard  of  Caesar’s  victory,  refused  him  entrance  ;  be¬ 
cause,  on  declaring  war  against  the  Romans,  he  had 
raised  a  mighty  pile  of  wood  in  the  middle  of  the 
forum,  designing,  if  unsuccessful,  to  massacre  all  the 
citizens,  fling  their  bodies  and  effects  on  the  pile, 
then  setting  fire  to  the  mass,  and  throwing  himself 


268  HIRTIUs’s  COMMENTARIES. 

on  it,  destroy  all  without  exception,  wives,  children, 
citizens,  and  treasures,  in  one  general  conflagration. 
After  continuing  a  considerable  time  before  the  gates, 
finding  that  neither  threats  nor  entreaties  would 
avail,  he  at  last  desired  them  to  deliver  him  his 
wives  and  children,  that  he  might  carry  them  along 
with  him.  But  receiving  no  answer,  and  seeing 
them  determined  to  grant  him  nothing,  he  quitted 
the  place,  and  retired  to  one  of  his  country  seats 
with  Petreius  and  a  few  horse. 

80.  Meantime  the  Zamians  sent  ambassadors  to 
Caesar  at  Utica,  to  inform  him  what  they  had  done, 
and  to  request  his  assistance  against  Juba,  who  was 
drawing  his  forces  together  to  attack  them.  They 
assured  him  of  their  submission,  and  resolution  to 
defend  the  town  for  him.  Caesar  commended  the 
ambassadors,  and  sent  them  back  to  acquaint  their 
fellow-citizens  that  he  was  coming  himself  to  their 
relief.  Accordingly,  setting  out  the  next  day  from 
Utica,  with  his  cavalry,  he  directed  his  march  to¬ 
wards  Numidia.  Many  of  the  king’s  generals  met 
him  on  the  way,  and  sued  for  pardon :  to  all  whom 
having  given  a  favourable  hearing,  they  attended 
him  to  Zama.  The  report  of  his  clemency  and  mild¬ 
ness  spreading  into  all  parts,  the  whole  Numidian 
cavalry  flocked  to  him  at  Zama,  and  were  there 
delivered  of  their  fears. 

81.  During  these  transactions  Considius,  who  com¬ 
manded  at  Tisdra,  with  his  own  retinue,  a  garrisor, 
of  Getulians,  and  a  company  of  gladiators,  hearing 
of  the  defeat  of  his  party,  and  terrified  at  the  arrival 
of  Domitius  and  his  legions,  abandoned  the  town ; 
and  privately  withdrawing,  with  a  few  of  the  barba¬ 
rians,  and  all  his  money,  took  his  way  towards  Nu¬ 
midia.  The  Getulians,  to  render  themselves  mas¬ 
ters  of  his  treasure,  murdered  him  by  the  way,  ana 
fled  every  man  where  he  could.  Meantime  C.  Vir 
gilius,  seeing  himself  shut  up  by  sea  and  land,  with 
out  power  of  making  a  defence ;  his  followers  aU 


AFRICAN  WAR. 


269 


slain  or  put  to  flight;  M.  Cato  dead  by  his  own 
hands  at  Utica ;  Juba  despised  and  deserted  by  his 
own  subjects ;  Sabura  and  his  forces  defeated  by 
Sitius  ;  Caesar  received  without  opposition  at  Utica ; 
and  that  of  so  vast  an  army,  nothing  remained  ca¬ 
pable  of  screening  him  or  his  children ;  thought  it 
his  most  prudent  course  to  surrender  himself  and 
the  city  to  the  proconsul  Caninius,  by  whom  he  was 
besieged. 

82.  At  the  same  time  King  Juba,  seeing  himself 
excluded  from  all  the  cities  of  his  kingdom,  and  that 
there  remained  no  hopes  of  safety,  having  supped 
with  Petreius,  proposed  an  engagement,  sword  in 
hand,  that  they  might  die  honourably.  Juba,  as 
being  the  stronger,  easily  got  the  better  of  his  ad¬ 
versary,  and  laid  him  dead  at  his  feet :  but  en¬ 
deavouring  afterward  to  run  himself  through  the 
body,  and  wanting  strength  to  accomplish  it,  he  was 
obliged  to  have  recourse  to  one  of  his  slaves,  and 
by  his  entreaties  prevailed  on  him  to  perform  that 
mournful  office. 

83.  In  the  mean  time  P.  Sitius,  having  defeated  the 
army  of  Sabura,  Juba’s  lieutenant,  and  slain  the 
general,  and  marching  with  a  few  troops  through 
Mauritania,  to  join  Caesar,  chanced  to  fall  in  with 
Faustus  and  Afranius,  who  were  at  the  head  of  the 
party  that  had  plundered  Utica,  amounting  in  all  to 
about  fifteen  hundred  men,  and  designing  to  make 
the  best  of  their  way  to  Spain.  Having  expe¬ 
ditiously  placed  himself  in  ambuscade  during  the 
night,  and  attacking  them  by  daybreak,  he  either 
killed  or  made  them  all  prisoners,  except  a  few  that 
escaped  from  the  van.  Afranius  and  Faustus  were 
taken  among  the  rest,  with  their  wives  and  children : 
but  some  few  days  after,  a  mutiny  arising  among 
the  soldiers,  Faustus  and  Afranius  were  slain.  Cae¬ 
sar  pardoned  Pompeia,  the  wife  of  Faustus,  with  her 
children,  and  permitted  her  the  free  enjoyment  of 
all  her  effects. 

Z  9 


270 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES, 


84.  Meanwhile  Scipio,  with  Damasippus  and  Tor- 
quatus,  and  Plaetorius  Rustianus,  having  embarked 
on  board  some  galleys,  with  a  design  to  make  for  the 
coast  of  Spain,  and  being  long  and  severely  tossed 
by  contrary  winds,  were  at  last  obliged  to  put  into 
the  port  of  Hippo,  where  the  fleet  commanded  by  P. 
Sitius  chanced  at  that  time  to  be.  Scipio’s  vessels, 
which  were  but  small,  and  few  in  number,  were 
easily  surrounded  and  sunk,  by  the  larger  and  more 
numerous  ships  of  Sitius ;  on  which  occasion  Scipio, 
and  all  those  whom  we  have  mentioned  above  as 
having  embarked  with  him,  perished. 

85.  Meanwhile  Cassar  having  exposed  the  king’s 
effects  to  public  sale  at  Zama,  and  confiscated  the 
estates  of  those  who,  though  Roman  citizens,  had 
borne  arms  against  the  republic,  after  conferring 
rewards  on  such  of  the  Zamians  as  had  been  con¬ 
cerned  in  the  design  of  excluding  the  king,  he  abol¬ 
ished  all  the  royal  tribunes,  converted  the  kingdom 
into  a  province,  and  appointing  Crispus  Sallustius 
to  take  charge  of  it,  with  the  title  of  proconsul,  re¬ 
turned  again  to  Utica.  There  he  sold  the  estates  of 
the  officers  that  had  served  under  Juba  and  Petreius  ; 
fined  the  people  of  Thapsus  twenty  thousand  ses¬ 
terces,  and  the  company  of  Roman  merchants  there 
thirty  thousand ;  fined  likewise  the  inhabitants  of 
Adrumetum  in  thirty  thousand,  and  their  company 
in  fifty  thousand ;  but  preserved  the  cities  and  their 
territories  from  insult  and  plunder.  Those  of  Leptis, 
whom  Juba  had  pillaged  some  time  before,  and  who, 
on  complaint  made  to  the  senate  by  their  deputies, 
had  obtained  arbitrators  and  restitution,  were  en¬ 
joined  to  pay  yearly  three  hundred  thousand  pounds 
of  oil :  because,  from  the  beginning  of  the  war,  in 
consequence  of  a  dissension  among  their  chiefs, 
they  had  made  an  alliance  with  the  King  of  Numidia, 
and  supplied  him  with  arms,  soldiers,  and  money. 
The  people  of  Tisdra,  because  of  their  extreme  gov- 


AFRICAN  WAR.  271 

erty,  were  only  condemned  to  pay  annually  a  certain 
quantity  of  corn. 

86.  These  things  settled,  he  embarked  at  Utica  on 
the  thirtieth  of  June,  and  three  days  after  arrived  at 
Carales,  in  Sardinia.  Here  he  condemned  the  Sul- 
citani  in  a  fine  of  one  hundred  thousand  sesterces, 
for  receiving  and  aiding  Nasidius’s  fleet ;  and  instead 
of  a  tenth,  which  was  their  former  assessment,  or¬ 
dered  them  now  to  pay  an  eighth  to  the  public  treas¬ 
ury.  He  likewise  confiscated  the  estates  of  some 
who  had  been  more  active  than  the  rest,  and  weigh¬ 
ing  from  Carales  on  the  twenty-ninth  of  June,  coasted 
along  the  shore,  and  after  a  voyage  of  twenty-eight 
days,  during  which  he  was  several  times  obliged  to 
put  into  port,  by  contrary  winds,  arrived  safe  at 
Rome. 


V 


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SPANISH  WAR. 


.  ’•^.’  ‘*'.S  V 


«.  X., 

■‘'V. 


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■?:.  .  , 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES 


SPANISH  WAR. 

1.  Pharnaces  being  vanquished,  and  Africa  re¬ 
duced,  those  who  escaped  fled  into  Spain,  to  young 
Cn.  Pompey ;  who,  having  got  possession  of  the 
farther  province,  while  Caesar  was  employed  in  dis¬ 
tributing  rewards  in  Italy,  endeavoured  to  strengthen 
himself  by  engaging  the  several  states  to  join  him  : 
and  partly  by  entreaty,  partly  by  force,  soon  drew 
together  a  considerable  army,  with  which  he  began 
to  lay  waste  the  country.  In  this  situation  of  things, 
some  states  voluntarily  sent  him  supplies,  others 
shut  the  gates  of  their  towns  against  him :  of  which, 
if  any  chanced  to  fall  into  his  hands  by  assault,  how 
well  soever  a  citizen  might  have  deserved  of  his 
father,  yet  if  he  was  known  to  be  rich,  some  ground 
of  complaint  was  never  wanting,  under  pretence  of 
which  to  destroy  him,  that  his  estate  might  fall  a 
prey  to  the  soldiers.  Thus  the  enemy,  encouraged 
by  the  spoils  of  the  vanquished,  increased  daily  in 
number  and  strength :  insomuch,  that  the  states  in 
Caesar’s  interest  were  continually  sending  messen¬ 
gers  into  Italy,  to  press  his  immediate  march  to 
their  relief. 

2.  Caesar,  now  a  third  time  dictator,  and  nominated 
also  a  tourth  time  to  the  same  dignity,  hastening, 
with  all  diligence,  into  Spain,  to  put  an  end  to  the 
war,  was  met  on  the  way  by  the  ambassadors  of  Cor- 


276 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


dova,  who  had  deserted  from  the  camp  of  Cn.  Pom^. 
pey.  They  informed  him  that  it  would  be  an  easy 
matter  to  make  himself  master  of  the  town  by  night, 
because  the  enemy  as  yet  knew  nothing  of  his  arri¬ 
val  in  the  province,  the  scouts  sent  out  by  Cn.  Pom- 
pey  to  inform  him  of  Caesar’s  approach  having  been 
all  made  prisoners.  They  alleged  besides  many  more 
other  very  probable  reasons ;  all  which  so  far  wrought 
on  him,  that  he  sent  immediate  advice  of  his  arrival  to 
Q.  Pedius  and  Q.  Fabius  Maximus,  his  lieutenants, 
to  whom  he  had  left  the  command  of  the  troops  in  the 
province,  ordering  them  to  send  him  all  the  cavalry 
they  had  been  able  to  raise.  He  came  up  with  them 
much  sooner  than  they  expected,  and  was  joined  by 
the  cavalry,  according  to  his  desire. 

3.  Sextus  Pompey,  the  brother  of  Cneus,  com¬ 
manded  at  this  time  at  Cordova,  which  was  accounted 
the  capital  of  the  province.  Young  Cneus  Pompey 
himself  was  employed  in  the  siege  of  Ulia,  which 
had  now  lasted  some  months.  The  besieged,  having 
notice  of  Caesar’s  arrival,  sent  deputies  to  him,  who 
passed  unobserved  through  Pompey’s  camp,  and  re¬ 
quested,  with  great  earnestness,  that  he  would  come 
speedily  to  their  relief.  Caesar,  who  was  no  stran¬ 
ger  to  the  merit  of  that  people,  and  their  constant 
attachment  to  the  Romans,  detached  about  nine  at 
night  eleven  cohorts,  with  a  like  number  of  horse, 
under  the  command  of  L.  Julius  Paciecus,  a  good 
officer,  well  known  in  the  province,  and  who  was 
besides  perfectly  acquainted  with  the  country. 
When  he  arrived  at  Pompey’s  quarters,  a  dreadful 
tempest  arising,  attended  with  a  violent  wind,  so 
great  a  darkness  ensued,  that  it  was  difficult  to  dis¬ 
tinguish  even  the  person  next  you.  This  accident 
proved  of  great  advantage  to  Paciecus ;  for  being 
arrived  at  Pompey’s  camp,  he  ordered  the  cavalry  to 
advance  two  by  two,  and  march  directly  through 
the  enemy’s  quarters  to  the  town.  Some  of  their 
guards  calling  to  know  who  passed,  one  of  our 


SPANISH  WAR. 


277 


troopers  bid  them  be  silent,  for  they  were  just  then 
endeavouring  by  stealth  to  approach  the  wall,  in  or¬ 
der  to  get  possession  of  the  town ;  and  partly  by 
this  answer,  partly  by  favour  of  the  tempest,  which 
hindered  the  sentinels  from  examining  things  dili¬ 
gently,  they  were  suffered  to  pass  without  disturb¬ 
ance.  When  they  reached  the  gates,  on  a  signal 
given  they  were  admitted ;  and  both  horse  and  foot 
raising  a  mighty  shout,  after  leaving  some  troops  to 
guard  the  town,  sallied  in  a  body  on  the  enemy’s 
camp ;  who,  having  no  apprehension  of  such  an 
attack,  were  almost  all  like  to  have  been  made  pris¬ 
oners. 

4.  Ulia  being  relieved,  Caesar,  to  draw  Pompey 
from  the  siege,  marched  towards  Cordova ;  sending 
the  cavalry  before,  with  a  select  body  of  heavy¬ 
armed  foot ;  who  as  soon  as  they  came  within  sight 
of  the  place,  got  up  behind  the  troopers,  without 
being  perceived  by  those  of  Cordova.  On  their  ap¬ 
proach  to  the  walls,  the  enemy  sallied  in  great  num¬ 
bers,  to  attack  our  cavalry ;  when  the  infantry,  leap¬ 
ing  down,  fell  on  them  with  such  fury,  that  out  of 
an  almost  infinite  multitude  of  men,  very  few  re¬ 
turned  to  the  town.  This  so  alarmed  Sextus  Pom¬ 
pey,  that  he  immediately  sent  letters  to  his  brother, 
requesting  him  to  come  speedily  to  his  relief,  lest 
Caesar  should  make  himself  master  of  Cordova  be¬ 
fore  his  arrival.  Thus  Cn.  Pompey,  moved  by  his 
brother’s  letters,  quitted  the  siege  of  Ulia,  which 
was  on  the  point  of  surrendering,  and  began  his 
march  towards  Cordova. 

5.  Caesar,  arriving  at  the  river  Baetis,  which  he 
found  too  deep  to  be  forded,  sank  several  baskets 
of  stones  in  it ;  and  raising  a  bridge  on  them,  sup¬ 
ported  by  double  beams,  carried  over  his  forces  in 
three  bodies.  Pompey,  arriving  soon  after  with  his 
troops,  encamped  directly  over-against  him.  Caesar, 
to  cut  off  his  provisions  and  communication  with  the 
town,  ran  a  line  from  his  camp  to  the  bridge.  Pompey 

CiKs.  VoL.  11. — A  a 


278 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


did  the  same ;  insomuch  that  a  struggle  arose  be¬ 
tween  the  two  generals  which  should  first  get  pos¬ 
session  of  the  bridge ;  and  this  daily  brought  on 
small  skirmishes,  in  which  sometimes  the  one, 
sometimes  the  other  party  had  the  better.  At  last,  the 
dispute  becoming  more  general,  they  came  to  a  close 
fight,  though  on  very  disadvantageous  ground ;  for 
both  sides  striving  earnestly  to  obtain  the  bridge, 
they  found  themselves  as  they  approached  strait¬ 
ened  for  want  of  room,  and  extending  themselves 
towards  the  river-side,  many  fell  headlong  from  the 
banks.  Thus  the  loss  was  pretty  equal;  for  on 
either  side  lay  heaps  of  slain :  and  Caesar,  for  many 
days,  used  all  possible  endeavours  to  bring  the 
enemy  to  an  engagement  on  equal  terms,  that  he 
might  bring  the  war  to  a  conclusion  as  soon  as 
possible. 

6.  But  finding  that  they  carefully  avoided  a  battle, 
with  a  view  to  which  chiefly  he  had  quitted  the 
route  of  Ulia,  he  caused  great  fires  to  be  lighted  in 
the  night,  repassed  the  river  with  all  his  forces,  and 
marched  towards  Ategua,  one  of  their  strongest  gar¬ 
risons.  Pompey,  having  notice  of  this  from  the  de¬ 
serters,  retreated  the  same  day  to  Cordova,  by  a 
very  narrow  and  difficult  road,  with  a  great  number 
of  carriages  and  machines  of  war.  Caesar  began 
his  attack  on  Ategua,  and  carried  lines  quite  round 
the  town;  of  which  Pompey  having  intelligence, 
set  out  on  his  march  the  same  day.  But  Caesar  had 
taken  care  beforehand  to  secure  all  the  advantage¬ 
ous  posts,  and  possess  himself  of  the  forts ;  partly 
to  shelter  his  cavalry,  partly  to  post  guards  of  in¬ 
fantry  for  the  defence  of  his  camp.  The  morning 
of  Pompey’s  arrival  was  so  foggy,  that  he  found 
means,  with  some  cohorts  and  troops  of  cavalry,  to 
hem  in  a  party  of  Caesar’s  horse,  and  fell  on  them 
in  such  manner  that  very  few  escaped  slaughter. 

7.  The  following  night  Pompey  set  fire  to  his 
camp,  passed  the  river  Salsus,  and  marching  through 


SPANISH  WAR. 


279 


the  valleys  encamped  on  a  rising  ground,  between 
the  two  towns  of  Ategua  and  Ucubis.  Caesar  mean¬ 
while  continued  his  approaches,  cast  up  a  mount, 
and  brought  forward  his  machines.  The  country  all 
around  is  mountainous,  and  seems  formed  for  war. 
The  river  Salsus  runs  through  the  plains,  and  divides 
them  from  the  mountains,  which  all  lie  on  the  side 
of  Ategua,  at  about  two  miles’  distance  from  the 
river.  Pompey’s  camp  was  on  these  mountains, 
within  view  of  both  the  towns,  but  nearer  to  Ate¬ 
gua;  to  which  he  could  however  send  no  relief, 
though  his  army  consisted  of  thirteen  legions.  Of 
these  he  chiefly  relied  on  four :  two  Spanish  ones, 
which  had  deserted  from  Trebonius;  one  formed 
out  of  the  Roman  colonies  in  those  parts ;  and  a 
fourth  which  he  had  brought  with  him  from  Africa. 
The  rest  were  for  the  most  part  made  up  of  fugi¬ 
tives  and  deserters.  As  to  light-armed  foot  and 
cavalry,  we  far  exceeded  him  both  in  the  number 
and  goodness  of  the  troops. 

8.  But  what  proved  principally  serviceable  to 
Pompey’s  design  of  drawing  out  the  war  into  length 
was  the  nature  of  the  country,  full  of  mountains 
and  extremely  well  adapted  to  encampments ;  for 
almost  the  whole  province  of  Farther  Spain,  though 
of  an  extremely  fertile  soil,  and  abounding  in  springs, 
is  nevertheless  very  difficult  of  access.  Here  too, 
on  account  of  the  frequent  incursions  of  the  natives, 
all  the  places  remote  from  great  towns  are  fortified 
with  towers  and  castles,  covered,  as  in  Africa,  not 
with  tiles,  but  with  earth.  On  these  they  place 
sentinels,  whose  high  situation  commands  an  exten¬ 
sive  view  of  the  country  on  all  sides.  Nay,  the 
greatest  part  of  the  towns  of  this  province  are  built 
on  mountains,  and  places  exceedingly  strong  by  na¬ 
ture,  the  approaches  to  which  are  extremely  difficult. 
Thus  sieges  are  rare  and  hazardous  in  Spain,  it  not 
being  easy  to  reduce  their  towns  by  force,  as  hap^ 
pened  in  the  present  war ;  for  Pompev  having  estab- 


280 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


lished  his  camp  between  Ategua  and  Ucubis,  as  re¬ 
lated  above,  and  within  view  of  both  towns,  Caesar 
found  means  to  possess  himself  of  an  eminence 
very  conveniently  situated,  and  only  about  four 
miles  from  his  own  camp,  on  which  he  built  a  for 
tress. 

9.  Pompey,  who  from  the  nature  of  the  ground 
was  covered  by  the  same  eminence,  and  besides  at 
a  sufficient  distance  from  Caesar’s  quarters,  soon  be¬ 
came  sensible  of  the  importance  of  this  post :  and 
as  Caesar  was  separated  from  it  by  the  river  Salsus, 
he  imagined  that  the  difficulty  of  sending  relief 
would  prevent  his  attempting  any  thing  of  that  kind 
in  its  defence.  Relying  on  this  persuasion,  he  set 
out  about  midnight,  and  attacked  the  fort,  which  had 
been  very  troublesome  to  the  besieged.  The  enemy, 
on  their  approach,  setting  up  a  shout,  discharged 
their  javelins  in  great  numbers,  and  wounded  multi¬ 
tudes  of  our  men :  but  those  in  the  fort  making  a 
vigorous  resistance,  and  despatching  messengers  to 
the  greater  camp  to  inform  Caesar  of  what  had  hap¬ 
pened,  he  hastened  to  their  relief,  with  three  legions. 
His  approach  struck  the  enemy  with  terror :  many 
were  slain,  and  a  great  number  made  prisoners ; 
nay,  multitudes  in  their  flight  threw  away  their 
arms ;  insomuch  that  above  fourscore  shields  were 
found  which  they  had  left  behind  them. 

10.  The  day  after  Arguetius  arrived  from  Italy, 
with  the  cavalry  and  five  standards  taken  from  the 
Saguntines ;  but  was  forced  to  quit  his  post  by  As- 
prenas,  who  likewise  brought  a  reinforcement  from 
Italy  to  Caesar.  The  same  night  Pompey  set  fire  to 
his  camp,  and  drew  towards  Coifiova.  A  king, 
named  Indus,  who  was  bringing  some  troops  to 
Caesar,  with  a  party  of  cavalry,  following  the  pursuit 
of  the  enemy  too  briskly,  was  made  prisoner  and 
slain  by  the  Spanish  legionaries.  Next  day  our 
cavalry  pursued  those  who  were  employed  in  carry¬ 
ing  provisions  from  the  town  to  Pompey’s  camp, 


SPANISH  WAR. 


281 


almost  to  the  very  walls  of  Cordova,  and  took  fifty 
prisoners,  besides  horses.  The  same  day  Q.  Mar- 
cius,  a  military  tribune  in  Pompey’s  army,  deserted 
to  us.  At  midnight  the  besieged  fell  furiously  on 
our  works,  and  by  all  the  methods  they  could  devise 
threw  fire  and  combustible  matter  into  the  trenches. 
When  the  attack  was  ended,  C.  Fundanius,  a  Roman 
knight,  quitted  the  enemy,  and  came  over  to  us. 

11.  Next  day  two  Spanish  legionaries,  who  pre¬ 
tended  they  were  slaves,  were  made  prisoners  by  a 
party  of  our  horse :  but  being  brought  to  the  camp, 
they  were  known  by  the  soldiers,  who  had  formerly 
served  under  Fabius  and  Pedius,  and  deserted  from 
Trebonius,  who  would  grant  no  quarter,  but  massa¬ 
cred  them  immediately.  At  the  same  time,  some 
courtiers,  sent  from  Cordova  to  Pompey,  entering 
our  camp  by  mistake,  were  seized,  had  their  hands 
cut  off,  and  then  were  dismissed.  About  nine  at  night 
the  besieged,  according  to  custom,  spent  a  consider¬ 
able  time  in  casting  fire  and  darts  on  our  soldiers, 
and  wounded  a  great  number  of  men.  At  day¬ 
break  they  sallied  on  the  sixth  legion,  who  were 
busy  at  the  works,  and  began  a  sharp  contest,  in 
which  however  our  men  got  the  better,  though  the 
besieged  had  the  advantage  of  the  higher  ground : 
and  fifty  of  their  horse,  who  had  begun  the  attack, 
being  vigorously  opposed  on  our  side,  notwithstand¬ 
ing  all  the  inconveniences  we  fought  under,  were  at 
length  obliged  to  retire  into  the  town,  with  many 
wounds. 

12.  Next  day  Pompey  began  a  line  from  the  camp 
to  the  river  Salsus  ;  and  a  small  party  of  our  horse, 
being  attacked  by  a  much  greater  body  of  the  ene¬ 
my,  were  driven  from  their  post  with  the  loss  of 
three  of  their  number.  The  same  day,  A.  Valgius, 
the  son  of  a  senator,  whose  brother  was  in  Pompey’s 
camp,  mounted  his  horse  and  went  over  to  the  ene¬ 
my,  leaving  all  his  baggage  behind  him.  A  spy,  be¬ 
longing  to  Pompey’s  second  legion  was  taken  and 

A  a  2 


282 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


slain.  At  the  same  time,  a  bullet  was  shot  into  the 
town,  with  this  inscription :  that  notice  should  be 
given,  by  the  signal  of  a  buckler,  when  Caesar  ad¬ 
vanced  to  storm  the  town.  This  encouraging  some 
to  hope  that  they  might  scale  the  walls  and  possess 
themselves  of  the  town  without  danger,  they  fell 
the  next  day  to  sapping  them,  and  threw  down  a 
considerable  part  of  the  outward  wall.  They  then 
endeavoured  to  mount  the  breach,  but  were  made 
prisoners,  and  afterward  employed  by  the  garrison 
to  make  an  oifer  of  surrendering  the  town  to  Caesar, 
on  condition  he  would  suffer  them  to  march  out 
with  their  baggage.  The  answer  was,  that  it  had 
been  always  his  custom  to  give,  not  accept  of  con¬ 
ditions  ;  which  being  reported  to  the  garrison,  they 
set  up  a  shout,  and  began  to  pour  their  darts  on 
our  men  from  the  whole  circuit  of  the  wall ;  which 
gave  reason  to  believe  that  the  garrison  intended 
that  day  to  make  a  vigorous  sally.  Wherefore,  sur¬ 
rounding  the  town  with  our  troops,  the  conflict  was 
for  some  time  maintained  with  great  violence,  and 
one  of  our  batteries  threw  down  a  tower  belonging 
to  the  enemy,  in  which  were  five  of  their  men  and 
a  boy,  whose  office  it  was  to  observe  the  battery. 

13.  After  this,  Pompey  erected  a  fort  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Salsus,  in  which  he  met  with  no  inter¬ 
ruption  from  our  men,  and  gloried  not  a  little  in  the 
imagination  of  having  possessed  himself  of  a  post 
so  near  us.  Also  the  following  day,  extending  him¬ 
self  in  like  manner  still  farther,  he  came  up  with  our 
out-guard  of  cavalry  ;  and  charging  them  briskly, 
obliged  several  squadrons  and  the  light-armed  foot 
to  give  ground ;  many  of  whom,  by  reason  of  the 
smallness  of  their  numbers,  incapable  of  any  vigor¬ 
ous  opposition,  were  trodden  down  by  the  enemy’s 
horse.  This  passed  within  view  of  both  camps, 
and  not  a  little  animated  the  Pompeians,  to  see  our 
men  pushed  so  far :  but  being  afterward  reinforced 
by  a  party  from  our  camp,  they  faced  about  with  de¬ 
sign  to  renew  the  fight. 


SPANISH  WAR. 


283 


14.  In  all  battles  of  the  horse  this  is  found  to 
hold  :  that  when  the  troopers  dismount  with  design 
to  charge  the  infantry,  the  match  evermore  proves 
unequal,  as  happened  on  the  present  occasion ;  for 
a  select  body  of  the  enemy’s  light-armed  foot  com¬ 
ing  unexpectedly  on  our  horse,  they  alighted  to  sus¬ 
tain  the  charge.  Thus  in  a  very  little  time,  from  a 
horse  it  became  a  foot  skirmish,  and  again  from  a 
foot  changed  to  a  horse  encounter,  in  which  our  men 
were  driven  back  to  their  very  lines  ;  but  being  there 
reinforced,  about  a  hundred  and  twenty-three  of  the 
enemy  were  slain,  several  forced  to  throw  down 
their  arms,  many  wounded,  and  the  rest  pursued 
quite  to  their  camp.  On  our  side,  a  hundred  and 
eleven  men  were  slain,  besides  twelve  foot-soldiers 
and  five  troopers  wounded. 

15.  Towards  the  evening  of  the  same  day,  the 
fight,  as  usual,  was  renewed  before  the  walls ;  and 
the  enemy,  having  thrown  many  darts  and  a  great 
quantity  of  fire  from  the  battlements,  proceeded 
afterward  to  an  action  of  unexampled  cruelty  and 
barbarity :  for  in  the  very  sight  of  our  troops  they 
fell  to  murdering  the  citizens,  and  tumbling  them 
headlong  from  the  walls :  an  instance  of  inhumanity 
of  which  no  parallel  is  to  be  found  in  the  history  of 
the  most  savage  nations. 

16.  When  night  came  on,  Pompey  sent  a  mes¬ 
senger,  unknown  to  us,  to  exhort  the  garrison  to 
make  a  vigorous  sally  about  midnight,  and  set  fire  to 
our  towers  and  mount.  Accordingly,  having  poured 
on  us  a  great  quantity  of  darts  and  fire,  and  de¬ 
stroyed  a  considerable  part  of  the  rampart,  they 
opened  the  gate  which  lay  over-against  and  within 
view  of  Pompey’s  camp,  and  sallied  out  with  all 
their  forces,  carrying  with  them  fascines  to  fill  up 
the  ditch,  hooks  and  fire  to  destroy  and  reduce  to 
ashes  the  barracks  which  the  soldiers  had  built 
mostly  of  reeds  to  defend  them  from  the  winter, 
and  some  silver  and  rich  apparel  to  scatter  among 
the  tents,  that  while  our  men  should  be  employed 


284  HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 

in  securing-  the  plunder,  they  might  fight  their  way 
through  and  escape  to  Poinpey ;  who,  in  expecta¬ 
tion  that  they  would  be  able  to  effect  their  design, 
had  crossed  the  Salsus  with  his  army,  where  he  con¬ 
tinued  all  night  in  order  of  battle,  to  favour  their  re¬ 
treat.  But  though  our  men  had  no  apprehension  of 
this  design,  their  valour  enabled  them  to  frustrate 
the  attempt,  and  repulse  the  enemy  with  many 
wounds.  They  even  made  themselves  masters  of 
the  spoil,  their  arms,  and  some  prisoners,  who  were 
put  to  death  next  day.  At  the  same  time  a  deserter 
from  the  town  informed  us  that  Junius,  who  was 
employed  in  the  mine  when  the  citizens  were  mas¬ 
sacred,  exclaimed  against  it  as  a  cruel  and  barba¬ 
rous  action,  which  ill  suited  the  kind  treatment  they 
had  received,  and  was  a  direct  violation  of  the  laws 
of  hospitality.  He  added  many  things  besides, 
which  made  such  an  impression  on  the  garrison 
that  they  desisted  from  the  massacre. 

17.  The  next  day  Tullius,  a  lieutenant-general, 
accompanied  by  C.  Antonius  of  Lusitania,  came  to 
Caesar,  and  addressed  him  to  this  effect :  “  Would 
to  heaven  I  had  rather  been  one  of  your  soldiers, 
than  a  follower  of  Cn.  Pompey,  and  given  those 
proofs  of  valour  and  constancy  in  obtaining  victo¬ 
ries  for  you,  rather  than  in  suffering  for  him.  The 
only  advantage  we  reap  from  following  his  banners 
are  doleful  applauses ;  being  reduced  to  the  condi¬ 
tion  of  indigent  citizens,  and  by  the  melancholy  fate 
of  our  country  ranked  among  its  enemies  ;  who, 
having  never  shared  with  Pompey  in  his  good  for¬ 
tune,  find  ourselves  yet  involved  in  his  disgrace ; 
and  after  sustaining  the  attack  of  so  many  armed 
legions,  employing  ourselves  day  and  night  in  works 
of  defence,  exposed  to  the  darts  and  swords  of  our 
fellow-citizens ;  vanquished,  deserted  by  Pompey, 
and  compelled  to  give  way  to  the  superior  valour  of 
your  troops,  find  ourselves  at  last  obliged  to  have 
recourse  to  your  clemency,  and  implore  that  you 
will  not  show  yourselves  less  placable  to  fellow- 


SPANISH  WAR. 


285 


citizens  than  you  have  so  often  been  to  foreign  na¬ 
tions.” — “  I  am  ready,”  returned  Caesar,  “  to  show 
the  same  favour  to  citizens  which  vanquished  na¬ 
tions  have  always  received  at  my  hands.” 

18.  The  ambassadors  being  dismissed,  when  they 
arrived  at  the  gate  of  the  town,  Tiberius  Tullius  ob¬ 
serving  that  C.  Antony  did  not  follow  him,  returned 
to  the  gate  and  laid  hold  of  him,  on  which,  drawing 
a  poniard  from  his  breast,  he  wounded  him  in  the 
hand,  and  in  this  condition  they  both  fled  to  Caesar. 
At  the  same  time  the  standard-bearer  of  the  first 
legion  came  over  to  our  camp,  and  reported  that 
the  day  when  the  skirmish  happened  between  the 
horse  no  less  than  thirty-five  of  his  company  fell ; 
but  it  was  not  allowed  to  mention  it  in  Pompey’s 
camp,  or  so  much  as  own  the  loss  of  one  man.  A 
slave,  whose  master  was  in  Caesar's  camp,  and  who 
had  left  his  wife  and  son  in  the  city,  cut  his  master’s 
throat,  and  deceiving  the  guards,  escaped  privately 
to  Pompey’s  camp,  whence,  by  means  of  a  bullet,  on 
which  he  inscribed  his  intelligence,  he  gave  us  no¬ 
tice  of  the  preparations  made  for  the  defence  of  the 
place.  When  we  had  read  the  inscription,  those 
who  were  employed  to  throw  the  bullet  returning 
to  the  city,  two  Lusitanian  brothers  deserted,  and 
informed  us  that  Pompey  in  a  speech  made  to  his 
soldiers  had  said,  “  that  as  he  found  it  impossible  to 
relieve  the  town,  he  was  resolved  to  withdraw  pri¬ 
vately  in  the  night,  and  retire  towards  the  sea;”  to 
which  one  made  answer,  that  it  was  better  to  hazard 
a  battle  than  take  refuge  in  flight ;  for  which  he  was 
immediately  killed.  At  the  same  time  some  of  his 
couriers  were  intercepted,  who  were  endeavouring 
to  get  into  the  town.  Caesar  sent  the  letters  to  the 
inhabitants,  and  one  of  the  messengers  begging  his 
life,  he  granted  it,  with  promise  of  further  reward, 
if  he  would  set  fire  to  the  enemy’s  wooden  turret. 
The  enterprise  was  not  without  difliculty :  he  un¬ 
dertook  it,  however,  but  was  slain  in  the  attempt. 
The  same  night  a  deserter  informed  us  that  Pompey 


286 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


and  Labieniis  were  greatly  offended  at  the  massacre 
of  the  citizens. 

19.  About  nine  at  night  one  of  our  wooden  towers, 
which  had  been  severely  battered  by  the  enemy’s 
engines,  gave  way  as  far  as  the  third  story.  At  the 
same  time  a  sharp  action  happened  near  the  walls, 
and  the  besieged,  assisted  by  a  favourable  wind, 
burnt  the  remaining  part  of  that  tower  and  another. 
_Next  morning  a  matron  threw  herself  from  the  wall, 
and  came  over  to  our  camp,  reporting  that  the  rest 
of  her  family  had  intended  the  same,  but  were  ap¬ 
prehended  and  put  to  death :  likewise  a  letter  was 
thrown  over,  in  which  was  written,  “  L.  Minutius  to 
Caesar :  Pompey  has  abandoned  me :  if  you  will 
grant  me  my  life,  I  promise  to  serve  you  with  the 
same  fidelity  and  attachment  1  have  hitherto  mani¬ 
fested  towards  him.”  At  the  same  time  the  depu¬ 
ties  who  had  been  sent  before  to  Caesar  by  the  gar¬ 
rison,  now  waited  on  him  a  second  time,  offering 
to  deliver  up  the  town  next  day,  on  a  bare  grant 
of  their  lives:  to  which  he  replied,  that  he  was 
Caesar,  and  would  perform  his  word.  Thus  having 
made  himself  master  of  the  place  the  nineteenth  of 
February,  he  was  saluted  emperor  by  the  army. 

20.  Pompey,  being  informed  by  some  deserters 
that  the  town  had  surrendered,  removed  his  camp 
towards  Ucubis,  where  he  began  to  build  redoubts, 
and  secure  himself  with  lines.  Caesar  also  de¬ 
camped  and  drew  near  him.  At  the  same  time  a 
Spanish  legionary  soldier,  deserting  to  our  camp, 
informed  us  that  Pompey  had  assembled  the  people 
of  Ucubis,  and  given  it  them  in  charge  to  inquire 
diligently  who  favoured  his  party,  who  that  of  the 
enemy.  Some  time  after,  the  slave  who,  as  we 
have  related  above,  had  murdered  his  master,  was 
taken  in  a  mine  and  burnt  alive.  About  the  same 
time  eight  Spanish  centurions  came  over  to  Caesar ; 
and  ill  a  skirmish  between  our  cavalry  and  that  of 
the  enemy  we  were  repulsed,  and  some  of  our  light¬ 
armed  foot  wounded.  The  same  night  we  took  four 


SPANISH  WAR. 


287 


of  the  enemy’s  spies.  One,  as  being  a  legionary 
soldier,  was  beheaded,  but  the  other  three,  who 
were  slaves,  were  crucified. 

21.  The  day  following,  some  of  the  enemy’s  cav¬ 
alry  and  light-armed  infantry  deserted  to  us ;  and 
about  eleven  of  their  horse,  falling  on  a  party  of  our 
men  that  were  sent  to  fetch  water,  killed  some,  and 
took  others  prisoners  ;  among  which  last  were  eight 
troopers.  Next  day  Pompey  beheaded  seventy-four 
persons  as  favourers  of  Caesar’s  cause,  ordering  the 
rest  who  lay  under  the  same  suspicion  to  be  carried 
back  to  the  towm,  of  whom  a  hundred  and  twenty 
escaped  to  Caesar. 

22.  Some  time  after,  the  deputies  of  Bursavola, 
whom  Caesar  had  taken  prisoners  in  Ategua,  and 
sent  along  with  his  own  ambassadors  to  their  city, 
to  inform  them  of  the  massacre  of  the  Ateguans, 
and  what  they  had  to  apprehend  from  Pompey,  who 
suffered  his  soldiers  to  murder  their  hosts,  and  com¬ 
mit  all  manner  of  crimes  with  impunity,  arriving  in 
the  town,  none  of  our  deputies,  except  such  as  were 
natives  of  the  place,  durst  enter  the  city,  though 
they  were  all  Roman  knights  and  senators.  But 
after  many  messages  backward  and  forward,  when 
the  deputies  were  on  their  return,  the  garrison  pur¬ 
sued  and  put  them  all  to  the  sword,  except  two  who 
escaped  to  Ctesar,  and  informed  him  of  what  had 
happened.  Some  time  after,  the  Bursavolenses, 
sending  spies  to  Ategua,  to  know  the  truth  of  what 
had  happened,  and  finding  the  report  of  our  deputies 
confirmed,  were  for  stoning  to  death  him  who  had 
been  the  cause  of  the  murder  of  the  deputies,  and 
were  with  difficulty  restrained  from  laying  violent 
hands  on  him,  which  in  the  end  proved  the  occasion 
of  their  own  destruction :  for  having  obtained  leave 
of  the  inhabitants  to  go  in  person  to  Caesar  and  jus¬ 
tify  himself,  he  privately  drew  together  some  troops, 
and  when  he  thought  himself  strong  enough,  returned 
in  the  night,  and  was  treacherously  admitted  into 
the  town;  where  he  made  a  dreadful  massacre  of 


288 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


the  inhabitants,  slew  all  the  leaders  of  the  opposite 
party,  and  reduced  the  place  under  his  obedience. 
Soon  after,  some  slaves  who  had  deserted  informed 
us  that  he  had  sold  all  the  goods  of  the  citizens,  and 
that  Pompey  sutfered  none  of  his  soldiers  to  quit 
the  camp  but  unarmed,  because  since  the  taking  of 
Ategua,  many,  despairing  of  success,  fled  into  Be- 
thuria,  having  given  over  all  expectation  of  victory  ; 
and  that  if  any  deserted  from  our  camp,  they  were 
put  among  the  light-armed  infantry,  whose  pay  was 
only  sixteen  ases  a  day. 

23.  The  day  following  Caesar  removed  his  camp 
nearer  to  Pompey’s,  and  began  to  draw  a  line  to  the 
river  Salsus.  Here,  while  our  men  were  employed 
in  the  work,  some  of  the  enemy  fell  on  us  from  the 
higher  ground,  and  as  we  were  in  no  condition  to 
make  resistance,  wounded  great  numbers,  obliging 
us,  contrary  to  custom,  to  retreat.  This  being  per¬ 
ceived,  two  centurions  of  the  fifth  legion  passed  the 
river,  and  restored  the  battle ;  when  urging  the 
enemy  with  astonishing  bravery,  one  of  them  fell, 
overwhelmed  by  the  multitude  of  darts  discharged 
from  above.  The  other  continued  the  combat  for 
some  time ;  but  seeing  himself  in  danger  of  being 
surrounded,  as  he  was  endeavouring  to  make  good 
his  retreat,  he  stumbled  and  fell.  His  death  being 
known,  the  enemy  flocked  together  in  still  greatei 
numbers,  on  which  our  cavalry  passed  the  river, 
and  drove  them  quite  back  to  their  intrenchments  ; 
but  pursuing  them  with  too  much  heat,  were  sur 
rounded  by  their  cavalry  and  light-armed  foot; 
where,  but  for  the  most  astonishing  efforts  of 
bravery,  they  must  all  unavoidably  have  been  made 
prisoners  :  for  they  were  so  hemmed  in  by  the  ene¬ 
my’s  lines  that  they  wanted  room  to  defend  them¬ 
selves.  Many  were  wounded  on  our  side  in  these 
two  encounters,  and  among  the  rest  Clodius  Aqui- 
tius;  but  as  the  fight  was  carried  on  mostly  at  a 
distance,  only  the  two  centurions,  of  whom  men¬ 
tion  has  been  already  made,  and  whom  the  desir  i 


SPANISH  WAR.  289 

of  dory  rendered  regardless  of  their  own  safety, 
were  killed. 

24.  Next  day  both  parties  withdrawing  from  Sori- 
caria,  we  continued  our  works.  But  Pompey,  ob¬ 
serving  that  our  fort  had  cut  off  his  communication 
with  Aspavia,  which  is  about  five  miles  distant  from 
Ucubis,  judged  it  necessary  to  come  to  a  battle. 
Yet  he  did  not  offer  it  on  equal  terms,  but  chose  to 
draw  up  his  men  on  a  hill,  that  he  might  have  the 
advantage  of  the  higher  ground.  Meanwhile  both 
sides  endeavouring  to  possess  themselves  of  an 
eminence  that  lay  extremely  convenient,  we  at  last 
got  the  better  of  the  Pompeians,  and  drove  them 
from  the  plain.  The  slaughter  was  very  great,  and 
would  have  been  still  greater  had  they  not  been 
protected  by  the  mountain  rather  than  their  valour. 
Night  came  on  very  opportunely  to  favour  their 
escape ;  without  which  our  men,  though  few  in 
number,  would  have  entirely  cut  off  their  retreat. 
Pompey  lost  on  this  occasion  three  hundred  and 
twenty-four  light-armed  foot,  and  about  a  hundred 
and  thirty-eight  legionary  soldiers,  besides  those 
whose  armour  and  spoils  we  carried  off.  Thus  the 
death  of  the  two  centurions,  which  happened  the 
day  before,  was  fully  revenged. 

25.  The  day  after,  Pompey’s  horse  advanced  ac¬ 
cording  to  their  usual  custom  to  our  lines ;  for  only 
the  cavalry  durst  venture  to  draw  up  on  equal 
ground.  They  therefore  began  to  skirmish  with 
our  men  who  were  at  work,  the  legionaries  calling 
out  to  us  at  the  same  time  to  choose  our  field  of 
battle,  with  design  to  make  us  believe  that  they 
desired  nothing  so  much  as  to  come  to  blows.  On 
this  invitation  our  men  quitted  the  eminence  where 
they  were  encamped,  and  advanced  a  great  way  into 
the  plain,  desiring  no  advantage  of  ground.  But 
none  of  the  enemy  had  the  boldness  to  present  them¬ 
selves,  Antistius  Turpio  excepted;  who,  presuming 
on  his  strength,  and  fancying  no  one  on  our  side  a 

Cacs.  Vol.  11. — Bb 


290 


HIRT1US*S  COMMENTARIES. 


match  for  him,  offered  us  defiance.  On  this  ensued 
a  combat  not  unlike  that  recorded  of  Memnon  and 
Achilles;  for  Q.  Pompeius  Niger,  a  Roman  knight, 
born  in  Italy,  quitting  his  rank,  advanced  to  the  en¬ 
counter.  The  fierce  air  of  Antistius  having  engaged 
the  attention  of  all,  the  two  armies  drew  up  to  be 
spectators  of  the  issue  of  this  challenge,  and  ex¬ 
pressed  no  less  impatience  than  if  the  whole  fortune 
of  the  war  had  depended  on  it ;  and  the  wishes  on 
both  sides  for  success  were  equal  to  the  anxiety  and 
concern  each  felt  for  his  own  combatant.  They 
advanced  into  the  plain  with  great  courage,  having 
each  a  resplendent  buckler  of  curious  workmanship. 
And  doubtless  the  combat  would  have  been  soon 
decided,  had  not  some  light-armed  foot,  drawn  up 
near  the  lines,  to  serve  as  a  guard  to  the  camp,  be¬ 
cause  of  the  approach  of  the  enemy’s  horse.  *  *  * 
Our  horse,  in  retreating  to  their  camp,  being  warmly 
pursued  by  the  enemy,  suddenly  faced  about  with 
great  cries ;  which  so  terrified  the  Pompeians  that 
they  immediately  betook  themselves  to  flight,  and 
retreated  to  their  camp  with  the  loss  of  many  of 
their  men. 

26.  C^esar,  to  reward  the  valour  of  the  Cassian 
troop,  presented  them  with  thirteen  thousand  ses¬ 
terces,  distributed  ten  thousand  more  among  the 
light-armed  foot,  and  gave  Cassius  himself  two 
golden  chains.  The  same  day,  A.  Bebius,  C.  Fla¬ 
vius,  and  A.  Trebellius,  Roman  knights  of  Asti, 
with  their  horses  richly  caparisoned  and  adorned 
with  silver,  came  over  to  Caesar,  and  informed  him 
that  all  the  rest  of  the  Roman  knights  in  Pompey’s 
camp  had  like  them  conspired  to  come  and  join  him, 
but  that  a  discovery  being  made  of  their  design  by  a 
slave,  they  had  been  all  seized,  themselves  excepted, 
who  during  the  confusion  found  means  to  escape 
The  same  day  letters  were  intercepted,  sent  by 
Pompey  to  Ursao,  importing,  “  that  hitherto  he  had 
all  the  success  against  the  enemy  he  could  desire, 
and  would  have  ended  the  war  much  sooner  than 


SPANISH  WAR. 


291 


was  expected,  could  he  have  brought  them  to  fight 
him  oil  equal  terms  :  that  he  did  not  think  it  advisa¬ 
ble  to  venture  new-levied  troops  on  a  plain :  that  the 
enemy,  defending  themselves  with  their  lines,  seemed 
inclinable  to  draw  out  the  war  to  length,  investing 
city  after  city,  and  thence  supplying  themselves  with 
provisions :  that  he  would  therefore  endeavour  to 
protect  the  towns  of  his  party,  and  bring  the  war  to 
as  speedy  an  issue  as  possible  :  that  he  would  send 
them  a  reinforcement  of  some  cohorts,  and  made  no 
doubt  of  forcing  C^esar  in  a  short  time  to  an  engage¬ 
ment,  by  cutting  off  his  provisions.” 

27.  Some  time  after,  as  our  men  were  carelessly 
dispersed  about  the  works,  a  few  horse  were  killed, 
who  had  gone  to  a  forest  of  olives  to  fetch  wood. 
Several  slaves  deserted  at  this  time,  and  informed 
us,  that  ever  since  the  action  at  Soritia  on  the 
seventh  of  March,  the  enemy  had  been  under  con¬ 
tinual  alarms,  and  appointed  Attius  Varus  to  guard 
the  lines.  The  same  day  Pompey  decamped,  and 
posted  himself  in  an  olive-wood  over-against  Hispa- 
lis.  Caesar,  before  he  removed,  waited  till  midnight, 
when  the  moon  began  to  appear.  At  his  departure 
he  ordered  fire  to  be  set  to  the  fort  of  Ucubis,  which 
the  enemy  had  abandoned,  and  that  the  whole  army 
should  rendezvous  in  the  greater  camp.  He  after¬ 
ward  laid  siege  to  Ventisponte,  which  surrendered; 
and  marching  thence  to  Carruca,  encamped  over- 
against  Pompey,  who  had  burned  the  city,  because 
the  garrison  refused  to  open  the  gates  to  him.  A 
soldier  who  had  murdered  his  brother  in  the  camp, 
being  intercepted  by  our  men,  was  scourged  and  put 
to  death.  Caesar,  still  pursuing  his  march,  arrived 
in  the  plains  of  Munda,  and  pitched  his  camp  oppo¬ 
site  to  that  of  Pompey. 

28.  Next  day,  as  Caesar  was  preparing  to  set  out 
with  the  army,  notice  was  sent  him  by  his  spies  that 
Pompey  had  been  in  order  of  battle  ever  since  mid¬ 
night.  On  this  intelligence  he  ordered  the  standard 
to  be  erected.  Pomoev  had  taken  this  resolution  in 


292 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


consequence  of  his  letter  to  the  inhabitants  of  Ursao, 
who  were  his  firm  adherents,  in  which  he  told  them 
that  Caesar  refused  to  come  down  into  the  plain, 
because  his  army  consisted  mostly  of  new-levied 
troops.  This  had  greatly  confirmed  the  city  in  its 
allegiance,  which  therefore  serving  as  a  sure  re¬ 
source  behind  him,  he  thought  he  might  hazard  a 
battle  without  danger;  and  the  rather,  as  he  was 
very  advantageously  encamped :  for,  as  we  observed 
before,  this  country  is  full  of  hills,  which  run  in  a 
continued  chain,  without  any  considerable  breaks  or 
hollows. 

29.  But  we  must  by  no  means  omit  an  accident 
which  fell  out  about  this  time.  The  two  camps  were 
divided  from  one  another  by  a  plain  about  five  miles 
in  extent ;  insomuch,  that  Pompey  by  his  situation 
enjoyed  a  double  defence ;  on  one  side,  the  town, 
seated  on  an  eminence ;  on  the  other,  the  nature  of 
the  ground  where  the  camp  stood :  for  across  this 
valley  ran  a  rivulet,  which  rendered  the  approach  of 
the  mountain  extremely  difficult,  because  it  formed 
a  deep  morass  on  the  right.  Caesar  made  no  doubt 
but  the  enemy  would  descend  into  the  plain  and 
come  to  a  battle,  and  his  whole  army  were  of  the 
same  mind  ;  the  rather  because  the  plain  would  give 
their  cavalry  full  room  to  act,  and  the  day  was  so 
serene  and  clear  that  the  gods  seemed  to  have  sent 
it  on  purpose  to  bring  on  an  engagement.  Our  men 
rejoiced  at  the  favourable  opportunity :  some  how¬ 
ever  were  not  altogether  exempt  from  fear,  when 
they  considered  that  their  all  was  at  stake,  and  the 
uncertainty  of  what  might  be  their  fate  an  hour 
after.  He  advanced,  however,  to  the  field  of  battle, 
fully  persuaded  that  the  enemy  would  do  the  same ; 
but  they  durst  not  venture  above  a  mile  from  the 
town,  being  determined  to  shelter  themselves  under 
its  walls.  Our  men  still  continued  before  them  in 
order  of  battle ;  but  although  the  equality  of  the 
ground  sometimes  tempted  them  to  come  and  dispute 
the  victory,  they  nevertheless  still  kept  their  post 


SPANISH  WAR. 


293 


on  the  mountain,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  town. 
We  doubled  our  speed  to  reach  the  rivulet,  without 
their  stirring  from  the  place  where  they  stood. 

30.  Their  army  consisted  of  thirteen  legions :  tho 
cavalry  was  drawn  up  on  the  wings,  with  six  thou¬ 
sand  light-armed  infantry  and  about  the  same  number 
of  auxiliaries.  We  had  only  eighty  heavy-armed 
cohorts,  and  eight  thousand  horse.  When  we  came 
to  the  extremity  of  the  plain,  as  the  ground  was 
very  disadvantageous,  it  would  have  been  dangerous 
for  us  to  advance  farther,  because  the  enemy  were 
ready  to  charge  us  from  the  eminences  :  and  there¬ 
fore,  that  we  might  not  rashly  entangle  ourselves, 
Caesar  had  taken  care  to  mark  beforehand  how  far 
we  might  advance  with  safety.  The  army,  when 
commanded  to  halt,  murmured  greatly,  as  if  they 
had  been  kept  back  from  a  certain  victory.  The 
delay,  however,  served  to  enliven  the  enemy,  who 
fancied  that  our  troops  were  afraid  of  coming  to 
blows.  They  therefore  had  the  boldness  to  advance 
a  little  way,  yet  without  quitting  the  advantage  of 
their  post,  the  approach  to  which  was  extremely 
dangerous.  The  tenth  If^gion,  as  usual,  was  on  the 
right ;  the  third  and  fifth  on  the  left,  with  the  auxil¬ 
iary  troops  and  cavalry.  At  length  the  battle  began 
with  a  shout. 

31.  But  though  our  men  were  superior  to  the 
enemy  in  courage,  they  nevertheless  defended  them¬ 
selves  so  well  by  the  advantage  of  the  higher  ground, 
the  shouts  were  so  loud,  and  the  discharge  of  darts 
on  both  sides  so  great,  that  we  almost  began  to  de¬ 
spair  of  victory ;  for  the  first  onset  and  clamour 
with  which  an  enemy  is  most  apt  to  be  dismayed, 
were  pretty  equal  in  the  present  encounter.  All 
fought  with  equal  valour ;  the  place  was  covered  with 
arrows  and  darts,  and  great  numbers  of  the  enemy 
fell.  W e  have  already  observed  that  the  tenth  legion 
was  on  the  right,  which,  though  not  considerable  for 
the  number  of  men,  was  nevertheless  formidable  on 

B  b  2 


294 


HIRTIUS’s  COMMENTARIES. 


account  of  its  courage ;  and  so  pressed  the  enemy  on 
that  side,  that  they  were  obliged  to  draw  a  legion 
from  the  right  wing  to  reinforce  the  left,  and  prevent 
its  being  taken  in  flank.  On  this  motion,  our  cavalry 
on  the  left  fell  on  Pompey’s  right  wing,  weakened 
by  the  departure  of  the  legion ;  but  they  defended 
themselves  with  so  much  bravery  and  resolution,  as 
to  stand  in  need  of  no  new  troops  to  support  them. 
Meanwhile  the  clashing  of  armour,  mingled  with 
shouts  of  the  combatants,  and  the  groans  of  the 
dying  and  wounded,  terrified  the  new  raised  soldiers ; 
for,  as  Ennius  says,  they  fought  hand  to  hand,  foot 
to  foot,  and  shield  to  shield.  But  though  the  enemy 
fought  with  the  utmost  vigour,  they  were  obliged  to 
give  ground,  and  retire  towards  the  town.  The 
battle  was  fought  on  the  feast  of  Bacchus,  and  the 
Pompeians  were  entirely  routed  and  put  to  flight ; 
insomuch,  that  not  a  man  could  have  escaped,  had 
they  not  sheltered  themselves  in  the  place  whence 
they  advanced  to  the  charge.  The  enemy  lost  on 
this  occasion  upwards  of  thirty  thousand  men,  and 
among  the  rest  Labienus  and  Attius  Varus,  whose 
funeral  obsequies  were  performed  on  the  field  of 
battle.  They  had  likewise  three  thousand  Roman 
knights  killed,  partly  of  Italy,  partly  of  the  province. 
About  a  thousand  were  slain  on  our  side,  partly  foot, 
partly  horse ;  and  five  hundred  wounded.  We  gained 
thirteen  eagles  and  standards,  and  made  seventeen 
officers  prisoners.  Such  was  the  issue  of  the  action. 

32.  The  remains  of  Pompey’s  army  retreating  to 
Munda,  with  design  to  defend  themselves  in  that 
town,  it  became  necessary  to  invest  it.  The  dead 
bodies  of  the  enemy,  heaped  together,  served  instead 
of  a  rampart,  and  their  javelins  and  darts  were  fixed 
up  by  way  of  palisades.  On  these  we  hung  their 
bucklers  to  supply  the  place  of  a  breastwork,  and 
fixing  the  heads  of  the  deceased  on  swords  and  lances, 
planted  them  all  around  the  works,  to  strike  the 
greater  terror  into  the  besieged,  and  keep  awake  in 
them  a  sense  of  our  bravery.  Amid  these  mourn- 


SPANISH  WAR. 


295 


ful  objects  did  they  find  themselves  shut  in,  when 
our  men  began  the  attack,  which  was  managed 
chiefly  by  the  Gauls.  Young  Valerius,  who  had 
escaped  to  Cordova  with  some  horse,  informed  Sex¬ 
tus  Pompey  of  what  had  happened ;  who,  on  receipt 
of  the  mournful  news,  distributing  what  money  he 
had  about  him  to  the  troopers,  left  the  town  about 
nine  at  night,  under  pretence  of  going  to  find  out 
Caesar,  to  treat  of  an  accommodation.  On  the  other 
side,  Cn.  Pompey,  attended  by  a  few  horse  and  foot, 
took  the  road  to  Carteia,  where  his  fleet  lay,  and 
which  was  about  a  hundred  and  seventy  miles  distant 
from  Cordova.  When  he  had  arrived  within  eight 
miles  of  the  place,  he  sent  P.  Calvitius  his  camp- 
marshal  before,  to  fetch  a  litter  to  carry  him  to  the 
town,  because  he  found  himself  out  of  order.  The 
litter  came,  and  when  he  entered  the  town,  those 
of  his  party  waited  on  him  privately,  to  receive  his 
orders  about  the  management  of  the  war.  As  they  as¬ 
sembled  round  the  place  in  great  crowds,  Pompey, 
quitting  his  litter,  put  himself  under  their  protection. 

33.  Caisar,  after  the  battle,  seeing  the  circum- 
vallation  of  Munda  completed,  marched  to  Cordova. 
Those  of  the  enemy  who  had  escaped  the  slaughter, 
possessing  themselves  of  a  bridge,  on  the  approach 
of  our  men  called  out  to  them  with  an  air  of  deri¬ 
sion,  “  What !  we  are  no  more  tnan  a  handful  of  men 
escaped  from  the  battle,  and  shall  we  be  allowed  no 
place  of  retreat  1”  Immediately  they  prepared  to 
defend  the  bridge.  Caesar  passed  the  river  and  en- 
,  camped  on  the  other  side.  Scapula,  who  had  stirred 
up  the  freedmen  to  a  revolt,  escaping  after  the  battle 
to  Cordova,  when  he  found  himself  besieged,  as¬ 
sembled  all  his  followers,  ordered  a  funeral  pile  to 
be  erected,  and  a  magnificent  supper  served  up : 
when,  putting  on  his  richest  dress,  he  distributed 
his  plate  and  ready  money  among  his  domestics, 
supped  cheerfully,  anointed  himself  once  and  again, 
and,  last  of  all,  ordered  one  of  his  freedmen  to  des¬ 
patch  him,  and  another  to  set  fire  to  the  pile. 


296 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


34.  Caesar  had  no  sooner  encamped  before  the 
place  than  a  division  arose  among  the  inhabitants, 
between  those  who  favoured  Caesar  and  those  who 
were  in  the  interest  of  Pompey,  attended  with  so 
rude  a  chimour  that  it  reached  our  camp.  During 
the  contest,  some  legions,  composed  partly  of  fugi¬ 
tives,  partly  of  slaves  manumitted  by  Pompey,  came 
and  surrendered  themselves  to  Caesar.  But  the  thir¬ 
teenth  legion  prepared  to  defend  the  place ;  and 
with  that  view  possessed  themselves  of  the  walls 
and  some  towers,  in  spite  of  all  the  opposition  they 
met  with ;  which  obliged  the  other  party  to  send 
deputies  to  Caesar  for  aid.  On  this,  those  who  had 
escaped  out  of  the  battle  set  fire  to  the  place,  and 
our  men,  entering  at  the  same  time,  slew  about 
twenty-two  thousand  of  them,  besides  those  who 
were  slain  without  the  walls ;  and  thus  became 
masters  of  the  town.  While  Caesar  was  employed 
in  this  siege,  those  who  were  blocked  up  at  Munda 
made  a  sally,  but  were  driven  back  into  the  town 
with  considerable  loss. 

35.  Thence  Caesar  marched  to  Hispalis,  which  sent 
deputies  to  sue  for  pardon,  and  obtained  it.  Though 
the  citizens  assured  him  that  they  were  able  to  de¬ 
fend  the  town  with  their  own  forces,  he  neverthe¬ 
less  thought  proper  to  send  Caninius  his  lieutenant 
thither  with  some  troops,  and  encamped  himself 
before  the  place.  There  was  in  the  town  a  strong 
party  of  Pompeians  ;  who,  displeased  to  see  Caesar’s 
troops  received  within  the  walls,  deputed  secretly 
one  Philo,  a  zealous  partisan  of  Pompey,  and  well 
known  in  Lusitania,  to  beg  assistance  of  Cecilius 
Niger,  surnarned  the  Barbarous,  who  lay  encamped 
near  Lenius,  with  a  strong  army  of  Lusitanians. 
These,  approaching  the  town  towards  night,  got  over 
the  walls,  surprised  the  sentinels  and  garrison,  shut 
the  gates,  and  began  to  defend  the  place. 

36.  During  these  transactions,  deputies  arrived 
from  Carteia  with  accounts  of  their  having  secured 
Pompey ;  hoping  by  this  service  to  atone  for  their 


SPANISH  WAR. 


297 


former  fault  of  shutting  the  gates  against  Caesar. 
Meantime  the  Lusitanians  in  Hispalis  still  continued 
pillaging  the  town,  which,  though  known  to  Caesar, 
did  not  yet  determine  him  to  press  it  too  hard,  lest 
they  should  in  despair  set  fire  to  the  town  and  de¬ 
stroy  the  walls.  It  was  resolved  in  council  to  sufifer 
the  Lusitanians  to  escape  in  the  night  by  a  sally,  yet 
so  that  the  thing  might  not  appear  designed.  In 
this  sally  they  set  fire  to  the  ships  that  were  in  the 
river  Baetis ;  and  while  our  men  were  employed  in 
extinguishing  the  flames,  endeavoured  to  get  off; 
but  being  overtaken  by  the  cavalry,  were  mostly  cut 
to  pieces.  Thence  he  marched  to  Asta,  which  sub¬ 
mitted.  Munda  having  been  now  a  long  while  be¬ 
sieged,  many  of  those  who  had  escaped  out  of  the 
battle,  despairing  of  safety,  surrendered  to  us ;  and 
being  formed  into  a  legion,  conspired  among  them¬ 
selves  that  on  a  signal  given,  the  garrison  should 
sally  out  in  the  night,  while  they  at  the  same  time 
should  begin  a  massacre  in  the  camp.  But  the 
plot  being  discovered,  they  were  next  night,  at  the 
changing  of  the  third  watch,  all  put  to  death  without 
the  rampart. 

37.  The  Carteians,  while  Caesar  was  employed 
in  reducing  the  other  towns  on  his  route,  fell  into  a 
dissension  about  young  Pompey.  There  were  two 
parties  in  the  town ;  one  that  had  sent  the  deputies 
to  Caesar,  and  another  in  the  Pompeian  interest. 
These  last,  prevailing,  seized  the  gates,  and  made  a 
dreadful  slaughter  of  their  adversaries.  Pompey 
himself  was  wounded  in  the  fray ;  but  escaping  to 
his  ships,  fled  with  about  thirty  galleys.  Didius,, 
who  was  at  Cadiz  with  Caesar’s  fleet,  hearing  of 
what  had  happened,  immediately  sailed  in  pursuit 
of  them ;  stationing  at  the  same  time  some  cavalry 
and  infantry  along  the  coast,  to  prevent  his  getting 
off  by  land.  Pompey  had  departed  with  so  much 
precipitation  from  Carteia,  that  he  took  no  time  to 
furnish  himself  with  water ;  which  obliging  him  to 
stop  by  the  way,  Didius  came  up  with  him  after  four 


298  HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 

days’  sailing,  took  some  of  his  ships,  and  burned  the 
rest. 

38.  Poinpey,  with  a  few  followers,  escaped  to  a 
place  strongly  fortified  by  nature ;  of  which  the 
troops  sent  in  pursuit  of  him  having  certain  intelli¬ 
gence  by  their  scouts,  followed  day  and  night.  He 
was  wounded  in  the  shoulder  and  left  leg,  and  had 
besides  strained  his  ankle,  all  which  greatly  retarded 
his  flight,  and  obliged  him  to  make  use  of  a  litter. 
A  Lusitanian  having  discovered  the  place  of  his  re¬ 
treat,  he  was  quickly  surrounded  by  our  cavalry  and 
cohorts.  Seeing  himself  betrayed,  he  took  refuge 
in  a  post  naturally  strong,  and  which  could  easily  be 
defended  by  a  few  men,  because  the  approach  to  it 
was  extremely  difficult.  We  attempted  to  storm  it, 
but  were  repulsed,  and  vigorously  pursued  by  the 
enemy ;  and  meeting  with  no  better  success  after 
several  trials,  we  at  length  resolved  to  lay  siege  to 
the  place,  it  seeming  too  hazardous  to  force  it.  Ac¬ 
cordingly  a  terrace  was  raised,  and  lines  drawn 
round  the  place ;  which  the  enemy  perceiving, 
thought  proper  to  betake  themselves  to  flight. 

39.  Pompey,  as  we  have  observed  above,  being 
lame  and  wounded,  was  in  no  condition  to  make  a 
speedy  retreat ;  and  the  rather,  because  the  place 
was  such  that  he  could  use  neither  horse  nor  litter. 
He  saw  his  people  driven  from  the  fort,  massacred 
on  all  sides,  and  himself  left  without  resource.  In 
this  extremity  he  fled  to  a  cave,  where  he  could  not 
easily  be  discovered,  unless  he  was  betrayed  by  the 
prisoners.  Here  he  was  slain,  and  his  head  brought 
to  Caesar  the  twelfth  of  April,  just  as  he  was  setting 
out  for  Hispalis,  and  afterward  exposed  to  the  view 
of  the  people. 

40.  After  the  death  of  young  Pompey,  Didius, 
proud  of  his  success,  hauled  some  of  his  vessels 
ashore  to  be  refitted,  and  retired  himself  to  a  neigh¬ 
bouring  fort.  The  Lusitaniaiis  who  had  escaped 
from  the  battle  of  Mimda,  rallying  in  great  bodies, 
found  themselves  strong  enough  to  make  head 


SPANISH  WAR. 


299 


against  him.  Tliough  the  preservation  of  the  fleet 
was  what  principally  engaged  his  attention,  he  was 
yet  necessitated  to  make  frequent  sallies,  to  check 
the  insolence  of  the  enemy.  These  daily  skirmishes 
gave  them  an  opportunity  of  projecting  an  ambus¬ 
cade  ;  for  which  purpose  they  divided  their  troops 
into  three  bodies.  Didius  sallied  according  to  custom ; 
when,  on  a  signal  given,  one  of  the  parties  advanced 
to  set  fire  to  the  fleet ;  and  another,  counterfeiting  a 
retreat,  drew  him  insensibly  into  the  ambuscade, 
where  he  was  surrounded  and  slain  with  most  of 
his  followers,  fighting  valiantly.  Some  escaped  in 
boats  which  they  found  on  the  coast ;  others  made 
for  the  galleys  by  swimming ;  and  weighing  anchor, 
stood  out  to  sea.  A  great  many  saved  themselves 
in  this  manner,  but  the  Lusitanians  got  all  the  bag¬ 
gage.  Caesar  meanwhile  returned  from  Gales  to 
Hispalis. 

41.  Fabius  Maximus,  whom  he  had  left  to  continue 
the  siege  of  Munda,  carried  on  the  approaches  with 
great  success :  insomuch  that  the  enemy,  seeing 
themselves  shut  up  on  all  sides^  resolved  to  attempt 
a  sally ;  but  were  repulsed  with  great  loss.  Our  men 
seized  this  opportunity  to  get  possession  of  the  town, 
and  made  all  the  rest  prisoners.  Thence  they  drew 
towards  Ursao,  a  town  exceedingly  strong  both  by 
nature  and  art,  and  capable  of  resisting  an  enemy : 
for  there  is  not  so  much  as  a  rivulet  within  eight 
miles  of  the  place,  nor  any  spring,  but  that  which 
supplies  the  town.  Add  to  all  this,  that  the  wood 
necessary  for  building  towers  and  other  machines 
was  to  be  fetched  from  a  distance  of  six  miles ;  be¬ 
cause  young  Pompey,  to  render  the  siege  more 
difficult,  had  cut  down  all  the  wood  round  the  place ; 
which  obliged  our  men  to  bring  all  the  materials  foi 
carrying  on  the  siege  from  Munda. 

42.  During  these  transactions  at  Munda  and  Ursao, 
Caesar,  who  had  returned  from  Cales  to  Hispalis, 
assembled  the  citizens,  and  made  the  following 
speech :  “  That  when  he  was  advanced  to  the  ques- 


300 


HIRTIUS’S  COMMENTARIES. 


torship,  he  had  chosen  their  province  preferably  to 
all  others,  and  during  his  continuance  in  that  office 
done  them  every  service  in  his  power:  that,  dur¬ 
ing  his  pretorship,  he  had  obtained  for  them  of 
the  senate  the  abolition  of  the  taxes  imposed  by 
Metellus,  declared  himself  their  patron,  procured 
their  deputies  a  hearing  at  Rome,  and  made  himself 
many  enemies  by  undertaking  the  defence  both  of 
their  public  and  private  rights.  In  fine,  that  when 
he  was  consul,  he  had,  though  absent,  rendered  the 
province  all  the  services  in  his  power :  that  instead 
of  making  a  suitable  return  for  so  many  favours, 
they  had  always  discovered  the  utmost  ingratitude, 
both  towards  him  and  the  people  of  Rome ;  as  well 
in  this  last  war  as  the  preceding.  You,”  said  he, 
“  though  no  strangers  to  the  law  of  nations  and  the 
rights  of  Roman  citizens,  have  yet,  like  barbarians, 
often  violated  the  sacred  person  of  Roman  magis¬ 
trates.  You  attempted  in  open  day,  in  the  public 
square,  to  assassinate  Cassius.  You  have  been 
always  such  enemies  to  peace,  that  the  senate  could 
never  suffer  the  province  to  be  without  legions. 
You  take  favours  for  offences,  and  insults  for  bene¬ 
fits,  are  insolent  and  restless  in  peace,  and  cowardly 
and  effeminate  in  war.  Young  Pompey,  though 
only  a  private  citizen,  nay,  a  fugitive,  was  yet  re¬ 
ceived  among  you,  and  suffered  to  assume  the 
ensigns  of  magistracy.  After  putting  many  citizens 
to  death,  you  still  furnished  him  with  forces,  and 
even  urged  him  to  lay  waste  the  country  and  prov¬ 
ince.  Against  whom  do  you  hope  to  be  victorious  1 
Can  you  be  ignorant,  that  on  the  supposition  of  my 
overthrow,  the  people  of  Rome  have  still  ten  legions, 
capable,  not  only  of  making  head  against  you,  but 
of  bringing  the  whole  earth  under  subjection  1”  *  • 


END  OF  C.SSAB. 


Date  Due 


BOSTON  COLLEGE  LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  HEIGHTS  -  , 

CHESTNUT  HILL,  MASS.  r 


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